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 i 
Abstract 
 The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the economic issues in the postal 
reform experiences of New Zealand and Japan. New Zealand’s reforms were 
conducted in the 1980s. Its experience raises questions about what factors were 
important for overcoming resistance to reform. Japan’s case is a current issue, 
raising questions of how likely privatisation may be, what dilutions may occur, and 
what might the post-reform organisation look like.  
 This study charts New Zealand’s reform evolution by supplementing the 
literature with interviews conducted with experts closely tied to the events. Japan’s 
reform is similarly traced to the present day where a simulation model I have 
developed proposes final negotiation outcomes. I argue that New Zealand Post’s 
pre-reform institutional environment was incongruent with efficiency and 
productivity. Reforms created an entirely new institutional environment based on 
neoliberal ideologies, separating governance from ownership and disentangling 
commercial and social objectives. This study shows that resistance was overcome 
by a culmination of implementation speed, scale of reform, carefully drafted 
legislation, and managerial acuity.  
 Japan’s pre-reform environment displays a number of parallels to New 
Zealand’s. However in this case, I argue that prolonged implementation and a 
greater presence of interest groups hamper reform progress and simulation suggests 
only a partial reform where legislation maintains entry barriers, favouring Japan 
Post over private competition. Key reasons in explaining the differences in 
outcomes between the two countries are argued to be differences in political 
ideologies and the strength of reform opposition. The separation of governance and 
ownership for instance, appears to be more distinct in New Zealand than Japan, and 
whilst the New Zealand model focuses upon shareholder wealth maximisation, the 
Japanese case appears to place greater emphasis upon stakeholder interests.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
While there are many determinants of a nation’s economic performance, the 
underlying institutional environment—the rules of the game—are arguably one of 
the major contributors. For instance, policies that restrict trade flows or statutory 
monopolies where there would otherwise be thriving competition are examples of 
constraints that can hamper growth. Similarly, legislation that prevents a healthy 
churning of the labour market can also contribute to stagnation. Although it is 
doubtful that a governing agency would specifically enact institutions designed to 
harm an economy, owing to external changes in society, they may have since 
become obsolete. That is, an incumbent institutional environment, which may have 
once functioned well, is now simply incompatible with the new reality. One way to 
instigate economic reform, and thus promote a return to prosperity, is to conduct an 
‘institutional change’: a fundamental redefinition of the rules and constraints that 
are placed upon organisations and individuals.  
Privatisation can be considered a form of institutional change at an 
organisational level: where once the organisation was beholden to the state, it now 
finds itself in the hands of private ownership with different requirements of 
management. For instance, while acting as a government department, a postal 
agency might be considered a provider of social services and therefore less 
concerned with turning a profit. Under private ownership, shareholders might well 
expect a greater return on their investment. Consequently the manner in which the 
postal service operates would more likely lean towards efficiency and profitability. 
Furthermore, there are often cases that require more than the simple transfer of 
ownership: the underlying regulatory environment must be prepared to allow for 
competitors and market forces. With postal privatisation, the state often was the 
previous sole provider of services through legislative monopoly. Therefore the 
institutions governing the competitive environment must also be addressed in 
addition to the organisation itself.  
Nevertheless, change often meets with resistance. Within any given 
institutional setting, some parties may benefit from the status quo and modifications 
may threaten them. From the examples above, repealing a statutory monopoly or 
liberalising trade laws clearly imposes a competitive threat upon the industry 
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incumbents; relaxed labour laws introduce a degree of risk to job security; and 
postal privatisation raises the possibility of reductions in service levels. Against this 
backdrop of potential losses, interested stakeholders may seek to obstruct change. 
One question that therefore arises is how much dilution or how many concessions 
these ‘resistance forces’ are able to secure and thus lessen the degree of institutional 
change. Another question is how the resistance or obstruction might be overcome. 
Within the setting of institutional change to postal services, there are two 
notable cases: New Zealand and Japan. New Zealand’s case is an historical one, 
Japan’s is a current. The New Zealand case is important as it represents an example 
of a country that found itself in dire economic circumstances and correspondingly 
implemented a broad range of sweeping reforms, enacting them over a very short 
time. Many government enterprises were privatised or corporatised and a number 
of key bills redefined the institutional landscape. New Zealand’s postal services 
also fell under these changes. Given that New Zealand executed such massive 
change within such a relatively narrow period, this presents number of interesting 
questions, including what led to the need to reform; the state of the institutional 
environments before and after the change; and how was it that New Zealand was 
able to overcome resistance to reforms.  
The reason that New Zealand’s experience is significant is because it shows 
that major institutional realignment can be achieved. In Japan, the economy has 
been suffering for many years despite numerous fiscal stimulus packages. The 
failure to coax the economy back to health has led people to ask if the institutional 
environment was a debilitating factor. Correspondingly, the Koizumi 
administration had sought to enact major structural change, one of the central 
components being the Japanese postal service.  
Postal reform is crucial for the Japanese because the organisation is truly 
immense and will have wide-reaching consequences. Japan Post (JP) accounts for 
roughly a quarter of a million full-time workers and many more part-time workers1. 
In addition to postal services, it provides banking and insurance and here we can 
truly begin to gauge the organisation’s scale: it is the single largest buyer of 
Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) and contains the world’s largest accumulation 
of private savings. Reforming an entity of this size or the environment in which it 
conducts business will have a number of far-reaching effects, both at the 
                                                 
1 In Japan, part time workers are known as ‘temporary’ workers. 
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microeconomic and macroeconomic level, and thus highlights the importance of 
the issue.  
Nevertheless, having fostered strong government-business links and 
cooperation as part of JP’s overall development model (Matsuura, Pollitt, Takada, 
& Tanaka, 2003; Tsuru, 2000), there are a number of groups that have an interest 
in JP and their ability to influence government policy is significant - reforming JP 
therefore presents a number of challenges as resistance is organised and entrenched. 
An example of the strength of resistance can be seen in Maclachlan’s work (2004, 
2006) as postmasters, by virtue of connections to powerful lawmakers, defeated 
earlier reform initiatives. Before any institutional change can be executed, the 
reformers must first overcome these opposing elements. 
What this leaves us with is a story that has yet to be concluded. To assess 
how the Japanese reform experience may eventuate, I will develop and employ a 
simulation model of how negotiations between stakeholders might play out and, 
depending on the resistance encountered, offer predictions of the level of 
institutional change. From there, a full comparison with New Zealand’s experience 
can be made, particularly highlighting lessons from New Zealand that may assist 
with Japan’s reforms. The objectives of this thesis are therefore to establish how 
New Zealand was able to overcome reform resistance; use a simulation model to 
examine the likelihood that reform can be implemented in Japan; consider the 
internal consistency of the reform policies predicted by the simulation model; and 
determine whether lessons drawn from New Zealand can help Japan overcome 
reform resistance to improve its reform policies. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The goals for postal reform in both countries bore a number of similarities 
(Campbell & Porges, 2008) and a comparison is therefore useful. The New Zealand 
case highlights the importance of tracing changes in the institutional environment 
and whether they can be replicated in Japan. To help determine whether Japan can 
carry out its own reforms, it is necessary to compare the institutional environments 
in both countries. To achieve this, the following questions need to be addressed: 
1. What was the institutional environment in New Zealand prior to reforms? 
2. What drove reform in New Zealand?  
3. How were reforms implemented and how was resistance to reforms 
overcome? 
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4. How did the new institutional environment compare against the old one? 
The thesis will examine Japan’s experience to date, answering the following 
questions: 
5. What was the institutional environment in Japan prior to reform? 
6. What drove, and continues to drive reform in Japan? 
7. How likely is it that full reforms will be implemented and will the resulting 
environment be internally consistent? 
8. If the Japanese reforms are internally inconsistent, what insights can we 
apply from the New Zealand experience to overcome these problems?  
1.3 Data Analysis 
To answer Questions One through Four, the thesis explores the literature 
surrounding New Zealand’s experience. Knowledge gaps are identified and 
addressed through interviews with subject experts and key personnel involved in 
the process itself. By combining these sources, the key elements of postal reform 
are discussed and the internal consistency of reforms is examined by analysing the 
new structure and institutional environment. 
Questions Five and Six are approached in a similar manner. Beginning with 
a review and synthesis of the literature, the initial institutional environment and 
drive for reform are described. Media reports and interviews I conducted are utilised 
to track reform evolution to the present date. Simulations conducted over the major 
issues are used to estimate JP reform outcomes and the new the institutional 
environment. 
Question Eight is answered by examining the components of the new 
institutional environment, comparing it against the pre-reform environment and the 
goals of the state. Whether New Zealand-style reforms can be applied to Japan will 
depend on the amount of common institutional overlap. In the event that resistance 
forces impede reform progress, lessons from how New Zealand overcame them will 
be examined for potential alternatives.  
1.4 Significance of Study 
Reform is often met with resistance as managerial personnel and workers 
may face threats to job security and customers may be inconvenienced or forced to 
bear higher costs. The New Zealand postal reform literature is rich but does not 
explain how such resistance was overcome; this study addresses the gap by drawing 
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on interviews conducted with subject experts and provides explanations at 
managerial, worker, and customer levels.  
Contributions will also be made to institutional economics as the New 
Zealand chapter provides a case which shows that ownership transferral is not 
absolutely necessary for successful reform providing the institutional environment 
is carefully prepared. This assertion is important as there is debate about whether 
gains from reforms are a result of ownership transferral or competition (Kikeri & 
Nellis, 2004). 
Additionally, studies in institutional change are often conducted in 
retrospect, using past events to plot institutional evolution. The simulation 
developed for this study provides a method of conducting similar research on 
current events, increasing the timeliness of findings.  
The simulation itself also represents a significant contribution as it can be 
used to model the interactions between many players over many issues. The model 
presented in this study is complex, containing over 3,300 calculation centres, 
running 1.2 million equations per iteration. Holding changes in inputs to increments 
of 0.12, the possible number of combinations exceeds 3x1014. Outputs can produce 
some interesting results that at first appear counter-intuitive but once traced 
backwards become clear. The model therefore offers a considerable advantage over 
thought experiments for applications that require a large number of calculations.  
1.5 Grounding in Mainstream Economics 
This thesis draws primarily upon institutional economics (IE). The 
examination of pre- and post-reform contexts falls into the category of institutional 
change, one of the foremost theories discussed within IE literature.  
Other mainstream theories are utilised in answering the research questions. 
Rent seeking acts as the principal guide in determining the incentive structure and 
behavioural patterns of certain stake-holding players and is a useful explicator in 
understanding the actions of some reform opponents. This study also employs 
agency theory in describing how reforms are designed and implemented; differing 
institutional environments in New Zealand and Japan will show that some agency 
mechanisms that operate well under Anglo-American conditions are not as effective 
in a Japanese context. As an example, stock markets adjust a firm’s share price in 
                                                 
2 This application models eight players over seven issues with three input matrices.  
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accordance with the skill of management (Stephen & Backhaus, 2003), but this 
mechanism is undermined in Japan as large shareholders 3  often exhibit stable 
shareholding and a reluctance to sell. 
This study also examines lobbying and its effect upon economic policy. The 
effects on the proposed changes the union of postmasters are able to realise will be, 
in part, the result of successful lobbying. Tracking these changes and simulating 
expected dilutions will thereby be an application of the theory of lobbying. The 
simulation itself is fundamentally based on utility theory and rational choice insofar 
that a player will only act if it increases the utility realisable. 
Moral hazard will also be used to examine some of the actions, both actual 
and potential, taken by players in New Zealand and Japan. The practice of 
amakudari4 in Japan is a moral hazard as it provides incentives for political officials 
to unduly favour certain organisations in exchange for comfortable post-retirement 
positions. The analysis of post-reform JP will employ moral hazard theory to 
examine the internal consistency of reforms and their overall effectiveness.  
1.6 Thesis Structure 
Fundamentally, the thesis is an analysis of two case studies that examine 
issues relating to institutional change relating to postal reform: one from New 
Zealand and one from Japan. I will argue that the processes of change can be 
deconstructed into a number of stages and that these stages are essentially the same 
in both cases. Firstly, the respective country’s initial institutional environment 
creates a range of problems, such as unemployment, inflation, and currency crises. 
These issues then give rise to corrective proposals that are subsequently negotiated 
over. Depending on the amount of resistance encountered in each country, the 
proposals are then implemented to greater or lesser degrees (or even defeated), 
which correspondingly redefines the institutional environment. The greatest 
difference is that while New Zealand’s experience is historical, Japan’s experience 
is ongoing and therefore the negotiation stage of institutional reform must be 
simulated. The simulation model that I develop represents a major contribution of 
the thesis. The resulting post-negotiation institutional environment for Japan is 
consequently dependent on the outcomes of the simulation. The two cases can then 
                                                 
3 Typically Keiretsu networks. 
4 Literally translated as the ‘decent from heaven’ or ‘soft landing’.  
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be compared to establish what factors were or are critical in the respective reforms 
and perhaps whether a New Zealand-style approach can be applied to Japan to assist 
in strengthening reform integrity.  
Nevertheless, before delving into the respective cases, it may be beneficial 
for readers to first have some knowledge of the historical reform precedents in both 
countries. In this regard, readers may be better able to see how postal reforms fit 
into their respective contextual situations and the differing political tendencies. As 
such, Chapter Two provides a brief overview of selected reform history prior to 
postal reform, highlighting some interesting similarities and differences. 
Chapter Three presents a review of the literature relevant to this study. As 
the reform experiences touch on a number of subjects, there are a several strands of 
literature that apply. Firstly, as the thesis contains two separate cases, a brief review 
of case study theory is included. Similarly, by studying institutional change relating 
to postal reform the thesis also draws on institutional economics and privatisation 
theory and these are accordingly discussed. As mentioned previously, the amount 
of resistance brought against a set of reform proposals arguably reduces the total 
level of institutional change. Chapter Three therefore also examines the literature 
that discusses associated difficulties in reform implementation and the forms 
resistance can take. Chapter Four presents the methodology and a discussion of the 
theories needed to generate a model for institutional change. Chapter Four also 
examines the methods used in constructing a simulation model for the Japanese 
negotiation and explains why the chosen approach is preferred. Chapter Five 
describes the New Zealand experience. Chapter Six examines JP, outlining its initial 
state and the evolution of reforms until the present day. Chapter Seven presents the 
actual mechanics of the simulation used to estimate the outcome of Japanese reform 
issues and Chapter Eight describes the results and accompanying sensitivity 
analyses. Chapter Nine outlines the institutional environment following the 
simulation and provides a final comparison with New Zealand to highlight ways to 
improve reform. Chapter Ten offers some final insights and concluding comments. 
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2 Reform History in New Zealand and Japan 
 This chapter briefly discusses reform history in New Zealand and Japan. An 
analysis of New Zealand reform experience will aid in understanding the context of 
JP privatisation and its relevant issues. In New Zealand, structural reforms were 
implemented and the postal service was a relatively small component thereof. In 
Japan, however, it has been said that structural reform hinges upon postal reform as 
Japan Post Bank (JPB) is the world’s largest depository of personal savings (Tsuda, 
2006), forms the core of the Japanese financial sector, and is the largest buyer of 
Japanese public debt (Takenaka, 2007). A comparison of previous specific 
experiences therefore produces some important caveats.  
2.1 New Zealand’s Need to Reform 
 A generally perceived need to reform often results in more concrete action. 
In New Zealand circa 1980 there was a keen sense that radical changes were needed 
to correct structural imbalances (Wood, 1995). Several key factors led to this 
perception. In the 1950s, New Zealand was one of the world’s richest nations per 
capita but this had significantly deteriorated by the 1970s. Growth had slowed to 
almost zero owing to losses in domestic competitiveness and the economy was 
highly protected by an interventionist state (Orr, 1995). Banking and farming were 
highly politicized with farming subsidies and restrictive banking regulations, 
particularly concerning foreign interests (Suppanz, 1998).  
Unemployment and the resultant strain upon the welfare system caused 
public debt to rise sharply (Wood, 1995). Ongoing current account deficits placed 
New Zealand in need of foreign capital and risk premiums rose in response (Orr, 
1995). Matters were further complicated by managed exchange rates and interest 
rate controls. High levels of inflation led to a broad perception that the New Zealand 
dollar was overvalued and reform was needed to correct the discrepancy (Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, 1996). Combined with other imbalances in the macro-
economy, currency speculation, and rigid capital markets, a currency crisis arose 
(Suppanz, 1998).  
Reform was also needed to address the increasingly large informal sector 
compromising monetary policy effectiveness (Suppanz, 1998). Government 
ownership and guarantees, both written and implied, placed tax-payers at risk in the 
event of failure (Suppanz, 1998). Many bank asset portfolios favoured government 
 9 
debt and increasing pressures upon public debt created a degree of instability 
throughout the sector (Hess, 2008). 
 Wood (1995) highlights three major conditions that led to structural change: 
a widely held and acute sense of crisis, a universal perception among leaders that 
no single interest group should be given preference or be immune to reform, and a 
realisation that the problems were largely of New Zealand’s own making and that 
no outside assistance would be forthcoming. 
2.2 Planning and Execution of Reforms  
 The real question was whether to initiate change on a gradual basis or more 
rapidly. The latter occurred; one study labelled them ‘big bang’ reforms (Caprio, 
Ativas, & Hanson, 1993). Designed and executed simultaneously, changes affected 
many parts of the economy, particularly the financial sector, trade and industry, and 
the public sector. Whilst not exhaustive, what follows is a brief discussion of the 
more influential changes. 
2.2.1 The financial sector 
 Reform was conducted in two stages (Suppanz, 1998), the first occurring 
from 1984 to the early 1990s. Some of the changes included floating the New 
Zealand dollar, removing restrictions in foreign currency lending, and a change in 
monetary policy that targeted price stability through inflation reduction (Suppanz, 
1998). Other moves loosened regulations in banking investments, allowed new 
entrants, and removed discrimination against foreign lending institutions (Hess, 
2008). The elimination of interest rate controls, credit ceilings, and ratio 
requirements were also brought in under stage one (Hess, 2008). 
 Stage two financial reforms began in the early 1990s and were designed to 
strengthen the legal framework of the industry (Suppanz, 1998). Most prominent 
was the introduction of measures that replaced internal control mechanisms with 
external disclosure documents (Suppanz, 1998). 
2.2.2 Trade and industry 
 Export taxes, agricultural subsidies, and other forms of governmental 
assistance were phased out from 1984 to 1990 (Orr, 1995). A key objective was to 
reduce the presence of the state in the economy; which was estimated to be involved 
in up to 60% of all economic activity (Wood, 1995). Exposing New Zealand 
businesses to global competition and raising efficiency was another major goal. 
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2.2.3 The public sector 
 These reforms were implemented in the early 1990s and divided into 
separate stages (Dale & Ball, 1996). The major articles of stage one included the 
privatisation and corporatisation of many trading operations, including the postal 
service (Dale & Ball, 1996). These new organisations were assigned unambiguous 
goals of profit maximisation and sale proceeds were used to retire debt (Wood, 
1995). Additionally the government and its support agencies began publishing 
financial reports similar to private companies, including balance sheets and 
statements of financial performance. To facilitate this, the government abandoned 
cash-based accounting in favour of an accrual-based system (Dale & Ball, 1996). 
 Stage two political reforms took the principles of privatisation and applied 
them to the government’s non-trading operations, such as policy advice, social 
services, and law (Dale & Ball, 1996). Ministers were separated from department 
heads, similar to the relationship between a CEO and board of directors. 
Departments were also free to use private-style costings and paid for the use of 
assets the same way as businesses paid interest. Department heads were responsible 
for the production of outputs, the minister being the purchaser. Government 
departments were publically audited. The government sought reforms that would 
produce an environment mirroring the private sector with the accompanying 
competition and transparency. It gave rise to the term ‘government by contract’ 
(Dale & Ball, 1996). 
 Stage three primarily focused upon the adoption of private-style financial 
indicators designed to promote fiscal responsibility and transparency. Government 
debt levels, net worth, risk management practises, and tax stability could now be 
identified, measured, and controlled through a system of open accounting practises 
and disclosure documents (Dale & Ball, 1996). 
2.2.4 The results  
 The reforms greatly changed many parts of the economy; through exposure 
to overseas competition, productivity rose and efficiency improved (Wood, 1995). 
New Zealand ranked 5th in the index of economic freedom (The Heritage 
Foundation, 2009a, 2009b). Government became more transparent, with better asset 
management and reduced operating costs (Dale & Ball, 1996). Nevertheless, 
transition costs were considerable and acute in selected areas. The following is a 
short description of some of the major effects of the reform process. 
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 Stage one financial reforms produced feelings of euphoria within the 
banking industry (Hess, 2008). Without credit allocation controls banks expanded 
into different fields and extended loans into new businesses. The proportion of 
government securities fell as shares and real estate investments rose (Hess, 2008). 
Most of this new lending was private (McNelis & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1992). However, 
inexperience 5  and implicit government guarantees led to questionable risk 
management (Hess, 2008). 
 The Reserve Bank’s explicit goal of price stability (Suppanz, 1998) 
produced a situation where domestic interest rates did not align with global rates as 
monetary policy was tightened to reduce inflation (McNelis & Schmidt-Hebbel, 
1992). Coupled with the deregulation of foreign exchange, this led to an influx of 
foreign capital and subsequent increases in the real exchange rate reduced export 
competitiveness (McNelis & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1992). This result was exacerbated 
by reduced subsidies and assistance (Wood, 1995). Caprio et al. (1993) note that 
further pressure was felt through the global collapse of commodity prices between 
1985 and 1986. Together, these factors produced a balance of payments crisis 
(McNelis & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1992). 
 In 1987 the New Zealand stock market crashed and between 1988-1989 
property losses occurred, resulting in considerable numbers of non-performing 
loans (Hess, 2008). Hess also notes that state owned banks fared worst and the Bank 
of New Zealand6 had to be rescued by the government. Twice.  
 Suppanz (1998) shows that borrowing increased and a wider range of 
instruments deepened the financial system. Monetary policy became more effective, 
due in part to a consolidated industry and less reliance on informal banking (Hess, 
2008). Opening the capital account reduced interest rate volatility (McNelis & 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 1992). By removing regulations that stifled foreign portfolio 
investment, capital was able to respond to changing conditions. However, the risk 
of investing in New Zealand was not removed, but rather displaced; volatility in 
interest rates was transferred to exchange rates (McNelis & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1992). 
Nevertheless, many economists would suggest that stability in the price of credit is 
preferable to stability in the price of domestic currency. 
                                                 
5 Particularly so in state owned banks. 
6 Please note that the “Reserve Bank of New Zealand” is the central bank whilst the “Bank of New 
Zealand” is a commercial one.  
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2.3 Contextualising New Zealand’s Experience 
The state of a country’s pre-reform banks needs to be considered carefully; 
evidence shows that when organisations are tightly regulated, have a large portion 
of government debt and little autonomy, they are susceptible to greater post-reform 
issues (Caprio et al., 1993). Relaxed banking controls are often associated with 
significant loans into private real estate. Financiers whose portfolios have been 
mostly public debt tend to over-expose themselves (Caprio et al., 1993) and this 
occurred in New Zealand (Hess, 2008). Had government also been pursuing 
expansionary policies the results may have been worse.  
 The removal of targeted or directed credit adheres to the recommendations 
of the literature. Governments that concentrate loans on certain industries or firms 
often foster a reliance on external funding, prolonging organisational inefficiency 
(Caprio et al., 1993). National savings are suggested to be only weakly linked to 
interest rates. Greater increases in savings can be attributed to a deepening of the 
financial system, referring to greater numbers of branches, services, and investment 
options (Caprio et al., 1993). Deregulation in New Zealand increased competition 
(Hess, 2008) and banks offer a wider range of products yet New Zealand’s savings 
performance has not greatly improved (Suppanz, 1998). The discrepancy with the 
literature is beyond the scope of this study but would be an interesting project to 
examine. 
Where economies have deregulated, unfavourable economic conditions, 
inexperience, and possibilities of bank collusion may increase real interest rates 
(Caprio et al., 1993), as was the case in Chile and Turkey. In New Zealand, the 
reforms effectively saw simultaneous opening of the capital account, complete 
interest rate deregulation, and an explicit goal of price stability. It is therefore not 
surprising that interest rates remained high to control inflation and exchange rates 
rose as foreign investors sought to capitalise on premium rates.  
Removing discriminatory restrictions on foreign investment is an area 
where New Zealand also conforms to the literature’s recommendations. Apart from 
bringing competition and experience, the domestic business cycle does not have the 
same influence on a foreign bank (Caprio et al., 1993). This can serve to mitigate 
the impacts of unfavourable shifts in macro-economic conditions. 
At a more general level, it has been suggested that reforms should be seen 
as a process, not an event; a continuing cycle of change where readjustment is often 
more effective that a rapid paradigm shift (Caprio et al., 1993). New Zealand’s 
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reforms may have not been optimal but they were implemented where there was 
significant political will and capitalised on opportunities at the time.  
2.4 Reform Literature and the Japanese Experience 
This section summarises the conditions that led to the drive for postal 
privatisation beginning with Japan’s development from the post-war era, which is 
important as it explains in part why there is such a strong political connection to the 
post office. 
Japan’s economic development was largely driven by close ties between the 
state and private companies (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002)7. It was born from a desire 
to catch up with the West, but without as many factor endowments (Child-Hill & 
Fujita, 2000). Natural resource efficiency and cost reduction have since become 
culturally engrained values (Takenaka, 2007).  
Government-private sector links bolstered established values of work ethics, 
social cohesion, and enterprise although they also produced an economy 
characterised by heavy government intervention, protectionist ideals, and managed 
trade (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). Attitudes imposed during the American 
occupation were readily accepted as they were generally extensions of, or 
complemented pre-existing beliefs (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002).  
Employment security was a guiding principle and loyalty to the company 
was a modern expression of traditional notions of fealty. Employment security was 
state-sponsored as many of its actions were (and still are) designed to prevent 
employment falling; private firms who maintained labour inputs during 
unfavourable economic conditions were granted offsetting subsidies (Child-Hill & 
Fujita, 2000). Japan is perhaps better described as a ‘work-fare’ state rather than a 
‘welfare state’. 
Since 1945, Japan’s development model focused upon exports and savings 
(Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000; Hwang & Schaefer, 2002; Takenaka, 2007). Heavily 
encouraged and incentivised, the government enacted many policies and 
regulations to directly raise net exports including subsidies, import restrictions, and 
transferral of resources and capital to favoured industries (Hwang & Schaefer, 
2002). Foreign investment was actively discouraged unless there was a domestic 
partner with a majority shareholding (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). Financial policies 
                                                 
7 This mentality has been cited since the beginning of the Meiji Restoration that began in 1868. 
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promoted savings and exports, including interventions to reduce the value of the 
yen. Public savings were often held within the state-run banking sector to fund 
construction and infrastructure spending (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000).  
By the 1970s, increasing economic waste and government inefficiency led 
to the beginnings of a movement that questioned such heavy intervention. 
Concurrent supply shocks exacerbated concerns (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the Japanese model produced significant growth and also maintained 
a high degree of income equality (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000; Takenaka, 2007). 
Recently however, the economy has become less able to adapt to changing 
conditions and suffers from inertia (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000).  
Another side effect of the model was the ‘dual-economy’ (Katz, 1998). This 
is characterised by one group of international companies who are amongst the most 
competitive, innovative, and efficient organisations in the world, and another group 
of producers who fall behind world standards (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). Insulating 
domestic industries as an explicit matter of policy, together with sponsorship of 
maximum employment, produced an unbalanced model that Japan has not yet been 
able to move away from (Scissors & Foster, 2009). For example, domestic firms 
can only borrow from domestic banks and following the bursting of the economic 
‘bubble’, extension of new credit essentially stopped and many businesses 
collapsed (Takenaka, 2007). 
Despite the severity, most of the ‘bubble’ losses were confined to the 
banking sector (Takenaka, 2007) and even here, massive government intervention 
muted the effects. Hwang and Schaefer (2002) concur, noting that unemployment 
did not rise substantially until only recently. Much of the expenditure was financed 
through government bonds purchased by JPB, where the Japanese citizenry have 
the bulk of their financial assets (Takenaka, 2007). 
2.4.1 Japanese reform experience 
The Japanese approach is more gradual than New Zealand’s (Takenaka, 
2007). Japanese policies are designed to benefit producers over consumers, a 
powerful tool for vote gathering although it impedes reform momentum (Toyama, 
1998). Nevertheless the global movement towards privatisation in the 1980s 
attracted the attention of Japanese regulators, initiating their own programme 
including three public corporations identified for privatisation (Toyama, 1998). 
Toyama also states that politicians with special relations to these corporations 
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resisted the proposals despite the majority of LDP members supporting 
privatisation. Proposals were subsequently diluted, which is unsurprising as 
previous deregulations in Japan have maintained a high degree of government 
control (Takenaka, 2007).  
Poorly conducted initial public offerings also hampered reforms; Toyama 
(1998) shows that initial sales to the public were not accompanied by any special 
incentives, nor were there any employee share schemes, both of which are common 
practices in other countries. A broader shareholder base may therefore dilute funds 
available for distribution through Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme agencies 
and perhaps threaten the solidarity of stable shareholding.  
2.4.1.1 The case of Japan Rail  
 Watanabe (1994) describes the privatisation of Japan Rail (JR), which adds 
perspective to JP. JR was burdened with debt8, had numerous vested interests, and 
opposed any changes to the status quo. Inertia was largely attributed to political 
pressure, unions, and local governments whose efforts diluted proposals and 
hampered implementation. Like JP, JR symbolised traditional employment 
practices: seniority-based pay, lifetime employment, and generous pensions.  
 JR was divided into six regional centres with a nationwide freight service. 
The government retained a share to ensure user interests were upheld and a 
stabilisation fund was established to aid less profitable providers on smaller islands. 
These same provisions would appear again in postal reforms. 
 61,000 of the 276,000 workers were displaced. 20,000 were asked to retire 
with extra benefits and the remaining 41,000 were relocated within three years via 
a settlement company. Other changes included a simplification of titles and 
hierarchy, and the introduction of a merit-based remuneration package9. Departing 
from traditional methods, a system of formal examinations and evaluations was 
introduced to determine ability.  
Following privatisation, the company earned profits and retired debt, 
assisted by the reduction of interest rates and increased passenger numbers. Key 
factors included public intolerance for the old system: service levels were poor, 
prices had risen, and previous reform attempts had been derailed. In-depth media 
coverage also exposed union corruption, destroying their credibility. The 
                                                 
8 So much debt in fact that the organisation could only just keep pace with interest payments. 
9 Previously, changes to titles were not associated with changes in pay, which discouraged workers. 
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privatisation of JR, however, should not be interpreted as a triumph of the 
democratic process. Watanabe (1994) argues that there was no glamour in it, rather 
the people execrated the former JR and the rail-lobby simply could no longer 
withstand reform pressure. 
2.4.2 Post-bubble experience 
Japan’s preferred method of dealing with cash-deficient organisations is 
concerning. The Ministry of Finance uses a convoy system (Takenaka, 2007): banks 
are carried along together without letting them fall. Banks likewise have a proclivity 
to ‘ever-green’ a failing business’ bad debt rather than dispose of it, creating further 
problems as loans to sound creditors lose precedence (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). 
Caprio et al. (1993) concur but acknowledge that banks often assist companies in 
restructuring, which reduces agency costs. They also contend, however, that bank 
restorations are only successful upon retiring bad debt and instilling a reluctance to 
extend non-performing loans in the future. 
The failure to realise a sustained recovery despite numerous government 
stimulus packages produced a sense of crisis and heralded Koizumi’s election in 
2001 (Peng, 2002). Koizumi began reforms he believed would bring Japan out of 
recession, including the expulsion of LDP members who had previously resisted 
proposed changes, although this drew criticism from US observers (Peng, 2002).  
For a time, the development model itself was debated. Scissors and Foster 
(2009) state that there was discussion about moving Japan away from the export-
led growth model but growth from 2002-2005 silenced the debate. It would appear 
that the global macro-environment has a large impact upon determination to reform 
in Japan and can galvanise resistance during inclement conditions (Peng, 2002).  
2.4.2.1 A note on shareholder and stakeholder theory 
Recently, the debate surrounding shareholder theory and stakeholder theory 
has resurfaced in the wake of financial crises initially beginning in the United States. 
The Anglo-American model of shareholder theory has been criticised by some for 
promoting reprehensible behaviours among some executives in an effort to achieve 
short-term share price rises as they are tied to executive remuneration packages (H. 
J. Smith, 2003). The Enron case is a vivid example of this. Smith (2003), however, 
also points out that shareholder theory dictates that profits should be made legally 
and without deceit. The actions of these (rightly) vilified executives cannot be 
associated with shareholder theory as they were acting in their own interests.  
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Nevertheless, recent developments in the Western world have driven a 
sometimes emotive call to adopt more stakeholder-oriented governance approaches 
(H. J. Smith, 2003; The Economist, 2010; Waldkirch, 2008). Commonly cited 
benefits include making the organisation more responsible to the community that it 
operates within and a greater realisation of the environmental impact of the firm’s 
activities. These features are certainly desirable but to claim that they are mutually 
exclusive to shareholder theory is a misrepresentation. Shareholder theory—when 
properly applied with a view to long term profitability—would suggest that 
charitable projects or employee investment, for example, can align with profit 
interests and therefore represent a good application of capital (H. J. Smith, 2003).  
Herein lies the problem. Placing primacy with shareholders is not 
intrinsically flawed, but it is its application through agent-principal relationships, 
often associating executive remuneration with short-term increases in prices, that 
can lead to problems (The Economist, 2010). Friedman (2007) argues that properly 
implemented shareholder theory focusses more on dividends than short-term share 
price fluctuations and in doing so the illustrative charitable project or employee 
investment becomes more economically viable.  
To borrow a term from modern art appreciation, context is everything; the 
recent popular support for stakeholder theory arose from the fallout of recessions 
sparked by financial crises in the Western world and subsequent questioning of 
shareholder theory (The Economist, 2010). Japan, however, has long held to the 
principles of stakeholder theory (Nottage, 2006; Simeon, 2009) and if pictured on 
a continuum featuring shareholder theory on one side and stakeholder theory on the 
other, leans further towards stakeholder theory than even Germany (Nottage, 2006). 
The particularly interesting point is that Japan, a country that has suffered prolonged 
recession for almost two decades, has recently begun to show glimmers of progress 
that coincide with gradual shifts towards shareholder theory (Nottage, 2006). 
Indeed, Simeon (2009) notes that the changing attitudes in Japan have been in 
response to their recession as debate surrounding the validity of the Japanese 
implementation of stakeholder theory came into question. 
One point that needs to be made though is that it is the stars of the dual 
economy that are most associated with these shifting attitudes; the public sector still 
appears to firmly hold to traditional stakeholder values (Nottage, 2006; Simeon, 
2009), including JP.  
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If, citing evidence from the American financial crisis, one were to argue that 
shareholder theory has failed America, one would also have to concede that 
stakeholder theory has failed Japan. A greater move towards shareholder theory will 
be argued for in later chapters. This does not infer that stakeholder concerns should 
be cast aside, but rather advocates a well-implemented form of shareholder theory 
that also addresses stakeholder concerns by making business decisions that are 
economically justifiable from a long-term profit perspective.  
2.4.3 Arguments for reform: Following New Zealand 
 The New Zealand reforms presented an attractive model to Koizumi as one 
of Japan’s primary goals was to remove the state from banking. Corruption and 
waste stemming from Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme investments was 
systemic and Koizumi was determined to sever links between government, postal 
savings, and Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme recipients (Maclachlan, 2011). 
During an interview, Koizumi also stated that privatisation of posts, insurance, and 
pensions would reduce the public sector by 300,000 and charge the new entities 
with unambiguous goals of profitability, generating tax income in the process 
(Iwakami, 1996). 
 These desires were precisely the outcomes of the New Zealand experience: 
the state had no presence in banking10, the public sector had been downsized, and 
New Zealand Post (NZP) became a net payer of tax following corporatisation. 
Koizumi praised the New Zealand reforms during an official visit (Japanese 
Communist Party, 2005), while business communities upheld the model as a 
benchmark for Japan and argued that it should be given foremost attention in 
drawing from others’ experience (Ogino, 2007). The New Zealand model clearly 
left a strong impression on the Koizumi administration and some commentators 
have described the Japanese reform as a copy of New Zealand’s (Gendai Net, 2005). 
2.4.4 Arguments for reform: JP 
Two common arguments centre on its sheer size and how funds are used. 
Accounting for 380,000 employees and roughly $3 trillion US dollars in deposits 
makes JP an immense organisation, but it has been noted that deposits are often 
                                                 
10 This was prior to the inception of Kiwibank. Even then, NZP approached private sector investors 
first and only brought their prospectus to the government when they could not raise adequate funds. 
Additionally the State Owned Enterprises Act ensured that no favouritism applied. 
 19 
used to fund dubious public spending campaigns (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). This 
arose in part due to the obligation to inject deposits into the Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Programme (Amyx, Takenaka, & Toyoda, 2005). Also, public spending 
projects are often ‘outcome-based,’ which in practice means that agencies 
responsible for contracting work are effectively presented with a blank cheque 
(Jones, 2003), nor are contracts subject to cabinet or ministerial approval and hence 
are issued without democratic oversight (Jones, 2003). JPB is the single largest 
buyer of government debt, which accounts for roughly 80% of JPB assets (Japan 
Post Group, 2007). Data from 2004 show that JPB had JPY233 trillion of 
government debt whilst the private sector only held JPY39 trillion (Takenaka, 
2007). 
Further arguments arose from concerns surrounding the ineffectiveness of 
government spending packages and the pressure this placed on JPB, as the stock of 
Japanese public debt is so large that doubts are forming over the ability to repay it 
(Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). Amounting to roughly 200% of GDP at an average 
yield of 1.4%, outstanding JGBs require 2.8% of GDP just to remain stable (Yao, 
2009). Given the growing perceived risk, it is not implausible to suggest that future 
JGB yields may rise. If so, the resultant devaluation of bonds currently held by JPB 
would create a capital loss great enough to cause insolvency (Rowley, 2006). Peng 
(2002) states that foreign pressure, particularly from international credit rating 
agencies, has added to the pro-reform argument. 
Supplementary complications are the regulations and distortions that 
incentivise investing with JPB. In previous years JPB was permitted to set deposit 
rates higher than the caps imposed upon private banks (Takenaka, 2007). 
Additionally, special tax benefits created powerful incentives to deposit funds in 
JPB. However, one of the greatest features that attracted savers was the ability to 
buy into 10 year term deposits with the special condition that an investor could 
break the deposit at any stage and collect all accrued interest without penalty 
(Takenaka, 2007). If bond yields rise, the consequences of such a policy would have 
severe repercussions for the organisation; many investors would likely refinance 
their accounts at higher rates, which would be in addition to the losses relating to 
JGB devaluation. These combined features create a strong argument for the need to 
reform JPB, particularly given its central role in the financial system (Takenaka, 
2007). 
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2.4.5 Arguments for reform: The financial system 
 Research shows that privatisation is less likely to be successful if the 
regulatory environment has not been suitably prepared. The Ministry of Finance 
supported failing banks during the post-bubble recession, allowing none to fail, and 
this suggests that continued protection of inefficient competitors is why Japan is 
still experiencing problems today (Takenaka, 2007). Hwang and Schaefer (2002) 
second this view but add that not even downsizing was promoted. In a clear nod to 
traditional values (and perhaps self-interest), the Government sought to maintain 
the financial system without labour losses. Additionally, Japan’s financial system 
falls behind other developed nations for two reasons: greater income equality results 
in less exposure to the share market, and a government-sponsored distrust of fund 
managers and managed funds (Takenaka, 2007). Consequently, Peng (2002) shows 
that Koizumi intended to reduce the size of government and introduce competition 
to public companies.  
 Many of Japan’s problems stem from reliance on trade surpluses (Scissors 
& Foster, 2009) which, by definition, implies high savings. Unsurprisingly, the 
Government sponsored industries that already enjoyed comparative advantages and 
neglected to develop less competitive industries (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). 
Superimposing Japan’s development model, it becomes apparent that structural 
problems would be inevitable as it would produce a dual economy, as noted by Katz 
(1998), characterised by ultra-competitive export industries and inefficient firms 
needing constant ever-greening of debt to remain solvent whilst maintaining 
employment levels (Takenaka, 2007). The financial system was one of the key 
drivers of this process and therefore is a powerful argument for reforms that include 
financial deregulation and a level playing field (Porges & Leong, 2006). 
 Some believe that JP should retain its traditional form. Toyama (1998) 
argues that it produces goods that, whilst demanded by the public, are difficult to 
profit from and a privatised postal system would limit service coverage and retire 
loss-making products and services. I respectfully disagree, as other public 
enterprises in Japan have undergone reform and produced profits whilst improving 
services11. Postal agencies in other countries have also become net payers of tax 
although modern conditions do require diversification into related services.  
                                                 
11 Japan Tobacco and Japan Rail are good examples in this regard. 
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2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
The literature highlights the differences in reform experience between New 
Zealand and Japan, where the two governments exhibit differing ideologies 
regarding the purpose of state-owned organisations. New Zealand’s experience 
shows a more arms-length relationship between the state and business, and the 
guiding principles are based more on commercial outcomes. Japan’s experience, 
however, shows a more intimate relationship and a more of a continuation of 
traditional values. The literature surrounding New Zealand’s reform is rich but the 
matters of how resistance was overcome and why NZP was never fully privatised 
have not received as much attention. This study intends to address these gaps.  
 The respective experiences of New Zealand and Japan expose some 
preliminary similarities and contrasts. Both countries began reform efforts in 
response to an ailing economy but where New Zealand shows relatively decisive 
action, Japan’s progress has been slower and less effective. Postal reform in itself 
represents a much greater issue in Japan, particularly so owing to its size and the 
role it plays with respect to the financial sector. These issues are discussed in more 
detail in later chapters. For now, our attention now turns in the next chapter to a 
more thorough discussion of the literature relevant to constructing a comparative 
study of issues in postal reform. 
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3 Literature Review 
3.1 Overview 
 This chapter reviews the literature related to producing a comparative study 
of postal reform. As this is a case study of comparative institutional change IE forms 
the core theoretical framework and therefore warrants examination. Privatisation is 
also discussed, including issues surrounding moral hazard and agency theory since 
both postal systems were affected by these factors. 
 The literature produces a preliminary illustration of the incumbent 
institutions and reform outcomes but also highlights knowledge gaps in the New 
Zealand experience that will be addressed in Chapter Five. Similarly, the events, 
structures and relationships of the Japanese experience leading up to the proposed 
reforms are discussed as Japanese reforms were intended to follow a similar path. 
Later developments will be pursued in Chapter Six.  
 In terms of the underlying thread that links the following topics together, 
the case study reveals the centrality of institutions, which leads the review to a 
section on IE and institutional change. Being a conscious and deliberate attempt to 
engender change, privatisation is a particular form of institutional change and 
entails a wide range of concerns. The review therefore also discusses some of these 
concerns, particularly some of the difficulties in implementing reform and 
resistance to it.  
3.2 Case Study Analyses 
 Case studies can be used to enhance the body of knowledge (Darke, Shanks, 
& Broadbent, 1998; Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). This thesis does so by 
examining New Zealand’s and Japan’s postal reform experiences. Thus the 
following section discusses how cases can be used to make contributions. 
3.2.1 Making contributions through case studies 
A case study is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 1994, p. 13). Using multiple methods 
of data collection, they are useful where the distinction between the phenomenon 
and its inherent context may be difficult to identify (Yin, 1994). Case studies are 
commonly used to understand a particular situation and contain a significant 
element of qualitative research (Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
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Despite critics of qualitative analysis (Gable, 1994), case study research 
should not be dismissed, as better qualitative understanding leads to better 
quantitative models (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Meredith & Vineyard, 1993). Case studies 
provide evidence, facilitating the construction of theories that are reliable, testable, 
and generalizable (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Case study research can therefore increase 
theoretical robustness. Likewise, case studies are powerful tools for theory 
development (Darke et al., 1998; Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002), having been 
used to help the construction of frameworks for theory building (Mintzberg, 1979).  
3.2.2 Theory building through case studies 
Theory can be deconstructed into four constituent components: variable 
definition, theoretical context; relationship examination, and predictions from 
application (Wacker, 1998). Case studies are valuable as they can analyse each of 
these components via a wealth of primary data (Voss et al., 2002).  
Notably, there are three advantages for theory building. Studying a 
phenomenon in its natural setting provides data based upon primary evidence; 
allows the full extent of the phenomenon’s complexity to be observed; and in 
situations where the underlying variables and relationships may not yet fully be 
understood, the case study approach can be used as a form of exploratory research 
(Meredith, 1998). The first of these advantages is particularly important for the 
thesis’ simulations, as the actions taken by Japanese politicians confirm that the 
strategies programmed into the simulations are actually used in practice. The 
primary evidence collected for the New Zealand and Japanese experiences also 
corroborates the model for institutional change presented in Chapter Four.  
Theory can be enhanced through either single or multiple case studies. A 
single case study analysis is more appropriate where the phenomenon under 
scrutiny is unique or exceptional (Yin, 1994). Multiple case study analyses are 
useful when examining a phenomenon across a broad range of situations, where 
cross-case comparisons may uncover trends and patterns (Darke et al., 1998). Using 
the multiple-case approach, juxtaposing the New Zealand and Japanese reform 
experiences is intended to show that the presence of elements in New Zealand’s 
case led to successful change, whereas their absence in Japan hampered it.  
To ensure rigour, cases must be strong (Yin, 1994). Yin therefore advocates 
a well-designed research protocol defining all the rules, procedures, data 
procurement methods, persons contactable, and interview questions that will be 
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used. Multiple methods of data collection allow triangulation, which strengthens 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989b). My study heeds the preceding advice by following 
methods employed in other case studies, most notably in terms of data procurement 
and processing, and by triangulating simulation inputs through media reports and 
expert opinion. 
Given that the case study highlights the importance of institutions, we now 
turn to a deeper review of institutional economics (the ‘rules of the game’), which 
includes agency theory and other issues that will contribute to deeper case study 
analysis.  
3.3 Institutional Economics 
 Institutional economics has existed long enough to evolve into what many 
term the new institutional economics. IE is used to analyse specific phenomena and 
to construct frameworks or theories around a given institution (Hodgson, 1998). 
This approach diverges from mainstream economics, which proffers broader 
application through relatively simplified theories. Losses in generalizability are 
counter-balanced by models more suited to individual situations where underlying 
assumptions do not necessarily constrain validity.  
 Some of the driving forces also depart from more traditional perspectives. 
IE explores the formation and evolution of institutions (Arrow, 1971); traditionally 
however, they are taken as a given (Williamson, 1975). Hodgson (1998) holds the 
institution as the basic unit of analysis rather than the individual because we are 
born into a world of institutions that often outlast the individuals who devise them.  
 Another key difference between IE and mainstream economics concerns 
assumptions about ‘the rational economic man’. While traditional perspectives 
assume rationality as given, the act of doing so implicitly acknowledges the 
presence pre-existing norms, rules and institutions (Field, 1979). Yet, if one 
assumes a person’s rationality as given and immutable, it implies that preferences 
are also given and the individual is in fact a ‘slave’ to their preferences, as aptly 
illustrated by Buchanan: “Choice, by its nature, cannot be predetermined and 
remain choice” (Buchanan, 1969, p. 47). An extension of this is the notion that 
preferences evolve, which will be shown to be an important factor contributing in 
particular to NZP’s institutional shift. 
 Models of choice, preference and behaviour also have a distinctive impact 
on agency theory within IE. Applying bounded rationality, satisficing (Winter, 
 25 
1971) and imperfect information, the complexity of a given transaction correlates 
with increasingly complex governance terms (Williamson, 2000). This has two 
major implications. Firstly, contracts cannot feasibly provide contingencies for all 
potential outcomes and are therefore fashioned to allow concerned parties the most 
opportunity to resolve their own differences. Judicial arbitration is an option but 
one cannot assume costless use of the courts, which in turn limits the number of 
disputes that are filed. The second is fascinating: it has been argued that the 
perceived inefficiencies of public bureaus12 have been installed intentionally to 
distance them from the concerned parties and therefore fulfil their role of governing 
often particularly complex transactions more objectively (Williamson, 2000). As 
Chapters Five and Six will demonstrate, the differing approaches of the two 
countries lead to differing levels of complexity, in the case of New Zealand clearer 
distinctions allowed for disputes to be resolved more resoundingly.  
 Much of the work produced by IE researchers has been through case studies 
as they are not bound to a single theory or hypothesis, although great emphasis is 
placed upon comparative institutional analysis (Hodgson, 1998). This is precisely 
the method employed here as the thesis compares institutions in pre- and post-
reform New Zealand and Japan. Specifically, by conducting a pre- and post-reform 
analysis, the literature denotes the individual cases as examinations of institutional 
change. More importantly, however, we recognise that this particular form of 
institutional change (privatisation) is done both consciously and deliberately. It is a 
redefinition of the institutional landscape by altering the ownership and governance 
structures, and the regulations guiding the organisation. As such, since privatisation 
is in fact an application of institutional change, the review now moves into a more 
thorough discussion of privatisation itself and the issues that apply to the New 
Zealand and Japanese cases.  
3.4 Privatisation  
Defined narrowly, privatisation is simply the transfer of national assets from 
the state to the private sector (Button & Weyman-Jones, 1994), however, the real 
process is much more complex. In the mid-20th century, governments produced 
increasing shares of goods and services in the economy (Megginson & Netter, 
                                                 
12 This includes reduced incentives, increased rules and regulations, and greater job security than 
private sector employment. 
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2001), including strategic assets, banks and other financiers (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). Economic arguments aside, nationalism was also a 
common feature (Noll, 2000).  
By the time of Great Britain’s Thatcher government, there were growing 
needs for efficiency and high public debt incentivised privatisation (Megginson & 
Netter, 2001; Price-Waterhouse, 1989). This was also evident in the European 
community where there was a greater thrust towards efficient outcomes (Button & 
Weyman-Jones, 1994). State-owned entities were often characterised by waste and 
inefficiency (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004), and in the most extreme cases were estimated 
to be an unsustainable five or six percent of GDP. New Zealand found itself in the 
same position and as privatisation gained favour in the 1980s among developed 
nations, New Zealand also began its reform process.  
Nevertheless, and despite considerable research, there is evidence to suggest 
that past mistakes are being repeated. Chi and Jasper (1998) produced a 
comprehensive survey in the United States and found that many states were 
conducting their efforts on a trial and error basis; less than 20% of respondents 
modelled their own programmes on another’s (Chi & Jasper, 1998). The same 
phenomenon is also present in other Western nations (Baumol, 1993). Through the 
respective cases developed here, this study will show that even though Japan took 
some cues from the New Zealand experience, they were not able to secure the same 
level of change. There is also evidence to suggest that even in developed nations 
privatisation is not conducted with a sense of systematic reform but rather on an ad-
hoc basis (Chi & Jasper, 1998). More disturbingly, many of these projects are 
implemented without monitoring or evaluative processes (Chi & Jasper, 1998). 
These points have contributed to a public misconception about the timing of 
privatisation benefits (Baumol, 1993), a feature that will become important for the 
New Zealand case. 
Once the decision to reform has been made, there are a number of important 
factors that should be considered. The review therefore now turns to a discussion 
of these factors and their relevance to the thesis.  
3.4.1 Factors of importance during the change process 
One important aspect is whether there exists a valuation differential between 
the state and the private sector (Mackenzie, 1998). Should the government place 
less value in the assets, the results are similar to a tax increase. Alternatively, if the 
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private sector places less value in the assets, the realised sale may be less than 
projected. Privatisation when a value differential exists may restrict inter-temporal 
budget constraints: if the state has a higher implied discount rate than the market, it 
follows that the revenue stream the state gives up is greater than what it could expect 
to receive from asset sales (Mackenzie, 1998). The presence or absence of a value 
differential is very important for Japan as the government now intends to use the 
sale of shares to fund reconstruction efforts after the Great Eastern Earthquake. 
Such a value differential may well be influenced by the regulations imposed on a 
new private entity and some of the more influential regulatory issues feature in the 
simulation.  
Another issue is the matter of profit or welfare maximisation (Campos e 
Cunha & Cooper, 1998). Corporate goals and strategies, organisational structures, 
labour practises, and organisational culture are all facets of the enterprise that will 
have to adapt to the new setting (Campos e Cunha & Cooper, 1998). Kikeri and 
Nellis (2004) argue that two critical measurements must be taken; whether the net 
economic welfare generated under private hands is at least equal to when it was 
owned by the state, and how diffusely the benefits of privatisation are distributed. 
Button and Weyman-Jones (1994) second these tests, but question whether 
increased performance is due to simply a change in ownership, the introduction of 
more competition, or perhaps a better set of regulatory incentives. The New Zealand 
case will present evidence that, in one instance at least, the latter two are of greater 
importance.  
Government plays a vital role in privatisation, particularly with respect to 
the asset’s financial and competitive position, including any pre-sale restructuring. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the most value-enhancing moves are to remove 
the CEO and liquidate the assets, on average, one year earlier than initial outlines 
(Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997). Other restructuring activities can improve sale prices but 
the resources and time required are often disproportionate to value gains (Lopez-
de-Silanes, 1997). It has been suggested that small and medium sized state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) should be sold in their current condition for the best possible 
price and new owners left to make decisions regarding new investments (Kikeri, 
Nellis, & Shirley, 1992). Bulow and Klemperer (1996) also find that auctions 
usually result in higher prices. This point is relevant as Chapter Six will illustrate 
the involvement of the state relating to assets held by the privatising entity can also 
lead to delays and lost opportunities.  
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Other factors include the government’s ideology regarding markets and 
regulation, commitment to property rights and government credibility, the condition 
of the corporate governance framework, willingness to allow foreign ownership, 
and the type of investors that assets will be passed on to (Megginson & Netter, 
2001). All of these factors appear in the respective case chapters and contribute to 
demonstrating how the two countries’ results differ.  
Gibbon (1997, as cited in Megginson & Netter, 2001) distils the common 
process for selling state assets. This includes preparing the environment the assets 
are to be sold into, establishing transparency for prospective buyers by providing 
the necessary information (accounting data, annual reports etcetera), and outlining 
the nature of any post-privatisation relationship between government and the newly 
privatised firm. Chapters Five and Six will show that this process appears in both 
countries 
During the transition, governments do not necessarily become less involved 
in the macro-economy. In practice, it is inadvisable to disown an enterprise and cast 
it to the private sector; rather the state becomes a supervisor and regulator, ensuring 
that the newly privatised companies and related industries are not exploited 
(Megginson & Kay, 2000). This view is supported by other studies that suggest 
control transferral is more effective when combined with market liberalisation and 
removal of entry/exit barriers (Pinheiro, 1996, as cited in Kikeri & Nellis, 2004), a 
point that will be clearly illustrated through New Zealand’s experience in Chapter 
Five. 
Governments must not hastily privatise an entity into a weak environment, 
but excessive delays in preparing the regulatory environment can impose significant 
costs (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). Experience also shows that over-regulation presents 
a threat to organisational freedom to the point where privatisation becomes 
ineffectual (Baumol, 1993). Raising these points is important because the two cases 
developed here corroborate the theory in both positive and negative respects.  
Some scholars contend that private ownership should grant the firm a 
number of freedoms – including the freedom to fail (Baumol, 1993; Kikeri & Nellis, 
2004). In the past, many governments rarely allowed state-owned businesses to fail 
despite being insolvent (Frydman, Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 2000). Bailout costs are 
ultimately borne by the state and can exacerbate incentive alignment issues 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). Allowing businesses to fail does not suggest that 
privatisation itself is a failure; rather that the opportunity costs of running such an 
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enterprise exceed the private sector’s willingness to bear them and freedom to exit 
infers that resource allocation efficiency is performing its role (Kikeri & Nellis, 
2004). This point is relevant to the New Zealand/Japan comparison because, as shall 
become clear in later chapters, New Zealand’s attitude and Japan’s attitude differ 
greatly, which in turn affects the amount of change exhibited. 
When considering employees, severance allowances, early retirement 
incentives, and voluntary departures have been suggested as ways to facilitate 
divestment of resources (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). Even so, many governments find 
employment-based political pressures too great and ultimately concede by either 
reversing parts of the process or by using vague guidelines with no explicit date 
(Baumol, 1993); the account provided in Chapter Six shows both practices 
occurring. This ‘regulatory risk’ places costs upon the incumbent, rival firms, and 
consumers, which is why regulators should sever themselves from the entity once 
control has been surrendered (Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002). Once again, in 
this most political of issues, the thesis will reveal differing approaches and in New 
Zealand’s case, a more liberalised approach would become a key factor in 
redefining the new institutional environment. 
How the preceding points are handled by the state will have significant 
implications for the overall outcomes of a reform programme. Having raised a 
series of factors that should be taken into account when implementing privatisation, 
we now move on to a discussion of the benefits that may accrue from it. 
3.4.2 The merits of privatisation 
Despite concerns, privatisation can benefit the economy. Megginson and 
Kay (2000) note that barring a few exceptional cases, aggregate employment 
generally remains unchanged and may even increase. There are also cases where 
employment in the privatised firm does not systematically fall, owing to increases 
in demand (Megginson & Kay, 2000).  
Empirical evidence displays improved productivity, rationalised pricing 
decisions, greater capital investment, and increased competition (Galal, Jones, 
Tandon, & Vogelsang, 1994). Other studies show increasing net consumer surplus 
despite some price increases and improvements in service quality (Delfino & 
Cassarin, 2001). Realising these benefits, however, requires a complementary 
regulatory environment and recently there has been a tendency to over-promote 
privatisation as a solution to many economic problems (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). One 
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complication is unequally shared welfare consequences. The case of British and 
Welsh electricity supply showed that although producers and consumers gained, 
most of the utility was realised by producers (Domah & Pollitt, 2001). Other 
evidence shows that such asymmetric distribution can result in wider income 
inequality, at least in the short run (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). Baumol (1993) argues, 
however, that this is an inalienable part of the open market mechanism and 
increasing welfare on the part of consumers is not to be turned down in light of 
greater benefits accruing to those willing to absorb the risk of purchasing state 
assets. This is a valid point but such faith in the market mechanism implicitly 
suggests that the regulatory environment is strong enough to withstand potential 
opportunism and moral hazards. These points reappear in Chapter Five where New 
Zealand’s experience shows many of the benefits accruing as well as the presence 
of a strong regulatory environment.  
The literature also highlights other advantages including improved 
performance and operating efficiency (Dyck, 2001), greater transparency, 
accountability and wider public shareholding (Button & Weyman-Jones, 1994), 
stronger capital markets, improved financial sector efficiency (Matoušek & Taci, 
2005), and dividends to the state in the case of SOEs (Darwall, 2003). Realising 
such benefits in Japan would be advantageous, and indeed were among Koizumi’s 
goals, but rest upon successfully reforming JP, which is the focus of Chapter Eight. 
3.4.3 Major issues in privatisation 
Despite a number of benefits that can be realised, there are many issues 
arising from privatisation. The literature on this is vast and so to give more focus to 
the review only the economic, political, and organisational factors that impinge 
directly on postal sector reform and the divergent interests of stakeholders are 
emphasised. These matters are important as how they are treated will have 
significant consequences for the respective country – particularly so for Japan as JP 
is so large. 
3.4.3.1 Economic issues 
Regarding the application of sale proceeds, increasing government 
expenditure or the down payment of government debt yield very different results 
(Mackenzie, 1998; Megginson & Kay, 2000) because privatisation-fuelled 
expansion crowds out private investment just as does debt-fuelled expansion 
(Mackenzie, 1998). By comparison, governments that saved receipts saw marked 
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improvements in fiscal positions over time (Davis, Ossowski, Richardson, & 
Barnett, 2000). The application of sale proceeds is a critical issue for Japan, as it 
has one of the highest sovereign debt rates in the world, but also faces the matter of 
reconstruction following the Great Eastern Earthquake. 
Another issue for newly privatised entities is the cost of capital. In many 
cases the enterprise may no longer draw funds from discounted public debt and 
must participate in open capital markets, raising the cost of capital through 
increasing Beta coefficients (Button & Weyman-Jones, 1994). This can be 
challenging for an organisation charged with universal service commitments 
(Campos e Cunha & Cooper, 1998). The prospect of imposing universal service 
commitments is one of the key issues examined in the simulation and thus may have 
implications for the cost of capital as well as the attractiveness of JP as an 
investment. 
One issue more applicable to developed nations is that many potential 
candidates exhibit monopoly attributes where the state has attempted to restrain 
profit-taking behaviour (Baumol, 1993). Additionally, a prominent argument for 
state control is the popular ‘universal service’ clause often imposed upon utility 
providers. In such cases, privatisation can be challenging as regulators have a 
number of additional tasks to perform balancing open competition, financial 
performance, and economic welfare. In this regard, the matter of disentangling 
social and commercial objectives becomes important and the two experiences will 
be shown to exhibit quite different predilections with equally differing outcomes.  
3.4.3.2 Political issues 
Government involvement in markets is often a point of contention. 
Arguments for private ownership often cite a central tenet of economics that 
markets generate competitive outcomes but this requires the absence of externalities 
and public goods (Megginson & Netter, 2001). The argument for government 
control implies that the market has failed in some way. Indeed, Briggs (1961) 
believes that governments should produce a ‘welfare state’ and in the process must 
alter the actions of the market through incentive and regulation to compensate for 
welfare losses associated with open markets.  
Even so, Coase (1960) states: “All solutions have costs, and there is no 
reason to suppose that governmental regulation is called for simply because the 
problem is not handled well by the market or the firm” (as cited in Megginson, 2005, 
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p. 459). Furthermore, whilst proponents of privatisation concede that although state 
control can correct some market failure(s) privatisation has the greatest impact 
where the market failure that state ownership alleviates is proportionately 
insignificant to the technical inefficiencies and weak performance incentives of 
government-run organisations (Megginson & Netter, 2001).  
Even in the cases for natural monopolies or public goods, some believe that 
state ownership is not optimal. Megginson and Netter (2001) suggest that 
governments often lack credibility to commit to or maintain policies that adversely 
affect the operations of an SOE, doubly so if administrations change over time. In 
the presence of conflicting goals, private ownership would at least produce an 
efficient outcome, if not necessarily the most welfare maximising (Shleifer, 1998). 
Li and Yamada (2015) produce some interesting results in this regard, noting that 
there appears to be incentives both to maintain employment and efficiency in 
partially privatised Chinese SOEs. Nevertheless, they also show that government 
control of SOEs may be a factor in explaining relative performance differentials 
compared to private firms. Compounding all the aforementioned issues, however, 
is the gap in the literature identified by Megginson and Netter (2001): little 
empirical work explores the decision of when to privatise, at what rate, and whether 
to divest the assets in stages or at once. They concede that this is a particularly 
complex topic of study. In this regard, the experience from the New Zealand case 
will show that, in this particular instance at least, it was not essential to surrender 
ownership to produce more efficient outcomes but rather a change in control. 
Political resistance can influence the integrity and reach of a given set of 
reforms. Even if the public supports privatisation, special interest groups can hinder 
the process (Peng, 2002). Furthermore, where power and influence are 
decentralised, political pressure often results in dilution. This can occur in both 
majority and minority governments and ultimately results in delays or removes the 
intended market-oriented outcomes.  
Many of the preceding points form part of an argument for government 
control of ‘strategic industries’ (Button & Weyman-Jones, 1994). A large public 
sector is argued to be vital for the protection of consumers and to ensure that such 
strategic industries act in accordance with the nation’s best interests. This forms 
one of the major barriers in terms of political resistance to privatisation and Chapter 
Seven will show it appearing on several occasions. 
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Other forms of political resistance are observed in the perception that gains 
from privatisation are less than the costs and indeed, the fairness of privatisation 
itself has come into question. Kikeri and Nellis (2004) summarise some of the major 
political counter-arguments and suggest that resistance to change often arises as 
critics question whether the gains made are a result of extra competition or 
ownership transferral. Finally there is also the fear that financial gains are only 
realised by a select group of privileged individuals (Baumol, 1993; Kikeri & Nellis, 
2004). The issue of resistance is particularly important in this study as we presume 
that greater resistance reduces institutional change. Accordingly, this topic is 
examined in both New Zealand and Japan. 
Labour reductions are possibly one of the most highly charged political 
issues. Governments are acutely aware of the political backlash from reform and 
often act strategically. Job losses are often sensationalised but empirical research 
shows that in competitive and some high-demand sectors employment levels 
change only marginally (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Megginson, Nash, & van 
Randenborgh, 1994). Other studies show that where labour reduction is more 
significant it is due to poor underlying economic conditions rather than privatisation 
itself (Jones, Jammal, & Nilgun, 1998). There is also empirical evidence to suggest 
that remaining employees are at least no worse off and in many cases are given 
higher wages (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). However, governments should perform a 
degree of restructuring prior to sale since they are better equipped to reduce the 
impact on displaced workers (Nellis & Kikeri, 1989). Despite the weight of 
empirical evidence, the issue is often dramatized and governments may temper 
reforms in an effort to avoid ill-will, perhaps because the benefits of privatisation 
are diffuse while its costs are comparatively concentrated (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). 
This issue appears in both New Zealand and Japan, and the corresponding chapters 
will show how the issue was respectively resolved, and used for political gains. 
Selling assets to foreign interests is a sensitive topic. Nevertheless, foreign 
ownership brings a number of benefits including increased transparency, greater 
access to capital, increased buying power, and world-class standards and practices 
(Dyck, 2001; Megginson & Kay, 2000). In one particularly broad empirical study 
it is suggested that each percentage point of foreign ownership corresponds with a 
3.9% increase in added value to the firm (Smith, Cin, & Vodopivec, 1997). Even 
so, nationalism/xenophobia can reach such a pitch that governments have been 
known to block sales to foreigners via specially implemented legislation. This issue 
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is relevant because it appears in the Japanese case and allowing foreign ownership 
is one of the factors included in the simulation model. 
3.4.3.3 Organisational issues 
One primary organisational issue is the change the firm undergoes from 
ownership transferral. Research indicates that changing objectives are often 
associated with restructuring to include flatter, more decentralised hierarchies, 
which can also reduce layers of middle management (Bishop & Thompson, 1994). 
This process creates uncertainty and employees at many levels of the organisation 
may resist as they perceive threats such as loss of influence, redundancies, and 
increased work stress (Nelson, Cooper, & Jackson, 1995). 
As the organisation becomes profit-oriented there is often the need for a 
change in corporate culture (Campos e Cunha & Cooper, 1998). One of the 
difficulties that managers may face is identifying instances where behaviour is 
incongruent with the desired new cultural setting and responding accordingly. 
Managers themselves may also be adjusting to the new conditions (Sathe, 1985, as 
cited in Campos e Cunha & Cooper, 1998). 
Human issues are another area of concern. In some cases ownership 
transferral decreased relative wages and employment levels for employees, yet 
managerial staff received remuneration increases to levels comparable to other 
private sector organisations (Haskel & Szymanski, 1992). Megginson and Kay 
(2000) also note occurrences of compensation policies favouring management in 
newly privatised firms. Instances such as this can fuel uncertainties felt by internal 
stakeholders. The points raised here are valid concerns and the data collected for 
the New Zealand experience (see Chapter Five) will show how NZP successfully 
addressed them.  
3.4.4 Moral hazards and agency issues 
Opportunism can be a serious issue in privatisation. Notable cases include 
the Chilean electricity example where managers secured enormously higher 
payouts than minority shareholders during a takeover bid (Wright, 1999). The 
Russian coupon privatisation saw privileged individuals purchase the public’s 
shareholdings for a fraction of their real worth (Goldman, 1997). Some of the major 
themes addressed in this section include governance chains, ownership structure, 
traditional and unique agency issues, and control without ownership. They are 
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relevant to this study as the Japanese postal system forms one part of what Prime 
Minister Koizumi described as an ‘iron triangle’ of questionable exchanges.  
Grabbing hand theory, a term first coined by Shleifer and Vishny (1998), 
describes many of the problems associated with the public sector, examples include: 
theft, misappropriation, perquisite consumption, insider trading, corruption, and 
tolerances of managerial slack (Dyck, 2001; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). At a high 
level of abstraction, many of these problems derive from the incentives of 
politicians. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
describe models where politicians are motivated by political benefits, securing 
votes for example. To that end, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that when control 
of the firm lies with managers, politicians rely on subsidies and bribes to incentivise 
political objectives; by comparison when control lies with politicians, managers 
will offer bribes to dissuade politicians from enforcing political objectives. In either 
case, the murky nature of the exchange may limit the overall effectiveness of 
privatisation. 
Dyck (2001) suggests a solution in the form of governance chains. Both 
formal and informal, they control flows of information and accountability through 
extending and formalising the relationships between individuals and organisations 
(Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Dyck, 2001; Greif, 1997). Chapter Five 
details how such governance chains were applied in New Zealand through the 
redefinition of the institutional environment. In Japan, the reformers also 
envisioned that such formalisation would occur through the separation of JP’s 
business units and this notion is one of the components of the simulation (see 
Chapter Eight for the results). 
Privatisation has also been accompanied by ‘entrenchment’: actions 
designed to limit the control mechanisms installed to regulate managerial behaviour 
(Walsh & Seward, 1990). Traditional agency theory problems arise from 
misaligned agent and principal incentives (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Increased 
monitoring and incentive alignment are potential solutions but require strong 
governance, a prerequisite seen more commonly in developed nations (Dharwadkar 
et al., 2000).  
In addition to traditional agent–principal problems, principal–principal 
problems are issues to consider (Dharwadkar et al., 2000). Megginson and Netter 
(2001) suggest, ceteris paribus, concentrated ownership is best, followed by diffuse 
ownership, and finally state ownership; foreign ownership is superior to domestic 
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ownership as far as long-term performance measures are concerned. Nevertheless, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) maintain that once control has been effectively 
transferred to management, and there is little corruption, cash flow rights can 
become irrelevant. This is an interesting point, which will be illustrated by the New 
Zealand case.  
Addressing weak governance chains should be a foremost consideration 
prior to selling state assets (Dyck, 2001). In the Czech Republic13 and Slovakia, 
insiders took control of company assets and the lack of financial reforms provided 
no incentives or obligations for managers to prioritise efficiency (Kikeri & Nellis, 
2004). The dual issues of unique agency theory problems and poor governance 
chains were major contributing factors resulting in disappointing experiences in 
both countries. By comparison, Chapter Five will elaborate on New Zealand’s 
solution to principal-agent concerns. The issue is also very important in the 
Japanese case as JP is such a vast organisation and, as Chapter Six will show, the 
issue of insider governance has created a number of problems. 
Regarding financing, historical evidence from Japan indicates that the 
concentration of financiers can reduce opportunism and abuse significantly (Aoki, 
1984). Debt can be a useful tool for reducing agency-based problems as it entails a 
range of commitments and obligations – many of which are legally enforceable and 
supported by an efficient debt collection system (Gibbs, 1993). However, where the 
major financier is a banking entity, over-lending and deferred corporate reforms can 
arise from relationship arrangements particular to Japan (Weinstein & Yafeh, 1998). 
Another complication arises regarding loans from state controlled banks as Li and 
Yamada (2015) find that SOE performance is negatively impacted from such loans. 
Consequently, whilst debt can be used to reduce certain agency issues, others may 
arise depending on the form the debt takes. 
Share ownership is another area where solutions to ‘grabbing hands’ can be 
found. Dyck (2001) contends that concentrated ownership fosters proactive wealth 
creation and preservation, leading to lower tolerances regarding unfavourable 
managerial behaviour. Empirical data show there is a positive relationship between 
shareholder concentration, profitability, and market value (Claessens, Djankov, & 
Pohl, 1997). Further studies concur with these findings but note that mutual funds 
may not be as instrumental to improved performance when compared to private 
                                                 
13 This was a voucher-based privatisation. 
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shareholders (Claessens & Djankov, 1999). Shareholder concentration can also 
reduce information asymmetries between agents and principals (Hill & Snell, 1989) 
and large holders of equity can leverage their voting rights to dilute managerial 
power and discretion (Boeker, 1992).  
Concentrated ownership, however, can counteract the political objective of 
more diffuse public share ownership. Nevertheless, where stronger legal protections 
exist, shareholdings are more diffuse (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998). Also, in developed countries, the accounting practices and final 
market valuation of share prices show little or no difference for firms with 
concentrated owners and firms with diffuse owners (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988). 
Hence, due to stronger corporate governance, many of the benefits of concentration 
can be achieved with a relatively small proportion of equity (Dharwadkar et al., 
2000). Ultimately, it appears to be the release of shares to an ill-prepared regulatory 
environment which produces the incentives that lead towards the failure of 
privatisation. Concentrated ownership of JP, however, may be difficult to achieve 
given its size and prospective buyers may be faced with requirements (such as 
universal service provisions) that other private entities are not burdened with. The 
possibility of universal service provisions and the state of the regulatory 
environment may well influence the attractiveness of JP as an investment 
alternative and these aspects form components of the simulation. 
Revisiting foreign ownership, dominant foreign ownership is argued to be 
optimal as it minimises both traditional and unique agency issues (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000). Foreign ownership, full or partial, is one of the most effective methods 
of severing ties to vested interests (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Djankov, 1999); given 
that this severance was one of Koizumi’s primary aspirations, the debate regarding 
foreign ownership arose several times and, as mentioned previously, is included in 
the simulation. 
Closely related to foreign ownership is the concept of the ‘golden share’, 
which is prominent among strategic assets (Megginson & Netter, 2001) and became 
part of the discussions surrounding JP. Such shares provide the state with veto 
powers against takeover bids and can become an issue if a prospective bidder is 
foreign. ‘Golden shares’ present a risk whereby a small amount of political pressure 
can have significant effects on the outcome of privatisation.  
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3.5 Issues in Japan and their Relevance to the 
Privatisation Literature  
 From the preceding discussion we can see that the privatisation literature 
identifies a number of issues, these are present to varying degrees within both of 
the cases compiled in this study. The following section, however, focuses on Japan 
and provides more case-specific details that illustrate how the previous concepts 
apply. The reason for doing so is that it begins the process of identifying the 
component issues that will become the focus of the simulation14. 
3.5.1 Organisational structure and reform 
The Japanese postal system faces a number of issues surrounding its 
upcoming post-reform structure15. One of the major concerns is the prospect of 
continuing cross-subsidisation. As Maclachlan (2006) points out, the original 
intention was to divide the postal bank into ten regional entities, similar to Japan 
Rail’s four units, who would then compete with one another. Resistance forces, 
however, successfully lobbied for a single unit, which makes cross-subsidisation 
easier to maintain (Maclachlan, 2006). 
Post office closures are also a sensitive issue. Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) members have strongly lobbied for the continuance of universal service, 
arguing that the postal system and associated postmasters play an integral part in 
Japanese society. The postal lobby used this as leverage and was able to enshrine 
universal service into legislation (Maclachlan, 2006). Baumol (1993) notes that 
governments sometimes compromise as institutions such as the post office are often 
expected to serve all citizens.  
In 2007, Heizo Takenaka, Minister of Postal Privatisation, stated that 
approximately 60%-70% of postal operations were supported by the financial 
business units (Ministers criticize DPJ plan on postal savings fiscal reforms, 2005). 
Unit separation and charging fees for counter services to all organisations, 
government owned or not, would make such operational subsidisation more 
apparent and ideally remove it (Porges & Leong, 2006).  
                                                 
14 See Table 8-1 (p.250) for the complete list and definition of issues that are simulated. 
15 Post-reform structure meaning the state of the group after government shareholdings have been 
sold. 
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Lobbying from certain members of the LDP and the Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) weakened reforms. Their goals were to prevent post office closures 
and to avoid privatisation of the postal bank16. In order to achieve these goals they 
pressured Koizumi to allow Japan Post Service Co. to buy back shares in financial 
services units once they had been sold (Porges & Leong, 2006). The government 
was therefore able to re-establish indirect cross-shareholding and cross-
subsidisation once initial obligations had been met. This contradicts Chisari, 
Estache, and Romero (1997), who assert that transferral of control is more effective 
if combined with liberalising regulation and a commitment to equitable distribution 
of economic utility. 
Many in the postal lobby see privatisation as a loss of cultural values 
(Maclachlan, 2006; Porges & Leong, 2006) and the LDP attempted to block foreign 
share ownership altogether (Porges & Leong, 2006). Eisenhardt (1989a) argues the 
appointment of outside directors often produces better results, primarily due to the 
separation from special interests. Megginson and Netter (2001) also noted similar 
results. A takeover bid with a foreign element may therefore be preferable but given 
the strength of the postal lobby this seems doubtful.  
Japan appears to suffer from ‘political xenophobia’; the LDP further 
attempted to block foreign ownership in banking and insurance arms but were 
thwarted by commitments to the World Trade Organisation’s General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (Porges & Leong, 2006). Foreign ownership in privatised 
Japanese organisations is sparse, making up approximately 1% of all shareholdings 
in the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) 17  (Bortolotti, 
Siniscalco, & Fantini, 2000) and about 17% of Japan Rail East (I. B. Smith, 2003). 
As shareholder wealth-based ideologies have encouraged Japan Rail East to 
successfully revise their corporate strategy (I. B. Smith, 2003), it seems short-
sighted to attempt to disincentivise foreign investment in JP. Evidence shows that 
the Japanese government has previously intervened in privatisations, such as Japan 
Rail (Mizutani & Nakamura, 1996). Baumol (1993) and Chong and Lopez-de-
Silanes (2002) argue that government disassociation is preferable but in the case of 
Japan, it seems unlikely. JGB purchases and the role of the post office in the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme present one of the greatest temptations. 
                                                 
16 A key purchaser of Japanese Government Bonds. 
17 NTT is Japan’s former state telecommunications enterprise. 
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Megginson and Netter (2001) state that incentive alignment issues can arise if 
government retains a degree of control over corporate finances; Koizumi himself 
wanted responsibility to rest with the private sector and not the bureaucracy 
(Maclachlan, 2006)18. 
3.5.2 Competitive environment and regulatory issues 
 Porges and Leong (2006) state that creating a ‘level playing field’ is 
inherently difficult as it requires balancing competition and universal service 
obligations. Bias on either side may result in either a privatised monopoly or an 
organisation so constrained that it may ultimately need re-nationalisation (Porges 
& Leong, 2006).  
Additionally, the postal lobby 19  exerts intense pressure to influence 
members of the LDP and the DPJ. One example is the legislation surrounding 
‘special’ and ‘general’ correspondence. Special correspondence could be 
approximated to courier services, where licensing regulations require one of the 
following conditions: 
1. combined dimensions exceed 90 centimetres, 
2. the package weighs at least four kilograms, 
3. delivery is to be within three hours, or 
4. postage must be more than JPY 1,000 (Porges & Leong, 2006).  
 
This market is relatively insignificant to JP, accounting for approximately 
13.8% of items delivered in fiscal 2007 (Japan Post Group, 2007). General 
correspondence however accounts for roughly 85.9% of all items handled (Japan 
Post Group, 2007). Here, the postal lobby effectively barred entry through punitive 
licensing requirements (Maclachlan, 2006).  
One of the most prohibitive regulations requires applicants to establish at 
least 100,000 post boxes nationally (Maclachlan, 2006). Sympathetic parties claim 
that monopoly status needs to be maintained in order to maximise economic welfare, 
coincidentally creating the conflicting goals cautioned against by Megginson and 
Netter (2001), and Shleifer (1998). Furthermore, the case of Telecom New Zealand 
shows decreasing prices and rising consumer surplus due to competition, not 
                                                 
18 Chapter Six shows that future administrations did interfere with postal accounts. 
19 This is an umbrella term covering postmasters, patron politicians, postal labour unions and other 
vested interests.  
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despite it (Ross & Bamber, 1998). The presence of firms who would otherwise 
express interest in general correspondence also suggests it is a contestable market. 
Unfortunately, outcomes in imperfectly contestable markets are determined by 
actual competition rather than potential (Martin, 2000). This suggests that the 
regulations are masking other concerns. The presence of the postal lobby and their 
political influence is therefore an important issue and features prominently in the 
simulation. 
 Other areas where the regulatory and competitive environments have been 
skewed include the LDP’s reduction of tax payable on fixed assets by JP and its 
application for consumption tax exemption (Porges & Leong, 2006). Concessions 
such as these will likely result in an environment that reduces reform efficacy.  
 Previous privatisations produced ineffective regulations and poor 
competitive elements. Entry into telecommunications, airline travel, and electricity 
has been restricted and consumer welfare consequently suffered (Furukawa et al., 
1995). Additionally, there appears to be an unfavourable spectrum of outcomes 
concerning relationships between corporate management and regulators. Either the 
two sides have shared conservative attitudes, stifling change and innovation; or 
have exhibited conflicting attitudes causing delays. Cross-subsidisations have 
continued and competition has been stifled20 (Furukawa et al., 1995). As Chapter 
Six will illustrate, all of these points also appear in the case of JP. 
Japan’s experience of deregulation is hampered by unclear objectives and a 
reluctance to adopt a trial-and-error approach (Furukawa et al., 1995), leading to a 
predisposition to maintain the status quo. Referring to Baumol (1993) and Chong 
and Lopez-de-Silanes (2002), the aversion to revising regulations once installed 
limits ‘regulatory risk’ but also raises the possibility that whatever regulations are 
enacted will favour the incumbent. These are particularly relevant points as the 
simulation is designed to estimate whether the status quo will endure and if JP will 
be favoured. Megginson and Netter (2001) claim that market solutions lead to 
socially preferable outcomes but given the resistance in Japan, the inefficiencies 
produced by the postal system’s current form will be difficult to reduce. 
                                                 
20 Examples include not allowing interconnects to the NTT network for long distance calls and 
banning of strategic pricing to persuade customers to switch providers. 
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3.5.3 Political issues and vested interests 
 A key factor of the postal lobby is the connection between postmasters and 
patron politicians. Postmasters use their chiensei21 to muster political support for 
their electorate’s candidates. In return, postmasters are awarded with prestige, 
financial rewards, and other benefits (Maclachlan, 2006). This system is 
entrenched22 and perpetuates conservative attitudes supporting the status quo. 
Vote gathering is subject to performance appraisal; should a postmaster fail 
to reach targets, results are publicised and benefits lost (Maclachlan, 2006). This is 
a manifest example of some of the issues that Dyck (2001), Eisenhardt (1989a), and 
Megginson and Kay (2000) described relating to poor governance chains and the 
effect of insider manipulation upon reform.  
 Such relationships are not limited to postmasters. Support businesses that 
service postal needs23 are awarded contracts by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications and granted exclusive rights to service regional post offices. It is 
not uncommon for the senior managers of these support companies to be retired 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications bureaucrats (Maclachlan, 2006). 
This system of amakudari strengthens the postal lobby as privatisation would 
reduce economic rents realisable to outgoing bureaucrats.  
Furukawa et al. (1995) also noted the tendency for Japanese bureaucracies 
to maintain the status quo, ostensibly for self-preservation. In other cases such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom, regulatory offices were disbanded once 
their purpose had been fulfilled, yet in Japan corresponding agencies were 
essentially left intact after reforms had been delivered (Furukawa et al., 1995). This 
is exacerbated by language phrased as guidelines and indications rather than 
concrete statements. Additionally, the system of checks and balances can be more 
easily corrupted where an industry is administered by a single ministry (Furukawa 
et al., 1995).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) make two important assertions regarding 
political benefits: monopolies tend to be large, and loss-making organisations can 
be valuable to politicians who maintain them. With respect to JP, Dyck’s work on 
governance chains is exemplified here as the lack of appropriate accountability 
                                                 
21 Connections to the local community. 
22 Many postmasters pass on their position through bloodlines.  
23 Examples include suppliers, ATM maintenance, and cleaning services. 
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produces a set of moral hazards. JP booked a net loss of ¥814bn in fiscal 2006 
(Japan Post Group, 2007), predominately from a lack of performance-based 
incentives (Maclachlan, 2006). At the inter-business level, contracts for public 
works are funded through government bonds purchased by JP and amakudari 
positions exist both in the appointed construction companies and JP; a relationship 
Koizumi labelled the ‘iron triangle’ (Mishima, 2005). 
Benefactors of this arrangement argue that universal service and other social 
benefits are the result of a state-run system. They contend that deposit insurance, 
reduced rates for newspaper and magazine delivery, house calls to the elderly and 
infirm, and universal service would deteriorate under privatisation (Maclachlan, 
2006). The postal lobby expounds JP as the embodiment of traditional Japanese 
culture and virtues24, and privatisation for the sake of profits would be a terrible 
cultural loss. These points formed some of the key arguments the postal lobby used 
to gain public support (Maclachlan, 2006). 
3.6 Potential Difficulties for Reform 
Koizumi foresaw postal privatisation as a way forward, particularly so with 
respect to dismantling the aforementioned political issues and vested interests. Yet 
despite arguments for change and Koizumi’s political will, several factors may 
contribute to making reforms harder to implement. 
In terms of economic difficulties, one problem is the state of competition 
within the financial sector: private banking is highly competitive, creating lower 
spreads and generating poor risk-return ratios (Takenaka, 2007). Low spreads 
reduce the ability to provision against high levels of non-performing loans. 
Privatising JPB into this market with its attendant advantages may destabilise the 
current equilibrium as it would seek to reduce exposure to government debt.  
 Furthermore, disposing of government debt will create disturbances in the 
market itself (Takenaka, 2007). The policies and incentives ensconced in the postal 
system were designed to attract public savings and thus provide the state an avenue 
for targeted credit (Takenaka, 2007). Targeted credit creates poor incentives 
regarding fund management and can threaten the health of the financial sector 
(Caprio et al., 1993). As a private bank, JPB would likely seek higher profits and 
                                                 
24 Although the post office is in fact based on the British system and the loudly lauded services only 
appeared after initial calls for reform began to surface (Maclachlan, 2006). 
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less exposure to government debt (Vollmer, Dietrich, & Bebenroth, 2009). New 
profit-centred objectives would reduce the pool of savings national and regional 
governments have access to, causing difficulties for regional authorities who are 
largely dependent on federal grants, subsidies and loans (Jones, 2003).  
 Curiously, despite a stagnant economy, there is not a wide call for reforms 
(Takenaka, 2007). Many of the true costs of the recession have not been felt by the 
public due to numerous policies to maintain employment. Wood (1995) 
demonstrates that in New Zealand, a sense of crisis was an important catalyst in 
driving reform. Without this perception, complacence and inertia can take hold and 
thus make reforms harder to implement.  
Moving on to a more political focus, other than the previously mentioned 
postal lobby and the barrier they represent to privatisation, another very powerful 
lobby group is the construction lobby. The construction industry employs about 
10% of the workforce and public works account for most of the transfers from 
national to regional governments (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000). In addition, subsidies 
to regional governments are distorted towards public works (Jones, 2003). 
Construction officials who go into politics tend to do well, and amakudari postings 
are common (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000). Most of the funding is provided through 
JGBs and with future funding uncertain it is quite likely that this group will strongly 
resist reforms. Incidentally, Peng (2002) notes that policies are forged in LDP 
councils, not in cabinet, and such councils are often populated by interest-
representing members. These factors may implicitly affect the initial setting of the 
simulation by creating a stronger ‘resistance bloc’ that will seek to stall reform 
efforts. 
3.6.1 Potential difficulties in applying New Zealand reforms 
Whilst the above are general difficulties towards implementing reforms in 
Japan, there are also particular complications in applying New Zealand-style 
reforms. It is important to highlight these as there are several parallels between the 
New Zealand reforms and the proposals generated by the Koizumi administration. 
With respect to contracts, a strong legal system with a well-developed 
method of defining and enforcing contracts is important (Caprio et al., 1993). 
However, Japan’s index value in contract enforcement is significantly weaker than 
New Zealand’s (The Heritage Foundation, 2009a, 2009b). Contracts in Japan are 
written in more general terms and the legal system is not as suited to business 
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litigation. By itself, this may not be cause for concern but—as Chapter Five will 
show—New Zealand’s approach was strongly based on the principle of 
contractualism and therefore expecting the same outcomes in a weaker environment 
may be misguided. 
Likewise, where corporate governance is contract based, Schick (2006) 
argues that traditional public service values suffer as shirking may occur if an 
individual’s responsibilities are not specifically stated. It is plausible therefore to 
suggest that privatisation based on contractual relationships may lead to the 
exchange of one form of economic waste (traditional public service inefficiencies) 
for another (lost productivity through non-specified obligations). This would not 
alleviate the moral hazard syndrome as identified by Child-Hill and Fujita (2000), 
but rather present it in a different guise.  
Schick (2006) raises another point: contracting is not costless and as Japan’s 
courts are said to be less effective than New Zealand’s, the costs of such reform 
may be higher. On a more theoretical note it should be stated that every part of New 
Zealand’s reforms were designed to strengthen contractual relationships (Schick, 
2006). The New Zealand experience draws on transaction cost economics (TCE), 
as institutions arose as a result of seeking the most efficient governance structure 
(Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008; Williamson, 2000). However, examining the 
Japanese postal system under an institutional lens, it could be argued that TCE is 
not the most appropriate model to apply since its assumptions are not firmly met. 
Rather it appears that the multiple evolutionary stable equilibria view (Kingston & 
Caballero, 2009) describes the Japanese situation more accurately. If the conditions 
for TCE are not met, gains from reforms whose foundations are based upon a solid 
contractual understanding of obligations and ability to enforce them may be limited.  
 New Zealand-style reforms are unsuitable where shortcomings in a 
country’s management systems exist (Schick, 2006) and it may therefore be 
imprudent to directly apply them to JP given the corruption of the organisation 
(Postal service rife with corruption, 2004). Schick asserts that when one’s 
employment depends upon interpersonal connections, informality thrives. Given 
that postmasters often inherit their positions, contractualism may be futile. Schick 
also states that informality is a part of culture and that it would likely persist even 
if the conditions that allowed it to flourish in the first place were eliminated. As 
close ties between government and business have been maintained since the Meiji 
Restoration, this bond would be very difficult to break. Finally, and on a 
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behavioural level, in order for contractualism to succeed, individuals need to be 
accustomed to an environment of contractual rules and have an ingrained respect 
for them (Schick, 2006). The Japanese postal system does not appear to be such an 
environment and may well prove to be resistant to the New Zealand-style 
contractualism.  
Turning now to the matter of corporate governance (CG), Child-Hill and 
Fujita’s (2000) ‘moral hazard syndrome’ describes some of the sources of inertia 
opposing reform. Japanese corporate governance uses the wider group to subsidise 
‘losers’ and corporate failure is rare (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000). As it stands, 
introducing the Anglo-American model of CG that encourages autonomous action 
may conflict with the established formal and informal constraints of the 
organisation. When such conflicts arise, it has been noted that the resulting shift in 
governance practices is less than intended (Williamson, 2000).  
Other evidence shows that rapid disposal of non-performing debt, 
addressing minority shareholder needs, and implementing more difficult changes 
quickly can expedite changes to CG (Kikeri & Nellis, 2004). However Japanese 
models are in direct contrast: the ‘ever-greening’ of debt (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002), 
the tendency to overlook minority shareholders (Miyajima & Kuroki, 2005), and 
the primary focus on stakeholder wealth (Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008) are all 
aspects of Japanese CG that would likely create resistance to what the literature 
advocates. Furthermore, New Zealand’s reforms were designed to replace 
relationship-style meetings (Schick, 2006); Japanese systems emphasise 
relationship maintenance (Matsuura et al., 2003). Schick (2006) also contends that 
part of the New Zealand experience was to replace ideas of civic duty and 
responsibility with accountability for results. Were this model imposed on Japanese 
postmasters, it may affect their public standing which could result in resistance. 
These points are implicitly relevant to the simulation as many of the changes 
proposed were designed to alter the institutional environment and correspondingly 
CG practices. The reluctance to adopt such changes by way of path dependency is 
a factor that may polarise the inputs of ‘resistance forces’ in the simulation. 
Japan’s inclination is often towards stakeholder wealth maximisation 
(Takenaka, 2007). Whilst Miyajima and Kuroki (2005) argue that foreign holdings 
of shares in Japanese companies are rising, and McGuire and Dow (2009) suggest 
that this is pressuring the stakeholder wealth system, Yoshikawa and McGuire 
(2008) note that introducing change to Japanese CG is a slow process. Inertia stems 
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in part from the fact that corporate boards in Japan have a very low frequency of 
outsider participation, which is in direct contrast to New Zealand, and that 
acquiescing to foreign models of governance runs the risk of distancing the 
company from its local support base (Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008). Put another 
way, the entrenched nature of Japanese CG, the observed preference to focus on 
stakeholders, and the lack of outsider influence at the board level, may dilute 
political action in reforming the postal system into an efficient, profit-orientated 
organisation. 
Given the preceding points, altering the institutions of contractualism and 
CG in Japan to align more with New Zealand may be difficult. Nevertheless, there 
is a one particular facet of the New Zealand reforms that may assuage some of the 
concerns of reform opponents and allow greater overall reform to materialize. As 
Section Seven of the SOE Act relates to subsidisation of socially-oriented services, 
Chapter Nine will explore some simulated scenarios of applying this feature and 
discuss the impact it might have on outcomes. 
Finally, one peculiarity of Japanese politics is the frequency the Prime 
Minister changes, which presents a heightened possibility of progress being undone. 
The review now draws attention to this phenomenon and other forms of political 
influence.  
3.7 Political Influences and the Effects of Political Flux  
Much of Koizumi’s ability to produce change is attributed to his popularity. 
Declining support makes reforms harder to implement and the public has regarded 
the performance of post-Koizumi premiers with a certain amount of rancour (Peng, 
2002). Furthermore, as bureaucrats share close ties to politicians, meaningful 
changes are more difficult to realise (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000). Peng (2002) shows 
that reforms are often diluted and delivered piecemeal, and that the executive office 
has little ability to push mandates through public policy.  
One of the major hindrances the reformer faces is that an individual’s 
political lifespan is often much shorter than that of the vested interests he or she 
opposes. Even successful actions can later be undone, one example being the 
removal of Makiko Tanaka25  from the Koizumi administration and subsequent 
reinstatement under the Abe administration (Peng, 2002). 
                                                 
25 A postal rebel. 
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Another issue is the autonomy and freedom afforded to lower levels of 
government. Government departments in Japan are often placed in competition for 
influence and enjoy considerable freedom (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000). In this sense, 
the system operates similarly to a business where effective initiatives are commonly 
copied (Child-Hill & Fujita, 2000). Note, however, that the Japanese government 
is far less transparent than New Zealand’s (The Heritage Foundation, 2009a). In 
light of such opaque autonomy, moral hazards pertaining to the effectiveness of 
reform may arise. Maclachlan (2011) also notes that the postal lobby has many 
representatives within several government departments and policy-making organs. 
Despite stated intentions to use privatisation proceeds to retire debt, Kikeri 
and Nellis (2004) argue that there is often a powerful temptation to use receipts for 
other purposes. Given the Japanese government’s penchant for public spending and 
the current macro-economic conditions it raises questions about the resolve of 
lawmakers26. Indeed, yielding to such temptation would be unfortunate as previous 
losses in real estate are likely to dampen the effects of fiscal stimulus in terms of 
the multiplier effect (Caprio et al., 1993). 
These points are relevant to postal reform as following Koizumi’s departure, 
the vested interests remained in place and given the avenues through which the 
postal lobby can re-engineer policy and the current macro-level concerns, it 
produces an opportunity to roll back some of the initial progress. Indeed, this is 
what the simulation will show: whether reforms can be advanced or if they will be 
turned back.  
3.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 This chapter reviews a sample of the literature relevant to conducting a study 
of institutional change relating to postal reform in two countries. The literature 
shows that case studies can assist in theory development and offer empirical 
evidence. It also shows that case-based methodologies are common in IE studies. 
 Although the privatisation literature offers a wealth of knowledge, 
governments do not appear to be learning from others’ mistakes and the reason why 
such experience is overlooked offers a potential avenue of research. The results of 
privatisation have also been shown to vary considerably depending upon state 
                                                 
26 The recent East Japan earthquake and accompanying reconstruction budget further complicates 
matters.  
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ideology. The distribution of economic welfare post-privatisation fosters 
considerable debate; some authors suggest gains should be equally shared, and 
some maintain that that those willing to bear the risks should be the primary 
benefactors. Continued government ownership of natural monopolies also presents 
disagreement. Some contend that private hands would be better placed at the helm, 
while others maintain that an appropriate combination of regulatory conditions 
would produce the same result. 
 Less divisive is the matter of preparing the regulatory environment; the 
works reviewed appear to agree that industry regulations need to be attended to 
prior to releasing state assets. The need for strong governance chains and the 
presence of outsiders is also an area where there is a high degree of consensus.  
 In terms of future strands of research, the literature commonly shows 
improved savings rates following financial deregulation. New Zealand’s case does 
not appear to follow this pattern and examining the cause may prove valuable. The 
decision of when to privatise, at what rate, and over how many stages poses an 
interesting line of study. The influence of macro-economic conditions on the 
motivation to reform offers a third avenue. 
 Relating to the issues pursued in this study, the review discusses a number 
of points that also arise in both the New Zealand and Japanese cases - thus providing 
details offers empirical evidence for the respective claims. The review also 
highlights several points that will ultimately be incorporated into the simulation, 
being expressed in the component issues, player identities, or factors that may help 
determine initial player inputs.  
 In closing, the placement of this thesis in the literature addresses gaps 
identified in the New Zealand experience and establishes the context for 
institutional environment identification where the changes observed in New 
Zealand and changes predicted in Japan can be compared. Attention is now directed 
to the manner in which progress in both countries will be traced, including a primer 
on the use of simulation analyses. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methods used in analysing the institutional 
changes of postal reform in New Zealand and Japan. The New Zealand experience 
is well documented although there are some gaps. Japanese postal reform, however, 
has yet to be concluded. In order to produce a post-reform institutional equilibrium 
for JP a model that simulates expected changes is needed.  
Eight research questions were presented in Chapter One, repeated here for 
convenience. 
1. What was the institutional environment in New Zealand prior to reforms? 
2. What drove reform in New Zealand?  
3. How were reforms implemented and how was resistance to reforms 
overcome? 
4. How did the new institutional environment compare against the old one? 
5. What was the institutional environment in Japan prior to reform? 
6. What drove, and continues to drive reform in Japan? 
7. How likely is it that full reforms will be implemented and will the resulting 
reform environment be internally consistent? 
8. If the Japanese reforms are internally inconsistent, what insights can we 
apply from the New Zealand experience to overcome these problems?  
Questions One through Four will all be answered in Chapter Five. Question 
One will be addressed by drawing on historical information – primarily from 
academic literature. Questions Two and Three follow the same pattern but where 
the literature is thinner they also utilise data from interviews with subject experts 
processed via the general inductive approach. With respect to Question Four, the 
new and old institutional environments will be compared by using the literature to 
create an image of the post-reform environment in the same manner as Question 
One. Performance indicators (profit figures and labour efficiency, for example) will 
then be applied to measure the differences. 
The research questions regarding the Japanese case will be approached in 
much the same way. Chapter Six answers Questions Five and Six. However, as the 
Japanese case has benefited from considerable media coverage, media reports will 
be used to supplement the literature relevant for answering Question Five; the media 
reports themselves will be processed via the general inductive approach and the 
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core sentence approach. Question Six will be answered through a mixture of 
secondary and primary data: literature, media reports, and expert interview data. 
Question Seven will be examined in Chapter Nine by constructing a post-reform 
institutional environment from the outcomes of my simulation model 27 . The 
mechanics of the model are based upon the methods commonly used within multi-
player multi-issue negotiations (discussed later). Finally, Question Eight will also 
be answered in Chapter Nine via an applied sensitivity analysis of the simulation 
where changes to player inputs will be made to establish how much of a change is 
needed to constitute a significant change in outcome.  
What follows is a more detailed explanation of the specific methods 
employed in this study, beginning with a brief look at the overarching theory of 
institutional economics. The chapter then presents the basis for constructing a 
model for institutional change, how details will be gathered for both countries, and 
discussion of the simulation including its antecedents and overall structure. 
4.2 Theoretical Background: Institutional Economics 
IE is a specialised branch of economics that analyses the ‘rules of the game’ 
within society and the influence they have upon human interaction (Kingston & 
Caballero, 2009). Whilst it uses the same fundamental tenets as classical economics 
IE can produce more situation-specific analyses (Furubotn & Richter, 1991). An 
institution is a man-made constraint upon human behaviour (Kingston & Caballero, 
2009). Informal constraints include norms and culture; formal constraints include 
rules, contracts, and laws (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). 
IE draws from a number of spheres of economic thought including, but not 
limited to: agency theory, transaction cost economics, property rights, and 
evolutionary institutional economics. IE can be considered an eclectic science that 
covers a range of theories and employs a variety of analyses depending upon the 
research topic (Furubotn & Richter, 1991; Groenewegen, Kerstholt, & Nagelkerke, 
1995; Klein, 1999).  
                                                 
27 Outcomes of the simulation can be found in Chapter Eight. 
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4.2.1 The differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional 
economics 
As IE has advanced there has been an increasing divide regarding problem 
definition, explanatory variables, and methods (Groenewegen et al., 1995), 
resulting in the distinction between Old Institutional Economics (OIE) and New 
Institutional Economics (NIE).  
4.2.1.1 Old institutional economics 
The primary focus of OIE is to understand the process of institutional 
change, with little identification of individual actors within the institutional 
framework (Groenewegen et al., 1995). The underlying assumption is that at any 
given level of aggregation, behaviour as explained by economic theory is 
interdependent and therefore “non-univocal” (Groenewegen et al., 1995, p. 469). 
Regarding institutional change, OIE looks more at the change process itself than 
the influence of the institution, even though some institutions foster change whilst 
others discourage it (Groenewegen et al., 1995). Methods often include a 
multidisciplinary approach and whilst this creates a particularly rich picture, it can 
create issues regarding rigour (Groenewegen et al., 1995). 
4.2.1.2 New institutional economics 
NIE by comparison seeks to explain the institution itself through classical 
and neo-classical economic theories (Groenewegen et al., 1995). The role of 
individual actors is given much greater credence, with the belief that preferences in 
the real world can be influenced by incumbent institutions. For expediency, the 
utility maximising individual is the base unit of analysis and bounded rationality 
and opportunism are both key factors in determining behaviour (Groenewegen et 
al., 1995). Where OIE tends to be multidisciplinary, NIE leans towards the more 
individualistic and deductive economic lenses. Hypotheses are generated and 
historical examples are used to support them.  
4.2.1.3 A pluralistic approach 
North (1973, 1994) supports integrating these two schools of thought into a 
more pluralistic form of research. North’s work uses the institution itself as a datum 
where the individual is considered to be a utility maximiser (as cited in 
Groenewegen et al., 1995) and argues that to produce optimal institutional 
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equilibria, scarcity and changes in transaction costs are the catalytic drivers of 
institutional change. 
Interestingly, North notes that whilst these forces should produce efficient 
outcomes, there are two reasons why inefficient institutional arrangements may 
prevail: one resulting from a free-rider problem, and the second through conflicts 
of interest and differences in the bargaining strength of players (as cited in 
Groenewegen et al., 1995). He also notes this second point is sufficient to explain 
the existence of inefficient institutional equilibria in both the long and short term. 
In closing, Groenewegen et al. (1995) conclude: 
It is necessary to start the analysis with the institutional environment in 
which the actors are embedded. Only then the pressures toward efficient 
governance structures can be made visible and only then the set of 
alternative governance structures of which actors can choose become known 
to the researcher (p. 474). 
 This study conforms to the statement above and does not make a distinction 
between OIE and NIE; referring to the applied pluralistic approach simply as 
‘Institutional Economics’. 
The appropriateness of IE as a theoretical background can be evidenced by 
citing some of its publications. Aligica (2006) shows that through institutional 
mapping, players can be identified and support or opposition to a particular issue 
can be clarified. Comparative studies are well suited to IE; noting the differing 
institutional environments where organisations conduct their activities has been 
used to determine whether certain lessons and experiences can be transferred 
effectively (FitzRoy & Acs, 1992; Hu, 2006).  
Groenewegen and De Jong (2008) discuss the potential of two particular 
strands of IE analysis as explicators of institutional change, arguing that IE is a 
strong foundation in a multidisciplinary approach when uncertainty and conflict is 
high. Other studies use IE to examine what changes are occurring within a country 
and why it can take so much time to implement them (Blomström & La Croix, 
2006). IE features in reform studies examining when certain institutional settings 
can be used by supporters or detractors to engender a shift in the status quo or 
preserve it (Schellenbach, 2007).  
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IE therefore forms the theoretical backbone of this study, the chapter now 
delves deeper into IE by discussing matters relevant for constructing an overall 
model for New Zealand and Japan’s postal reform experiences 
4.3 Issues in Modelling Institutional Change 
As this thesis is a comparative study of institutional change, this section 
discusses the theories directly involved in creating such a model 28 . One 
complication that arises, however, is the fact that I have the luxury of viewing the 
New Zealand experience in hindsight where outcomes are known, but not for Japan. 
The proposed model for Japan therefore differs slightly as it must also develop a 
method by which outcomes can be estimated but otherwise follows the same 
progression of issues leading to reforms and eventual changes. The following 
discussion looks first at modelling institutional change from an overall perspective, 
and then in finer detail. The simulation, being a very large section, is detailed later 
in the thesis.  
4.3.1 Modelling institutional change: A broad perspective 
When examining institutional change, one of the most fundamental 
questions is ‘what creates the drive for institutional change?’ In answering this, IE 
provides two particularly important notions: preferences can change over time 
(Johannessen, 2008; North, 1995), and that performance is affected by institutions 
– most commonly through historical links and the political framework (Johannessen, 
2008). In terms of evolving preferences, the impetus for change may derive from 
something as simple as no longer preferring the current arrangement. The 
motivation that drove a government to install protectionist policies, for example, 
may no longer apply if its domestic industries have reached a certain level of 
development (Johannessen, 2008). In terms of historical links, one of the most 
common is technological. Technology has a direct impact upon transaction costs 
and therefore performance (Johannessen, 2008). The problem, however, is that 
people often become ‘locked-in’ to the technology they are familiar with, and as 
the technology evolves (with the potential to reduce transaction costs) the current 
institutional framework becomes less appropriate (Johannessen, 2008). Further 
                                                 
28 An applied version of the model developed here can be found in my article “Cranes and Kiwis: 
Postal system privatization and institutional realignment.” 
DOI 10.1080/2329194X.2016.1163641 
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theoretical support is provided by North (2005), who notes that changes in relative 
prices are one of the most powerful motivators for social changes and that 
technology is a major cause of changing relative prices. At a high level of 
aggregation, the impetus for institutional change is therefore argued to be a result 
of some influence exogenous to the institutional environment that results in the 
incumbent framework becoming less efficient (Libecap, 1989; Ostrom, 2005). 
Once there is sufficient motivation for change, the next question that can be 
asked is how change occurs. Within institutional change theory, Kingston and 
Caballero (2009) identify two high-order categories: a design-based approach, and 
an evolutionary approach. The former refers to new institutions that are 
purposefully designed and implemented (for example, in a political process), while 
the latter refers to a more gradual, less deliberate process. As postal reform in both 
New Zealand and Japan entails a raft of purpose-specific legislation, the design-
based approach applies to this study.  
Suppose for a moment that an exogenous parameter affects the institutional 
environment, which sufficiently motivates change and a new set of institutions are 
installed, for instance, via a designed-based approach. Two issues then confront the 
researcher: how to study the system at point ‘A’ and point ‘B’, and how to study 
the change mechanism between points ‘A’ and ‘B’. Aoki (2000) denotes these 
issues respectively as the synchronic problem and the diachronic problem. More 
specifically, the synchronic problem relates to understanding the institutional 
environment at a point in time, and the diachronic problem relates to understanding 
how institutional change occurs. In doing so, Groenewegen and De Jong (2008) 
argue that TCE can address the synchronic problem, whilst comparative 
institutional analysis (CIA) can help address the diachronic problem. 
With respect to TCE, the essential hypothesis is that the governance 
structure that minimizes transaction costs is the efficient one and will hold until an 
exogenous change renders it otherwise (Williamson, 2000). In terms of the 
synchronic problem, advocates of TCE therefore suggest an analysis of the 
governance structures present within the institutional environment as the theory 
argues that the most applicable governance structures will arise in relation to the 
current institutional environment (Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). TCE, however, 
is not equipped to deal with institutional change when there is uncertainty: suppose 
that an external change prompts a shift in the institutional environment, without 
knowing what the future holds it is entirely possible that players may not be able to 
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select the efficient governance structures (Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). 
Therefore, in the presence of uncertainty TCE is better used to explain what is and 
what was, not what will be29. 
Where there are two distinct equilibria to compare, TCE can be quite useful. 
Changes in transaction costs can be measured directly by observing differences in 
production costs, transaction costs, quality levels, labour efficiency, levels of 
technological innovation, and other such measurements (Groenewegen & De Jong, 
2008). Groenewegen and De Jong (2008) also maintain that modelling with TCE 
can be adjusted to fit to both high and low levels of aggregation, presumably by 
adjusting the performance measures to suit. Nevertheless, by directly comparing the 
two equilibria with these transaction costs, the researcher can infer whether a 
change in the institutional environment has improved performance.  
CIA, developed by Aoki (2000), looks at the process of shifting from one 
institutional equilibrium to another. It utilises a form of evolutionary game theory 
where utility-maximising players (technically cost-minimising) organise 
themselves and opt for institutional arrangements that minimise costs. As players 
interact with each other, they gradually come to share the same views and the 
system eventually reaches an equilibrium. It is particularly important to note that 
Aoki’s application differs from traditional game theory as players are assumed not 
to have full knowledge of the objective structure of the game which therefore 
prevents the use of backwards induction (Aoki, 2000; Groenewegen & De Jong, 
2008). Instead, players interact with each other over time, employing strategies 
from a set of alternatives; an equilibrium is reached once none of the involved 
parties has an incentive to change their strategy (Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). 
One key limitation of CIA, however, is its assumption of a smooth, gradual 
progress towards a new equilibrium through a steady learning process. In reality, 
political power plays and shifts in public support, for example, are wont to occur 
and this can result in ‘bumpy’ institutional shifts (Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). 
In cases of design-based institutional change, the very nature of designing new 
institutions can be political and therefore warrants a different approach to 
determining expected outcomes. Accordingly, my simulation model is politically-
based and allows for the influence of such effects. 
                                                 
29 For this reason, TCE is sufficient for the New Zealand case: being historical there is no need to 
predict its outcomes. 
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In summary, TCE and CIA are both useful theories within the field of 
institutional change. TCE allows for the comparison of two discrete equilibria and 
can be used to infer an improvement (or deterioration) in the institutional 
environment. However, it is not able to explain the process of institutional change 
as it does not describe the ideas and preferences of change instigators. Nor does it 
cover the tactics and strategies players use to foster change (Groenewegen & De 
Jong, 2008). CIA offers a contribution in this respect, but is limited because it is not 
designed to cope with political power play (Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). Aoki 
himself also notes that game theory is, in all likelihood, unable to provide a 
complete theory of institutions. He argues that “to understand why one equilibrium 
is chosen and not others, we are required to make use of comparative and historical 
information and engage in inductive reasoning as well” (Aoki, 2001, p. 3). 
Groenewegen and De Jong (2008) also note that in cases of high complexity and 
uncertainty, a multi-disciplinary analysis can be beneficial. In such a setting 
researchers therefore need to examine history and apply an approach other than pure 
game theory. At the same time, the chosen method also needs to be able to 
incorporate the influence of political bargaining to overcome the shortcomings of 
CIA. This is why the thesis uses a multi-disciplinary case study analysis with a 
particular view to the historical information in both New Zealand and Japan, and 
develops a new approach for estimating the new institutional environment in the 
case of Japan.  
4.3.2 Modelling institutional change: An operational 
perspective 
One notion that continually surfaces in IE is path-dependency, that is to say, 
history matters as past actions influence future actions (Aoki, 2001; Blomström & 
La Croix, 2006; Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008; Johannessen, 2008; North, 2005). 
Since this study examines institutional change with an implied ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
state, and since time is linear (at least to the best of our understanding), it is logical 
to model institutional change as a linear process divided into a number of stages. 
The following therefore discusses the theoretical underpinnings necessary to 
construct such a model. 
The first step is to define the institutions prior to reform. As mentioned 
earlier, North (2005) describes institutions as formal or informal. By definition, 
formal institutions are explicitly written down (contracts and legislation for 
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example) and thus identifying them is a simple matter. Informal institutions can be 
identified by examining the relevant literature, such as in Groenewegen and De 
Jong (2008) and Blomström and La Croix (2006), or through direct contact with 
knowledgeable individuals, such as in Maclachlan (2011). One minor complication 
is that institutions can evolve over time (Johannessen, 2008) and this may lead to 
confusion surrounding when to set the ‘before’ state. For a design-based approach 
this is less of an issue: new legislation, for example, comes into effect at a specific 
time and thus redefine at least the formal institutions at a distinct point. Pre-reform 
institutions could therefore be considered those to be in place prior to the 
application of new legislation. 
The notion of institutional change implies that there are parties dissatisfied 
with the status quo, that is, the institutional environment is creating problems. 
Consequently, the next part of the model should examine the issues being created. 
In this regard, Johannessen (2008) argues that a ‘historical causal process’ is a 
useful tool. A historical causal process maintains that the cause of ‘X’ was ‘Y’; 
recall that North (2005) argues that an exogenous parameter shift can render an 
institution inefficient or obsolete. In an environment which has been influenced by 
an external force, two further concepts that are important are ‘cognitive legitimacy’ 
and the ‘pattern perspective of institutional change’. Cognitive legitimacy refers to 
what people take for granted: informally, ‘the way things are done around here’. A 
cognitively closed system is less able to learn and adjust to the outside world 
(Johannessen, 2008). The pattern perspective of institutional change is based on a 
historical causal process where “thought and action structures can be maintained 
despite being unproductive, since our habits and historical attachments maintain 
and reinforce ways of being which are obviously not optimal” (Johannessen, 2008, 
p. 30). These patterns can be reinforced where cognitive legitimacy is low; one 
empirical example drawn from Groenewegen and De Jong (2008) shows that the 
issues in Nordic road management reform were exacerbated owing to a strong 
labour union insisting on maintaining the current system. Adding to the pattern 
perspective of institutional change, Blomström and La Croix (2006) also note that 
change is only likely to occur when a critical majority of individuals and 
organisations are convinced that the current framework can no longer meet 
expectations and that a viable alternative exists. In other words, the two components 
of incumbent institutions and issues arising thereof can be linked as follows: a 
change in the external environment causes the governing institutions to become less 
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effective (historical causal process), this inefficiency can be exacerbated through 
continuing the same behaviours (pattern perspective of institutional change), which 
is in turn negatively reinforced as levels of cognitive openness decrease.  
Suppose now that an external change has created a series of issues – a 
historical causal process. Johannessen (2008) maintains that explaining the stability 
of a system rests upon expectations, meaning that the failure to deliver on those 
expectations can undermine the stability of the institutional environment. 
Blomström and La Croix (2006) state that when an institutional environment can 
no longer address the relevant issues, a wider call for reform arises. Commons, in 
Kaufman (2007), concurs, arguing that individuals or groups will then seek to 
implement change through the courts or legislation. As institutions are human-
devised constraints this directly implies that a series of proposed changes will have 
to be supplied and deliberated over (in a democratic system at least). In creating a 
model, one important point to note is that at this stage the causal process now 
transforms from a historical causal process to a functional causal process (if one 
does ‘A’, one will get ‘B’). That is, up until this point, past events have driven the 
discussion; from here onwards, the process is driven by the expectation held by 
reform instigators that the proposed new institutions will alleviate the current issues. 
In other words, there are now three links in the chain: the failure of the institutional 
environment leads to a range of issues, which in turn drives reformers to propose 
changes to the system that must be negotiated over. 
One of IE’s major contributions is the notion of transaction costs. 
Johannessen (2008) argues that transactions costs in the political field are related to 
the establishment, maintenance, and change of power either within a system or 
between a system and its environment. Importantly, he also argues that “resistance 
and opportunistic behaviour may ensue when transaction costs and transformation 
costs are changed” (Johannessen, 2008, p. 29). Blomström and La Croix (2006) add 
that with respect to institutional change, some political groups may face loses to 
their wealth and/or power and therefore resist. North (2005) concurs, adding that 
some organisations’ very survival may depend on maintaining the current 
institutional framework and will therefore apply resources to defend against any 
proposed change. With respect to institutional change theory relating to group 
decision making, Kingston and Caballero (2009) note that the vested interests 
fighting for the preservation of the status quo may themselves have been created 
by the very institutional environment they seek to defend. In the same strain of 
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theory, Kantor (1998) states that constituent groups will often lobby their 
representative politicians to change or preserve the rules and that these politicians 
are sensitive to their needs, but also face their own set of constraints and objectives. 
The implication of all these contributions to institutional change theory is that 
before a new arrangement can be settled upon, there will likely have to be a number 
of concessions and compromises applied to the proposals. In terms of 
operationalising such a claim, Ostrom (2005) suggests that institutional change in 
a group decision context is a question of the involved parties weighing the costs of 
benefits of a new system and generating a ‘minimum coalition’ – a majority vote, 
which is in itself very similar to Black’s (1958) median voter theorem. From a 
modelling perspective this produces further linear stages in the sense that 
negotiations will (most likely) lead to some dilutions and also gives rise to questions 
of how resistance can be overcome. 
Suppose then, that a negotiation regarding the implementation of a new set 
of institutions takes place. Assuming the proposals have not been entirely defeated, 
the manner of implementation must be considered. Institutional change theory 
suggests that changes are often delayed until an implementation strategy has been 
decided on; two common outcomes are a simultaneous reformation of all 
interlocking-institutions, or a sequential process that can result in a transitory period 
which is internally inconsistent (Blomström & La Croix, 2006). Blomström and La 
Croix (2006) also assert that a country is more able to reform if the reformers and 
society understand that the proposed institutions are superior to the existing ones. 
The theory also maintains that actors will be more likely to adopt new ideas or alter 
preferences if they are unhappy with the current situation (Groenewegen & De Jong, 
2008). The preceding points could therefore suggest that negotiations then lead to 
a series of implemented reforms agreed upon by a set of players who are trying to 
maximise their individual payoffs (Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). These reforms 
then alter the institutional environment, at which point it can be argued that an 
institutional change has occurred and a comparison between initial and final stages 
can be made. 
4.3.2.1 Theoretical overlap 
As the theory of institutional change can cover a wide range of contexts it has 
the potential to overlap with a large number of other theories. Since this study 
examines the economic issues of postal reform relating to institutional change 
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through a design-based process, there is considerable overlap between institutional 
change theory and privatisation theory. In this application, therefore, institutional 
economics and institutional change are the guiding overall theories with the 
fundamental hypothesis being that an inappropriate institutional environment leads 
to reforms, which leads to a new environment. Nevertheless, there will be 
implications for elements of privatisation theory since the New Zealand and 
Japanese experiences are discussed in considerable detail. It is not my intention to 
directly ‘test’ these elements of privatisation theory but as details are provided 
through the case study, they provide contributions of empirical evidence to the 
privatisation literature. A second area of theoretical overlap occurs in the simulation 
stage of the model, which draws and extends upon the theory relating to multi-
player multi-issue negotiations30. For the moment, however, attention is now drawn 
to the overall models for the two countries.  
4.4 The Model for New Zealand 
From the preceding section, we can now illustrate the models that plot the 
course of both countries studied. See Figure 4-1 for New Zealand’s. 
 
Figure 4-1 Institutional change in New Zealand 
 
 The model assumes each element shares a causal relationship with the next. 
That is, the incumbent institutions are argued to cause the issues, just as the drive 
for reform and negotiation is caused by the issues of the initial institutional 
environment. Factors giving rise to initial conditions are considered exogenous.  
 A synthesis of the literature discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Five 
provides information for describing much of the New Zealand experience. However, 
significant gaps appear: whilst there are papers on institutional change in New 
                                                 
30 See Section 4.6, p. 66. 
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Zealand, how resistance to reform was overcome has largely been neglected. The 
matter of why NZP was corporatised but never privatised is another question 
overlooked thus far. Additionally, considering NZP as an example of institutional 
change to which Japan is compared also produces questions that, when examining 
New Zealand in isolation, are not necessary to ask. The interview responses will 
therefore address these gaps.  
4.4.1 Using interviews with subject experts 
Expert interviews are a well-established method of gaining insights in 
economics. Bezemer, Stanikunas, and Zemeckis (2006) use them to design an 
ordered probit model that addresses agricultural reforms in Lithuania. Other reform 
studies using interviews include Donner (2010), Gugushvili (2009), Wilder (2009), 
and Lukauskas and Shimabukuro (2006). Expert opinion features in longitudinal 
studies focusing on inter-temporal labour market dynamics (Weymann, Reinhold, 
& Matthias, 1999). Song (2011), conducts a thematic analysis of Chinese retail 
brands using 16 retail experts to study investment strategies.  
Expert interviews commonly feature in IE. Hirschauer and Zwoli (2008) 
develop a game-theoretic approach for reconstructing incentives for players in a 
setting of economic misconduct. They state that expert interviews are vital for 
determining the technical processes and business practises used in principal-agent 
models. Perkmann (2006) uses interviews to better understand the institutional 
realms of Southern Italy. Lange (2009), studies institutional embeddedness in 
Germany and England where expert interviews improve understanding of the 
institutional environment.  
As mentioned earlier, the major shortfall in the literature concerning the 
New Zealand experience relates to reform resistance and how it was overcome: an 
extensive search shows very few insights and expert participants therefore helped 
to illuminate this otherwise dim area of knowledge, thus answering research 
Question Three. With respect to the drive for reform (research Question Two), the 
literature describes the goals of the state but not their respective importance. These 
unanswered matters were therefore included in the interview questions (see 
Appendix A for questions). Interviews were conducted on a standardised open-
ended basis. Whilst standardisation can complicate coding, it permits similar 
answers amongst respondents to be collated and improves the validity of the data.  
 63 
The following criteria for expert selection were inspired by and adapted 
from Whitefield et al. (2007). Interviewees had to satisfy one or more of the 
following: 
1. their knowledge of NZP was referred to in the literature, 
2. they were employed by an academic institution and had published papers 
surrounding the reforms, 
3. they held a position of authority within the government or NZP itself and 
were involved in the transition, or 
4. they were referred by an interviewed participant satisfying any of the first 
three criteria. 
Four experts for New Zealand were interviewed between July and August, 
2012. Another important point to note is that the simulation model does not apply 
to New Zealand, only Japan31. The experts called upon to assist with the New 
Zealand experience (research Questions One through Four) were different to the 
experts involved in the Japanese side of the thesis. Similarly, the New Zealand 
experts were not involved with matters relating to the simulation. Owing to 
confidentiality clauses in the ethics approval, I am unfortunately unable to disclose 
the names of participants. 
4.4.2 Collecting and processing interview data 
Interviews were conducted in person, or electronically when physical 
meetings were impractical. Regarding the processing method, this study used the 
‘general inductive approach’, described by Thomas (2003). The technique is widely 
cited and outputs are very similar to grounded theory approaches (Thomas, 2003). 
Material from interviews was transcribed from digital audio files and through 
multiple readings, emergent themes and categories32 were revealed and condensed. 
Initial sweeps often produce many categories but further passes enable 
subordination and combination into higher order categories. Not every piece of text 
has to be coded. As with other qualitative methods, the determination of codes is 
not essential prior to data collection. Rather as the reading progresses, excerpts are 
coded under their associated themes as they become apparent.  
                                                 
31 See pages 65 and 94 for specific details on how experts for Japan assisted with this thesis. 
32 With regards to the general inductive approach, the term ‘category’ is interchangeable with the 
term ‘factor’ in explaining phenomena. 
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The general inductive approach often involves reading entire transcripts at 
once. However, the semi-structured nature made it possible to analyse specific 
questions one at a time, which is advocated by Atkins (1984). After multiple 
readings, when coding is completed and categories finalised, results are then 
counted and tabulated (Atkins, 1984). Thomas (2003) prescribes that each category 
be labelled and supplied with a commentary that describes it and its meaning. 
Excerpts from the raw data that support this interpretation are then inserted. 
4.5 The Model for Japan 
The model describing Japan’s experience follows the same path as the New 
Zealand model although the resulting post-reform institutions will be determined 
from the simulation. In very brief terms, the simulation examines key issues and the 
interactions of parties involved in reform negotiations. Expert surveys, interviews 
and media reports provide the data needed for the simulation. By phrasing the issues 
in terms of reform proposals, the probability of each issue’s success can be 
determined as well as an overall probability of success of the reform proposal. 
Figure 4-2 illustrates Japan’s model. 
 
Figure 4-2 Progression of institutional environment in Japan 
 
 
4.5.1 Tracing the course of reforms using media reports 
Postal privatisation enjoys considerable (if sporadic) media attention. These 
reports are a valuable source of information for tracing overall progress as well as 
highlighting the issues most discussed by significant actors including their relative 
stances. These secondary data provide an informative background in addition to 
aiding preliminary issue identification, which were vetted through expert opinion. 
Media reports are a practical tool in economics. Shama (1996) uses 
newspapers to acquire information on companies and identify interview participants. 
Hale (2010) identifies players, issues, and their relative importance through 
newspapers. Heppell, Crines, and Nicholls (2010) analyse newspapers to track 
 65 
voting behaviours of Labour parliamentarians in England. Data from media reports 
surrounding issues and positions also form the crux of the work done by Helbling 
and Tresch (2009) and Kriesi et al. (2006). Media reports are also timelier than 
academic journals. 
Media reports serve two purposes in this thesis. Firstly, they produce a 
chronology of major events that shaped reforms from 2001 and thus contribute to 
answering Questions Five and Six. Secondly, they show vocal players and issues 
and therefore assist in setting up the simulation in Chapter Eight. Interviews with 
subject experts were used to triangulate the data and provide a more illuminating 
picture of the actors, connections, and pressure points regarding privatisation. 
Regional newspapers were eschewed to avoid parochial biases. The two 
primary sources were the Daily Yomiuri and the Nikkei. Some information was 
also drawn from Kyodo News and the Jiji Press. Articles were selected by having 
the words “Japan Post”, covering April 26, 200133 to March 21st, 2014. In total, 
1,913 individual articles were retrieved from the Factiva database and analysed for 
references to issues, actors, and the disclosures of those actors. Editorials were 
referred to only when the article made a direct quotation from a political actor, or 
some other objective statistic. 
Data were processed using the same principles as the general inductive 
approach in conjunction with the core sentence approach (see page 91). Individual 
articles were coded by issues and the actors who discussed them. Individual actors 
were then subordinated to their representative factions. Factions were identified by 
published membership or support and triangulated through expert opinion. Specific 
issues formed subcategories and after successive passes were combined into 
dominant, upper order categories, which were then included in expert interviews 
for verification.  
4.5.2 Expert interviews in the Japanese experience  
Similar to the New Zealand experience, the literature contains gaps that 
benefit from the insights of enlightened individuals. Interviews serve a number of 
purposes in this study. Firstly, they were used to generate a better understanding of 
political dynamics, specifically between different political administrations and 
therefore contribute to answering Questions Five and Six in Chapter Six. Secondly, 
                                                 
33 The date when Koizumi took office. 
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they were used to validate the allocation of a particular actor to a faction. Finally, 
they were used to confirm the validity of issues identified from the media reports 
and determine whether any other primary issues had been omitted – therefore 
contributing to the simulation in Chapter Eight. Expert surveys (discussed later) 
were then used to gather the actual input values for the simulation. 
Interviews were conducted in the same manner as the New Zealand 
interviews, using English or Japanese depending upon the preferred language (see 
Appendix B for questions). The criteria for expert selection were also the same, 
replacing “New Zealand” with “Japan”; three experts were interviewed between 
May 2013 and January 201434. Where factional membership was incongruent with 
the media reports, expert judgements were given preference. Similarly, where 
issues not suggested by the media analysis were uncovered, these were included in 
the input survey.  
4.5.3 Identification of the elements prior to simulation  
Japan’s economic growth since the 1970s has been examined by numerous 
scholars. As such, a large body of work describes the formal and informal 
constraints; incumbent institutions relevant to JP can therefore be drawn from the 
literature, as can the resulting issues. Koizumi’s intended reforms are widely 
available through a number of channels, both public and academic. Accordingly, 
all the information necessary to summarise the initial institutional environment in 
Chapter Six is provided by the literature. We now move on to a discussion of 
simulations and how my model is intended to process negotiations and reveal the 
resulting institutional setting. 
4.6 Introduction to Simulations 
The term ‘simulation’ is broad and with increasing computing power and 
package providers, the pervasiveness and appeal of simulations are growing. 
Fundamentally, a simulation is an abstract representation of a real-world system 
that can develop and evolve. Key features include the ability to create an artificial 
history of events, allowing the user to probe alternative scenarios through parameter 
adjustments. 
Simulations can be tasked to almost every field of study and feature 
extensively in economics. Examples include: asset price movements (Danielsson, 
                                                 
34 Four individuals were actually interviewed, however, one later opted to withdraw from the study. 
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1994), voter preferences on education subsidies (Borck & Wimbersky, 2014), the 
role of patrol vessels in fishing waters (Edwards, Hillary, Hoshino, Pearce, & 
Agnew, 2011), changing inequality and growth preferences (Alesina, Cozzi, & 
Mantovan, 2012), transport policy reform (Kickhöfer, Grether, & Nagel, 2011), 
organisation size (Garibaldi, Constantini, Donadio, & Viarengo, 2006), and tax 
reform (Boeters, 2013).  
Economic reforms also have been studied through simulation. Examples 
include electricity emissions (Fuentes-Bracamontes, 2012), outcome and 
opportunity equality reforms (Ekmekci, 2013), intergenerational welfare and 
benefit analysis (Oguro, Shimasawa, & Takahata, 2013) and financial sector reform 
(Saqib & Waheed, 2011) to name a few. 
Because of such wide-ranging applicability, the methodology surrounding 
simulation modelling is diffuse and relatively loose. This is partly because model 
complexity can vary widely; some may have a dozen equations, others may have 
thousands if not more. Another reason for the diversity is the proliferation of 
software packages that use their own specialised coding languages. As an 
illustration, among the studies cited above Alesina et al. (2012) use Matrix 
Laboratory, Kickhöfer et al. (2011) employ MATSim, Böhringer, Wiegard, 
Starkweather, and Ruocco (2003) describe their model with the General Algebraic 
Modelling System, and Ekmekci (2013) utilise the NetLogo framework. 
New models are frequently inspired by, based upon, and adapted from 
previous studies. Thus, as with many other lines of research, accuracy and reliability 
steadily improve as our ability to approximate the real world becomes more 
sophisticated. 
Simulations confer a number of advantages, not least of which is the ability 
to manipulate time steps to compress or expand dynamic shifts in the variables. 
Sensitivities can be explored by experimenting with individual variables or clusters. 
One primary disadvantage, however, is the specialist skills required. This becomes 
more burdensome when communicating a model, particularly so in terms of the 
actual coding where it may be necessary to paraphrase the structural mechanics in 
more common syntax. With larger models, feedback loops and causal links may 
become particularly long, making tracing the root of anomalies potentially difficult. 
Some systems also may not allow for data errors, implying that the quality of data 
collected is particularly important. 
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 Nevertheless, the presence of simulations in economic studies establishes a 
strong precedent for justifying the model developed here. More specifically, as my 
model represents an expansion of an existing method, it is necessary to provide a 
justification of the underlying principles and discussion of the work which has 
inspired it.  
4.6.1 Justification for a new approach 
As noted earlier, CIA looks at the process of establishing a new set of institutions. 
Aoki (2001) uses an evolutionary form of game theory to solve the problem as he 
maintains that pure game theory cannot offer a complete understanding. 
Nevertheless, his model presumes a smooth gradual learning process and does not 
account for political power play (Groenewegen & De Jong, 2008). By comparison, 
my model estimates institutional change as a direct consequence of political 
negotiation. As a result, it requires an alternative that is responsive to political 
power play and circumvents some of the limitations in applying game theory to this 
situation. 
4.6.1.1 Game theory 
Game theory as it is known today was founded in the mid-twentieth century 
by notable mathematician John von Neumann. Initial forays examined zero-sum 
games, but more recently studies have looked at competitive and cooperative games 
(Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008). Irrespective of type, one common thread that permeates 
all games is the principle of interdependence: that the outcome for each participant 
rests upon not only their own choices but the choice of other participants (Dixit & 
Nalebuff, 2008).  
In terms of deploying a solution concept to ‘solve’ the game, backwards 
induction is a common mechanism. It is used in extensive form, repeated, and 
sequential games where one identifies the best strategy for the last player and 
progresses backwards through time, alternating between the players and 
determining their actions before arriving at the game’s beginning – effectively 
tracing the Nash equilibrium of each subgame to the first (Shor, 2006). Sub-game 
perfect equilibrium is an extension of this idea which also applies to finite games. 
More recently, the theory has been developed to cover other situations where games 
may be repeated indefinitely or there is some probability that the game may 
continue (J. Tressler, personal communication, May 24, 2016). The state-of-the-art 
is therefore wide and encompasses many potential scenarios.  
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Nevertheless, game theory has certain limitations. With respect to rational 
behaviour, Pettit and Sugden (1989) argue that while players may act rationally in 
the moment, it does not necessarily follow that a player will continue to act 
rationally in later rounds. This notion has indeed been shown to appear in empirical 
studies of repeated prisoner dilemma games where players cooperated as opposed 
to following the equilibrium strategies (Htun, 2005; Maschler, Solan, & Zamir, 
2013).  
Another issue arises when games become complex. In chess from instance, 
the sheer range of options leads to a state where calculations receding from the 
endgame are not possible even with computers and therefore players look only a 
few moves ahead and refer to experience as a guide (Dixit & Nalebuff, 2008). In 
modelling political negotiations, the number of potential interactions can be such 
that it overwhelms the researcher (Bueno de Mesquita, 2011) and the outputs can 
easily stretch into the hundreds of pages (Kugler, Abdollahian, & Tammen, 2000). 
As a result, when attempting to model and describe the complexity of real-world 
political negotiations that include a range of disparate views and issues, it can 
become necessary to move to a more ‘applied’ approach rather than a purely 
theoretical one. Such an approach appears in a strain of literature sometimes called 
‘multi-player multi-issue negotiation modelling’. 
4.6.2 Multi-player multi-issue negotiation models 
This section describes some of the prominent models that have influenced 
the creation of my model. They include: Bueno de Mesquita’s work (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 1988, 2011; Wu & Bueno de Mesquita, 1994), the Matrix of Alliances 
and Conflicts Tactics Objectives and Recommendations (MACTOR) and resultant 
Multi-issue Actor Strategy Analysis Model (MASAM) (Bendahan, Camponovo, 
Monzani, & Pigneur, 2005; Bendahan, Camponovo, & Pigneur, 2004; Camponovo 
& Pigneur, 2004), the ‘Stokman’ model (Stokman, van Assen, van der Knoop, & 
van Oosten, 2000), and Allas and Geogiades’ (2001) graphical model. The Bueno 
de Mesquita and MACTOR/MASAM models are mathematical. The Allas model 
is a practical guide and follows a similar pattern but without the mathematics. The 
Stokman model is presumably mathematic although they do not elaborate on their 
mechanics. 
Before presenting each of the models, it is useful to note a key universal 
similarity: in modelling political negotiations, all use three fundamental inputs to 
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describe the involved players. The first independent variable is called ‘position’ and 
represents a player’s preferred outcome, commonly measured on a scale from 0-
100 or a five to seven point Likert scale. Lower positions infer increasing opposition 
to an issue and higher positions represent increasing support. 
Salience measures how important an issue is to the player. Salience is 
indicative of the resources the player is willing to mobilise in an effort to secure the 
desired position and is usually codified either by rating it from 0-100, or via Likert 
scale.  
 Clout (also referred to as power or influence35) is the player’s ability to 
influence the outcome of a particular issue. This is often a relative measure so it 
facilitates intrinsic comparisons between players. Please note, however, clout is the 
perceived level of power rather than the actual amount deployed. The reason for 
this distinction is that player behaviour is determined by the level of clout they 
perceive other players exhibiting. 
4.6.2.1 The Bueno de Mesquita model 
The work of Bueno de Mesquita (Bueno de Mesquita, 1985, 1988, 2011) 
has been widely cited and influenced a number of similar applications such as (Allas 
& Geogiades, 2001; Bendahan et al., 2005; Kugler et al., 2000; Stokman et al., 
2000). The approach used in the Bueno de Mesquita model (hereafter referred to as 
the BDM model) is an ‘applied game theory’ method that utilises expected utility 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). Owing to the complexity of negotiations it tries to 
encapsulate in analysing real-world situations, it introduces a number of key 
heuristics and simplifying assumptions to operationalise the model (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2011). 
The fundamental purpose of the BDM model is to predict the outcome of 
complex negotiations which can end in agreement, conflict, or simply break down 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). At the heart of the model is the assumption that players 
are partially myopic: they cannot foresee the final result of the game. More 
specifically, as it proceeds, the payoffs each player can receive change and 
expectations about the future are altered. In response to this, players are constrained 
to pursue options that are only locally optimal: they cannot look to the ultimate 
                                                 
35 The Stokman model uses a measurement by the name of capabilities but the difference is primarily 
in name only. 
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terminal node and work backwards (Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). To accommodate 
these factors, the BDM considers the game an iterative one, not a repeated one.  
As players’ views of the future are clouded, it falls to the model itself to 
establish an end point. Here we find a key heuristic mechanism: the game ends 
when either the net payoffs or utility from the current round are greater than gains 
in the next (Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). In essence, this means that the model 
imposes a stop when the average player is made worse off by continuing. The 
rationale for employing a round-based approach is best conveyed in the words of 
Bueno de Mesquita himself:  
If we knew the number of iterations ex ante we could, in principle, solve the 
particular game analytically but this uncertainty about iterations is one of 
the fundamental features of real-world politics that is simplified away in 
pure theorizing and that is not simplified away here (2011, p. 73). 
 
In processing the strategic interactions between players, programming all 
potential bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral etc. games simultaneously is 
overwhelming and so the social fabric is broken down into a series of dyadic games 
which also makes some provisions for how ‘spectating’ players are expected to 
interact with the principle pair (Bueno de Mesquita, 2011). Third party involvement 
is fundamentally a matter of implied support given to the principal player whose 
position is closer to the third party. 
The BDM model has evolved over time, but the essential mechanism up to 
the 2011 revision is based around the internal decision to challenge an opponent to 
abandon their position on an issue and take up one that is more favourable for the 
challenger. In very brief terms, the model progresses in the following manner:  
1. Players estimate the ‘outcome’ of the current round by using the position, 
salience, and clout figures of all players to determine the location of the 
‘median voter’ – an application of Black (1958). 
2. Each player then determines their own expected utility from potential 
dyadic interactions, based on: the current expected outcome, a successful 
challenge, and an unsuccessful challenge. 
3. Challenges are issued and positions are adjusted at the end of the round. 
4. A new round of negotiation begins and continues until the global changes 
in expected utilities are less than an arbitrary threshold (Scholz, Calbert, & 
Smith, 2011). At this point, the simulation stops.  
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4.6.2.1.1 Variables and quantification 
 Position represents the desired outcome on a one-dimensional continuum. 
Salience refers to the importance of the issue and capability represents the amount 
of influence the player has over its outcome. 
 Inputs are determined by field experts (Bueno de Mesquita, 1988, 2011; 
Scholz et al., 2011) but selection criteria, sample size, and processing techniques 
are not widely discussed. 
4.6.2.1.2 Analysis and insights 
 One of the unique features is the calculation of a player’s risk aversion based 
upon realisable utility, in turn affecting the likelihood of issuing a challenge. 
Challenges result in conflict, capitulation or compromise and the resultant changes 
in position vary depending on the type of outcome. The model has been suggested 
to produce accurate predictions in conflict scenarios (Bueno de Mesquita, 1988, 
2011). 
4.6.2.1.3 Limitations 
 One of the limitations is the apparent disconnection of issues; processed in 
isolation, the outcome of one issue does not affect another. This is most likely a 
simplifying assumption but exploring the interconnections could potentially 
increase the model’s dynamism. A second limitation is the narrowness of options 
available to the player. In modelling challenges, the model makes a convincing case 
but it excludes other potential alternatives.  
4.6.2.2 MACTOR and MASAM 
MACTOR (Bendahan et al., 2004) was designed to examine the interactions 
between multiple players over multiple issues and was primarily developed from 
methods presented by Godet (2001, as cited in Bendahan et al., 2004). Whilst it 
seeks to explore potential outcomes in the same manner as the Stokman and Allas 
models, it attempts to do so at a more global level than the more focused Allas 
model (Bendahan et al., 2004). As with the BDM model, it assumes partial myopia 
and uses a round-based approach to reaching a final outcome. 
4.6.2.2.1 Variables and quantification 
Position is measured as one of three alternatives: for (1), against (-1), and 
neutral (0). Each player has a specific position on each issue. Salience is measured 
on a five point Likert scale ranging from least important (0) to most important (4). 
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The clout variable, known as influence in the MACTOR model, represents the 
power an influencing player has over an influenced player (Bendahan et al., 2004). 
This is also measured as a five point Likert scale that codifies a range of descriptive 
terms ranging from ‘no influence’ to ‘very high influence’ (Bendahan et al., 2004). 
MACTOR uses expert surveys to quantify data.  
The differences in the more recent MASAM are that influence is subdivided 
into direct influence and indirect influence. In addition, the effects of salience have 
been more disassociated from influence (Bendahan et al., 2005). Conceptually, the 
MASAM model is largely an amalgamation of the Allas model and MACTOR. 
4.6.2.2.2 Analysis and insights 
MACTOR uses the three variables to determine both direct and indirect 
influence, where one player can influence another either through their own actions 
or vicariously through a third party (Bendahan et al., 2004). Comparisons of total 
influence can then be made to establish which players are more powerful. Strategies 
are limited to unilaterally polarising a player’s own position and position exchanges. 
Data transformations of the output matrices determine coefficients for 
mobilization, agreement, and disagreement. Pairings of actors can then be made by 
further transformations to establish relative agreement or disagreement (or 
ambivalence) over a particular issue (Bendahan et al., 2004). MACTOR produces 
graphical depictions of the data and displays information similarly to the Allas 
model. Outputs are as follows: 
The influence and dependence chart plots the global influence of a player 
against their dependence, allowing one to determine the more powerful, the less 
powerful, and the relay players. In this sense, the influence and dependence chart is 
akin to the stability analysis provided by the Allas model. 
The mobilization chart shows whether the player is supportive or opposed 
to a particular issue and their propensity to deploy resources in an effort to influence 
the outcome. 
The convergence and divergence analysis is similar in many respects to the 
relationship analysis provided by the Allas model. By measuring the degree of 
convergence and divergence, it is possible to identify potential allies and 
adversaries. 
Finally, an issue battlefield chart depicts the players and their proximity to 
particular issues. Issues in close proximity to two players will be settled quickly, 
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whereas issues that are far removed from the placement of the player are contested 
more forcefully. 
4.6.2.2.3 Limitations  
 The greatest flaw in the model is its treatment of influence. Since only one 
player’s influence over another is considered, it implicitly suggests that each player 
has equal power over a decision (Bendahan et al., 2004). To say that one has 
influence does not necessarily mean to say that one has power.  
 The manner in which indirect influence is measured includes a systematic 
error. As the number of players rises, the proportion of direct influence any given 
player has falls relative to the amount of indirect influence they possess. This 
treatment of indirect influence becomes increasingly disparate as the number of 
players rises (Bendahan et al., 2004).  
4.6.2.3 The Allas and Geogiades model 
The model developed by Allas and Geogiades (2001), abbreviated to the 
‘Allas model’ also draws upon the BDM model for its theoretical underpinnings. It 
was principally designed to act as an aid for managers without the need for complex 
mathematical processing (Bendahan et al., 2004). The Allas model differs from 
others cited here by focusing more on the strategies available to players than the 
overall outcome. 
4.6.2.3.1 Variables and quantification 
Position is measured on a scale of 0-100, referring to the player’s preferred 
outcome (Allas & Geogiades, 2001) and usually quantified in increments of ten 
(Bendahan et al., 2004). Salience is measured from 0-100 and is a relative measure 
of importance compared to the other issues identified (Allas & Geogiades, 2001). 
Clout, measured from 0-100, refers to the ability of the player to influence the final 
decision relative to other players. Each player is assigned input values for each issue. 
Inputs are determined by expert judgements. 
4.6.2.3.2 Analysis and insights 
The Allas model makes use of graphs to produce five analytical tools. The 
first is an ‘outcome continuum’, illustrating the outcome prior to negotiation. 
The ‘stability analysis’ plots salience and clout against the player’s distance 
from the initial outcome, determines which players will contest the outcome, and 
identifies ‘heavyweight’ players – those with high salience and clout values. 
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The third tool is the ‘stakeholder classification’. This provides information 
about which issues other players can be drawn on for support, and which players 
will be confrontational. A distinct diagram emerges for each player. 
The ‘negotiation landscape’ is a high-low lattice of clout plotted against 
salience for a particular issue and allows the observer to identify the shapers and 
the influencers. Shapers have high salience and clout and are more likely to 
determine the course of the outcome on a particular issue. Influencers by 
comparison have high clout but low salience; these players can be lobbied for 
support. 
Finally the ‘relationship analysis’ plots the various issues under analysis as 
data points on a chart described by one player’s salience values on the x-axis, and 
another player’s salience values on the y-axis. This allows the analyst to determine 
which issues will be debated more vigorously and which can be exchanged. 
4.6.2.3.3 Limitations  
 Whilst this model generates useful outputs, analyses with a large number of 
players and/or issues require a very large number of individual diagrams 36 . 
Bendahan et al. (2004) also note that the model is useful for specific purposes and 
in the event that the researcher would want to conduct a more aggregated study this 
model could benefit from the addition of other tools to support its findings. 
4.6.2.4 The Stokman model 
The Stokman model was originally designed for policy analysis and 
government ministries. It uses a computer simulation to establish the outcome of 
the negotiation process including the amount of expected conflict (Stokman et al., 
2000). The model predicts outcomes both with and without intervention. 
The Stokman model states that proper specification of issues is critical. 
Misspecification is argued as the most common reason for a given analysis to fail. 
‘Good’ issues should have two extremes at opposing ends of a spectrum, 
intermediate positions are therefore a compromise between the two. More 
importantly, these intermediate positions must be able to be ordered (Stokman et 
al., 2000); to borrow a term from expected utility theory, they must adhere to the 
axiom of transitivity. 
  
                                                 
36 Although creating a software template could speed the process. 
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4.6.2.4.1 Variables and quantification 
Position and salience are measured in the same manner as other models but 
they describe clout as capability where it refers to the potential capabilities for the 
player to mobilise resources to achieve desired positions (Stokman et al., 2000). 
Players can be added together, combining their relative capabilities to form a more 
powerful coalition.  
Expert surveys are used to quantify inputs. Expert selection is not discussed 
but in the case of their principal example, rely on the judgments of “one or two 
experts” (Stokman et al., 2000, p. 134).  
4.6.2.4.2 Analysis and insights 
 Two insights arise, the first being that the combined measures of position 
and salience produce the expected behaviour of the player as behaviour is tied to 
the player’s incentive structure (Stokman et al., 2000). The second is that the 
combination of salience and capability produces the player’s effective power. 
Effective power can be seen as what fraction of capability a player is willing to 
mobilise (Stokman et al., 2000).  
 The model provides for three non-mutually exclusive strategies. The first is 
‘management of meaning’ and involves changing position by providing information 
that persuades the player that their incentive structure is better captured by another 
position. Stokman et al. (2000) note that this usually occurs with close stakeholders, 
but do not elaborate on the mechanics. ‘Challenge’ forms the second option. In this 
strategy, they adapt the BDM model into their own. ‘Exchange’ is the final option, 
involving the bilateral trade of positions over issues that a player feels are less 
salient for favoured positions on more important issues. 
 The Stokman model takes cues from game theory, although it does not 
appear to be purely game theoretic in design37. Instead, it is a simulation performed 
through a number of iterations to determine a final result.  
4.6.2.4.3 Limitations 
 The authors admit that the model is dependent upon the particular decision-
making setting. If changes alter the underlying conditions, issues and input values 
may need to be re-evaluated. Conditions under which a more cooperative approach, 
or a more confrontational approach, would be more effective remain uncertain. 
Similarly, whether confrontation-based solutions produce unfavourable outcomes 
                                                 
37 They question a comparison of their model against such a method. 
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for social welfare, or if confrontational outcomes take longer to resolve are 
questions that have yet to be answered.  
4.6.2.5 Comparing pre-existing models 
Table 4-1 presents an overview of the definitions of inputs used in other 
studies for comparative purposes along with data collection methods.  
 
Table 4-1 Comparative input definitions and data collection methods 
 
Position Meaning 
Allas and Geogiades (2001) Preferred outcome 
Bendahan et al. (2004) (MACTOR) Preferred outcome 
Bendahan et al. (2005) (MASAM) Preferred outcome 
Bueno de Mesquita (1988, 2011) Preferred policy outcome on issue 
Camponovo and Pigneur (2004) Preferred outcome 
Stokman et al. (2000) Preferred outcome 
Salience Meaning 
Allas and Geogiades (2001) How important is the issue compared to 
other issues 
Bendahan et al. (2004) (MACTOR) Subjective importance of the issue to 
the actor  
Bendahan et al. (2005) (MASAM) Importance of obtaining outcome 
relative to other issues 
Bueno de Mesquita (1988, 2011) The degree of importance or salience 
each group 
Camponovo and Pigneur (2004) “Value of attaining preferred outcome” 
(p. 140) 
Stokman et al. (2000) Degree of interest in the issue 
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Table 4-1 continued  
Clout Meaning 
Allas and Geogiades (2001) Amount of power the stakeholder has to 
influence the decision on the current 
issue and ability to influence other 
actors 
Bendahan et al. (2004) (MACTOR) Ability to directly influence the other 
actors  
Bendahan et al. (2005) (MASAM) Power player has to influence outcome 
Bueno de Mesquita (1988, 2011) The specification of relative power 
Camponovo and Pigneur (2004) “Power to influence issue’s outcome” 
(p.140) 
Stokman et al. (2000) Formal voting power and other 
influences 
Data Collection Method 
Allas and Geogiades (2001) Expert surveys/interviews 
Bendahan et al. (2004) (MACTOR) Expert interviews. No precise 
methodology but suggests interviews or 
Delphi approaches 
Bendahan et al. (2005) (MASAM) Expert surveys – Delphi method 
Bueno de Mesquita (1988, 2011) Expert surveys. They identify the 
groups, issues and other variables 
required by the model 
Camponovo and Pigneur (2004) Expert survey (5 respondents) 
Stokman et al. (2000) Expert interviews (1 or 2) 
 
In summary, the three input dimensions are applied in a very similar manner. 
The single greatest difference appears in the MASAM model whereby clout is 
subdivided into direct and indirect influence. Scalar metrics are usually measured 
from 0-1 or 0-100 although MACTOR uses a scale of -1 to +1 to show support or 
opposition more clearly. All of these studies utilise expert opinion for data 
collection and in most cases only a small number of respondents are needed. 
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4.6.2.6 A note on systems dynamics 
Note that the models described above are distinct from System Dynamics, 
which assumes a continuous flow of time and changes in resource levels. A key 
component of System Dynamics is the inclusion of delay functions that prohibit 
resource levels changing immediately. The BDM model and its counterparts, 
however, do not treat time as continuous: the length of a round is unspecified and 
it is quite likely that, in practice, some rounds are longer than others. It is the 
outcome of the round—the changes to player inputs—that is important and changes 
are applied immediately and fully at the end of each round, implying that there are 
no delay functions at work. The reason for doing this is because these models are 
not processing physical resources, they are processing values and opinions: in the 
BDM model, if a player loses a challenge for instance, he or she must change their 
position and this happens at the speed of thought. These same principles appear in 
related work (Allas & Geogiades, 2001; Bendahan et al., 2005; Kugler et al., 2000; 
Stokman et al., 2000). Consequently, although the process is an iterative one and 
different situations may require more rounds than others, this approach to modelling 
political negotiations is distinct to applications written in System Dynamics. 
As a final note, Bueno de Mesquita (2011) invites others to alter the heuristic 
rules of his model in their own work, in this regard the effect they have upon 
outcomes can be examined. It is here that I submit a new model, one that is heavily 
influenced by the underlying principles of the BDM model but seeks to broaden the 
range of options available to players and thus incorporates ideas proposed by Allas 
and Geogiades (2001), Bendahan et al. (2005), and Stokman et al. (2000).  
4.6.3 A new model: Fundamental principles and assumptions 
My model is designed to estimate the likely outcome of political negotiations 
that include a large number of players wrangling over a large number of issues. 
Owing to the inherent complexities, it uses the same key heuristics and simplifying 
assumptions as the BDM model in order to operationalise it. Three fundamental 
notions are: 
1. Players are partially myopic: they are unable to foresee the final outcome 
and therefore cannot work backwards to determine the ‘optimal’ solution. 
The actions they take are therefore limited to what serves their immediate 
interests. 
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2. The model considers the negotiation as an iterative process where players 
attempt to influence each other within each round. Owing to partial myopia, 
the model itself must determine an endpoint whereupon all players cease 
interacting with one another.  
3. The model deconstructs the negotiation landscape in to an exhaustive series 
of all possible bilateral interactions. The effect of ‘spectating’ players upon 
the principal pair is present in selected interactions but is predominantly 
held in control. 
  
To determine the expected outcome of a round, consider a unidimensional 
continuum of positions on an issue ranging from complete support (+1) to complete 
opposition (-1). The expected outcome is the median voter location (MVL), which 
is a function of position, salience, and clout. Calculating each player’s utility from 
the issue is then a simple matter of measuring the distance in Euclidean space 
between the expected outcome and the player’s preferred outcome; the lesser the 
distance the better.  
Once a player determines the expected outcome of an issue and the utility 
associated with it, the player then has the option to attempt to influence other 
players in an effort to shift the MVL closer to the preferred outcome. My model 
incorporates three strategies, the first of which is to challenge players to adopt a 
more favourable position. A second alternative, dubbed ‘salience lobbying’ 
potentially increases a player’s utility through convincing an allied player to 
commit further to an issue. A third alternative is to seek an exchange with another 
player: giving up one’s own position on an unimportant issue in exchange for a 
reciprocal shift in position over a more important issue. The exchange principle is 
founded on the notion that the utility gained from a given favourable shift in a more 
important issue is greater than utility lost in surrendering an unimportant issue. 
Salience lobbying and exchanges increase the complexity of the model as they 
inherently affect multiple issues simultaneously, and within a single round a player 
may be employing multiple strategies to multiple players. The choice of which 
strategy to use is determined heuristically, and is based upon the relationship of the 
dyadic pair.  
At the end of each round players may be compelled to change their inputs 
from multiple suitors – having received multiple challenges or multiple offers to 
increase commitment for example. In this case the model assumes that each player 
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accepts only the best challenge and the best offer in a single round (challenges and 
offers affect different inputs). The concept of ‘best’ is also heuristically determined: 
being the least costly challenge and the most rewarding offer. With respect to 
exchanges, only one exchange is processed globally per round owing to 
complications that may arise from multiple exchanges per round. The effects to 
player inputs as a result of the three strategies are then applied to the respective 
inputs at the end of the round fully and immediately; all the multi-player multi-issue 
models cited above do so. A new round then begins. 
The process continues until a final outcome is reached; ‘final outcome’ 
implies that no further changes to player inputs occur. When the model reaches such 
an equilibrium there are two potential interpretations: the first, which is less likely, 
is that a global consensus is reached and all players share the same position over 
each respective issue. The second alternative is where the outcomes of the issues 
are not necessarily ideal for the players, but no more changes to inputs can 
incorporated as players have exhausted their options. Nevertheless, there are also 
potential cases where the model fails to reach a stable outcome and oscillates 
endlessly38.  
In the broadest terms, my model proceeds as follows: 
1. Define issues, players, and input values (position, salience, and clout). 
2. Estimate the expected outcome of the round without any bargaining. 
3. Determine each player’s utility from the expected outcome and if 
sufficiently motivated, employ strategies to secure a more favourable 
outcome. 
4. Establish relationships between player pairs and the expected outcome and 
determine appropriate strategy. 
5. Process the three strategic alternatives: 
a. lobby salience of strong allies, 
b. challenge position of weak allies, and 
c. offer exchanges to adversaries. 
6. Process changes to player inputs and incorporate at the end of the round. 
7. Repeat steps 2-6 until there are no significant changes to input values. 
 
                                                 
38 Stokman et al. (2000) also found their model could potentially return these outcomes and can be 
interpreted as the ‘breaking down’ of negotiations. 
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A full account of the mechanics can be found in Chapter Seven. There are 
two reasons for doing so: firstly, it keeps this chapter to a more digestible size; 
secondly, as model uses a lot of special notation and terminology, describing the 
mechanics directly before the results eases the burden placed on the reader as these 
details are still fresh in the mind. 
4.6.3.1 Synthesizing and adapting other models  
The existing models and their mechanics have played a vital role in 
constructing my model. Some components have been directly translated, others 
adapted. This section provides a disclosure of where and how they have been 
integrated. It also provides a brief comparison of the existing models where their 
approaches diverge.  
 
Expected outcome calculation (p. 201)  
In calculating the expected outcome of a round, my model, and many of the 
models cited above apply the approach deployed in the BDM model, which in itself 
is an application of Black’s (1958, as cited in Wu & Bueno de Mesquita, 1994) 
work on median voter theory. The concept of the median voter is described 
succinctly by Scholz et al. (2011):  
 …in a majority election where a voter’s attitude is represented as a 
point in one dimension, if all voters vote for a candidate closest to their 
own preference and there are only two candidates, then if the 
candidates want to maximize their votes they should commit to the 
policy attitude preferred by the median voter (p. 521). 
 
The exact mechanics differ slightly between the models: Allas and 
Geogiades (2001) show a weighted average between all players but do not elaborate 
on the specific mathematics. Bendahan et al. (2005; 2004) take the sum of all 
positions, using a scale of -1 to 139, weighted only by clout, to arrive at a figure and 
use the following calculation to determine their expected outcome: 
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Full Influencea,b is a measurement of how a player may alter the outcome by 
influencing other players. Clout b,i refers to the player’s ability to unilaterally 
                                                 
39 In the MASAM model, position is normalised to between 0 and 1. 
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influence the issue. The exclusion of salience from above calculation, however, 
implies that an actor would fully mobilise all their available resources in an effort 
to secure their desired position. More informally, it would suggest the actor would 
put their ‘full weight’ into their argument over every issue.  
My model uses a similar equation as Bendahan et al. but also incorporates 
an idea present in the BDM model by including salience. The reason for doing so 
is due to the limiting factor salience places upon a player’s actions: a player might 
be in favour of a particular issue and have a considerable degree of clout, yet if the 
player does not consider the issue to be particularly important then he/she/they will 
not deploy all resources at their disposal to secure the issue. To affect the outcome 
of an issue a player must not simply be powerful; the player must also be 
sufficiently interested in the outcome. 
 
Utility (p. 214) 
The method for determining the utility players can realise from the expected 
outcome is derived from utility functions in the BDM model and in Bendahan et al. 
(2005). 
 
Activation calculation (p. 203) 
The term ‘activation’ represents a player taking an active role in the 
negotiation of an issue with the aim of securing a better outcome. When players are 
dissatisfied with the outcome, they consider alternative strategies and attempt to 
change the outcome to one closer aligned to their preferred position. How they go 
about this differs from model to model. 
Recall Bueno de Mesquita’s (2011) model focuses primarily on a challenge 
process; if the challenge is won, the defeated player must take on the position of the 
victor. In the event of losing, the challenger must forfeit their own position and 
move towards the position of the other player. Allowances for unilateral shifts in 
position also exist.  
Bendahan et al. (2005) take a different approach. They use an algorithm 
where a dissatisfied player will incrementally polarise their position in an effort to 
bring the outcome closer to their desired position. They also allow for the exchange 
of positions on issues: one gives up issues that one has little stake in for concessions 
in issues that are more salient. 
 84
Allas and Geogiades (2001) also identify exchanges with enemies as a 
strategy available to negotiators but they also suggest lobbying powerful allies with 
low salience to convince then to expend more effort on the issue. More importantly 
for taking action, the Allas model uses a graphical representation to show that 
players who are dissatisfied and have proportionately high salience and clout will 
be the ones likely to actively dispute the result. My model draws from the Allas 
model and expresses it as activation where I develop the corresponding equations.  
With respect to considering which players are active in the negotiation, the 
BDM, MACTOR, and MASAM imply that all players are active over all issues, the 
Allas model assumes that only some players will be active. My model contains a 
feature that allows the user to switch between these alternatives (see page 205). 
 
Alliances (p.206) 
Bueno de Mesquita’s models (1988, 2011) do not appear to track alliances. 
He mentions that lobbying is a potential option but his work focuses upon 
challenges. Bendahan et al. (2005) look at the possibility of alliances and do so by 
measuring differences between two players’ positions over a neutral value which is 
then multiplied by the salience values of the pair. Their model considers that players 
will be more likely to ally with those who have high salience in the issue, and it is 
necessary to do so as salience is not present in their expected outcome calculation. 
To offer a visualisation, consider the Association of Commissioned 
Postmasters (Zentoku) and the postal workers’ union (Zentei). These two factions 
are both opposed to privatisation but have traditionally not seen eye-to-eye with one 
another. Consider also the particular issue of postal network maintenance: it is more 
important to Zentoku than Zentei as commissioned postmasters frequently own the 
premises and lease them to JP itself. The Bendahan model suggests via its expected 
outcome equation that each group would exert all the force they can muster to defeat 
the reform movement; as the output is not weighted by salience it implies full 
mobilisation of all resources. The likelihood of alliances being formed is dependent 
upon being on the same side of the position spectrum, finding an issue over which 
they share common ground, and how important it is to maintain ownership of the 
post offices.  
My model, however, uses an approach adapted from the Allas model, which 
identifies players as allies, enemies, or in-between. The logic is that both of these 
players will work in concert to defeat the reform movement irrespective of the 
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existence of alliances or agreements, which is reflected in the calculation of the 
expected outcome. However, as salience is included in the expected outcome it 
suggests from the perspective of Zentoku that having Zentei also on the opposition 
side of reform will not guarantee victory: Zentei must be convinced to commit to 
the issue, which may necessitate a concession in the process. Alternatively, an 
attempt must be made to align them more closely with Zentoku. Operationalising 
the Allas model therefore becomes a matter of comparing player pairs with the 
expected outcome over each issue. In terms of which strategy to use, the Allas 
model’s delineation of relationship types inspired the mechanism used here. 
 
Salience lobbying (p.210) 
The principle of salience lobbying is applied from the Allas model. As it 
makes no suggestion of how this can be done, the algorithm describing the salience 
lobbying process is an original contribution. 
 
Weak ally lobbying (p. 221) 
The process of weak ally lobbying is heavily influenced by the work of 
Bueno de Mesquita (1988, 2011) and is based on the idea of challenging weak allies 
to give up their current position on an issue and adopt a position closer to the active 
player. The mechanics and evolution of the BDM model are explained in detail by 
Scholz et al. (2011), which was referred to frequently in this part of the model. To 
be clear, this includes: the overall algorithm, probability functions, utility 
calculations, output type determination, and offer selection process. The major 
proviso that must be noted is that translating the core of the BDM into this 
application requires the creation of a number of conditional equations but these are 
merely checks and balances to ensure the model is working properly. 
Whilst the approach is fundamentally the same, one key difference is that 
my model does not allow for unilateral adjustments to positon. Once a player has 
determined their initial position, they will not revise it unilaterally – only through 
interaction with other player can position be shifted.  
 
Exchanges (p. 232) 
The concept of issue exchange features in a number of models (Allas & 
Geogiades, 2001; Bendahan et al., 2005; Bendahan et al., 2004; Stokman et al., 
2000). These studies share a common element, which is that exchanges can occur 
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when a pair of players have fundamentally different views on a particular issue but 
also share different patterns of salience. 
The Allas model is beautiful in its intuitive simplicity but the manual 
repetition of pairing on a case-by-case basis creates logistical difficulties as more 
complex negotiations arise. More importantly, being graphical in nature, it does not 
specify the magnitude of concessions offered or even if they are possible. 
Bendahan et al. (2005) use an elegant solution for addressing exchanges 
requiring only one equation: 
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 Whilst this reduces the complexity of programming, it does not appear to 
take into account certain conditions whereby an outcome can be pushed passed a 
player’s position and hence may result in decreases in utility. Additionally, their 
work requires manual linkage of players and issues, which is potentially limited as 
once an exchange on issue i has been performed the involved players may not shift 
attention to other issues unless the operator manually specifies other issues to trade 
in later iterations. 
Stokman et al. (2000) provide a sophisticated method of exchanges but limit 
themselves to two bilateral strategies (excepting unilateral shifts in position).  
I draw on Bendahan et al. (2005) and the Stokman model in developing the 
assumptions that govern exchanges. That is, the gains from exchanges are equally 
shared, the salience patterns must very different, and the players must have 
fundamentally different views on the exchange issues. My model is distinctive from 
Bendahan et al. (2005) in that it develops a more comprehensive and automated 
algorithm. It differs from the Stokman model as it is designed to act in conjunction 
with concessions and challenges and thus advances the complexity of negotiations 
that can be simulated.  
 
Higher Order Simulation (241) 
This is primarily a simple data transformation but one element has been 
taken from Bendahan et al. (2005), the notion of criticality. Criticality serves a 
different function in their model but the calculation is the same. 
 
In summary, the determination of initial outcomes are drawn from the BDM 
model, although a similar mechanic is present in all other models reviewed. The 
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graphical Allas model has been adapted to produce the activation process and 
determine which strategies to use on which players. In terms of the inspiration for 
strategies themselves, the Allas model relates to salience lobbying, the BDM model 
for challenges, and MACTOR/MASAM and the Stokman model for exchanges. 
Figure 4-3 provides a visualisation of the strategies and their antecedents in the 
literature.  
Figure 4-3 Component strategies in the new model 
 
4.6.3.2 Applying the model to Japan 
As noted before, the model presumes that there are a number of issues 
contested by a range of players who exhibit different ideological standings and 
influence. The term ‘player’ is an inclusive one: it represents an array of individuals 
and interests who form a homogenous group as described by the three input metrics. 
In this regard, a ‘player’ can incorporate interest groups along with their political 
patrons. For example, the links between The Association of Commissioned 
Postmasters (Zentoku) and Shizuka Kamei of the People’s New Party were so 
strong they can be represented by a single ‘player’. This method is common to the 
models cited previously. 
The probability of Japanese postal reforms being implemented depends 
upon the outcome of individual issues and the overall effectiveness of reforms is a 
function of how critical each issue is in the overall context. As a result, this model 
contains two modules termed the ‘lower order simulation’ (LOS), and the ‘higher 
order simulation’ (HOS). The LOS (listed above in steps one to seven) processes 
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individual issues as players lobby, challenge, and exchange with each other. The 
LOS passes it outputs into the HOS, which then weighs each issue according to how 
critical it is to the reform package. Finally, the HOS outputs a probability for overall 
effectiveness. A secondary efficacy index, independent of salience, is also provided. 
One key advantage is the facility to determine whether failure to reform a 
given issue may compromise the entire package. Additionally, if an analysis of the 
underlying institutions has already been performed, the HOS can be used to 
approximate the amount of change in those institutions by way of examining the 
probability of change in each issue.  
To illustrate, one of the critical factors in the New Zealand experience 
(described in Chapter Five) was the establishment of the State Owned Enterprises 
Act and its requirement to produce a profit and only ‘have regard’ for the 
community which NZP serves. Without this legislative support, it is likely that NZP 
would have been forced to continue loss-generating (although socially desirable) 
services. If the model presented here focussed on the New Zealand experience, the 
act would be identified as a critical issue and its placement in the HOS would 
strongly influence the effectiveness measurements.  
 Rural delivery fees, however, whilst a salient issue for the company and 
rural communities, would be much less likely to endanger the overall process 
whether they are subsidised or not. This issue would therefore feature less 
prominently in the HOS, muting its influence.  
4.6.3.3 Contributions  
This model is more ambitious than many others by including a greater range 
of options available to an active player. As noted earlier, most models focus on one 
or two strategies, but mine considers three distinct options simultaneously: position 
challenge, salience lobbying, and position exchange. The chosen option depends 
upon the relationship the active player has with other players. Modelling eight 
players over seven issues requires some 1.2 million calculations per round and 
therefore requires significant processing capabilities 40 . Extensive original 
contributions have been made in salience lobbying; many works cite the importance 
of lobbying allies, but do not explore it. The exchange algorithm also offers a more 
dynamic approach to exchange issue offer selection; automation allows for repeated 
                                                 
40 I found that a 64-bit environment saving to a solid state drive appears to offer the best performance. 
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offers and counter offers. Also introduced is a new feature that allows ‘default’ 
behaviour to be overridden, allowing for modelling under ‘normal’ conditions and 
‘crisis’ conditions. This feature can be applied to individual issues or used globally.  
4.6.3.4 A note on the choice of software 
In programming the model, the vast majority of equations are relatively 
simple ones, relying primarily on either basic algebra or logical programming. 
Microsoft’s Excel spreadsheet software is sufficient for the most part but as the 
model uses an iterative process, meaning that changes must be incorporated into the 
primary inputs, it creates a circular reference that can create problems. 
One potential solution is to create a separate worksheet for each iteration or 
list the iterations in columns. Regrettably, I am no better informed than the players 
in terms of the number of iterations required for a given run and therefore this 
solution is unsatisfactory. Excel does provide an iterative solving process: in the 
options menu, the user specifies the number of iterations to perform and this 
alleviates the circular reference issue. Even so, this does not solve the fundamental 
issue of determining how many rounds are needed as the outputs displayed are from 
the last round only. Additionally, is it useful to visualise the outputs as they progress 
round by round to see how the players interact with one another, particularly so 
during sensitivity testing. As a result of these issues, it was decided that the Excel 
suite was not the most appropriate package for this study. 
Venata Systems Inc., however, produce a software suite—Vensim© —that 
can accommodate circular references easily. The software is primarily designed for 
System Dynamics and therefore accounts for changes in resource stocks and flows 
over time by means of Euler integration. Some examples of studies that use Vensim 
in economics and management include Kim and Oh (2005), who model the decision 
making process through bargaining power in regards to strategic relationships for 
quality improvement and new product development. Kundapur and Rodrigues 
(2012) chart how knowledge workers adopt new technology and integrate it into 
their work patterns as an aid for policy making decisions with respect to new 
technology purchasing. Another study examines the costs of quality, including non-
compliance and prevention costs (Kiani, Shirouyehzad, Bafti, & Fouladger, 2009). 
In calculating stocks and flows the core engine is therefore an iterative 
solving process and it is this mechanism that expedites calculating multiple rounds. 
In most applications, Vensim treats an iteration as a division of time – usually in 
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months or years. In this case, I use Vensim for its iterative solving process but one 
point must be made absolutely explicit: each unit of time in Vensim simply 
represents a ‘round’ in the model. To be sure, this is not to say that a round is 
equivalent to a month or year, but the mechanism the software’s engine uses makes 
it much easier—for me at least—to approach the problem of running a model that 
includes circular references, requires an unknown number of iterations to solve, and 
produces visual objects that track developments as the number of rounds increases. 
Vensim also provides the same logical equations built into the Excel suite needed 
to generate the model. As a result, whilst the software is not being used in the exact 
capacity for which it was primarily designed—System Dynamics—it possesses all 
the necessary features so solve a programming issue I am otherwise unable to 
adequately address. Indeed, Venata Systems themselves mention that their software 
can be used for many applications. Therefore, whilst Systems Dynamics is the 
primary application, it does not preclude the software’s use from other forms of 
problem solving. The one proviso that must be made explicit, however, is that 
Vensim output objects often list time on the x-axis. In this application, one must 
accept those outputs simply as ‘rounds’.  
4.6.3.5 Inputs  
This section details how variables are defined, coded, gathered and 
measured. All inputs were quantified by using the vetted expert survey. As with 
other models, respondents are not asked about how they think the issue will be 
solved, only about the observed inputs of each player over each issue. As will be 
explained shortly, I also developed my own estimation of position from the media 
reports via the core sentence approach for cross-checking. 
4.6.3.5.1 Position 
Position defines a player’s standpoint on a particular issue. Issues are 
phrased to elicit two possible extreme responses or a range of intermediate values, 
which is the principle advocated in the Stokman model. Position ranges from +1 to 
-1. A score of +1 implies complete support for the proposal, -1 means complete 
opposition, and zero reflects a neutral position41. 
                                                 
41 Due to intra-party divergences and the factional nature of Japanese politics, a three point system 
as utilized in the MACTOR model is considered to be too polarizing for players who exhibit only a 
partial leaning to one extreme or the other. 
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4.6.3.5.2 Salience 
 Salience measures the importance of one issue relative to others. As 
discussed shortly, the expert survey includes seven issues and experts are asked to 
consider the importance of each one. Salience is measured from zero to one, with 
‘1’ implying it is the most important issue and everything is subordinate to it, and 
‘0’ implying the issue has no importance at all. Middling values imply ‘average’ or 
‘moderate’ importance. 
4.6.3.5.3 Clout 
Clout refers to the amount of power a player holds over the decision-making 
process in regards to a particular issue; this includes actual power and ability to 
influence others. Players with more clout are better able to realise their desired 
position. 
The survey uses a freestanding measurement of clout. Freestanding 42 
measurements are more appropriate when there are many players or when power is 
more unevenly distributed, particularly in cases where there are “800-pound gorilla” 
players (Dometrius, Burke, & Wright, 2008, p. 91). A freestanding measurement is 
preferable to paired comparisons, as it does not require participants to make forced 
comparisons between two players that can lead to manufactured results. 
Clout is measured from zero to one. A score of 1 means that the player is 
dominant and zero means that the player has no influence at all. 
4.6.3.6 Acquiring data 
 Conducting surveys of the political elite is difficult, which has given rise to 
the development of proxies. Three common proxies are expert surveys, media 
coverage, and mass surveys. In defining the inputs for the simulation in Chapter 
Eight, the study makes use of expert surveys; additionally, the accuracy of position 
was triangulated with media coverage. 
 Media is advantageous as reports are document driven (Helbling & Tresch, 
2009). At the same time, the political elite are turning increasingly to the media to 
engage with the public (Taniguchi, 2007). Media reports also have the advantage 
of retaining a longer memory than expert surveys and can show gradual changes as 
well as intra-party conflict (Helbling & Tresch, 2009).  
                                                 
42 A ‘freestanding’ measurement asks respondents to consider player clout individually; it is not 
necessary to consider the player’s clout relative to every possible pairing of players. 
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The core sentence approach was used to derive position from media reports. 
This involves reducing sentences to their constituent elements to determine the 
political object 43  and direction of the relationship (Helbling & Tresch, 2009; 
Kleinnijenhuis, de Ridder, & Reitburg, 1997). In one grammatical sentence, there 
may be more than one core sentence. As an example, “Koizumi supports lowering 
the deposit cap to five million yen, but not its removal.”44 This sentence contains 
two core sentences: the first is support for cap reduction, the second is opposition 
to its removal. The relationship is typically quantified as ranging from +1 (support) 
to -1 (opposition) with three intermediary values (Helbling & Tresch, 2009). 
Overall positions of a party can then be determined by taking the average of all data 
pertaining to a particular issue (Helbling & Tresch, 2009).  
This study used media reports to estimate the position of parties and factions. 
However, treating the two major parties as single entities is an oversimplification 
and thus responses were subdivided into ‘supporters’ and ‘detractors’. The 
interviews show that minority parties are quite united in their stances over issues 
and thus can remain single entities. The results of the expert survey were then 
compared against the core sentence approach application to test accuracy of 
responses.  
Whilst position can be successfully approximated through media reports, 
salience poses a more challenging task (Helbling & Tresch, 2009). Certain proxies 
do exist, such as a frequency approach as used by Epstein and Segal (2000), but this 
suffers from two primary limitations: that salience means the same to a political 
actor as it does to an editor (Epstein & Segal, 2000), and that editorial bias is more 
significant in the presence of other stories like natural disasters (Helbling & Tresch, 
2009). Helbling and Tresch have also gone so far as to show that correlation 
between expert surveys and frequency approaches to measuring salience are not as 
strong as they are with position. Salience therefore relies on expert participants, a 
method well supported by the previously cited models.  
Clout was also measured by expert opinion. The survey asked participants 
to make a judgement about each player’s three inputs over each issue. 
Measurements were freestanding. Data were averaged across participants. For 
                                                 
43 The political object can be an actor or an issue. 
44 This is an example sentence, not a direct quote from a publication. 
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convenience, inputs in the survey were measured by indices from 0-100 as it offers 
an intuitive range. Table 4-2 provides a guide to the expert survey’s index. 
 
Table 4-2 Summary of data inputs with descriptions 
Index value Position Salience Clout 
0 Totally opposed Completely unimportant No influence 
10 Majorly opposed Very unimportant Very little influence 
30 Moderately opposed Marginally unimportant Some influence 
50 Neutral Average importance Moderate influence 
70 Moderate support Fairly important Large influence 
90 Major support Very important Very large influence 
100 Total support Most important Dominance 
4.6.3.7 Expert surveys 
Expert surveys/interviews are used extensively in multi-player, multi-issue 
simulations (Baranowski & Gross, 2006; Dometrius et al., 2008; Mahoney, 2007). 
Steenbergen and Marks (2007) note that they have become particularly prevalent in 
the comparative studies of party positions. Budge (2000) also states that 
accessibility is a large part of the reason they are so favoured, as is their perceived 
authority.  
An expert is an individual who has a deep understanding of the players 
involved in the game and the dynamics of the environment. The most commonly-
used experts are political scientists drawn from the academic community (Benoit & 
Laver, 2007; Netjes & Binnema, 2007; Ray, 1999; Steenbergen & Marks, 2007; 
Whitefield et al., 2007), although participants have also been drawn from business 
circles and journalistic fields. 
4.6.3.7.1 Errors and validity 
Budge (2000) analyses the issues of using expert surveys to quantify party 
positions. His primary concern was the possibility of random error entering the data, 
often from ambiguity in the interpretation of survey questions. Examples include 
whether the expert is evaluating the party leadership or activists, whether intentions 
and preferences are being considered or concrete actions, and what timeframe the 
expert is considering (Budge, 2000). Whitefield et al. (2007) also note the possible 
appearance of random error but argue that as it is statistically measureable, it can 
be controlled for by using a mean squared error. 
Systematic error, however, cannot be controlled for in the same way 
(Whitefield et al., 2007). This can be illustrated by expert bias; for example, if a 
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party is considered left-of-centre, an expert might then note all of their policies to 
be left-of-centre as well. 
Political volatility is a potential source of error; frequent political change 
might imply that two expert surveys conducted at different times would produce 
differing results even if individually accurate (Whitefield et al., 2007). 
A fourth concern is the possibility of ‘telescoping’– recalling facts from 
the wrong period of history (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007). This can occur when 
experts are asked to make judgements on events in the distant past.  
Consequently, research has been conducted to determine if expert surveys 
are a reliable source of data. Helbling and Tresch (2009) examine three common 
proxies: mass surveys, expert surveys, and party manifestos, to measure position 
and salience. They find expert surveys offer high correlations with manifestos and 
produce consistent results. Netjes and Binnema (2007) also find expert surveys are 
in fact superior to comparative manifesto analyses in measuring issue salience as 
experts are able to balance manifesto promises and actual behaviours. 
Volkens (2007) concludes that expert surveys are a good proxy for 
measuring position and validity increases with the number of experts. In measuring 
party positions, expert surveys have the smallest error compared with other proxies 
(Benoit & Laver, 2007). Even in difficult cases of political change, they have been 
found to be effective (Whitefield et al., 2007), and have yielded consistent results 
when used with comparative manifesto projects (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007). 
4.6.3.7.2 Application in this study 
To ensure the survey was indicative of the players and issues involved in 
postal reform, literature, media reports and interviews were analysed and processed 
before developing a full instrument. The literature and media reports provide an 
illustration of the parties and issues. Between these two sources, the general 
inductive approach was used to condense lower order issues into higher order issues 
and produce a list of player groups. Higher order issues and player groups were then 
vetted through expert interviews and the resultant lists featured in the expert survey. 
The survey was then finalised and disseminated (see Appendix C for questions)45. 
                                                 
45 Please note that the disseminated survey includes eight issues. The last one, removing public 
servant status, was dropped from the simulation as this had already been finalised by the time the 
simulation was ready. 
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In addition to experts identified through the literature, media reports also 
produced a list of extra potential participants. The criteria for identifying these 
participants were as follows: 
(a) the participant was quoted as being a member of the academic 
community, 
(b) the participant was quoted as being a leading member of the business 
community and had been called upon to make a judgement relating to 
the particular news article surrounding the privatisation, 
(c) the participant was quoted as belonging to JP or its affiliated unions, 
either in the present or past tense, 
(d) the participant was quoted as being affiliated with private or 
government sponsored institution or think-tank, 
(e) the participant had some official capacity in the Japanese government 
and had been called upon to make a statement relevant to the particular 
media report, or 
(f) the participant was referred by an interviewed participant satisfying 
any of the first five criteria. 
4.7 Post-simulation Japanese Institutional Environment 
 The issues that are presented in the simulation represent reform proposals. 
Since the LOS returns probabilities for each proposal passing, higher values suggest 
a greater likelihood of change and therefore institutional shift. 
 Proposals themselves are underpinned by the institutions envisioned by their 
progenitors. As an illustration, one of the institutions influencing JP is the distorted 
savings incentives favouring JPB46. Creating a level playing field would correct this 
distortion; if successful, it would engender a shift towards deregulation. The 
success or failure of proposals from the simulation therefore determined the new 
institutional environment.  
4.8 Post-simulation Comparison with New Zealand 
 The most critical elements of NZP’s reform, which are described in Chapter 
Five, were identified through the data collected from experts. The simulation in 
Chapter Eight identifies critical issues through the HOS and efficacy index. Cross 
                                                 
46 See Chapter Six for details. 
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comparison of post-reform environments with a particular view to internal 
consistency appears in Chapter Nine and will expose similarities and differences in 
the two cases. Also in Chapter Nine, changes in critical issues will present a 
measurement of how effectual Japanese reforms could potentially be.  
4.9 Chapter Conclusion 
 IE forms the theoretical backbone of this project. Pluralistic IE is the 
preferred framework, in which the institution itself is analysed and individuals are 
utility maximising. By using a pluralistic approach, the institutional environments 
will be identified and the resultant issues and pressures for change followed. 
Referring to institutional change, TCE allows for a comparison of the New Zealand 
case. CIA, however, has been eschewed in favour of multi-player multi-issue 
negotiation theory and the simulation is built around principles therein. Post-reform 
environments will then be developed for comparative analysis. 
 To trace reform evolution in New Zealand, a synthesis of the literature 
provides a good illustration of the pre-reform environment and attendant problems. 
Further questions, especially concerning resistance, have been identified and data 
gathered from interviews with subject experts will show explanatory categories for 
each question. 
 The initial stages of the Japanese model follow the same principle: the initial 
institutions, issues, and drivers are distilled through literature analysis. Media 
reports, processed via the general inductive approach and core sentence approach, 
add further detail and estimate position. Expert interviews will also help seal gaps 
in the literature and finalise the list of players and issues that will feature in the 
simulation. 
 The simulation follows the methods used in a particular strain of multi-
player multi-issue negotiation modelling. It will produce an estimated post-reform 
institutional environment by encompassing an array of players and issues that 
represent political factions and simulate the outcome of proposed reforms. Outputs 
will be expressed as probabilities of particular proposals succeeding. Lower order 
outputs will then be inserted into a higher order module that offers an overall 
estimation of reform effectiveness.  
 The simulation synthesises ideas from other models and makes extensive 
contributions in regards to the three strategies available to a player. Three inputs, 
position, salience, and clout, measure players’ standpoint, the importance of the 
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issue, and players’ power over the issue. Inputs are quantified by expert survey and 
position will also be triangulated with media reports for improved accuracy. The 
multi-player multi-issue models that have been drawn upon–and my resulting 
model–are not purely game theoretic, nor are they applications in Systems 
Dynamics.  
 Post-reform institutional environments will then be compared by analysing 
the results of simulation. The LOS provides expected changes to individual 
proposals and institutions, showing whether reform elements will succeed or not. 
The HOS will offer an overall figure, and taken together, the LOS and HOS 
approximate the amount of change allowing Japanese reforms to be compared 
against New Zealand’s. 
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5 The Experience of NZP 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the examination of reform literature presented 
earlier but focusses on NZP through the lens of institutional economics. It is a 
retrospective observation of the process of changing a state-owned public entity 
into a profit-driven enterprise.  
The chapter offers a contribution by synthesizing the existing literature and 
supplementing it with interview data I collected from expert participants. 
Resistance from the rural sector is widely acknowledged but internal resistance has 
not drawn much attention and thus formed a key section of the interview questions. 
Owing to a lack of attention in the literature, relationships between NZP and the 
unions also featured in the interviews, as did the reason why NZP was corporatised 
but never privatised.  
The chapter is organised by tracking NZP’s progression beginning with the 
institutional environment. The issues created by this environment are identified, 
leading to the drive for reform. Following this, the reforms are catalogued. The 
presence and influence of resistance forces are examined, including concessions 
and accommodations made. Underlying contextual factors, such as the 
macroeconomic climate, that may have affected reform implementation are 
discussed. The new institutional setting is identified and performance 
measurements are provided. A discussion of key factors in the New Zealand 
experience follows. Chronologically, Kiwibank was founded several years later and 
is therefore not included in initial analysis. As re-establishing a state-owned bank 
does at first appear contradictory, the chapter also includes a section focusing on 
Kiwibank’s consistency with the reform ideology and placement within the new 
institutional environment. The chapter concludes by restating key findings and 
caveats concerning future developments at NZP.  
5.2 Pre-reform Institutional Environment and 
Performance 
The word ‘institution’ uses the demarcation provided by North: a formal or 
informal constraint upon human behaviour. An organisation is not an institution per 
se, but can be depending on the level of analysis. Consider a particular mail centre 
for instance, its institutional environment would include government-imposed 
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constraints and internal policies of NZP. In this study however, the post office 
(‘NZP’ after corporatisation) is considered in its entirety and is therefore not 
considered as an institution, but rather as an organisation. The component 
institutions comprising the environment are specifically the government regulations 
and policies imposed on the post office firstly as a government department and later 
as an SOE. Whilst broader, societal constraints do exist, this study holds them 
constant as they influence organisations throughout New Zealand.  
Figure 5-1 illustrates the major constraints prior to reform. The outer ring 
represents the constraints themselves and the post office is placed at the centre, 
being affected by them.  
 
Figure 5-1 Pre-reform institutional environment 
 
The New Zealand Post Office prior to corporatisation in 1987 operated as a 
department of state responsible to the Post Master General, a Minister of the Crown 
(Fogelberg, 1992). Corporate governance literature describes this arrangement as 
insider governance and creates a host of issues including internal resistance to 
change, opportunism, and agency problems. This constrained operations, as 
commercial goals were in direct conflict with social and political considerations 
(Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, & Teece, 1996; Fogelberg, 1992).  
The post office operated in a tightly regulated market and enjoyed protective 
monopolies in all operations; input and output prices were determined by 
government, with commercial concerns often subordinated to social or political 
objectives (Saunders, 2006). As well as providing postal services, the post office 
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also regulated the postal industry (Evans et al., 1996; Saunders, 2006). This 
explains in part why the statutory monopoly was particularly strong. Together, the 
existing legislation along with the ability to regulate its industry autonomously 
formed powerful barriers to entry. Prior to 1987, there were no competitors in 
standard mail delivery and it would not be until 1998 that the industry became fully 
open to competition. Unsurprisingly, Saunders (2006) notes that operations, 
especially sorting, were highly labour-intensive and not automated. 
The post office also provided banking and telecommunication services 
(Saunders, 2006; Toime, 1997). Cross-subsidisation was commonplace; 
telecommunications accounted for approximately 60% of total revenue and was 
often used to subsidise postal agency services (Fogelberg, 1992). Informational 
deficiencies is the name coined to describe the flow of information available to 
upper levels of management. Accounting methods were cash based (Dale & Ball, 
1996). Coupled with a lack of accountants (less than 10), accurate information was 
rarely supplied and often delayed (Fogelberg, 1992).  
The post office was also a source of job creation: when unemployment 
figures rose, staff numbers at the post office increased accordingly (Erakovic & 
Wilson, 2005; Fogelberg, 1992). Toime (1997) concurs, suggesting the cross-
subsidisation of postal services made it possible to conceal structural 
unemployment and was an explanatory factor in combining communications and 
posts. Prior to corporatisation, it employed approximately 40,000 people 
(Fogelberg, 1992), operating a network of 906 full post offices and a further 338 
postal agencies (Saunders, 2006). This institution has been labelled employment 
creation. 
Finally, Kelsey (2003) notes that the department had a tall organisational 
structure, with as many as 15 layers of management (Erakovic & Wilson, 2005). 
5.2.1 Links between institutions 
The institutional environment in Figure 5-1 was the product of an 
interventionist state. The institutions were interlinked and self-reinforcing, creating 
many issues. These links produced a stagnant environment resistant to change as 
workers had no efficiency or productivity incentives.  
Insider governance was strongly connected to every other institution. 
Regulatory authority was a critical factor in creating barriers to entry; any rational 
actor given the ability to remove competition would invoke such power. Placing 
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telecommunications and postal operations under a single ministry facilitated cross-
subsidisation. Fogelberg (1992) notes that it was a political decision to subsidise 
the post, a typical flaw of insider governance. Employment creation also appeared 
via insider governance. The link between these two institutions explains to a degree 
why the post office exhibited such a lack of strategic capital expenditure as greater 
mechanisation would have reduced the government’s ability to increase labour 
inputs, or at the very least complicated the justification of such staffing decisions. 
Barriers to entry were related to cross-subsidisation. Statutory monopolies 
prevented private entry, allowing posts to be subsidised by telecommunications 
without fear of losing market share. Barriers to entry also strengthened employment 
creation; isolating the post office from competition placed it in a position to absorb 
excess labour supply. It was simpler to increase labour inputs than to install 
sophisticated sorting equipment for instance, which also contributed to the state’s 
goal of providing welfare. The absence of competition negated the need for strategic 
decision-making and therefore entry barriers smoothed the job creation process. 
Insider governance, barriers to entry and employment creation were therefore a 
trinity of sorts, with insider governance providing the political motivation for job 
creation and barriers to entry granting the post office the logistical means to carry 
out the policy. 
Barriers to entry were also connected to the tall organisational structure. It 
was inevitable that increasing layers of management emerged from operating as a 
traditional government department with a bureaucratic design. Such structures 
confer advantages of standardisation and a strong chain of command, which a 
government may well wish to capitalise upon, although they may also result from 
rent-seeking opportunism deriving from insider governance. Removal of barriers 
would create competitive pressure to reduce the hierarchy, particularly middle 
management, creating strong incentives to resist change. Postal workers were 
public servants, represented by a single powerful union, and had considerable 
backing which likely further increased their resolve to oppose changes. 
Barriers to entry also reinforced informational deficiencies. In a 
competitive environment, transfer of useful information on a timely basis is critical 
to organisational survival. In the absence of competition, there was little incentive 
to improve information systems and thus the legislative monopoly linked directly 
to the ineffective use of information. This linkage contributes to the explanation of 
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the inefficiencies and subsequent annual losses the department created as protection 
fostered complacency and reduced innovation. 
Cross-subsidisation linked to employment creation. In effect, receipts from 
telecommunications were used to pay additional personnel. Without cross-subsidies, 
labour costs would have had to be financed through other alternatives, diverting 
funds, additional taxes, or public debt. Cross-subsidisation was therefore an 
expedient solution to employment creation. Adding employees to postal operations 
was simpler than telecommunications for a number of reasons. Firstly, the lack of 
capital investment implied that labour inputs had to be used instead47. Secondly, 
skill requirements for postal operations were less than telecommunications, and 
thirdly, the use of temporary, casual, and non-classified staff offered an easy way 
to increase staff numbers. Indeed from 1981 to 1986, temporary, casual, and non-
classified staff numbers increased by 14.4% whilst permanent staff levels remained 
almost constant (Statistics New Zealand, 1986). 
The combination of being isolated from competition, governed internally 
with poor information systems, hampered by an inflexible organisational structure 
and burdened with a large pool of (often inferior) labour created an organisation 
that was ineffective in terms of customer satisfaction and unwilling to change. 
These factors produced an institutional environment incompatible with service 
performance and lacked incentives to foster productivity and efficiency, resulting 
in annual losses, poor customer service, poor asset management, and cross-
subsidisation. In other words, there was no economic rationale for improvement; 
the pre-reform organisation was simply not designed with competitive efficiency in 
mind.  
5.3 The Drive for Reform 
The intention to corporatize NZP was set within the context of sweeping 
public and private sector reforms. New Zealand’s global competitiveness had fallen 
and the country faced a number of economic and political issues (Wood, 1995). 
Many of the proposed reforms were drafted under the intellectual climate of 
neoliberalism, which had gained much credibility both domestically and overseas 
(Cardow, Tripe, & Wilson, 2011; Kelsey, 2003; Woods, 2006). Under the principle 
                                                 
47 The total amount of consigned deliveries in the early ‘80s was increasing, further easing the 
justification for more employees. 
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that the state should own major national infrastructure but not control it (Cardow et 
al., 2011), there was also an underlying belief that governments should focus upon 
governance and not the production of goods and services (Fogelberg, 1992). To 
illustrate the scale of state involvement, “10% of national income in 1986 was spent 
on the Post Office, the Lands and Survey Department, the New Zealand Forest 
Service, and the Ministry of Energy” (State Services Commission, 2002, para. 30). 
One of the government’s primary aims was to reduce state presence in the 
economy and many state-owned assets were prepared for eventual privatisation. 
However, even if considered in isolation, the post office presented a number of 
issues. Another driving influence was the desire to disentangle conflicting 
objectives. Social and commercial requirements created internal inconsistencies 
and it was evident that social requirements were given more credence by preceding 
administrations (Fogelberg, 1992). Saunders (2006) notes a third goal was to raise 
profitability. In 1986, the year prior to corporatisation, the post office booked a 
$37.9 million loss despite raising standard postage stamp prices from 25c to 40c. 
The shift in economic thinking championed by the Chicago Business School led 
many of the government’s more influential officials, particularly in Treasury (Wood, 
1995), to focus more on economic efficiency. 
Kelsey (2003) also states that the post office was inefficient and privileged. 
She cites some of the reasons why it created such a drain on public funds, chiefly 
through over-employment, excessively labour-intensive operations, over-
capitalisation in property with a large number of loss-making rural offices, and 
provision of services below full cost. This is reinforced by Toime (1997), who states 
that the cross-subsidisation receipts from telecommunications removed the 
incentive to improve productivity. A fourth aim therefore, was to raise efficiency 
and separate the business entities thereby necessitating self-sufficiency. 
The literature does not describe the relative importance of these goals. When 
asked to place the objectives in rank order, data collected from the interviews 
produced a broad consensus indicating that reducing state presence was the most 
important. Table 5-1 elaborates.  
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Table 5-1 Rank order of government objectives 
Goal of reforms Rank of importance  
Reduce the presence of the state 1 
Disentangle social and commercial concerns 2 
Increase efficiency 3 
Raise profitability of the postal SOE 4 
These results were largely consistent among the interviewed experts despite 
differing ideologies. During the sessions, one comment made was that increasing 
efficiency was always going to be an important aspect. Postal services have been 
said to be an element of a country’s infrastructural services along with 
telecommunications (Participant 4, Personal communication, August 27, 2012) and 
as such, maximum efficiency should be pursued to avoid unnecessary resources 
being diverted from more productive areas of the economy even if profitability itself 
were not possible. Government did not fully expect the post office could be made 
to produce a profit and therefore profitability appears as the least important 
objective. 
Figure 5-2 summarises the issues that the pre-existing institutional 
environment created. These issues produced the perceived drive for reform. Note 
that as part of a wider reform programme, exogenous pressure has been omitted for 
clarity.  
 
Figure 5-2 Issues leading to drive for reform 
 
I also questioned whether the post office was a critical element of the reform 
process or if it was included as a matter of expedience. Data show four major factors 
why the post office was made part of the overall package: 
1. aggregate reform, 
2. Telecom separation, 
3. banking separation, and 
4. public salience. 
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With respect to aggregate reform, inclusion was a matter of course as 
exclusion would have been inconsistent with the ideology and necessitated specific 
legislation. As participant two mentioned, “…there were several things happening 
at the same time, there was Telecom, that was happening, rail was happening, post 
was happening, they probably [thought]: get on and do the lot.” (Personal 
communication, July 26, 2012).  
 Separating Telecom from the post office raised an interesting point. Whilst 
there was a desire to reform the post office, the telecommunications arm was 
particularly attractive as it was seen being more lucrative. As a result, reforming the 
post office was requisite to privatising Telecom. This is encapsulated by a 
submission from participant four: 
…in the UK by now the ‘T’ part of the P&T department had been split off 
and so the telecoms were going their own way; telecommunications [were] 
clearly becoming the bigger force, so that was a pretty easy call to make. 
(Personal communication, August 27, 2012). 
 
Separating the Post Office Savings Bank from the other two entities was 
also a relevant point as a matter of consistency. Whilst the bank was much smaller 
than postal services or telecommunications, it was salient in terms of the underlying 
ideology. The bank’s social functions conflicted with neoliberal ideologies and the 
Mason-Morris review48 engendered these principles, recommending that the postal 
bank be made into a third distinct entity. 
 The final point of public salience suggests that whilst not central to the 
process, NZP and Telecom would come under closer observation than other 
elements as changes here would be more keenly felt by the average citizen. The two 
organisations would also serve as unifying banners for support and opposition, and 
used as precedents for other SOEs. 
 In summary, the post office was an important part of the reforms as it 
included a number of infrastructural services but it was not at the core of the 
programme, as was the case in Japan. It was significant however, in the sense that 
it would be a pioneering SOE. 
                                                 
48 A government-commissioned external review. 
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5.4 The Proposed and Implemented Reforms 
The Mason-Morris review recommended the department be divided into its 
three constituent units (Fogelberg, 1992; Saunders, 2006). Regulatory functions 
would be separated from operations and transferred to the Department of Trade and 
Industry49 (Saunders, 2006). 
The separated business units then became SOEs subject to the State Owned 
Enterprise Act of 1987. This law clarified the objectives of an SOE through three 
major stipulations. An SOE must: 
 be as profitable and as efficient as a comparable business that is not owned 
by the state, 
 be a good employer, and 
 have regard for the community in which it operates when able to do so 
(Fogelberg, 1992; Kelsey, 2003). 
 
The Act charged management with realising profits as a private company 
would, distinctly removing conflicting social and corporate objectives. Should the 
government request an SOE to carry out socially motivated operations, the Act also 
required commensurate compensation payable to the SOE (Fogelberg, 1992). 
Separating the three units was a critical development and therefore was a 
focal point of the interviews. The data suggest four major explanatory factors: 
1. commitment to reform,  
2. desire to sell Telecom, 
3. driver disassociation, and 
4. change management. 
  
 ‘Commitment to reform’ represents both the will and the means to carry out 
changes. The desire to make government departments into viable private-sector 
entities was a key motivator, and the SOE Act was the manifest output of that desire. 
The government also held an enviable position, backed by the public, business 
leaders, and the media. Expectations of improved services, wages, and working 
conditions contributed to this support. Additionally, the speed of reforms was 
important. The government passed reforms rapidly, so much so that many of the 
                                                 
49 This later became the Ministry of Economic Development. 
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major elements had already been implemented before some of the costs became 
apparent.  
Telecom’s sale was expected to produce considerable funds but the 
government was doubtful about finding domestic buyers and thus had to appeal to 
overseas investors. Separating postal operations from telecommunications was 
logical as the two industries faced different drivers and competencies. Prospective 
buyers would also not have suffered universal service obligations pertaining to 
postal networks lightly. 
 In regards to differing drivers, operating the various services under a single 
government department involved either complexity in training or replication of cost 
centres. Indeed, under the old system there were heads of the three different units 
already present so a state of quasi-separation was already in effect. Formal 
severance would therefore allow each company to pursue efficiency autonomously 
without conflicting business drivers.  
 Change management is the final factor and this was more important for 
separation proper. The data indicate that decisions were made at high levels and 
executed very quickly. Importantly, these decisions were made under the principles 
of outsider governance by private sector players. However, participants two, three, 
and four note that unions and workers were handled carefully; conflict was actively 
avoided and a more conciliatory approach was pursued 50 . This helped reduce 
internal friction and contributed to reform implementation. 
NZP shares were initially held by the government; 50% by the Minister of 
Finance, and 50% by the Minister of State Owned Enterprises (Fogelberg, 1992). 
The shareholders then appointed a board of directors and met every three years to 
reach contractual agreements on the nature and scope of activities as well as 
performance targets (Saunders, 2006). The government expected to sell its stake in 
NZP within a few years. While Kelsey (2003) noted that the government intended 
to use as many outsiders as possible, the first board of directors only made two 
outside appointments at senior management levels. Further outside vision was 
brought in later (Participant 4, Personal communication, August 27, 2012). NZP 
was subjected to the same system of checks and balances as others in the public 
sector (Saunders, 2006).  
                                                 
50 At least in the postal service. Telecom’s experience was much less conciliatory.  
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New legislation addressed the competitive environment. The Postal 
Services Act of 1987 reduced the monopoly to apply only to letters weighing less 
than 500 grams or where the postage payable was equal to or less than $1.75, 
however it preserved NZP’s authority as sole issuer of stamps (Saunders, 2006). 
The act also imposed changes to NZP’s financial accounting and reporting 
procedures (Saunders, 2006), requiring transparent accounting arrangements that 
would prove that it was not using its monopoly over standard mail to cross-subsidise 
other operations open to competition (Fogelberg, 1992). 
One of the important features was the lack of a legislative universal service 
obligation; instead, a Deed of Understanding was drafted. This was a contractual 
agreement between NZP and the government, specifying the frequency of deliveries, 
penetration of the network, and pricing limits on standard mail (Saunders, 2006). 
The requirements were imposed in exchange for maintaining the statutory 
monopoly NZP enjoyed regarding official stamp issue (Erakovic & Wilson, 2005). 
The Deed’s terms could be renewed every three years and if the government were 
to consider allowing other operators to issue official stamps the terms would be 
reviewed (Saunders, 2006).  
The 1998 Deed is still current in that NZP must maintain a network of 880 
outlets including at least 240 post offices51. In 2010, however, minor variations 
surrounding delivery on public holidays were installed (New Zealand Post, 2010). 
Similarly, the actual number of Post Shops52 and post outlets currently in operation 
are considerably more than the Deed specifies (Saunders, 2006). Prices for standard 
letters as per the 1998 Deed were capped at 45 cents for three years (New Zealand 
Post, 1998). The most recent Deed does not specify any pricing caps (New Zealand 
Post, 2013a). Thus, whilst this may give the appearance of a universal service 
obligation, it is important to note that requirements were, and still are, rather loose.  
When the Postal Services Act was amended in 1998, it fully deregulated the 
industry. Private operators can now deliver standard mail. NZP is still the sole issuer 
of official stamps although private operators may join the Universal Postal Union 
if they wish. None have applied to date (Kenny, 2009) but there is a provision that 
                                                 
51 Recall that as a government department, the network included 906 post offices. 
52 Post Shops are staffed by NZP employees, post outlets are outsourced. 
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allows them to sell their own unofficial stamps53 (Saunders, 2006). Interestingly, 
the true threats that NZP faced were not from direct competition, but technologies 
that have replaced postal services (Participant 2, personal communication, July 26, 
2012). 
Reforms to unions were also proposed and there is now no union 
specifically for postal workers or postmasters. They were incorporated into the 
Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union – one of New Zealand’s largest 
(Kenny, 2009). 
Finally, having separated the business units and prepared them for eventual 
deregulation, the intention was to privatise them (Kelsey, 2003). Postbank and 
Telecom were sold but NZP remains a corporatized SOE. The reason for not 
privatising NZP is not apparent from the literature, but the data provide three 
explanatory reasons: 
1. political unpopularity,  
2. the success of NZP, and 
3. regulatory conditions. 
 
By 1989, privatisation had fallen from public favour as the costs of 
transition began to bite. Privatisation became politically divisive whereby 
constituent support was often based upon the member’s position. Experiences with 
forestry and Telecom left many disillusioned and it was not politically feasible to 
privatise NZP in such an environment. Even so, management had prepared the 
groundwork and NZP was due to be listed following Contact Energy’s initial public 
offering, however upon National’s defeat, further privatisation plans were 
indefinitely postponed.  
NZP had also become commercially successful, returning dividends and 
taxes whilst building a strong public image. In addition, to this day there is a sense 
of pride in the company and consequently little reason to sell it. Kiwibank has 
further strengthened the aforementioned points. 
Finally, the regulatory conditions today are such that privatisation is 
somewhat redundant. The current situation is one of ‘effective privatisation’ via 
deregulation. Under the Deed of Understanding, prospective buyers would have to 
                                                 
53 Such stamps cannot bear the words “New Zealand” unless they form part of the company name, 
which must appear unabbreviated in the same type face and scale as the company’s registered trading 
name. 
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shoulder those responsibilities. By comparison, the protective monopoly has been 
removed, network access is assured, and entry barriers to postal delivery have been 
eliminated. Should an organisation be motivated to begin operations it would be 
simpler to invest privately than attempt a take-over of NZP. It is possible to suggest, 
however, that standard mail delivery54 constitutes a natural monopoly. Whilst some 
private operators have intermittently entered, few have survived (Participant 3, 
personal communication, August 3, 2012). Those that remain tend to focus on niche 
markets such as business customers, rural deliveries and courier services. Even so, 
competition is fierce and working conditions are harsh (Participant 2, personal 
communication, July 26, 2012). As of this writing, the entire market is populated 
by 22 operators including NZP (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 
2013). Given that the market is competitive and effectively dominated by an 
efficient natural monopoly, there is little reason for complete privatisation. 
5.5 Vested Interests, Lobbying, and Resistance 
5.5.1 Operations level management 
Privatisation often faces resistance from management or employees, and 
sometimes both. The literature surrounding NZP provides no significant evidence 
of either and therefore was a point of interest in the interviews. Three explanatory 
factors have been identified: 
1. oppositional marginalisation, 
2. employee engagement, and 
3. change management. 
 
Staff at NZP were largely unable to resist changes because similar events 
were unfolding throughout the public sector. Employees were understandably 
anxious, particularly middle and lower management, but they accepted that changes 
had to be made in light of the reforms being implemented on a national scale. The 
unions were also cautious of public action and the internal handling of initial 
challenges weakened the unions later on. Unions themselves were being 
restructured; being placed in competition with one another reduced their power. 
Consequently, the weak position of employees and unions meant there was little 
they could do. 
                                                 
54 Excluding courier services and rural mail. 
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Nevertheless, employees were given opportunities for advancement, 
promotion, and responsibility, and were excited to be a part of the reform process. 
At the same time, NZP offered generous exit packages, which incentivised 
supporters to stay and detractors to withdraw. Employee engagement was 
articulated soundly by participant three: “Yes, I think they relished it, the people 
who remained with the reformed business.” (Personal communication, August 3, 
2012). 
Change management is the third factor identified in explaining the lack of 
internal resistance. NZP pursued a cooperative approach with unions and 
employees, going so far as to assist transfers to the new union. They also kept as 
many employees as was economically viable. Corporate culture was transformed 
and the shift in paradigms resulted in much greater involvement. Participant four 
provided an excellent example of this: employees initially argued for price 
increases to reduce the pressure to improve productivity but now are actively 
engaged in efficiency drives and looking for ways to reduce prices. Employees at 
NZP today exhibit an unwillingness to return to the pre-reform paradigm, such was 
the acuity of management in fostering change. 
5.5.2 Divisional and strategic level management 
Fogelberg (1992) states that in preparation for the 1987 transition, an 
interim board of directors was appointed by the shareholding ministers and 
consisted of five individuals from the private business sector, one trade unionist, 
and two political nominees. Later, a permanent board was assembled, consisting of 
six non-political appointments drawn from private businesses (Fogelberg, 1992). 
The data indicate two factors that reduced resistance to change. 
The first has been termed ‘management revitalisation’. The appointments of 
Harvey Parker and Elmar Toime by the board headed by Michael Morris were a 
clear example of agency theory. Parker came from Australia following the 
privatisation of Telstra. Under Toime, NZP began appointing more outside 
managers as incumbents retired. Bringing in these new personnel injected new ideas 
and thinking, helping convert the organisation into a commercial entity. 
 ‘Employee engagement’ reappears as the second factor. Incumbent 
managers who supported the changes were heavily invested in. A strong working 
relationship with the union was also important; participants two and three both 
acknowledged that during the transition the union itself worked alongside 
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management, persuading line-level staff to adopt changes. Consequently, these two 
categories indicate how outside management was instrumental in reducing internal 
resistance. 
5.5.3 Union relations 
An important aspect in terms of overcoming resistance from employees was 
the early involvement of the unions. According to Kenny (2009), both management 
and the unions wanted to preserve industrial stability; neither party saw advantages 
in drawing attention to the organisation and this reduced conflict. Toime (1997) 
states that involving the workers’ union from the outset and emphasising the need 
for change and competitive behaviour resulted in a cooperative relationship 
allowing changes to be implemented quickly and purposefully. The interview 
findings concur, but they reveal a limiting factor: NZP was the first significant 
negotiator under the new system and prudence had to be exercised in light of any 
precedents set. From participant four:  
…but in this one we were on our own, we were a flagship negotiation 
and so if we had agreed to a significant wage increase or something 
like that, that would have been a bellwether for the economy. (Personal 
communication, August 27, 2012).  
 
 This caution exposed management to a degree but was mitigated by a 
constructive relationship and recognition of new drivers. Growth and productivity 
also meant strong jobs were being established, assuaging union concerns.  
Fogelberg (1992) also states that the trade unions saw reform as inevitable 
and accepted it with reservation but not resistance. Unions received advanced 
warning of the company’s intentions regarding strategic direction and their 
reactions were taken into account when implementing changes. The data 
corroborates this but also indicates that removing public servant status made union 
negotiations easier as agreements were now private as opposed to affecting all 
public servants. Similarly, union power had diminished significantly by the time 
reforms were implemented. Kelsey (2003) however, notes that there were industrial 
disputes regarding working conditions and pay but does not say if the workers were 
opposed to reforms themselves. Nevertheless, the collaborative approach between 
management and the unions was an important factor in reducing resistance. 
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5.5.4 Rural reaction 
Resistance was apparent in the rural sector, particularly from the Federated 
Farmers Women’s Group (Participant 3, personal communication, August 3, 2012). 
The government received some 300 submissions opposing post office closures in 
rural areas, although rural delivery only made up 8.9% of delivery points (Saunders, 
2006). Several legal attempts to block closures were dismissed by the courts, who 
concluded that the new corporate directive implied that NZP only had to ‘have 
regard’ for the community and was not obliged to maintain unprofitable services 
(Kelsey, 2003).  
The literature suggests that it was not the loss of postal services rural 
residents opposed55 (Scott, Bushnell, & Sallee, 2005), but rather the loss in banking 
services previously supplied through Postbank (Saunders, 2006). Although 
electronic banking has since become more common, there is not sufficient evidence 
in the literature to suggest this was able to overcome rural resistance. The data 
however indicate that much of the rural opposition centring on NZP resulted from 
its symbolic status of reform. Whilst irresistible changes were being made in other 
parts of the economy, there was a sense that certain concessions could be gleaned 
from NZP or the state.  
5.5.4.1 The rural delivery fee 
In 1991, the National party (conservative) took power and continued the 
reform process (Kenny, 2009). The party had a large number of rural votes and 
allegedly attempted pressuring NZP to cross-subsidise rural deliveries (New 
Zealand Business Roundtable, 1992). Nevertheless, in 1992 the annual rural 
delivery fee was doubled from $40 per year to $80 (Kelsey, 2003; New Zealand 
Business Roundtable, 1992), although this decision was not made without 
consultation (Smith, 1997). NZP met with Federated Farmers, who were initially 
supportive and understood that the company now had to respond to commercial 
drivers. The doubling of the fee was made during the time of least profitability and 
rural deliveries were still being cross-subsidised; even then it was a compromise 
between the two parties (Smith, 1997). The increase therefore was consistent with 
reform ideology but also reflected management’s conciliatory approach. 
                                                 
55 The number of postal agencies actually increased from 1987 to 1989. 
 114
Nevertheless, rank-and-file members of Federated Farmers grew 
increasingly frustrated with higher fees. Members of the National party also began 
to add their own voices and the leaders of Federated Farmers were forced to reverse 
their position (Smith, 1997). The organisation sued NZP to remove the fee but the 
case was dismissed, following the same legal precedent as post office closures 
(Kelsey, 2003; Smith, 1997). Later however, in 1995, NZP unilaterally removed 
the fee completely.  
The incumbency of a National government coupled with the removal of the 
fee in a reformed, neoliberal environment has drawn some criticism, arguing that 
the move was politically motivated. This study therefore placed particular emphasis 
on the matter to develop a clearer understanding. The interview data were narrowed 
and refined until three broad explanatory factors were uncovered: 
1. political pressure, 
2. economic rationalisation, and 
3. strategic decision making. 
  
 It would be naïve to suggest that there was not at least an attempt to exert 
political pressure. Federated Farmers was a powerful interest group working closely 
with National party members. However, there is an absence of evidence in the 
literature to suggest that following the losses in court, pressure was successfully 
directed at NZP. The data offer a stronger case to the contrary: “…the doubling of 
the rural fee was internal, and its removal was totally internal – there was no advice, 
suggestion, [or] discussion with [the] government on that point” (Participant 4, 
personal communication, August 27, 2012). Similarly, referring to the economic 
and strategic rationale, from participant three: “[A top manager] told me why they 
did it – I stand by that earlier answer” (Personal communication, August 3, 2012). 
Note that public sector reforms were specifically created to remove cases of undue 
influence such as this. Whilst the removal of the fee in a user-pays environment 
does appear to be inconsistent, it can be better explained via economic and strategic 
rationale. 
 By the mid-1990s, many of the company’s operating costs had been 
significantly reduced. Similarly, the expansion of courier services and substitute 
technologies also played a role, participant one stating, “…there has been a huge 
decline of mail vis-à-vis courier, but there has also been a huge decline of mail vis-
à-vis electronic communications. So the importance of the snail mail is hugely 
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diminished.” (Personal communication, July 25, 2012). Saunders (2006) also notes 
that the policy was enacted as part of a wider rebalancing of prices and efficiency 
gains the company had made, passing savings on to customers. Participant four also 
noted that the expansion of contracted rural carriers converted many fixed costs into 
variable ones – a particularly important attribute for what was described as a “fixed-
cost industry” (Personal communication, August 27, 2012). As the service was now 
profitable, removal of the fee was economically justifiable. 
 Most important was strategic decision making. Post office closures and legal 
battles had damaged NZP’s public image and the rural delivery fee was seen as 
further provocation. The company recognised that brand value and positioning 
would become greatly important in a potentially competitive and deregulated 
environment, thus the decision to remove the fee was a strategic choice to improve 
public perception. Losses in revenue from the abolishment of the fee were more 
than compensated for in gains to intangible assets, as indicated by participant four, 
“…public favourability was an important component in a State Owned Enterprise 
and therefore it was worth it for the brand value” (Personal communication, August 
27, 2012).  
 This also had long-term implications as the company foresaw physical mail 
giving ground to electronic and thus had a business plan to reintroduce banking at 
some future point. A strong public image would aid future developments, once 
again drawing from participant four: “And so later on when we wanted to argue for 
Kiwibank or do some other diversifications and so on, there was a high degree of 
support and trust for the company” (Personal communication, August 27, 2012). In 
conclusion, the actions taken by NZP were not politically influenced, nor were they 
inconsistent with reform ideology: the dictum of shareholder wealth maximisation 
was adhered to by favouring long-term profitability over more immediate results.  
5.5.4.2 Later concerns 
Further opposition from the rural community was evident through 
submissions regarding the 1998 amendment to the Postal Services Act56; Federated 
Farmers wanted to secure free rural delivery in law (Kelsey, 2003). Other 
submissions against the bill were largely based around costs of services, security, 
privacy, and liability for damages on the part of private carriers (Kelsey, 2003). The 
                                                 
56  Although the Act was widely supported by postal management, business interests, and 
competitors. 
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government appeared to yield to this pressure as the 1998 Deed of Understanding 
– signed under National – specified that NZP may not reintroduce a rural delivery 
fee (Kenny, 2009). Intuitively however, NZP would most likely never reintroduce 
the fee as it would damage their carefully built image.  
An analysis of the interview data presents three distinct categories that 
demonstrate how rural opposition was negotiated with and minimised: 
1. internal factors, 
2. external factors, and 
3. regulatory factors. 
  
 Whilst NZP inherited the postal network and concluded it was too costly to 
maintain in its present state, the company also realised that in order to build 
goodwill and brand value a ‘balanced score card’ approach was needed (Participant 
4, personal communication, August 27, 2012). This measurement framework 
includes strategic non-financial metrics57  as well as traditional tools, providing 
managers with a wider view of organisational performance. Increases in service 
performance, broader agency networks, removal of the rural delivery fee, lower 
standard postal rates, and the establishment of Kiwibank were all initiatives that 
added value for the public, offsetting societal losses of post offices proper. 
 As previously discussed, banking services were one of the most salient 
issues. Despite its prior connections, the banking entity was now separate and thus 
NZP cannot be accountable for service deterioration. Whilst it created transitory 
issues for rural residents, the expansion of the ATM network, internet, and mobile 
banking has made much progress in returning services.  
 Finally, the SOE Act clearly defined SOEs as profit-oriented businesses, not 
social agencies. Regulatory factors were instrumental in settling legal debates; if 
specific social considerations were to be included they would have to be explicitly 
funded under Section Seven. The other key component was to separate the 
government from the SOE thus preventing undue influence. Indeed, the very 
motions initiated by rural groups were attempts to apply political pressure that the 
reforms were designed specifically to remove. The regulatory factors therefore were 
particularly effective in overcoming resistance but NZP saw them as a last resort as 
there were costs in terms of public image to consider.  
                                                 
57 Examples include customer satisfaction and organizational learning. 
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5.6 Factors Aiding and Hindering Reform 
The underlying macroeconomic conditions were conducive to reform. Many 
writers note that the government of 1984 realised that New Zealand was facing a 
broad range of issues (Kelsey, 2003; Scott et al., 2005; Wood, 1995). From the 
interviews: “There were pressures and adjustments that were needing to take place” 
(Participant 1, personal communication, July 25, 2012); “The New Zealand 
economy had been kept in a straitjacket between ’80 to ’83, ‘84” (Participant 3, 
personal communication, August 3, 2012); and finally, “And so in thinking about 
the entire economic competitiveness of the economy of trying to break it out of this 
high level of protectionism exactly as you’ve described, one facet was the reform 
of the public sector” (Participant 4, personal communication, August 27, 2012).  
The sheer scale of reforms and the government’s single-minded approach 
was a contributing factor. Additionally, Wood (1995) states that the consensus 
among New Zealand’s central leadership was that no interest group would be 
impervious to change or permitted to sway the course of reform. Kelsey’s (2003) 
viewpoint differs, asserting that any arguments against the proposed changes were 
dismissed as lobbying by vested interests. The data also show the government’s 
drive to implement change was a key factor. As might be expected, some described 
this resolve as ‘determined’ whilst others labelled it ‘ruthless’. Irrespective of one’s 
view, the motivation and unity of the government aided the process of reform.  
Another contributing factor was the freedom granted to reduce labour inputs 
and outsource to external contractors. Being far less profitable than urban delivery, 
rural delivery is commonly a point of conflict. In the case of NZP, contractors were 
selected via a bidding process. Those who won the contracts then collected rural 
mail from a local mail centre, sorted, and delivered it (Saunders, 2006). Contracts 
were renewed every three years subject to performance. Freedom to outsource to 
external organisations enabled fixed costs to be converted into variable costs 
(Toime, 1997). This freedom to reorganise operations without interference was an 
important factor in aiding reform. It also serves as an illustration of the internal 
consistency of the New Zealand reforms as the selection of rural delivery 
contractors can be seen as the use of competitive tendering to achieve a potentially 
competitive outcome.  
Management at NZP competently implemented changes and took a path 
much less divisive than Telecom. The pain of downsizing employment was 
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carefully approached; management were concerned about maintaining favourable 
relationships with employees and unions.  
Findings taken from expert interviews show that reforms were easier to 
implement as the 1984 National party was unable to respond after losing support 
from its central bastions to Labour. The lack of a strong opposition party meant that 
Labour could implement policies with minimal resistance. The public were 
exhausted with industrial action from the 1970s, blunting union power. 
Additionally, NZP was not the single focus of attention as much wider changes 
were taking place. 
In summary, the data suggest five interrelated factors whose presence aided 
the reform process: 
1. macroeconomic conditions, 
2. political determination, 
3. managerial acuity, 
4. governance institutions, and 
5. minimisation of opposition. 
 
With respect to factors hampering reforms, towards the end of the 1980s 
and mid-1990s privatisation developed a stigma as reform costs became apparent, 
creating public hostility towards further sales. The National party rallied as ructions 
and divisions within the Labour party stalled progress. Eventually, the National 
party claimed power in part due to its campaign of no further asset sales, although 
they would continue their own reforms. Excluding political divisions and public 
rancour, the data were unable to define any other external elements that slowed the 
process.  
5.7 Outcomes and Resulting Institutions 
During the early 1980s, the post office lost $20 million per year on average 
(New Zealand Post, 2006). Without change it was expected to be $68 million in the 
1987-1988 financial year (Scott et al., 2005) despite raising standard stamps to 45c 
from 25c (State Services Commission, 2002). Following corporatisation, NZP 
immediately began booking end-of-year profits (see Figure 5-3), 1988 represents 
the first year as an SOE. 
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Figure 5-3 NZP annual profits from 1987 to 2015 
 
 Sources (Kelsey, 2003; Kenny 2009, NZP Annual Reports) 
 
The smaller figure shown in 1992 ($5 million) resulted from absorbing a 
non-recurring cost of restructuring (Toime, 1997). The 2010 figure of $1.3 million 
is the non-normalised figure including non-recurring items totalling $72.3 million 
(New Zealand Post, 2010). These profits were realised even after lowering standard 
letter prices to 40c, high annual inflation, and increases in consumption tax 58 
(Fogelberg, 1992).  
Prior to corporatisation, approximately 80% of mail was delivered the next 
day (Brash, 1996; Fogelberg, 1992). This increased to 98% by 1990 despite 
shedding 30% of the workforce (Brash, 1996; Fogelberg, 1992). Labour 
productivity also increased; by 1997, 20% more mail items were being handled by 
a workforce 40% smaller than the pre-reform post office (Toime, 1997). 
Capital spending increased, and machinery investments reduced the cost of 
sorting by approximately 30% (Kelsey, 2003). Toime (1997) also states that the 
proportion of labour costs fell from about 75% to roughly 50% and in 1994, NZP 
was voted ‘New Zealand Company of the Year’.  
The new institutional environment contrasts starkly with the preceding one, 
see Figure 5-4. 
.  
  
                                                 
58 Consumption tax is known as Goods and Services Tax in New Zealand. 
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Figure 5-4 Post-reform institutional environment 
 
 
The market is open and lightly regulated, allowing entry subject to 
registration as a postal operator. As such, barriers to entry can be rewritten as 
deregulation, which includes level playing fields, light-handed regulation, and 
government neutrality. 
At the time of writing, there are less than a score of companies competing 
with NZP. Economic theory suggests, however, that implied or potential 
competition provides incentives for efficiency and productivity, not just actual 
competition. Whilst exact figures of market share do not appear to be available, ITA 
Consulting (2010) notes that Freightways is the second largest competitor, 
occupying 5% of the postal market (Post & Parcel, 2006). As such, considering 
NZP’s dominant position and the scale economies it can realise, the company 
resembles a natural monopoly. Nevertheless, physical mail volumes have been 
decreasing globally and NZP is responding by further increasing efficiency and 
exploring supplementary operations. Thus, whilst other firms are a source of direct 
competition and market entry is relatively simple, replacement technologies and 
services are providing much of the impetus for NZP to remain innovative and 
competitive. 
Cross-subsidisation has been removed. What we now observe is a term other 
authors have described as contractualism. This arrangement no longer requires that 
one part of the business support another and the increased transparency of contracts, 
bidding processes, and accounting methods act as checks and balances to that effect.  
Outsider governance and shareholder wealth maximisation are the new 
constraints guiding managerial decision-making. The presence of directors not 
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appointed on political grounds is widely advocated by the privatisation. Similarly, 
the principles of shareholder wealth maximisation, which prioritises returns to 
owners, is an essential element in establishing an incentive structure that removes 
the influence of conflicting commercial and political objectives. Under the old 
system, corporate governance mechanisms could be better described as stakeholder 
wealth maximisation, providing socially admirable but uncommercial services. 
Shareholder wealth maximisation by comparison, as explicitly stated in the SOE 
Act, dictates that the organisation’s objective is to produce profits and it need only 
have regard for the public. In this sense, NZP is no longer constrained by political 
goals and is only as accountable to the public as good corporate social responsibility 
models advocate. 
The Employment Contracts Act and other reforms produced a more flexible 
labour market. The government also now designs policies based upon outputs and 
uses contracts extensively and has been described as ‘government by contract’ 
(Dale & Ball, 1996). 
5.7.1 Links between institutions 
The new environment is also interconnected and self-reinforcing although 
designed with different motivations and ideologies. As with the old environment, 
governance principles influence all the other institutions. Outsider governance is 
linked to output based policy as the state is now more concerned with outputs rather 
than inputs, implying much less (if any) direct involvement in the operations of the 
enterprise and enabling governance by outsiders. The state is therefore a passive 
investor and does not interfere as it once did. 
In facilitating outsider governance, contractualism is the bridge that 
connects the state to the enterprise, specifying the objectives and requirements of 
the investor. The contractual obligations of NZP are specified in the SOE Act and 
Deed of Understanding, and NZP has the autonomy to pursue these objectives. 
Contractualism also extends to lower level agreements; NZP has contractual 
relationships with its postal agencies and rural delivery operators based on 
commercial principles.  
Outsider governance is strongly tied to shareholder wealth maximisation as 
an embodiment of agency theory. In addition, the new charter for an SOE to 
function as a private firm provides the guiding principles for management to ensure 
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decisions are made with respect to commercial objectives for the express purpose 
of increasing shareholder wealth.  
The flexible labour market is also tied to the governance institution by 
allowing management to autonomously determine labour inputs. No longer is the 
company used as a vehicle to absorb structural unemployment. Additionally, the 
removal of public servant status has simplified working relationships with 
employees as negotiations can be handled internally. 
Finally, outsider governance is connected to deregulation as a requirement 
for consistency. The presence of an organisation operated by the state in a 
deregulated market presents an image of an uneven playing field. Such a scenario 
could result in the government using its powers to dominate competition artificially. 
NZP receives no such favourable treatment and thus must be self-reliant. This 
arrangement ensures that whilst NZP may be the dominant competitor, the playing 
field is level.  
Shareholder wealth maximisation is reinforced by output-based policy. The 
focus on results, specifically profits, presents a clear objective and ensures 
management maximises shareholder wealth. This principle also applies to 
shareholder wealth maximisation and contractualism: the SOE Act is similar to a 
contract in that it specifies the obligations of an SOE. Explicitly requiring that the 
organisation be as profitable as a private firm encourages NZP to adopt the 
principles of shareholder wealth maximisation. 
There is also an association between shareholder wealth maximisation and 
the flexible labour market. In pursuing maximum returns to investors, labour inputs 
must be carefully controlled, evidenced by the pre-reform figure of approximately 
40,000 (Fogelberg, 1992) being reduced to 11,432 in 2010 (New Zealand Post, 
2010). The ability of NZP to restructure its labour force is due in no small part to 
new labour regulations and this has directly, and positively, affected annual net 
earnings. 
Lastly, shareholder wealth maximisation is supported by deregulation. 
Competitive threats ensure that the company remains lean and innovative. The 
minimization of costs and diversification into related products and services is a 
direct response to this. Thus, the deregulated market encourages shareholder wealth 
maximisation by providing competitive incentives. 
Output-based policy, deregulation, and contractualism contribute to aiding 
the separation of governance and ownership. The contractual relationship specifies 
 123 
the roles and authority given to management whilst deregulation provides ongoing 
competitive pressure to remain efficient. Focusing primarily on outputs then 
separates government from operations. This triumvirate is important for reducing 
state presence in the economy whilst ensuring NZP remains competitive in an 
industry where the government has a significant investment but very little active 
involvement. 
The flexible labour market shares a relationship with deregulation and 
contractualism for reasons of overall consistency. Market entry would still be 
possible given the reduced barriers but tight labour conditions would undo some of 
efficiency gains generated by the reforms. Likewise, giving NZP freedom to 
administer labour inputs autonomously is greatly supported by their own use of 
contracts – particularly so in postal agencies and rural delivery. Whilst the 
institutions of outsider governance and shareholder wealth maximisation create 
incentives to act as a private company, the interrelatedness illustrated here provides 
the lubricant for transactions to be conducted efficiently in the new institutional 
setting.  
Combined, the new institutional setting produces a very specific objective: 
profitability. Whilst NZP offered concessions to rural residents, employees, and 
competitors (via competitive access rates), these decisions were made internally to 
reduce conflict and build goodwill. Fundamentally, these tenets serve to improve 
long-term profitability. This has been done within the context of an open market 
that is amiable to new entrants and provides the framework for business to be 
carried out with minimal interference. Ultimately, the new setting is unambiguous 
in its motivations and facilitates competition and efficiency. 
5.7.2 Potential flaws  
Despite these achievements, the interviewees identify some reservations and 
potential flaws. One surrounds rural communities, particularly in terms of access to 
communications technology and the greater prevalence of poverty in those areas. 
As access to communications could be argued to be a public good, these caveats are 
perhaps more an issue for the telecommunications industry than NZP but are still a 
salient issue for reform. Still, the interviews suggest that NZP could be considered 
as an infrastructural service, and providing that service as efficiently as possible is 
therefore important as it allows business customers to allocate scarce resources to 
more productive activities. Nevertheless, the reforms were designed to place service 
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provision on a commercial footing, hence some ‘gaps’ are inevitable. A second 
prevalent concern related to jobs displaced by restructuring not being reabsorbed 
elsewhere in the economy, although this is not unique to the experience of NZP. 
Another possible flaw in the reform package was the failure to recognise 
future threats to postal operations from new technologies. The Mason-Morris 
review centred on separating the different units as per prevailing wisdom, but did 
not appear to consider changes to postal services owing to new technologies. 
Separating the different units followed international precedents, but perhaps 
providing the opportunity to restructure the postal network and take advantage of 
potential economies of scope may have proven a more effective long-term solution 
given the new commercially-oriented objectives. The subsequent establishment of 
Kiwibank to bolster profitability illustrates this point quite succinctly. 
5.8 Key Factors in the New Zealand Experience 
Several factors were instrumental in the New Zealand experience. These 
have been placed under three interrelated higher-order categories. 
5.8.1 Political factors 
 Political power and unity, 
 speed of reforms, 
 intellectual climate (neoliberalism), 
 economic conditions conducive to reform, and 
 consistency with reform ideology. 
 
The Lange government of the early 1980s enjoyed unprecedented support 
and shared almost singular unity. The government had committed itself to state 
sector reform and there was a consensus that it had to be done. Tellingly, additional 
reforms began to flounder in later years owing to the formation of political rifts as 
the costs of reforms were felt and the public began to feel disillusioned with further 
privatisations.  
The speed of reforms was an important factor. Rapid implementation took 
advantage of making vital but difficult changes whilst support was still strong. A 
more protracted and staggered approach may subject the populace to less pain at 
any given point but it also raises the possibility of dilutions or complete reversals 
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as political power wanes. Whilst the impacts of rapid reform are subject to debate, 
in the New Zealand experience, it was a critical factor in bringing about change. 
The intellectual climate was another key feature. The view was that New 
Zealand would only prosper if all parts of the economy were open to competition 
(Wood, 1995). Brash (1996) makes a similar statement and points to the belief that 
the market is a better allocator of resources than government, a belief which the 
1984 Labour party ascribed to. This was supported by Fogelberg (1992), who stated 
that the government believed that the business of government is governance, not 
the production of goods and services.  
Economic crises can often spur action. The literature and data concur that 
New Zealand faced challenging conditions. The data also confirm that this was a 
motivating factor behind structural reform.  
The final element coded under political factors is consistency with reform 
ideology. Corporatising an organisation is one thing, but preparing the regulatory 
framework and having the entity function as a private firm would is quite another. 
The new legislature gave SOEs the ability to pursue those goals in a competitive 
environment with minimal political interference (Kenny, 2009).  
Respondents also note that the Deed of Understanding is consistent with 
reform ideology. Whilst similar to universal service obligations in some respects, it 
is a contractual arrangement. In the words of participant four: “Now in other 
countries because they are so politically weak, for example in the UK…it’s an act 
of parliament. In New Zealand the Deed of Understanding could change just by 
agreement with the government of the day” (Personal communication, August 27, 
2013). Importantly, NZP significantly outperforms all requirements set by the 
current Deed, indicating that its conditions are not a hindrance to the organisation. 
When placed in contrast with universal service concessions made in other cases 
such as those described by Baumol (1993) or Campos e Cunha and Cooper (1998), 
it can be seen that the New Zealand approach is internally consistent. 
5.8.2 Legislative factors 
 The State Owned Enterprises Act. 
  
Expert data maintain that the SOE Act was vital because it specified the role 
of the company as a profit-oriented entity, applying shareholder wealth 
maximisation as a direct consequence and giving SOEs the ability to diversify and 
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divest where necessary. Furthermore, the Act provided the framework to separate 
ownership from governance and allowed managerial autonomy. These two 
elements form the final higher-order category. 
5.8.3 Governance factors  
 Separation of ownership and governance, and 
 managerial autonomy. 
 
The state appoints a board of directors who then assign management 
authority. Shares are held by two different ministries and regulated by a third. The 
Commerce Commission observes the behaviour of NZP to ensure fair competition 
(Kenny, 2009). With respect to the intellectual climate, this is an internally 
consistent arrangement as it separates ownership from control, reducing potential 
conflicts of interest. According to research participants, this is also important as it 
implies that any debates surrounding public policy and NZP are carried out at higher 
levels and removed from shareholder ownership issues.  
By allowing NZP to make decisions in the same manner as a private 
company, the organisation was able to pursue its new corporate mandate. Kenny 
(2009) notes that NZP was freely able to start new business lines.  
Managerial autonomy also extends to outsourcing and contracting. NZP has 
more than twice as many post centres than it does post offices (New Zealand Post, 
2006). These are staffed by contracted agents (Saunders, 2006) and Toime (1997) 
asserts that this helped reduce costs. A restructuring of the organisational chart 
decentralised authority and reduced the layers of management which now number 
four or five (Erakovic & Wilson, 2005). Decisions regarding employee numbers 
can be made by local management (Kelsey, 2003). Similarly, following the removal 
of subsidies in 1988, NZP was able to close unprofitable post offices without 
interference. Finally, the founding of Kiwibank—whilst championed by The Hon 
Mr Anderton—was a proposal internally developed to remain competitive given 
shrinking physical mail deliveries. 
 Lastly and whilst not a factor unique to the case presented here, managerial 
acuity played an important role. A management team that engendered a change in 
paradigms but was also sensitive to the concerns of the workers and unions made 
progression much easier. Placing high importance to favourability ratings was a key 
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part of this and involving staff was significant in bringing about the necessary 
change in culture from public servant to employee. 
5.9 Kiwibank 
As part of NZP’s corporatisation, the Post Office Savings Bank was sold to 
the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group in 1989 (Cardow et al., 2011). One 
may well question the establishment of the state-owned Kiwibank in 2001. This 
section offers a brief history of Kiwibank as well as a commentary on its placement 
within the institutional environment and ideology. 
5.9.1 The formation of Kiwibank 
Whist NZP was profitable, management foresaw reductions in earnings as 
new communications technologies arose (Cardow et al., 2011). Declines in mail 
volumes were also accompanied by greater levels of competition in parcel delivery 
as regulations were eased (Price, 2010). Banking, however, represented an 
attractive adjunct and management saw an opportunity to bolster earnings with 
financial services (Cardow et al., 2011).  
Public opinion of the banks played a large role in the formation of a business 
strategy (Price, 2010). With the consolidation and deregulation of the banking 
industry, many branches were closing and extra fees were being introduced 
(Cardow et al., 2011). The banking sector had become dominated by large offshore 
players, predominantly Australian (Hess, 2008), and the combined decline in 
services, fee increases, and profit repatriation led to negative perceptions creating a 
call for a local bank that would look after the ‘little people’ (Cardow et al., 2011). 
A business case was presented to the Taranaki Savings Bank and the 
Southland Building Society, the two largest New Zealand-owned financial 
institutions. Both declined. Support was later found with the leader of the minority 
Alliance party. 
In 1999, the Labour party took power but only with the support of the left-
leaning Alliance party (Marsh, 2005). This granted The Hon Mr Anderton 
significant influence and he expressed an interest in establishing a ‘people’s bank’ 
(Cardow et al., 2011). The government was initially hesitant. Luke (2008) notes 
that SOEs are supposed to raise funding from private sector institutions and these 
agreements are based on standard commercial terms. Similarly, the Labour 
government had removed financial services from the post office in the 1980s. 
 128
By 2001 however, enough political pressure had been applied and Kiwibank 
was founded with $78.2 million (Cardow et al., 2011). Many argue that the decision 
was political rather than economic (Cardow et al., 2011; Fifield, 2003) as the 
business case itself was considered weak (Cardow et al., 2011; McIntyre & Tripe, 
2009). Arguments for Kiwibank were familiar political rhetoric: railing against 
foreign dominance, and cries for supporting rural communities (Cardow et al., 
2011). Kiwibank capitalised on these ideals in its marketing strategy, positioning 
itself as leading the ‘New Zealand Resistance Movement’ as its chairman, The Rt 
Hon James Bolger, puts it (Price, 2010). 
5.9.2 Profitability 
Nevertheless, Kiwibank exceeded expectations and was able to profit within 
three years of incorporation (Marsh, 2005). The CEO maintained that the low fee 
structure, local ownership and accessibility were key factors for building market 
share (Fifield, 2003). Another advantage was Kiwibank’s late market entry because 
technology acquisition costs were lower than for more established banks (Marsh, 
2005). The bank targets small to medium sized enterprises, as well as acting as a 
community bank for rural communities (Price, 2010). Financially, it has performed 
admirably, with lower impaired and past-due asset ratios than industry averages 
(Cardow et al., 2011). Disregarding losses in the initial years of growth, Figure 5-5 
presents the profit figures from 2005 to 2015. 
 
Figure 5-5 Kiwibank profits from 2005 to 2015 
 
 Source: NZP Group Annual Reports (2005-2015) 
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Despite these successes, there are potential concerns. Low average deposits 
and high customer numbers present a risk in terms of transaction processing costs 
(Fifield, 2003). Secondly is the contribution to the group’s total profits as Figure 
5-6 illustrates.  
Figure 5-6 Contribution to NZP from Kiwibank 
 
 Source: NZP Group Annual Reports (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2013b, 2014, 2015) 
Group profits in 2010 are drawn from the normalised annual profits which 
removes the effect of one-off, non-recurring items. In 2011 the group booked a loss 
although Kiwibank itself was profitable. Contributions to group net earnings are 
presented in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2 Contributions to NZP from Kiwibank 
Year Group profits Kiwibank profits  % contribution 
2005 137.2 7.2 5.2% 
2006 68.7 15.8 23.0% 
2007 86.8 25.5 29.4% 
2008 110.2 36.8 33.4% 
2009 71.8 51.0 71.0% 
2010 73.6 45.8 62.2% 
2011 -35.6 21.2 -59.6% 
2012 169.7 79.1 46.6% 
2013 121.0 97.0 80.2% 
2014 107.0 100.0 93.5% 
2015 143.0 127.0 88.8% 
 The data show Kiwibank becoming a vital component of total net earnings. 
A continuation of long-term trends presents a possibility, although remote, that 
returns from postal operations may become unprofitable whilst overall gains are 
predominantly attributable to financial services. This could potentially develop to 
the point where we may observe a return to cross-subsidisation.  
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5.9.3 Kiwibank’s place in the new institutional environment 
In terms of deregulation, Kiwibank is congruent with the new setting 
despite some irregularities. Kiwibank is situated in a competitive environment and 
operates on an equal footing to private banks. The restraint shown by government 
in not isolating Kiwibank from competition and allowing it the same autonomy as 
a private bank prevents it from being an exception to neoliberal ideology.  
Political influence likely played some role in bank’s founding as the 
Alliance party enjoyed the luxurious position of ‘king-maker’. Yet although the 
provision of financial services touted as a ‘people’s bank’ does contribute to 
achieving social objectives, these services are provided without special conditions. 
More to the point, they are profitable, which is the founding principle of the SOE 
Act. 
Viewed from the perspective of NZP, establishing a bank within its network 
makes sound commercial sense given declining physical mail. Ignoring the source 
of capital funding, the motivation to establish Kiwibank was profit-rather than 
socially-oriented. As a result, whilst there was a degree of political motivation in 
Kiwibank, commercial interests were the key component. The creation of the bank 
is therefore consistent with the ideals of shareholder wealth maximisation.  
Compliance with shareholder wealth maximisation is also visible from 
recent decisions to close six branches in Christchurch (Brown, 2009). This was said 
to be the result of signals from government to SOEs to lift dividend payouts. 
Providing management is charged with profitability and has the mandate to 
restructure as it sees fit, the bank will likely continue to operate consistently within 
the new setting.  
There is, however, the issue of government funding59. Two factors partially 
mitigate this, the first being that whilst the government does technically own the 
bank it does not govern it. The second is that the concentration of government 
funding in relation to total financial liabilities is relatively small, 4.84% in 2007 
(New Zealand Post, 2007) and 5.88% by 2010 (New Zealand Post, 2010). 
Interestingly enough, the National Government signalled that it might consider the 
possibility of selling shares in Kiwibank to New Zealand investors as part of its 
2011 election campaign (Cardow et al., 2011). 
                                                 
59 Recall, SOEs are supposed to raise funds from the private sector. 
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In terms of governance, the board of directors consists of seven individuals, 
four of whom are related parties by extension of the parent company. Only three 
are fully independent (McIntyre & Tripe, 2009). Transforming data provided by 
McIntyre and Tripe (2009), 43% of Kiwibank’s board is composed of independent 
directors, slightly less than the industry average (49%). A redeeming quality 
however is the presence of directors with varied political stances, the Rt Hon James 
Bolger having served with National and the Hon Dr Cullen from the Labour party. 
The largest concerns lie in potential conflicts of interests with the parent 
company and possible returns to cross-subsidisation. McIntyre and Tripe (2009) 
show that total assets of the parent are $2.5 billion, while Kiwibank’s total assets 
breached $10 billion in 2010 (New Zealand Post, 2010). As it stands, NZP is 
Kiwibank’s guarantor (McIntyre & Tripe, 2009). Whilst the state owns NZP group 
and does not guarantee its debts, it is not unheard of for governments to offer rescue 
packages to large financially troubled firms. Indeed, the current National 
government has extended an uncalled capital facility to Kiwibank (New Zealand 
Government: Government support for NZ Post plans, 2010). This allows NZP to 
use the fund under certain conditions if an event occurs that cannot be covered by 
either Kiwibank or its parent (New Zealand Government: Government support for 
NZ Post plans, 2010). Whilst it must be noted that this change occurred within the 
context of multiple global financial crises, it can be seen as a proxy for a 
government guarantee. 
Financial services through the postal network provides convenience for 
customers and increases market presence, but it implies that costs are determined 
by transfer pricing. McIntyre and Tripe (2009) note that prior to incorporation, 
‘Agency Service Fee Revenue’ used to appear under NZP accounts, whereas now 
they appear under Kiwibank’s. They contend that a stronger board is necessary to 
maintain fairness and consistency, and that whilst not improper, the situation is very 
fluid. Mr Bolger stated that the board aims to ensure that one part of the group will 
not support another (Price, 2010), although there is the risk that internally generated 
transfer prices can implicitly subsidise postal operations. Falling profits from the 
parent do not alleviate these concerns. 
Overall, Kiwibank does present some internal inconsistencies within the 
context of the original reform intentions although the environment today is very 
different from the 1980s. Chief was its inception on politically motivated grounds 
via the actions of a minority party. The possibility of a return to cross-subsidisation 
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is also concerning and requires strong, independent governance. Herein is the third 
inconsistency: the board is not governed by a majority of outsiders.  
The ability to draw upon government funding in certain dire conditions also 
presents a quandary, but is a measure of last resort. Although never traditionally 
guaranteed, the government installed temporary deposit insurance over much of the 
financial sector in reaction to the global financial crisis; Kiwibank is therefore not 
the sole recipient of government attention. Since the New Zealand banking system 
is relatively isolated from the ill effects of the global financial crisis, this may only 
be a marginal concern.  
It must be mentioned though that Kiwibank operates in an environment that 
encourages competition with minimal governmental interference. In this respect, 
Kiwibank is consistent with reform ideology as it is simply another contender in a 
competitive industry. Many authors have in fact noted that Kiwibank has made 
strides to increase competition as cost-leader efforts affect other players. Mr Bolger 
notes that globally, profits from postal operations are falling and banking is a good 
complement to their organisations (Price, 2010). Ultimately, consistency with 
reform ideology is, and will be, determined by the neutrality of government and the 
autonomy to pursue commercial objectives. Restraint from using Kiwibank to 
achieve social policies and a board dedicated to ensure that inefficient postal 
operations are not unduly maintained will also be necessary. Despite these caveats, 
Kiwibank appears to be more congruent than not.  
5.10 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an examination of the reforms executed in New 
Zealand from the mid-1980s to the late-1990s. It has summarised existing work and 
supplemented the knowledge with interview data I collected, adding details 
previously overlooked. 
The pre-reform context comprised economic institutions not conducive to 
the efficient operating of a government department or related infrastructures. The 
post office was isolated from competition, cross-subsidised via banking and 
telecommunications, and governed internally with a tall organisational structure 
and poor information flows. It was also used as a source of job creation. 
The department lost money every year and with economic conditions 
worsening, the government embarked on a radical restructuring of the entire public 
sector. Chief among their goals were to reduce the presence of the state, to 
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disentangle political and commercial concerns, to increase efficiency and thus raise 
the profitability of the newly created state owned enterprises. Specifically relating 
to posts, there was a strong desire to transform the department as 
telecommunications were becoming a global force and represented an opportunity 
to extract significant value from its sale.  
Two major pieces of legislation were enshrined. The State Owned 
Enterprises Act defined the role of an SOE as a profit-oriented business that would 
be given the autonomy to pursue corporate objectives and was expected to be as 
competitive as a private company in the same industry. The Postal Services Act 
defined the regulations of the postal industry proper and specified the monopoly 
NZP would maintain. The department was then separated into three distinct units: 
postal delivery, postal banking, and telecommunications. The latter two were sold 
to private interests. NZP entered into a contractual relationship with the government 
known as a Deed of Understanding, describing the minimum penetration of the 
postal network, and pricing and delivery requirements for standard mail. The 
market was gradually deregulated until 1998 when it became fully open to 
competition. NZP was never fully privatised; the data indicate that as the company 
had become so successful there was little call to sell it. Additionally, privatisation 
fell out of favour with the public, which restricted its sale.  
 In terms of overcoming resistance to reform, the New Zealand experience 
provides some potential lessons for Japan. At the political level, the scale of reform 
in New Zealand represents an important factor. Covering numerous areas of the 
economy and public sectors simultaneously caused the concerns of individual 
interest groups to pale by comparison, because vocalizing their opposition could be 
contextualized as asking for ‘special treatment’ and therefore more easily 
discredited by pro-reformers. The State Owned Enterprises Act reinforces the 
argument of scale as it covered all SOEs under a single legislative blanket and any 
revisions to its stipulations would therefore affect all SOEs. The legal challenge 
surrounding the rural delivery fee, for example, affected only a small area of 
operations of a single SOE in the context of some 30 entities. Therefore, the crux 
of this lesson suggests that resistance can be overcome if the reforms are sufficiently 
large. 
 Similarly, resistance was further weakened by disaggregating potential 
factions. The SOE Act specified that workers would lose their public servant status 
and become private employees. This action simultaneously reduced the state’s 
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payroll and divided a once-large collective with similar interests and incentives into 
smaller groups that would then negotiate with respective employers on a private 
basis. Concessions would therefore be confined to individual SOEs and not threaten 
the overall integrity of reform to the same degree. This could perhaps be seen as a 
modern interpretation of ‘divide and rule.’ 
Speed was another important factor. Delivering changes in rapid succession 
capitalized on widespread public support and also prevented opposition forces 
having the time to muster a significant counter-offensive. Speed also ensured that 
by the time some of the transition costs began to manifest themselves, most (if not 
all) of the intended reforms had already been delivered. 
The SOE Act was critical in establishing the regulations governing SOE 
operations and therefore narrowing the legal grounds upon which resistance forces 
could argue their case. The legal challenges brought against NZP were defeated on 
the grounds that an SOE cannot be forced to provide uneconomic services. Given 
that much of the populace’s opposition to postal reform often derives from the 
services it provides, the SOE Act provides an uncompromising solution. The lesson 
for Japan in this case is that a clear separation of social and commercial objectives 
with supporting legislation can overcome reform resistance, but this particular 
option may be more difficult to transfer given Japan’s long history of intertwined 
objectives.  
If the description of New Zealand’s lessons at the political level evokes 
military imagery, the organisational level lessons are far more pacifist. Offering 
generous exit packages and opportunities for career development provided strong 
incentives for employees of both inclinations. Close working relationships with the 
unions and the creation of strong jobs also assisted in quietening resistance60. The 
unilateral abolishment of the delivery fee was a clear concession to rural residents 
and addressed their opposition directly, but it also added to the company’s brand 
image which would return dividends in the future. In summary, the conciliatory 
approach of NZP management was a critical factor of overcoming resistance, both 
                                                 
60  Recently, New Zealand Post has been forced to reduce staff numbers owing to increasing 
competitive pressures and although management are still working closely with the unions to relocate 
workers, current economic conditions may complicate matters Tanquintic-Misa, E. (2014, February 
27). NZ post slashes jobs, more to follow. International Business Times. Retrieved from 
http://au.ibtimes.com/nz-post-slashes-jobs-more-follow-1333449. 
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internal and external. Applying a similar approach to JP could produce similar 
results.  
An analysis of the new institutional environment shows that the market is 
open to competition, policy is implemented contractually and based upon outputs, 
boards are populated by outsiders, the labour market is more flexible, focus is 
placed on shareholder wealth maximisation, commercial and political goals are 
separate. This new environment is self-reinforcing and promotes competition and 
efficiency. 
The macroeconomic conditions at the time reforms began were important in 
providing an incentive to change as the sense of crisis was a great motivator. 
Ultimately, the data indicate that political power and unity, the speed of reforms, 
the SOE Act itself, and political consistency with reform ideology (via 
neoliberalism) were the most important aspects in fostering change.  
Kiwibank’s introduction is interesting. Whilst it could be suggested that the 
bank’s founding and its champion’s motives conflicted with the original ideology, 
the bank is highly profitable in an already competitive industry and operates without 
special concessions. The legislation provides NZP with the autonomy to pursue 
profits wherever it sees fit and diversification into banking is the manifestation of 
that endowment. The fund which NZP group can call upon is of concern as this is 
tantamount to a government guarantee but in light of the international crises at the 
time of writing and temporary insurance of other banks, this concern is less 
troubling. A greater fear lies in the prospect of a return to cross-subsidisation if mail 
volumes continue to decline and this requires transparency from the board and 
management. Overall, Kiwibank appears more consistent than not with the original 
ideology as the regulatory environments were already in place and have not been 
altered to accommodate the new player. 
Having completed an analysis of NZP, attention is now turned to Japan Post, 
whose pre-reform institutions and reform evolution is covered in Chapter Six. The 
simulation described in Chapter Seven will then be applied to estimate the final 
post-reform state of Japan Post and the overall image of Japanese experience can 
finally be compared to New Zealand to search for commonalities and differences in 
institutional change.  
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6 The Experience of JP 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the Japanese postal service and a chronology of 
changes wrought from the Koizumi era until today. In doing so, the details provided 
here are a synthesis of literature, expert interview 61 , and 1,913 media reports 
referring to Japan Post since April 26, 2001.  
The chapter first discusses the pre-reform institutional environment and its 
corresponding problems. Koizumi’s reforms are described, including how his 
administration was able to pass reform bills in the face of strong opposition. Reform 
evolution is then traced through succeeding administrations until the present day, 
which translates to the initial settings of the simulation model in Chapter Seven. 
The combined findings of this chapter and the simulation therefore provide an 
illustration of Japanese postal reform from beginning to end. Whilst NZP was a 
significant employer in relative terms, JP’s payroll was greater by factor of ten at 
incorporation, formed the core of the financial system (Takenaka, 2007), and was 
the largest financial institution in the world by deposits (Tsuda, 2006).  
Although perhaps a crude metric, to illustrate the importance of postal 
reform relative to its corresponding country, consider that Japan’s population is 
approximately 28 times greater than New Zealand’s. Prior to reform, the New 
Zealand Post Office Savings Bank carried $2061.5 million in government securities, 
representing 78.4% of total deposits (Statistics New Zealand, 1986). Government 
securities62 held by the banking component of Japan Post made up 90.8% of the 
bank’s total assets. Whilst these figures are proportionately similar in a general 
sense, the scale of postal banking relative to population is an entirely different 
matter. Figure 6-1 compares the two banks by converting Japanese Yen into New 
Zealand dollars at a rate of JPY70:NZD1. 
  
                                                 
61 The calibre of individuals polled counterbalances the relatively small panel of experts interviewed. 
62 Including JGBs, local government bonds, and deposits held in the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Fund. 
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Figure 6-1 Comparative size of New Zealand Post Office Savings Bank and Japan 
Post banking prior to reform 
 
 Source: (Japan Post Group, 2004a, 2004b; Statistics New Zealand) 
Whether measured by savings or by government securities, Japan Post 
‘Bank’63 was well in excess of a thousand times larger than the Post Office Savings 
Bank. Japan Post is therefore much more significant to the Japanese economy than 
its New Zealand counterpart and hence its reform represents a case of much greater 
risk. 
Japan’s economy circa 2001 had suffered greatly from the inevitable 
bursting of the ‘bubble economy’. Seeking to redress the lack of demand, a series 
of stimulus packages were implemented. Funding was problematic as tax revenues 
were insufficient. At the same time, households looked for safe locations to store 
their liquid assets and many turned to the post office. Consequently, a significant 
proportion of fiscal expenditure was financed through postal savings.  
                                                 
63 Please note that at this stage, the bank was not a legally distinct entity. Nevertheless, in the 
interests of a fair comparison, only data from banking operations were included.  
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The lack of transparency surrounding Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme64 budgets led to objectionable spending. Japan’s particular style of 
policy decision making, often conducted between interest-representing politicians 
and the bureaucracy, effectively removed the executive from the process 
(Maclachlan, 2004). The resulting arrangement led to what many have called an 
‘iron triangle’ whereby interests are catered to through specially designed 
legislation and public spending and in turn mobilise votes for their patron 
representatives. The bureaucracy benefits from the relationship by means of 
lucrative post-retirement appointments (amakudari) and promotion into positions 
of office.  
The postal system’s placement within this context was critical as it supplied 
the funds necessary to maintain such practices. Postal reform was expected to break 
these relationships. Additionally, it was envisioned that as the post office shrank, 
its deposits would shift into private banks, revitalising both the financial industry 
and the wider economy. 
6.2 The Structure and Institutional Environment of JP 
Circa 2001 - 2003 
6.2.1 Structure 
In early 2001, Prime Minister Mori65 reorganised the national bureaucracy, 
transferring the administration of postal services to the then Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and Telecommunications (Maclachlan, 2004). 
Under Koizumi, it was converted into a public corporation, Japan Post Inc., on April 
1st, 2003, with the state as sole shareholder.  
At the time of incorporation there were three types of post offices: 1,312 
general post offices, 18,916 commissioned post offices, and 4,550 basic post offices 
(Maclachlan, 2004). General post offices were usually staffed by more than 40 
people, offering postal delivery, banking, and insurance. They were state-owned 
and operated by postmasters on the basis of seniority and performance (Maclachlan, 
2004).  
                                                 
64 The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme is operated through the Ministry of Finance and 
predominately extends loans to targeted projects and corporations. Sometimes it is also known as 
Japan’s ‘second budget’. 
65 Predecessor to Koizumi. 
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Some commissioned post offices offered home collection services, while 
others did not (Maclachlan, 2004). Many of the non-collecting branches operated 
at a loss. Nevertheless, all offered financial services and accepted deposits (Amyx 
et al., 2005). Commissioned post offices were privately owned and leased to the 
state at premium rates, although some have since been sold (Maclachlan, 2004). 
Postmasters for commissioned offices were appointed on political grounds (Amyx 
et al., 2005) and up to a third of positions were inherited through bloodlines (Amyx 
et al., 2005; Maclachlan, 2004).  
Finally, simple post offices were essentially kiosks operating out of retail 
stores in rural areas. Their scope extended to the sale of stamps, postcards, and 
occasionally the distribution of welfare payments (Maclachlan, 2004). Workers had 
no bureaucratic status. Figure 6-2 illustrates the original structure of JP. 
 
Figure 6-2 Simplified JP structure as at 2003 
 
6.2.2 Institutional environment circa 2003 
 How an enterprise operates is determined in no small part by the institutions 
that constrain it. In the case of JP, many of these institutions had long historical 
precedence, having been established when the state assumed a much more paternal 
role in the economy. Some led to an entanglement of socio-political and economic 
Government
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objectives. Others, by their opaque nature, fostered opportunism, rent seeking, and 
inefficiency. Consequently, many issues surrounding the Japanese postal system 
were a product of the institutional environment itself. The following section details 
eight key institutions66 applicable at the time of incorporation. 
Firstly was the diversion of public funds. From its early beginnings, the post 
office collected funds from the public and all branches offered postal savings 
(Amyx et al., 2005; Maclachlan, 2004). It has also been argued that during the mid-
1950s Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka raised the number of commissioned post 
offices to expand vote-gathering activities and increase access to funds not under 
government oversight (Maclachlan, 2004).  
Prior to 2001, funds deposited in postal savings were obligated to be placed 
in trust funds held by the Ministry of Finance and then distributed to Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme agencies as loans (Amyx et al., 2005). Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme budgets were opaque, not subject to debate or 
approval, and often favoured special interest groups (Survey: How did it get into 
this mess?, 2002). In many cases, Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
expenditures increased when LDP support began to fall (Amyx et al., 2005). Heizo 
Takenaka, Koizumi’s chief economic advisor, admits that some LDP members 
engaged in pork barrel politics that were funded at least partially through the post 
office (Takenaka, 2006). 
From 2001, deposits were no longer required to be held in the ministry’s 
trust funds, although in practice most were still invested in JGBs or Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme bonds (Amyx et al., 2005). Disallowing JP from 
engaging in commercial or retail lending strengthened this institution. 
Supporting the diversion of public funds were distorted savings incentives. 
Postal savings were guaranteed by the state (Amyx et al., 2005) and offered a small 
premium above private banks, whose rates were not permitted to match postal 
savings rates (Takenaka, 2007). This altered the public’s incentive structure in 
favour of the post office.  
A third institution is lobby influence. Maclachlan (2004, 2006) and M. 
Takenaka (2007) identify the postal lobby as one of the strongest in Japan, having 
successfully resisted proposed changes in the 1980s and 1990s. The postal lobby, 
                                                 
66 The use of the word ‘institution’ adheres to the definition supplied by Kingston & Caballero 
(2009) and refers to constraints, either formal or informal. 
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comprised of postmasters and sympathetic politicians, has been cited by many, 
including Koizumi, as one side of the ‘iron triangle’ between the post office, the 
government, and Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme agencies. Amyx et al. 
(2005) note that through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, almost every 
ministry benefited from the arrangement and therefore gave the lobby significant 
influence to maintain the status quo. 
Further evidence of the strength of the lobby can be observed by 
appointments of pro-postmaster politicians to senior cabinet positions (Maclachlan, 
2004) and the presence of postal lobby politicians on the Policy Research Council67 
(PRC) (Amyx et al., 2005). Mishima (2007) shows that policy was drafted primarily 
through the PRC, not cabinet, where the postal lobby could influence policy 
formation. 
The strength of the lobby derived largely from its ability to muster votes. 
Postmasters were firmly rooted within the local communities, particularly so in 
rural areas, and held sway over public opinion (Maclachlan, 2006). In a mutually 
beneficial exchange, postmasters gathered support for local LDP members and were 
then favoured with prestige, political opportunities, and other material rewards 
(Krauss & Pekkanen, 2010). Unsurprisingly, politicians in areas with large numbers 
of post offices were some of the most vocal opponents of reform (Imai, 2009).  
Another prevalent institution was insider governance. Postmasters were 
politically appointed public servants who enjoyed lifelong tenure and were very 
close to the LDP (Amyx et al., 2005). This behaviour has been noted elsewhere too; 
in Japan, linkages and relationships between bureaucracy, politics, and private 
business were (and still are) seen as the best way to get things done (Colignon & 
Usui, 2001). As a result, by means of appointments either on political grounds or 
through bloodlines, the post office was a classic example of an organisation run by 
insiders. In addition, the presence of the institution of amakudari68 offered these 
stakeholders considerable economic rent, providing strong incentives to resist 
changes. 
Amakudari is the ‘glue’ that binds the bureaucracy and politics to private 
business (Colignon & Usui, 2001). Over a period of 12 years there were 28 
documented cases of amakudari with individuals coming to rest within the post 
                                                 
67 The PRC was previously also known as the Policy Affairs Research Council. 
68 Amakudari was first described in Chapter Three; it refers to outgoing officials landing lucrative 
post-retirement positions, often in the very companies they once regulated. 
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office69 (Colignon & Usui, 2001). There were also cases of postmasters granting 
contracts to supporting companies that they themselves owned. The amakudari 
process can also happen in reverse, as postmasters often became party members 
(Maclachlan, 2004). Such positions and appointments carried significant financial 
benefits and required little effort from the recipient.  
Corporate governance institutions shared similarities to keiretsu networks. 
This is not surprising, as within such networks, businesses and government share 
close relationships and many amakudari appointments are made to large firms 
within the keiretsu (Colignon & Usui, 2001). Political involvement is quite high 
and similar motivating ideals are present, such as cross-subsidisation (Miyajima & 
Kuroki, 2005); mail delivery was consistently supported by banking services 
(Amyx et al., 2005).  
Stable shareholding is another key principle of the keiretsu system 
(Miyajima & Kuroki, 2005; Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008). The arrangement is 
based on cross-shareholding but more specifically, on not selling those shares when 
their value falls or a particular firm is weakened. The principle is to protect the 
weaker link from adverse events including hostile takeover (Yoshikawa & McGuire, 
2008). This ideal became manifest after the post office became a public corporation. 
Finally, JP governance objectives focused on stakeholder wealth 
maximisation, a trait that also exists among keiretsu networks. Rather than placing 
emphasis upon maximised returns to equity, share value, and dividends, keiretsu 
provide stakeholders with job security, lifetime employment, mutual support, risk 
reduction, and insulation from market pressure (Matsuura et al., 2003; McGuire & 
Dow, 2009; Tezuka, 1997; Yoshikawa & McGuire, 2008). The post office exhibited 
comparable traits. Postmasters and politicians expounded the post office as a 
bastion of traditional values, providing social benefits and not something as crass 
as mere profit (Maclachlan, 2004). Mr. Arai of the LDP explicitly states that the 
post office is not about putting shareholder interests first, its purpose is to deliver 
valuable services to the community (Arai, 2005). 
Monitoring mechanisms for stakeholder wealth maximisation differ subtly 
from shareholder wealth maximisation. Agency theory suggests that the use of 
external managerial markets is a powerful controlling force for a shareholder-
                                                 
69 As a matter of linguistic curiosity, retirement to a public corporation such as JP is sometimes 
known as yokosuberi lit. sideslip. 
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focused firm. The post office however, with its insider-based management structure 
and inherited positions, was not subject to the same influences. Agency theory 
necessitates financial performance and maximum returns to company owners, 
which explains the behaviour observed in profit-oriented postal services like New 
Zealand. JP however, was guided by other principles. 
Figure 6-3 shows displays the institutional environment circa 2003. 
 
Figure 6-3 JP institutional environment as a public corporation 
 
 
In summary, prior to reform the post office operated in an environment that 
diverted funds from the private sector by distorting saving incentives. Postmasters 
and their Diet patrons formed a powerful lobby that was reinforced and maintained 
by a self-perpetuating insider governance structure. Incentives to maintain this state 
of affairs derived from the mutual exchange of votes on the part of postmasters, and 
economic rent on the part of politicians. Meanwhile the actual manner in which 
operations were conducted shared similarities to a keiretsu network characterised 
by cross-subsidisation, lifetime employment, stable shareholding and stakeholder-
based corporate governance motives. 
6.2.3 Links between Institutions 
 The institutional configuration shared many links. The distorted savings 
incentives strengthened the diversion of public funds. State guarantees and the 
premium attached to postal deposits encouraged households to invest in postal 
savings, which were funnelled through the Ministry of Finance to Fiscal Investment 
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and Loan Programme organisations. The diversion of public funds linked to lobby 
influence; the postal lobby’s influence was directly linked to funds dispersed 
through the post office. Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme spending translated 
into votes for representative politicians and material and social benefits for postal 
officials. Declines in the quantity of funds channelled through the post office would 
directly reduce the influence and payoffs these individuals received hence there was 
a strong incentive to maintain the status quo. 
 Insider governance and lobby influence were mutually related; politically 
appointed postmasters, pro-postal politicians in senior positions and interest 
representation on the PRC ensured unity of purpose and provided a strong presence 
in policy formation. This arrangement granted the ability to resist reform proposals. 
 A triangular relationship existed between the diversion of public funds, 
amakudari, and the insider governance structure. Transfers to Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Programme agencies were maintained by insider governance practices, 
creating the diversion of funds, and the amakudari processes ensured that players 
were rewarded for doing so. Opaque Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
budgets exacerbated the issue. Similarly, the presence of insider governance 
allowed for the continuation of amakudari. Whilst amakudari was (and still is) 
resilient, it is unlikely that quite so many appointments would have been made 
under outsider governance structures.  
 Cross-subsidisation between mail and financial services produced a 
rationale to maintain the distorted savings incentives and severe restrictions left no 
real alternative other than JGBs or Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme bonds. 
Cross-subsidisation was further sustained by the lobby influence. As previously 
stated, the lobby had significant political resources to resist change, implying 
continued transfers from financial services. Indeed, without subsidies, the postal 
network would likely have shrunk, representing a loss of welfare and economic rent 
to its benefactors. Consequently, there were firm logical grounds for the lobby’s 
wish to maintain the institutional context.  
 Stable shareholding was compounded by the lobby influence. As discussed 
later, the postal lobby pressured the government on several occasions to ensure the 
state remained the sole shareholder. Stable shareholding also linked to the diversion 
of public funds through the principle of stakeholder wealth maximisation. If the 
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objectives of the state were to pursue stakeholder wealth70, the state would have 
been more inclined to retain shares since outside buyers would have been motivated 
by profits. In this case, JP would continue to need large deposits to maintain services 
and therefore the attendant distortions that provided these deposits.  
 Stakeholder wealth maximisation was further reinforced by the lobby 
influence and insider governance. Lobby members were stakeholders in JP, 
including workers, postmasters and representative politicians. Clearly, their 
interests were served by the incumbent structure and the lobby would have 
vigorously opposed changes that threatened the benefits they received. The link can 
be considered as the lobby influence exercising control over JP through insider 
governance to maintain stakeholder wealth maximisation.  
6.3 The Drive for Reform 
During the post-war expansion, little thought was given to changing the 
system. The economic development model sponsored cooperation between the state 
and the private sector (Szekeres, 2005) and with rapid growth, few challenged it. 
However, the bubble burst in the mid-1990s; falling stock prices and real estate 
values produced considerable bad debt and bank failure. The older systems that had 
served well now hindered recovery. In response, the LDP implemented numerous 
fiscal rescue packages and the post office71 was a primary source of funding owing 
to its obligation to the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. Many of the 
packages included unnecessary and unprofitable construction projects (Jones, 2003) 
and postal savings were a means of delivering pork to special interest groups in 
exchange for political support (Amyx et al., 2005; Hwang & Schaefer, 2002; 
Maclachlan, 2006; Tsuda, 2006). The post office itself was seen as a nexus of 
corruption and inefficiency (Hwang & Schaefer, 2002). 
Koizumi came to power in 2001 and privatisation became the focus of his 
career. His objective was to break the connections of what he described as an ‘iron 
triangle’ between the post office, Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, and the 
LDP (The man who remade Japan, 2006). By creating a publicly traded company, 
                                                 
70 Even Koizumi did not want to reduce the size of the network or the number of postal employees; 
the postal lobby had an even stronger interest in postal stakeholder wealth. 
71 The term ‘post office’ is used generically in this instance, as it was a government department until 
2003. 
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market oversight and outsider management mechanisms would ideally remove 
politically motivated spending.  
6.3.1 JP’s placement in Japanese reform 
In comparing the Japanese case with New Zealand’s, participants were 
asked if JP was meant to be part of an overall package or a standalone issue. The 
results were fascinating in the sense that both answers were valid depending on the 
scope being considered. 
For Koizumi, postal privatisation was a freestanding reform. Long before 
becoming prime minister, he had cultivated a loathing for the postal system as to 
him it embodied the special interest politics hindering economic progression. 
Government, however, saw it as a key element in greater structural reform. The 
cabinet assembled by Koizumi and the committees formed during his term wanted 
market reform, to address the state of public finances, and a general movement 
towards smaller government. Postal privatisation represented the last major hurdle 
as it had always been widely politicized. The aim was primarily to change the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme system because it was responsible for maintaining 
inefficient rent-seeking companies who would in turn often provide amakudari 
positions for retiring bureaucrats in exchange for Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme contracts. JP was instrumental in perpetuating this system and postal 
reform would serve a number of goals:  
 Privatising the post office and subjecting it to market-based incentives 
would shift preferences away from investing solely in Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Programme bonds, resulting in a reorganisation of Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Programme itself as funding dwindled (Participant 8, personal 
communication, January 17, 2014). This was expected to weaken connected 
politicians in the Diet by eroding the non-merit based system of power. 
 Greater fiscal responsibility would arise. Corporations that could only 
survive via subsidisation from the programme would cease to exist and more 
productive areas of the economy would benefit from postal deposits being 
divested away from Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme bonds. The 
postal service itself would be turned into a more efficient enterprise 
(Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 2013). 
 Bureaucratic intrusion would be reduced. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications in particular had a strong interest in preserving this 
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system, many of whose officials were attached to the post office via special 
corporations72.  
 
The data therefore reveal that whilst postal privatisation was an issue of 
singular importance to Koizumi himself, it was also important to future 
transformations of the Japanese economy and therefore seen as part of wider 
structural reforms. This was also the case in New Zealand, although the significance 
of postal reform in Japan was much greater.  
In 2003, JP was Japan’s largest employer with approximately 380,000 
employees of varying types (Tsuda, 2006). Removing these employees from 
government payroll would significantly reduce the size of the state (Takenaka, 
2006). Takenaka also contends that the post office distorted capital markets as 
private banks could not compete on equal terms. Consequently, small businesses 
and entrepreneurs struggled to raise capital, stifling economic development. 
Breaking up the post office would modify the incumbent institutions to more market 
oriented ones and allow capital markets to function properly.  
Another issue was the proportion of JGBs held by the post office and the 
long-term effects of relying on debt. Increasing levels of public debt raise the 
potential for downgrades in credit ratings (Yao, 2009). Revaluations of bond yields 
would have negatively affected capital. Amyx et al. (2005) also cite this as a salient 
issue and the revaluation problem was a result of the initially formal and later 
informal constraint of requiring JP to purchase JGBs. Figure 6-4 represents the 
issues caused by the pre-reform institutional environment. These issues produced 
the motivation for change. 
 
  
                                                 
72 These corporations often supplied logistical support for postal operations and were often founded 
or run by ex-ministry officials. 
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Figure 6-4 Issues leading to the drive for reform 
 
 
In summary, the drive for reform arose from the desire to disentangle public 
funds from special interest groups, to reduce the size of government, and to remove 
market distortions fostered by the incumbent institutional arrangement. 
6.4 Changes Under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
This section discusses actions the Koizumi administration took to convert 
the Postal Services Agency (PSA) into a public corporation. It examines the 
resistance and its effect upon outcomes secured before Koizumi’s tenure expired.  
6.4.1 Intentions for the postal system 
Taking office in early 2001, Koizumi was elected on a platform that centred 
on structural reform as the only way Japan could return to sustained growth. At its 
core was the intention to privatise the PSA. 
Plans emerged in 2003 to split the post office into three separate entities 
(postal services, savings, and insurance) and privatise them as early as April 2007. 
Financial and postal units would operate on equal terms to their private-sector 
counterparts. The amassed savings would be used in revitalising the private sector 
through lending to SMEs. A private postal system would also reduce the size of the 
state.  
Initial deliberations within the Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy 
(CEFP) proposed in January 2004 that JP become a special joint-stock corporation 
beginning with 100% government ownership. The CEFP, chaired by Koizumi and 
Takenaka, used the precedent set by JR and suggested that the postal savings 
business be separated into between 7-10 regional units with an accompanying 
national postal service along with two to three insurance-based units. Joint-stock 
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corporations in Japan each have their own specific legislation and the objectives of 
the new entities would be enshrined in statute. Members of the LDP however, 
resisted the idea of regionalised postal savings and argued for a single entity73.  
The CEFP explicitly stated that privatisation should not reduce service 
levels and as early as 2004 specified that universal services obligations and uniform 
charges on mail delivery would form part of the bills. Indeed, article one of the 
Postal Law stipulated that JP should deliver to all addresses at a uniform cost as 
fairly and as cheaply as possible. Additionally, their objective was not explicitly to 
reduce the number of post offices as they mentioned that the current network should 
be maintained. 
However, universal financial services were not intended to be part of the 
legislation. Some LDP members disagreed, including the Minister of Internal 
Affairs and Communications, Taro Aso. The CEFP argued that no other postal 
system in the world offered universal financial services and used this as part of their 
reasoning to exclude it from the bills. They did however recommend that each 
business unit use its own accounting system so that internal transfers and abuse of 
state-granted regulations could be seen if they occurred.  
The council also advised an incremental transition from state to private 
ownership over 10 years due to the quantity of deposits held in postal savings. 
Financial arms would be gradually permitted to expand operations into products 
such as loans, mortgages, and medical insurance. Similarly, postal operations would 
be given license to conduct other forms of business such as international 
distribution. In preparation for entry into private markets, a committee of five 
outside experts was established to estimate the impact of market entry.  
By September 2004, the plan had evolved to the point where the public 
corporation would be split into four units; postal services would be subdivided into 
two entities, one would focus on mail collection and delivery, the other would 
manage the physical network and other fixed assets. Management would have 
authority to break down these units further into regional providers after the 
transition was complete. Deposit and insurance caps of ¥10 million would remain 
in place over the transitory period. 
At the same point, a government-owned holding company became a 
preferential option as it became apparent that a special corporation would probably 
                                                 
73 This topic is further discussed in Section 6.4.3. 
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not pursue privatisation after Koizumi’s tenure expired. Share sales would be 
conducted periodically, savings and insurance would be sold completely over a 
series of floats beginning in 2011 and completed by 2017. The government also 
would gradually reduce its holdings and by 2017, was expected to retain 
approximately one third of outstanding shares. However, in March 2005 the LDP 
raised concerns about the possibility of foreign takeovers and argued that the state 
should maintain a 50% stake in the holding company or include a ‘golden share’ 
that granted veto rights74.  
In terms of personnel management, details emerged in October, 2004, with 
expectations that the savings unit would account for three to four thousand 
employees, two or three thousand in insurance, and the remaining 260,000 divided 
between the delivery and network units. Staff would have limited employment 
guarantees. Reductions would primarily arise through natural attrition and smaller 
graduate intakes. In August 2006, the head of JP outlined a plan of the break up in 
which only 3,800 jobs would be shed. The group would still employ 253,200 full-
time employees. 
Assets controlled by the network unit would be downsized. First among the 
expected sales was the series of resorts and conference centres known as Kampo no 
Yado75. Many were bought or renovated during the ‘bubble’ years at significant cost 
and the majority were loss-making. A plan was announced in April 2005 offering 
them as bundled packages at reduced prices under the expectation that buyers would 
be difficult to find. Sales were expected to be completed by 2012. 
Ultimately, Heizo Takenaka detailed four pillars of the proposed reforms 
that were not open to compromise:  
 the postal service would operate under the same legal framework as the 
private sector, 
 the corporation would be split into four separate units to spread risk,  
 a public corporation would be established to take over the liabilities of the 
units, and 
 postal workers would lose their status as public employees after 
privatisation and would be private employees under their respective units. 
 
                                                 
74 This argument was unsuccessful but a compromise was reached, see Section 5.4.3. 
75 Literally, ‘Postal Insurance Inns’. 
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Koizumi’s administration outlined a number of factors to create a more 
equitable competitive environment between 2004 and 2006. The sale of over-the-
counter insurance policies by banks would be liberalised in 2007. Insurance and 
savings policies would not be guaranteed after privatisation and JP’s corporate tax 
exemption would be annulled. Similarly, the Ministry of Finance would levy 
consumption taxes against intra-unit transactions as well as applicable stamp duties. 
The committee studying JP would also monitor and control entry into new 
financial services. Expansion would be subject to tripartite approval from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Financial Services Agency, 
and the committee itself. 
Special correspondence would be largely liberalised and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications commissioned a study to consider opening 
the postal network to private operators, allowing them to uplift parcels from 
dwellings and deliver them to JP on a contractual basis. JP would also be given 
leave to deliver parcels itself. Koizumi wanted to fully liberalise mail delivery and 
allow open competition but this proposal was resoundingly defeated within the LDP 
(Uchiyama, 2010). 
6.4.2 Forces of resistance and opposition 
Broadly categorised, these factions included parts of the bureaucracy, the 
Association of Commissioned Postmasters (Zentoku), the Association of Retired 
Postmasters (Taiju), postal workers and their respective unions, and the LDP itself. 
Opposition parties such as the Japanese Communist Party, and the Social 
Democratic Party, whilst generally against the Koizumi reforms as a matter of 
course, could not influence policy formation although they could vote on it through 
the lower and upper houses. The position of the DPJ was more complex: it was 
mainly a reformist party although their opposition to the LDP was based on the type 
of privatisation and its details. 
The bureaucracy’s resistance to reforms stemmed primarily from the desire 
to protect against loss of influence. One of the methods employed was to rely upon 
bureaucratic jargon with statements such as “we’ll follow your instructions to the 
best of our abilities” (Sekine, 2003 para. 3) which were then manipulated or 
disregarded altogether. Even so, following the establishment of the PSA, attitudes 
in the bureaucracy became divided. Some saw the advantages of market reforms 
and desired more freedom (Participant 8, personal communication, January 17, 
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2014). As a result, whilst there were many within the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications who preferred the status quo, there was a growing element of 
cautious optimism towards privatisation. 
 Zentoku was prompt in declaring firm opposition to privatisation. Indeed, 
prior attempts to liberalise postal services that extended beyond the data range had 
invariably met with strong resistance from Zentoku. In lobbying for support, 
pressure was directly applied to Diet interest representation members. Whilst ties 
to these members were maintained, the system was based on interpersonal 
exchanges. Postal lobby members who favoured constituents with roads, trains, and 
local developments provided postmasters with considerable prestige and sway over 
public opinion (Participant 5, personal communication, May 15, 2013). The 
receiving postmaster in turn capitalised on this social capital and fed votes to the 
representative LDP member. Private interests were nurtured via the institution of 
amakudari and its other two forms.  
 Much of the actual pressure Zentoku applied was directly to its benefactors 
in the LDP (Participant 5, personal communication, May 15, 2013; Participant 6, 
personal communication, July 10, 2013). Zentoku was a strong lobby, and postal 
reform galvanised the group. Traditionally, the unions had been at odds with 
Zentoku but the threat of privatisation forced the two groups together and increased 
the number of votes that could be delivered (Maclachlan, 2011). Today, they do not 
have the same voice in policy making as they once had (Participant 5, personal 
communication, May 15, 2013) and support for a particular member is no longer 
automatically given (Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 2013). 
Pressure is still applied at the individual level although in extreme times they will 
canvas Diet offices and attempt to convince politicians to vote against a particular 
issue (Participant 8, personal communication, January 15, 2014). 
Zentoku’s objectives were explicitly described in two cases. Firstly, they 
wanted to manage all postal business units jointly. The second came about just prior 
to the bills’ submission to the Diet in July 2005; they approached every LDP 
member they could find in the Diet building, threatening to withdraw their support 
in the upcoming election unless the bills were voted down. 
Postal workers and their representative unions also campaigned against 
proposals. In terms of productivity reforms, a management system introduced from 
the Toyota Motor Corporation in 2003 was expected to meet with resistance as 
workers still maintained the mind-set of a public servant. One executive noted that 
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the custom of working slowly and receiving overtime benefits had never been 
challenged before. Head of Japan Post Holdings (JPH), Masaharu Ikuta, also noted 
in 2003 that improving efficiency was proving to be such a challenge that there was 
no remaining time to focus upon privatisation.  
The two unions, the Japan Postal Workers’ Union and the All Japan Postal 
Union, were united in opposing reforms. Previously, they had been divided over 
labour–management relationships and policies but Koizumi’s actions pushed them 
into merger discussions largely because they believed that privatisation would 
diminish their bargaining power (Maclachlan, 2011). Together with Zentoku, their 
combined strength was enough to persuade the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications not to continue with its plans to offer area-specific services in 
2006. 
The Mori faction in August 2003 voiced their disapproval of the CEFP 
commandeering policy formulation and wanted to be included in discussions. At 
the same time, Koizumi identified former party secretary Hiromu Nonaka 
personally as a force for resistance. Shizuka Kamei, a champion of the postmasters, 
also wanted to keep JP under state control and to expand its social services, 
extending as far as nursing. Between Kamei and two other figureheads, Takao Fujii 
and Masahiko Komura, they were able to stall progress by focusing attention on 
other issues. Data from the interviews suggest that delays were caused by reluctance 
to confront LDP members with strong ties to the postal regime as the following two 
paragraphs illustrate: 
Despite gradual losses in power and standing, even today postmasters are 
still a powerful group. This is doubly true in rural areas where, in the words of 
participant five, “…there are fairly targeted districts that supported certain 
politicians that would have been adamantly immovable on this issue” (Personal 
communication, May 15, 2013). Koizumi viewed previous administrations as 
ineffectual, however he was under no illusion that his reforms would be painful and 
were aligned against powerful interest groups. Arrayed against such opponents and 
understanding the consequences, Koizumi took a different approach in the early 
years of party presidency. 
During that time, Koizumi violated his own principles and attempted to 
cater to both the floating vote and the special interest vote (Participant 8, personal 
communication, January 15, 2014). It has been suggested that there were probably 
some accords struck although details will never be made available. His earlier 
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efforts had produced weak results as he conformed to tradition and used the 
conventional process of policymaking, submitting proposals to the bureaucracy and 
the PRC, damaging his image of the stalwart reformer in the process. In 2004, he 
lost the organised vote in the upper house election (Participant 8, personal 
communication, January 15, 2014). This marked a turning point whereupon he 
became a more determined leader, disavowed from special interests and aligned 
with public interest. 
In September 2003, a group of LDP dissenters lamented that the party had 
to vote to put him in power as he was essential to the election victory in 2001 
(Maclachlan, 2011). Kamei claimed at this point that only about 30% of the LDP 
actually supported privatisation although other government insiders placed the 
figure around 40% (Participant 8, personal communication, January 15, 2014). The 
data also describe Koizumi as possibly the most popular prime minister in Japan’s 
history (Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 2013). Subsequently, 
whilst the postal lobby opposed Koizumi’s plans, they had no alternative but to 
endorse him as leader. Nevertheless, a survey by the Yomiuri in June 2004 found 
that 51% of LDP members said that a decision to privatise the post office should 
only be made after the results of reforms were known. Interpreted another way, it 
would suggest that many within the party felt that by postponing until after the 
reforms were complete, Koizumi’s term would have expired and the state could 
reassert control over JP. 
The most frequently covered issue was the separation of business units; 
doing so would reveal the extent to which financial services were supporting post 
offices. In addition, keeping the units together would have made it easier for 
resistance forces to undermine privatisation efforts. One party member explicitly 
stated in September 2004 that if the separation of the units could be prevented, 
turning JP back into a public corporation could be achieved under the next 
administration. Unsurprisingly, there was much opposition to selling shares in the 
financial units. 
Other ways in which LDP politicians tried to undermine or dilute the 
reforms included pressing for universal financial services. There was also a drive 
to postpone the guidelines for the programme: Taro Aso and Kaoru Yosano, heads 
of the public management ministry and PRC, argued to extend the deadline beyond 
2017. Koizumi’s plans were challenged, the resistance bloc argued that they lacked 
details and were not properly communicated to the public. Rather contrarily, it was 
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then suggested in early 2005 that Koizumi should stop publicizing the issue, 
possibly in an effort to reduce public support for the changes.  
In August 2005, between the DPJ, Japanese Communist Party, Social 
Democratic Party, and 22 LDP members, the bills were defeated in the House of 
Councillors by 17 votes.  
6.4.3 Overcoming resistance: victories and compromises 
In the early years of the Koizumi administration, the pro-reform group 
realised that quietening politicians representing special interests would be vital. 
This section details some of the measures that were used in overcoming resistance 
and some of the compromises made until ultimate approval of the bills on October 
14, 2005. Four higher order categories became clear in explaining how reforms 
were advanced: 
1. executive control, 
2. carrot-and-stick, 
3. implementation style, and 
4. leadership. 
6.4.3.1 Executive control 
 One of the key contributing factors was the increased power the executive 
office held as a result of the Hashimoto reforms ten years earlier (Maclachlan, 2011). 
These powers, including the ability of the prime minister to form policy committees 
that transcended the bureaucracy (Maclachlan, 2011), had not been previously 
utilised as informal institutions within the LDP required that policy pass through 
PRC after being drafted by the relevant ministry. As such, the established route 
wound its way through the party and the bureaucracy where it could be filtered and 
diluted by layer upon layer of interest representation.  
Koizumi’s administration created a number of supra-cabinet organs 
including the CEFP and the Postal Privatisation Promotion Office, staffing them 
with specially chosen reform-oriented researchers, legislative staff and advisors 
including business leaders and academic economists (Participant 5, personal 
communication, May 15, 2013). The Promotion Office in particular had 
considerable influence, as three of its members were deputy ministers. Similarly, 
drawing personnel from a wider range of people effectively tempered the influence 
of the postal lobby, whose representatives were not evenly distributed through the 
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LDP. Cabinet also installed a crisis management clause into legislation in April of 
2005, which limited the amount of time postal privatisation could be postponed. 
This limit was imposed in anticipation of increased resistance forces asserting their 
positions after Koizumi’s retirement76.  
Using these organs centralised power in the executive office and wrested 
policy formulation from the bureaucracy and rank-and-file party members; this was 
important as an unnamed LDP politician in September 2004 stated that the PRC 
was heavily populated by postal lobby members. Following traditional approaches 
would have resulted in failure, as it had done for many before Koizumi (Participant 
8, personal communication, January 17, 2014).  
6.4.3.2 Carrot-and-stick 
Another key factor was the use of rewards and punishment. This included 
exchanges with opposition parties, credible threats, and concessions to the postal 
lobby. It should be noted that whilst Koizumi was an adamant reformer, he was not 
so naïve as to think he could ‘bulldoze’ privatisation through the LDP; some 
concessions were made. 
6.4.3.3 Carrots  
Koizumi silenced some of the resistance in his party by reaching across the 
floor and offering exchanges. In exchange for support over one issue, Koizumi 
softened his position over another, less salient, issue (Participant 6, personal 
communication, July 10, 2013). This was a useful mechanism as it not only 
increased support for the bills, but made subversive LDP members appear disloyal 
to the party should they continue voicing protests. Offering exchanges also served 
to raise Koizumi’s popularity even further (Participant 6, personal communication, 
July 10, 2013).  
It was not the CEFP’s intention to provide universal financial services but 
in mid-2004, cabinet agreed to ensure that insurance and savings would be offered 
in rural areas in principle, citing the protection of the elderly. In early 2005, 
although not an enforceable clause in policy, universal service would include 
savings and insurance for the transition period until 2017. In light of these new 
constraints, a compromise was brokered regarding potential entrants into general 
                                                 
76 Koizumi was one of very few prime ministers to resign due to term limits. 
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correspondence: firms were required to have their business plans vetted by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and erect at least 100,000 post 
boxes nationwide (Maclachlan, 2011). This second stipulation effectively isolated 
general correspondence and the two main candidates77 soon abandoned entry plans. 
In terms of staff levels, it appeared that the CEFP sought to avoid active 
confrontation with the unions (Maclachlan, 2011). Also in 2004, a report issued by 
the CEFP stated that they wished to maintain stable labour-management 
relationships. In 2005, Takenaka suggested considering placing quasi-government 
employee status on postal workers; the intention was to maintain employment and 
keep the corruption rules for public servants applicable 78 . Demonstrating a 
willingness not to scythe through postal employees, the government expected to 
mitigate some of the resistance they would face from the labour unions. 
In 2005, cabinet allowed cross-shareholding between the financial units and 
the mail-based units 79  would be allowed to hold shares in the financial arms. 
Japanese antimonopoly laws specify limits on the percentage of allowable cross-
shareholding by industry at 5% for banking and 7% for insurance (Bird, 2002). 
Companies may be exempted from this restriction either by Cabinet order or if 
given permission from the Free Trading Commission (Goodman, 2003).  
Koizumi and Takenaka relented to pressure and established the Regional 
and Social Contribution Fund in response to universal service obligations. Managed 
by the holding company, this fund would compensate post offices for lost income 
from financial services after 2017. Dividends would pay for the provision of postal 
services in unprofitable areas. The initial cap of ￥1Tril was later revised to ￥2Tril 
in October of 2005; six months after the LDP first argued that one trillion was 
insufficient. This accommodation was made to placate the lobby after having 
delivered the plans for separation and whilst it was supported by the LDP, it was 
only begrudgingly so.  
Two other compromises were made. The holding company would be 
permitted to repurchase up to 33% of shares after 2017 (Maclachlan, 2011), and 
                                                 
77 Yamato Kyubin and Sagawa Kyubin. Kyubin translates as ‘express mail’. 
78 Maintaining public servant status would also technically prohibit them from taking political action, 
although this obligation had been conspicuously disregarded on many occasions in the past by 
Zentoku.  
79 The mail units were later merged under the Noda administration in 2012. 
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postal savings would remain a national unit (discussed in detail shortly). Koizumi 
should not be mistaken for a soft leader however, as the following illustrates.  
6.4.3.4 Sticks  
The other side of this category includes the expulsion of what famously 
became known as the ‘postal rebels’: members of the LDP who had deep 
connections with the postal lobby and were subsequently ejected from the party or 
ousted in electorates by Koizumi’s handpicked ‘postal assassins’ (Carlson, 2008). 
In terms of overcoming resistance, these tools were blunt instruments and drew 
criticism from some quarters who argued that the dismissals in particular were 
‘undemocratic’. A rebuttal to this accusation however is that the individuals 
removed were arguing for the continuation of a system known to be corrupt, which 
was undemocratic in itself. Irrespective, it demonstrated the degree of Koizumi’s 
conviction to reform the post office. 
One of the measures employed in previous cases was threatening to dissolve 
cabinet and even the House of Representatives itself if opposition could not be 
overcome. Koizumi had threatened to fire both Taro Aso and Masaharu Ikuta in 
2004 if they continued to endanger plans to separate the business units and actually 
did remove Hiroshi Matsui (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Vice 
Minister of Policy Advice) and Hideo Shimizu (Director of Postal Services 
Planning Bureau) in May 2005 for distributing a paper opposed to privatisation. 
When the bills were resubmitted to the Diet houses in 2005, Koizumi 
removed another two vice ministers and vice parliamentary secretaries who had 
openly opposed privatisation. Upon the Lower House’s rejection of the bills, 
Koizumi dissolved parliament and called a snap election, making it clear that he 
would only endorse supporting members. Phrasing the election itself as a public 
referendum on postal reform80, Koizumi led the LDP to its largest ever victory, 
leaving the ‘postal rebels’ with no alternative but to side with reformists and 
approve the bills after parliament reconvened. The resubmission saw no real 
changes to any of the previous clauses except for a six-month postponement to the 
beginning of the process, which was delayed from April 2007 to October 2007.  
                                                 
80 Although some scholars argue it was more referendum of change versus non-change rather than 
postal reform. 
 159 
6.4.3.5 Implementation style 
 A third factor not apparent from media reports but gleaned from expert 
interviews was the logistics of how plans were implemented. Koizumi approached 
issues methodically and kept plans within his closest circle for as long as possible, 
reducing the amount of time that policy could be debated and diluted.  
Sponsoring anti-bureaucratic sentiment among the public through the media 
was another factor in reducing opposition. Greater public desire for change and less 
faith in the incumbent ministries made opposition more difficult to voice without 
appearing solicitous of special interests. 
6.4.3.6 Leadership 
Koizumi’s leadership was instrumental; previous prime ministers had 
considered postal reform but had abandoned the idea. Koizumi’s determination and 
single-mindedness were crucial, as detractors within both the party and the 
bureaucracy had become embedded in the system. Exercising leadership over the 
party and not developing policy through the normal channels was an unorthodox 
approach. Koizumi’s conviction was succinctly paraphrased by participant eight: “I 
don’t care what they think about me, postal privatisation or die. If the LDP or the 
postmasters or the post bureaucrats disagree with me, so what? I’ll fire them or I’ll 
bring them down in an election” (Personal communication, January 17, 2014). 
 His ability to promote issues to an otherwise disinterested and perhaps ill-
informed public was another important factor; many ordinary citizens did not 
understand the true ramifications of the changes he sought to implement. 
Supplementing this, his popularity and proficiency with the media were such that 
the postal regime realised that without Koizumi, the LDP would most likely have 
been defeated. Consequently, they had to support him to a degree. All the 
participants interviewed in this study concluded that he was exceptionally skilled, 
and exhibited a resolve rarely seen in Japanese politics. In terms of a relative 
comparison to New Zealand, where the executive approach was quite conciliatory, 
I questioned whether Koizumi’s confrontational approach was truly necessary; 
participant eight responded: “But there was no other way. No other way.” (Personal 
communication, January 17, 2014). 
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6.4.3.7 Exogenous factors 
Beyond the Koizumi administration itself, other factors were advantageous 
in the sense that they reduced the power of the postal regime. The postmaster lobby 
had suffered from a voting scandal centred around Kenji Koso in 2001 and it had 
tarnished their reputation (Maclachlan, 2011). Similarly, the office held by 
postmasters had lost much of its lustre and finding replacements for outgoing 
retirees was becoming more difficult – especially so with hereditary positions. 
Finally, the passing of Kakuhei Tanaka, one of the greatest spokespersons for the 
postal lobby, reduced their representation within the Diet.  
6.4.3.8 Failure to regionalise postal savings 
Amidst pressure from the postal lobby, a decision was made in April 2004 
not to divide the postal savings arm into regional units. The argument presented 
from the postal lobby was that regional units would not have the wherewithal to 
perform in sparsely populated regions (Maclachlan, 2011). As the single greatest 
compromise, further analysis was conducted on this issue and expert interviews 
show two broad categories of concerns. 
6.4.3.9 Political concerns: Structure 
The proposed formation and structuring of regional units created concerns. 
One was the matter of bank capitalisation; areas like Kanto and Chiba would have 
a much higher capitalisation as opposed to more remote areas, hence the division 
of resources created a complex issue. Similarly, the degree of unit networking and 
the extent to which they would be supported by central government if the need for 
bailouts arose created a political challenge. Whilst these concerns were valid, they 
did not explain fully the severity of resistance arrayed. A more likely explanation 
derives from the potential threat to the lobby’s private interests. 
6.4.3.10 Political concerns: Iron triangle 
Smaller organisations that are closer to taxpayers are often easier to 
understand in terms of their operations and are often accompanied by a greater 
demand for accountability and transparency. Greater regionalisation also 
decentralises power and restricts the ability of the central government to engage in 
pork-barrel politics (Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 2013). None 
of these points is desirable from the opportunistic agent’s perspective.  
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The application of a market-based incentive structure, and not having the 
size advantage of a national unit, would have placed greater competitive pressure 
on localised units. In turn, this would have threatened the security of post offices 
and lessened the intensity of co-ordination. A decline in post office numbers would 
have reduced the power of the postmasters’ vote-gathering network and hence 
lessened support for embedded Diet representatives (Participant 8, personal 
communication, January 17, 2014).  
Put simply, a regionalised system would have reduced postmaster cross-
subsidisation derived from postal financial services, effectively removing the 
financial foundation the vote gathering and exchange system was built upon, 
threatening the private interests of its benefactors. The lobby therefore had a strong 
incentive to oppose regionalisation. 
6.4.3.11 Practical concerns: Cross subsidisation and universal 
service 
Postal networking aside, postal delivery presented a valid argument. An 
envisaged challenge for national postal delivery was the potential for ‘cream-
skimming’ by private contractors unconstrained by universal service obligations. 
As such, expectations were that postal deliveries would have required subsidisation 
to endure; the problem was where those subsidies derived from. Transfers from a 
nationwide financial provider provided a more intuitively simple approach. Were 
regionalisation to occur, discussions of regional contributions to transfers would 
undoubtedly impose greater transactional costs.  
6.4.3.12 Practical concerns: Organisational disentanglement  
Another issue the postal lobby raised was the complexity of separating the 
services. They argued that splitting mail and parcel delivery from financial services 
was an unnecessarily complicated process and that a degree of national coordination 
was needed (Participant 5, personal communication, May 15, 2013). The lobby 
cited NTT as an example that regional units proved to be unviable over time 
(Participant 8, personal communication, January 17, 2014).  
Finally, an accord was reached splitting the postal system into four business 
units: savings, insurance, postal network operations, and postal delivery services. 
Masaharu Ikuta and Taro Aso (who later stated that he was against privatisation) 
were opposed to the idea of individual units and Aso suggested in July 2004 that he 
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would accept the separation insofar that all capital be held by a holding company. 
Two weeks later the government agreed to establish Japan Post Holdings.  
 Ultimately, the administration had to abandon their drive to split financial 
services into units. Whilst practical concerns over implementation and political 
concerns regarding capitalisation and universal service are sound points, the most 
likely explanation behind the strength of resistance was that, if successful, 
regionalisation would have collapsed one of the greatest postal iron triangles. 
6.4.4 Outcomes 
Koizumi’s resubmitted bills were passed in October 2005, dissolving the 
PSA and creating four new businesses in its place: Japan Post Postal Service Ltd., 
Japan Post Network Ltd., Japan Post Insurance Ltd. (JPI), and Japan Post Bank Ltd. 
(JPB)81. All shares were transferred to Japan Post Holding Company (JPH), which 
would eventually sell its stake in the financial arms but maintain ownership of mail 
units. Shares in JPH would also be periodically sold although the state would 
maintain 33% ownership. Mail units were permitted to hold shares in the financial 
units, and cross-shareholding between the financial arms themselves was also 
allowed.  
A state-owned agency known as the Incorporated Administrative Agency 
Management Organisation for Postal Savings and Life Insurance was established to 
oversee the preparation of financial statements and accounting practices of JPB and 
JPI. It also supervised accounts and policies predating privatisation, which were 
still be guaranteed by the state.  
Figure 6-5 offers a simplified diagram of the ownership structure of the 
business units and links between them as defined by the Koizumi administration. 
Also included are the envisioned outcomes in 2017. 
                                                 
81 JPB is also more commonly known as Yūcho. 
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Figure 6-5 Koizumi's proposed ownership structure of JP 
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 The Ministry of Public Management also passed a ruling surrounding the 
monopoly status of JP. Direct mail for promotional purposes was considered 
confidential and as such only JP had the right to deliver it. Postcards, bills, 
certificates, and invitations were classified as general correspondence. Magazines, 
catalogues, and physical credit cards however were considered special 
correspondence and private handlers could deliver these items freely.  
JP was granted interim tax exemption during the transition period. Raising 
delivery prices was subject to government approval although parcels were not 
bound to universal service obligations. For the financial units, caps on savings and 
insurance would remain in place whilst the government held 100% of JPH but these 
limits would be revised later. JPB was permitted gradual entry into other products 
such as loans and credit cards from 2007. All units were required to improve 
internal controls and auditing systems in addition to submitting four-year business 
plans to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications for approval.  
Figure 6-6 describes the major events in postal reform that occurred under 
the Koizumi administration. 
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Figure 6-6 Major events under Koizumi 
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6.4.5 Summary 
 The Koizumi administration engendered the largest change to postal 
services ever seen in Japan, converting it from a government agency into a 
collection of distinct function-based companies. The ideal sought was to create a 
system whereby each of the units would be on an equal footing with privately 
owned firms, although Koizumi’s reluctance to remove the universal mail delivery 
produced inconsistencies with true freedom of operation. 
 Postal reform would serve a number of goals. It was intended to break the 
connection between postal savings and the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. 
This would also weaken the influence of special interests in government and 
invigorate capital markets.  
 Strong opposition was encountered and the bills were initially defeated. The 
administration made a number of concessions including the abandonment of 
regionalised financial units, the establishment of the Social Contribution Fund, 
universal financial services during transition, cross-shareholding allowances, the 
establishment of JPH and its ability to repurchase previously sold shares. Koizumi 
also used a number of strategies to minimise or coerce opposition, including 
circumventing established policy-making customs, ejecting postal dissidents, 
calling a snap election, and capitalising on his personal charisma with the public.  
 Whilst Koizumi’s bills were passed the second time and made much more 
progress than previous administrations82, the power of the postal lobby was still 
sufficient to dilute the amount of changes so that the outcome was less than the 
idealised goal.  
6.5 Changes Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
Shinzo Abe succeeded Koizumi on September 26, 2006 and served until the 
same date a year later. Cited by many as a supporter of Koizumi’s efforts, it was 
expected that his cabinet would cement the efforts made. 
 The handover of power heralded a time of muted resistance as the legitimacy 
of Abe’s administration hinged upon continued implementation. Additionally, since 
the bills had already been passed, little could be done. Whilst estimates from party 
insiders suggested that upwards of 60% of the LDP opposed it (Participant 8, 
                                                 
82 Although credit must be given to prior administrations for increasing the powers of the executive 
office – without which, Koizumi would have had less ability to control the party. 
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personal communication, January 17, 2013), there was a broad recognition that the 
lower house victory of 2005 served as a mandate to support privatisation.  
 Nevertheless, two months after inauguration, Abe welcomed the ‘postal 
rebels’ back into the LDP. Whilst they were forced to sign a pledge supporting the 
legislation, it was noted that they attempted to stall or delay the privatisation process 
(Participant 5, personal communication, May 15, 2013). Ultimately, resistance in 
the LDP was reduced as members recognised they would have to suffer reforms or 
risk their station (Participant 8, personal communication, January 17, 2013).  
 It soon became apparent, however, that Abe was not a forceful leader and 
party unity was more important to him than it had been to Koizumi. In terms of the 
political landscape, the LDP was in a highly defensible position although there were 
growing concerns surrounding the upcoming election in 2007 (Participant 8, 
personal communication, January 17, 2013). The rift created by Koizumi’s thrust 
for privatisation had led to a number of members breaking away and forming the 
People’s New Party, whose primary policy was to return JP to its former state or 
perhaps to expand its reach and presence. Although the party was very small, it 
attracted the support of the postal workers unions, comprising some 220,000 
members. Taiju, the largest professional interest group in Japan with 110,000 
members, also broke with the LDP and aligned with the People’s New Party. The 
Yomiuri estimated that Taiju was capable of mustering up to a million votes. Taiju’s 
two major policies were to support the postal rebels and the People’s New Party. 
The isolated position of the People’s New Party and its size was insufficient to 
challenge the Abe administration but the party would become a more influential 
player in later years. 
The DPJ was in a poor position. After suffering major defeat, the party was 
in disarray and it took several months to create a unified front and several more 
months to articulate their intentions and policy stance. As it was, excluding other 
issues of the day, the Abe administration faced comparatively little outside 
resistance that was at once both organised and influential. 
On an organisational level, JP expressed intentions to expand operations 
into foreign exchange, credit cards, mortgages, and trust banking. Competing banks 
accepted JPB’s entrance into securitized markets but the Banker’s Association 
opposed entrance into mortgage lending, arguing that JPB still enjoyed an implicit 
government guarantee. They also claimed that the practice of collecting deposits 
through the postal network, even if on a contractual basis, defeated the purpose of 
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privatisation. As part of their strategy to diversify away from JGBs, management at 
JPB announced plans to target lending to young women. This market was associated 
with higher risk and was not a significant portion of private banks’ portfolios. JPB’s 
entry therefore was not expected to damage private interests. Despite concerns, in 
December 2006 the Postal Services Privatisation Committee approved expanded 
operations in banking and insurance. A month later, they also approved a motion to 
allow the extension of housing loans in certain metropolitan areas prior to listing 
on the public stock exchange. 
In terms of mail operations, JP announced in September 2006 that it would 
make deliveries to Lawson convenience stores in rural areas. They also opposed a 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications-proposed deregulation that would 
allow area-specific services to be carried out by private firms. The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications relented at the request of JP and withdrew the 
proposal. The ministry expressed a desire to increase competition but agreed to 
postpone further deregulation measures until 2009 when restrictions to entry and 
operations would gradually be relaxed.  
Streamlining asset management proved less successful. Most of the 
commissioned post offices were directly leased from postmasters at a 20% market 
premium. JP proposed a buyout but by April 2007, only 30% had accepted the offer 
with another 40% categorically refusing. Other efforts to renegotiate ground leasing 
arrangements also met with significant resistance from Zentoku and their patron 
LDP members. Plans were also formulated to convert JP’s central post offices, 
many of which lay in prime areas, into skyscrapers providing commercial leasing 
options. Kunio Hatoyama83 took exception to these plans however, and argued that 
the post offices should be protected on the grounds of architectural heritage. 
Through his influence, these plans never eventuated under the Abe administration. 
There were also a number of cases where affiliated companies offered 
amakudari positions in exchange for high-end contracts. As per the mandate of the 
Koizumi administration, JP had discretion to grant contracts and this led to 
sometimes-questionable practices. The case most prominent under Abe’s 
government involved an official at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications receiving a contract to operate 70 of the 122 cafés and shops at 
JP’s resort chains.  
                                                 
83 Kunio Hatoyama was part of the LDP. His brother, Yukio Hatoyama, was part of the DPJ. 
 169 
Figure 6-7 describes the major events in postal reform that occurred under 
the Abe administration. 
 
Figure 6-7 Major events under Abe 
 
6.5.1 Summary 
Overall, the major pillars of the privatisation plan remained intact 
throughout Abe’s term. The forces of resistance claimed a small number of minor 
victories, mostly in the area of asset management, but not enough to compromise 
the integrity of the reform as a whole.  
6.6 Changes Under Prime Minister Yasao Fukuda 
Succeeding Abe on the 26th of September 2007, and serving until September 
24th 2008, the Fukuda administration represented a period of relative calm in terms 
of the frequency of articles related to JP.  
Organisational-level events included the merging of postal unions in 
October 2007. This created the largest corporate labour union in Japan, Zenyusei, 
with 220,000 members. Under the leadership of Yoshifumi Nishikawa, who 
succeeded Koizumi’s handpicked Masaharu Ikuta, JP did not actively reduce staff 
levels, but decreased the influx of new workers as natural attrition was preferential 
to downsizing. Additionally, management announced that remuneration would be 
based on performance measurements rather than the more traditional seniority-
based scales.  
However, despite drives to increase labour productivity and efficiency, a 
significant amount of inertia was encountered as employees still operated under the 
Abe Administration: Timeline of significant events
Sep-2006 JP to deliver parcels to convenience stores.
Oct-2006
Nov-2006 JP persuaded MIAC not to allow area-specific delivery services.
Postal rebels allowed to return to LDP on condition of support.
Dec-2006 JP allowed to expand banking and insurance services. 
Deregulation plans for mail delivery postponed. 
Jan-2007 JP allowed to offer housing loans before listing in certain metropolitan areas.
Feb-2007 MIAC plans to gradually deregulate mail delivery from 2009.
Mar-2007 JP faced considerable resistance to land lease restructuring.
Apr-2007 JP plans to renovate central post offices.
May-2007
Jun-2007 MIAC extends planned deregulation of parcel delivery.
Jul-2007
Aug-2007
Sep-2007 JP bank announces plans to enter questionable credit market.
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mind-set of a government department. In February 2008, it was documented that 
when sales targets for New Years’ cards were not met, employees purchased the 
balance privately and on-sold them at a discount. Other examples included 
commission charges of ¥100 to issue a ¥50 stamp. Many employees complained of 
difficulties adjusting to new performance targets and workloads, and retirements 
rose as a result. 
Outsourcing expanded and by June 2008, plans emerged to further contract 
out mail delivery and other services to Lawson convenience stores and SECOM 
security in rural areas. Political pressure later became apparent, however, when JP 
was forced to reopen some of the recently closed outlets despite having outsourced 
services in the same location. 
Deposits at JPB decreased and many promotional campaigns were 
unsuccessful despite considerable cost. In an effort to stem capital outflows, the 
bank asked the Postal Services Privatization Committee (PSPC) to remove the 
¥10m deposit cap in 2008. Private banks strongly opposed, arguing that government 
ownership constituted an unfair advantage and threatened to deny access to 
domestic fund transfer systems if attempts to raise the cap continued.  
The PSPC approved expansion into international logistics in June 2008, so 
long as a level playing field was created. However, this was inconsistent with 
inward bound competition as the government was unwilling to reduce restrictions 
on foreign freight companies. Similarly, JP executive staff and members of the LDP 
opposed foreign ownership stakes. Nishikawa stated that he was opposed to foreign 
takeovers and a precedent for government intervention had been set when the LDP 
blocked a UK-based company from acquiring a stake in a Japanese electricity 
provider the same year.  
Asset management was a contentious issue during the Fukuda government. 
Pressure to postpone or annul plans to redevelop the central post office was 
championed by Kunio Hatoyama and further bolstered by other Diet members and 
a cadre of architects. Whilst the renovations were eventually approved, a large 
portion of the main facade was protected. The concessions and delays imposed costs 
and overall profit expectations were revised downwards significantly. 
Ministry influence during this period was muted. A panel working for the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications submitted a recommendation in 
November 2007 suggesting deregulating delivery service, particularly the 100,000-
mailbox requirement, but it was not pursued any further. In preparation for eventual 
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share floats, the Ministry of Finance established an office to oversee the sale of 
shares and to ensure that financial markets were not disrupted. 
Whilst not directly connected to the post office, perhaps the single most 
prominent event of Fukuda’s term was the supplementary budget that offered 
targeted support for farmers. ￥80B was offered to promote shifting production 
from rice to other crops. What is interesting to note is that total agricultural spending 
between the previous three supplementary budgets amounted to ￥10B. Similarly, 
Davis and Oh (2007) state that effectively all farmers belonged to a single lobby 
and are a powerful vote gathering instrument. The members of parliament who 
supported the farming lobby also opposed privatisation.  
When asked about the presence of a relationship between the postal lobby 
and the agricultural lobby, interview participants unanimously agreed that one most 
likely existed although there was not a perfect correlation; supporting politicians 
tended to fall into one group or the other. Both groups shared similar ideologies, 
favouring isolated and protected markets, and displayed preferences for more 
traditional models with layers of culture masking the inherent inefficiencies. It is 
interesting to note that two unrelated participants both acknowledged the Trans 
Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks as a shared threat, fears including foreign purchases 
of assets and increased competition.  
The alignment of incentives and objectives, similar organisation, and 
pressure tactics made the postal lobby and the agricultural lobby close potential 
partners (Participant 8, personal communication, March 4th, 2014). The two groups 
were also linked economically: many of the subsidies and investments channelled 
into farming communities were funded directly through postal savings or through 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme bonds (Participant 5, personal 
communication, May 15, 2013; Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 
2013). It was therefore only logical that rural communities opposed privatisation at 
the risk of reduced rural spending. Figure 6-8 describes the major events to postal 
reform that occurred under the Fukuda administration. 
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Figure 6-8 Major events under Fukuda 
 
6.6.1 Summary 
During Fukuda’s term, postal workers merged and JP pressed for increased 
deposit caps. Political interference continued in regards to asset management and 
network operations. Recommendations to level the general correspondence playing 
field were also firmly defeated. 
Koizumi’s reforms had alienated parts of the LDP’s traditional support 
bases, chiefly among the rural and elderly84. Widespread public dissatisfaction with 
the Fukuda government saw efforts to contain the damage. Growing support for 
opposition parties, who stated that they would revise privatisation, later placed the 
reforms in a vulnerable position. The LDP still maintained a strong controlling 
interest in the Diet from the 2006 general election but waning support and poor 
leadership increased the possibility of an opposition victory in 2009. As such, the 
progress of privatisation remained steady during Fukuda’s term, but the longer-term 
future began to look uncertain. 
6.7 Changes Under Prime Minister Taro Aso 
Taro Aso’s term in office extended from Fukuda’s resignation, taking effect 
from September 24, 2008. He served until September 16, 2009. This period was 
                                                 
84 These groups received￥171.9B to stave off increases in health insurance in the supplementary 
budget. 
 
Fukuda Administration: Timeline of significant events
Sep-2007
Oct-2007 Postal workers' unions completes merger.
Nov-2007 MIAC panel submits recommendations for deregulation.
Dec-2007
Jan-2008
Feb-2008
Mar-2008
Apr-2008 JP presses MIAC to lift deposit cap.
JP begins to reorganise labour structure.
May-2008
Jun-2008 JP looks to outsource some services to Lawson and Secom.
JP allowed to expand into international logistics.
Jul-2008 MOF establishes office to sell JP shares and monitor market impact.
Aug-2008
Sep-2008 JP reopens closed rural post offices.
Resistance to redevelopment plans causes delays and costs.
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particularly controversial as the election in 2009 and the LDP’s weakened position 
meant the party had to consider all possible alternatives to avoid defeat. 
The political landscape was turbulent. The LDP had lost some of its longest-
supporting interest groups as splinters broke away to form the People’s New Party 
or join the DPJ (Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 2013). Zentoku 
stated goals to modify the programme and to manage the four business units jointly; 
their ability to influence and mobilize votes in the hundreds of thousands was 
thought to be a key factor in some of the dissenting views held within the LDP. In 
the words of Participant 5, “…the LDP lost a lot of rural votes in that election and 
I think it’s fairly easy to see that this was the fallout from the 2005 elections” 
(Personal communication, May 15, 2013). 
At the same time interest in privatisation appeared to have ebbed as 
attendance at privatisation review meetings had steadily fallen. Prime Minister Aso 
mentioned in 2009 that he discussed the possibility of reviewing it and of potentially 
freezing IPOs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications also proposed 
to JPH that postmasters should be paid for participation in community events. Many 
saw these as efforts to win back Zentoku support although undoing the efforts to 
date risked the support of independent urban voters. Nevertheless, securing rural 
support was an important objective as rural voters had higher turnouts, and because 
of a peculiar technicality of Japanese electorates, a rural vote was more valuable 
than an urban vote (Katz, 2003; Stokes, 2007). 
Even so, there was still support for Koizumi’s reforms. A group of LDP 
members considered severing ties with the LDP in protest at Aso’s reluctance. This 
group included three high-profile members: former LDP secretary general Hidenao 
Nakagawa, former Defence Minister Yuriko Koike, and former administrative 
reform minister Yoshimi Watanabe85. Other members expressed displeasure with 
Aso’s leadership and opposed the construction budgets and accompanying fiscal 
debts. In the absence of an assertive figurehead, the unity of the LDP was 
compromised and presented an opportunity for opposition parties to gain support 
for the upcoming election. 
The DPJ had gradually gained public support since the latter half of the Abe 
administration. The three prime ministers succeeding Koizumi failed to meet the 
public’s expectations and whilst approval of each began promisingly, all fell to very 
                                                 
85 Watanabe later created the reform-oriented ‘Your Party’. 
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low levels. The opposition coalition of the DPJ, People’s New Party, and Social 
Democratic Party promised to undo privatisation, reintegrate business units, retain 
share ownership, and exempt JP from private sector regulations, citing perceived 
declines in service quality and lack of universal financial service as their primary 
justification. To demonstrate their commitment they drafted legislation that would 
block share sales and promised to introduce it if victorious. 
The People’s New Party vocally denounced privatisation. Headed by 
Shizuka Kamei, the party was fiercely opposed to reform and lamented competition 
being placed above all else. Kamei’s personal relationship with Zentoku gave him 
a significant amount of influence. 
JP experienced a number of teething problems. Nishikawa admitted in July 
2009 that many targets for new business lines were not met. Trusts and mortgages 
in particular were far below expectations. To improve corporate governance he 
sought to create a chair post as well as an advisory panel that would help oversee 
management of the four units. 
Political interference, however, was more prominent under the Aso 
administration than any other LDP-led government, particularly with respect to 
asset management. As per the law regarding JPH, the break up and sale of selected 
assets was supposed to be completed by September 2012. However, doubts were 
raised when it became apparent that of the 634 sales from 2004-2008, 70% had 
already been resold, seven at such low prices they were described by the Yomiuri 
as being ‘given away’.  
The proposed sale of ‘Kampo-no-yado’ to the ORIX Corporation received 
the most attention. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications minister, 
Kunio Hatoyama, took issue because he believed they were being offered at fire-
sale prices to ORIX, chaired by prominent Koizumi supporter Yoshihiko 
Miyaguchi. Hatoyama wanted an investigation, claiming the bidding process was 
opaque. Nishikawa argued that overall, the resorts had always operated at a loss and 
in order to dispose of the particularly poorly performing ones they had to be bundled 
with better ones and offered at a discounted price86. ORIX had expressed interest 
in purchasing all of the resorts. Nishikawa countered that stricter reporting would 
have resulted in even lower prices. Following several meetings, one of which 
                                                 
86 In my travels, I happened to chance across a Kampo-no-yado at a resort town; it appeared to have 
been completely abandoned and was fenced off. 
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resulted in the threat to remove Nishikawa as head of JPH, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications eventually halted the sale in January 2009. This action 
raised concerns that other sales of loss-making assets would be interfered with. 
Intentions to redevelop the central Tokyo post office also drew Hatoyama’s 
attention. Whilst JP did not need approval to proceed with construction, Hatoyama 
wielded considerable power and he was suspected of intervening in these plans in 
an attempt to roll back privatisation efforts. Through his influence, more of the old 
building was preserved than initially intended and construction postponed, but his 
stance softened when business circles reiterated support for the renovations.  
Insider-influenced appointments also occurred during the Aso 
administration. Hatoyama pressured JP into accepting the appointment of three 
vice-president positions at JPH. These individuals were all ex-postal officials and 
one in particular, Hiroaki Dan, was given authority over JPH personnel, enhancing 
bureaucratic influence.   
By May 2009, Kunio Hatoyama made it clear that he wanted Nishikawa to 
resign from his position as head of JP, a stance that his brother, Yukio, mirrored in 
the DPJ. Zentoku also wanted to replace Nishikawa as he supported privatisation. 
An unnamed LDP lawmaker reportedly told postmasters that he was involved with 
personnel selection at JPH and pressed for management changes. However, in June, 
Aso dismissed Kunio Hatoyama over the ORIX debate, stating that it was 
inappropriate to interfere with a private company. This produced a clash within the 
Diet, particularly from Yukio Hatoyama. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications also noted their displeasure and wanted an external panel 
established to review the corporate governance and management practices of JP.  
Hatoyama’s replacement, Tsutomu Sato, agreed to keep Nishikawa on as 
president. However, Sato also expressed a desire to hire an outsider to the position. 
Nevertheless, he appeared to be undecided about his stance on privatisation: whilst 
he expressed readiness to amend the laws related to privatisation, he also wanted 
Nishikawa to continue with efforts to turn JP into a private enterprise. 
In terms of operations, however, progress remained steady. The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications was not opposed to the expansion of JPB into 
loans to the public and the Board for Postal Privatisation wanted JPB to enter the 
field. The board also called to lift the deposit cap although competitors remained 
opposed to any changes and were wary that JPB would receive government 
intervention or support. They also contended that expansion into loans was unwise 
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as JPB lacked the experience or the personnel to manage individual loans and 
mortgages properly. Even so, the PSPC approved expanded banking and insurance 
activities.  
The Aso administration was the last LDP-led government. The rural vote, 
where Zentoku was most powerful, had been lost (Participant 5, personal 
communication, May 15, 2013). Poor leadership, recurrent scandals, and an 
unprincipled scramble to gather as many votes as possible left the public 
disillusioned and weary of machine politics, which resulted in urban and suburban 
vote losses (Participant 5, personal communication, May 15, 2013). The LDP was 
defeated in August 2009 by the DPJ, who promised to do away with amakudari and 
break with old traditions. The DPJ also proposed a smaller, more efficient 
government and claimed that their more revolutionary approach would help Japan 
recover some of its former growth. 
Figure 6-9 describes the major events in postal reform that occurred under 
the Aso administration. 
 
Figure 6-9 Major events under Aso 
 
 
6.7.1 Summary 
 Political interference with management was common under Aso; legally 
required sales were blocked and refurbishment plans were delayed. Amakudari 
Aso Administration: Timeline of significant events
Sep-2008
Oct-2008
Nov-2008
Dec-2008
Jan-2009 Hatoyama opposes ORIX deal, orders investigation into it.
Feb-2009 Aso confirms willingness to revise reform package.
PSPC allows JP to expand financial services prior to listing.
LDP postal privatisation board pressures government to lift deposit cap.
Mar-2009 Compromise reached over post office redevelopment, delays construction and adds 
costs.
Hatoyama and MIAC pressure JP to appoint ex-bureaucrat VPs.
Apr-2009
May-2009
Jun-2009 MIAC prevents sale to ORIX. Hatoyama dismissed from MIAC.
Opposition parties announce intentions to reintegrate units, stop share sales.
Jul-2009 Nishikawa admits targets not being met.
Aug-2009 MIAC requests improvement list from JP Holding.
Sep-2009 DPJ produce legislation that will block share sale.
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appointments also continued. The greatest threat to postal reform stemmed from the 
LDP’s weakened position and Aso’s willingness to revise changes in order to secure 
power. Loses for the LDP translated to gains for the DPJ and their supporters, 
including the anti-privatisation People’s New Party. Irrespective of electoral results, 
postal reform was in a precarious position.  
6.8 Changes Under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama 
Yukio Hatoyama served from September 16th 2009, to June 8th the following 
year. An interesting point is that the DPJ’s 2005 manifesto stated the party 
supported privatisation, advocating downsized postal operations. Then leader, Seiji 
Maehara, suggested that the cap on postal savings be lowered to ￥7M and that 
opposition for the sake of opposition was irrational (Nabeshima, 2005). The strong 
position of anti-privatisation became apparent from 2007 although the party line 
still supported smaller, transparent and more efficient government. 
 Discussions with expert participants highlighted the stark differences in the 
DPJ’s attitude towards privatisation; the influence of Ichiro Ozawa was a crucial 
factor. Prior to the ‘Ozawa era’ the DPJ were more pro-reform oriented with 
members serving on a non-partisan privatisation study committee (Maclachlan, 
2011). In addition, the party was not directly opposed to Koizumi’s views: “[The 
DPJ] understood the political aspects of privatisation…they understood the political 
implications behind what Koizumi was trying to do” (Participant 6, personal 
communication, July 10, 2013). Their approach was to offer an alternative plan 
congruent with their constituent’s wishes and distinctive enough from the LDP’s to 
attract voters (Participant 8, personal communication, January 17, 2013). 
 The DPJ under Maehara considered in 2005 that breaking up the postal 
network would simultaneously produce their desired neoliberal change and sever 
the links between the LDP and one of its key support groups. Nevertheless, they 
were unsuccessful and following a punishing defeat in the 2005 election, the DPJ 
took a different path. 
 Ozawa came to the DPJ after defecting from the LPD in 2003 although his 
‘faction’ did not gain strength until after 2005. Ozawa and Kamei had often worked 
closely together and shared similar views on a number of issues. The newly formed 
People’s New Party formed a coalition with the DPJ and together, they fostered the 
change in DPJ policy objectives upon realising a broader support network was 
needed (Participant 5, personal communication, May 15, 2013).  
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 Ozawa himself was described as the ‘classic LDP politician’ in the sense 
that he was a machine politician and attempted to draw in as many stakeholders as 
possible (Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 2013). Together with the 
People’s New Party, they became the party of the postmasters, taking power in 2009, 
and began to unravel Koizumi’s hard-won gains. It is interesting to note that the 
DPJ, who once promised to depoliticise the post office, re-politicised it after 
winning power.  
In terms of political incentives circa 2005, the DPJ may have indirectly 
supported Koizumi’s intentions because a privatised post office would have 
significantly weakened one of the LDP’s most effective vote-gathering mechanisms. 
The change in position was perhaps not coincidental following Zentoku’s 
withdrawal of support for the LDP as the DPJ saw an opportunity to gather some 
of the rural vote. Expanded postal services would both secure public support and 
provide the DPJ with the very funding they wanted to deny the LDP. 
Hatoyama took office in 2009 and pledged to undo changes wrought by 
previous LDP governments. This stance gained the support of the People’s New 
Party led by Shizuka Kamei. Despite having only three seats, this small party had a 
disproportionately significant amount of influence as Kamei acted as the champion 
for Zentoku and Taiju. As will be demonstrated, Kamei capitalised on his political 
connections and implemented a number of modifications favouring his constituents. 
One of Hatoyama’s first actions was to assign Kamei as minister of postal 
and financial affairs. This appointment produced inconsistency as actual power lay 
with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, headed by Kazuhiro 
Haraguchi. Kamei openly dismissed Haraguchi’s mandate and this created internal 
conflicts; Haraguchi saw the separation of units and market supervision as desirable 
outcomes and opposed raising the deposit cap. 
The separation of business units was perhaps the most salient issue that 
characterised the dissolution of the old network. Immediately following the election 
victory, a law was passed that reintegrated management of the business units and 
blocked share sales. This was congruent with the stance of the People’s New Party 
who wanted all shares in JPH to remain under state ownership. Later in January 
2010, Kamei, Jiro Saito, and Haraguchi announced a plan that would consolidate 
the five entities into three: insurance and savings would both remain specific units, 
whilst the delivery, network, and holding companies would be merged.  
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Management and the organisational hierarchy also underwent significant 
change. Pro-privatisation Nishikawa was forced to resign his presidency of JPH on 
October 28, 2009. Kamei replaced him with Jiro Saito, formerly of the Ministry of 
Finance, despite the DPJ’s pledge to stop the practice of appointing former vice 
ministers to such roles. Kamei stated that Saito shared the government’s view to 
postal reform, which led to his appointment. As for the board of directors, Kamei 
asked for the resignation of four pro-privatisation board members who had served 
since 2007. He later suggested that the board need not resign en masse but would 
have to adopt new principles if they wished to remain.  
The government instigated a number of law changes that distorted the legal 
process of appointments. Six weeks into the new term, the government doubled the 
number of directors to 18, and of the five full-time positions, three were former 
bureaucrats. Most of the other roles were filled by bureaucratic staff; outside 
directors were drawn from public good entities (who favoured universal service 
policies). The nomination committee was reduced to a single individual, which 
made deliberations impossible.  
Four vice presidencies were created and of these, Atsuo Saka was a former 
deputy chief cabinet secretary and Seijiro Adachi was an ex-postal bureaucrat. Final 
approval of ascension to the board lay with Kamei. Overall, these changes produced 
a large number of placements filled with official staff, and more to the point, 
individuals who reflected the pro state-owned view of the new government. This 
contrasted with the DPJ’s pledges to reduce the number of bureaucratic 
appointments and amakudari.  
Universal provision of financial services was also an issue that drew rapid 
action. On October 20, 2009, a law was passed establishing universal financial 
service. The decision was not completely unanimous however as some within the 
DPJ suggested that it might be difficult to provide all services at all locations and 
instead the provision should extend only to basic services such as settlements and 
remittances. 
A much more controversial matter was the debate surrounding deposit and 
insurance caps. Zentoku argued to raise the￥10M savings cap or remove it 
completely, citing convenience and administration costs. The People’s New Party 
also wanted to raise the cap but they were less optimistic about the possibility of 
removal and hence pressed to lift it to ￥30M. They argued that higher profits 
derived from greater deposits would pay for universal service obligations. Many 
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within the DPJ also wanted to increase the limit, although there were several high-
profile ministers who did not support the change.  
The Minister of Finance, however, argued that a higher cap would deprive 
the private sector of business opportunities and did not support an increase (Japan 
Noda: Need more debate on Japan Post plan, 2010). Haraguchi of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications was also opposed, as were the insurance and 
banking associations. Representatives from the credit union association met with 
Kamei in February 2010 and persuaded him to recant his position on the insurance, 
but not the deposit cap. Kamei announced after the meeting that he did not wish to 
damage the private sector but nonetheless continued to press for increases to the 
deposit cap. By March 2010, the banks even went so far as to threaten to cut access 
to their networks of ATMs if it was lifted. 
The People’s New Party also fought to increase life insurance payouts from
￥13M to ￥50M. The National Federation of Life Insurance Worker’s Unions 
were firmly opposed. The DPJ found itself in a difficult position as much of its 
support derived from business circles. According to the Nikkei, concessions in 
postal services risked lower voter support. Also in March, leaders from business 
groups approached the DPJ and asked the government not to acquiesce to the 
People’s New Party, however on March 24, the deposit cap was doubled to ￥20M 
and the maximum life insurance payout increased to ￥25M. The DPJ considered 
this a compromise between business interests and the People’s New Party. 
Following the amendment, Kamei announced further intentions to raise the 
insurance deposit cap to ￥20M. 
6.8.1 Cap limit and JGB sales 
It should be noted that at the same point in time, sales of JGBs had fallen 
greatly and previous increases in caps diverted private savings to the post office. 
Indeed, the Ministry of Finance had even gone so far to begin advertising JGBs in 
taxis, featuring a popular local actress (Evans-Pritchard, 2009). Discussions from 
expert interviews presented two factors that explained this coincidence:  
6.8.1.1 Alliance with Ministry of Finance 
Prior to 2009, the DPJ had never been a governing party and needed support 
from the bureaucracy. Ironically, one of their few coherent mandates was a drive 
for administrative reform – a drive that placed the party at odds with many 
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bureaucratic stakeholders (Participant 6, personal communication, July 10, 2013). 
Discussions revealed that the DPJ counted the Ministry of Finance as one of its few 
allies, a position that granted the ministry considerable influence. This relationship 
became stronger as DPJ administrations continued (Participant 6, personal 
communication, July 10, 2013). 
6.8.1.2 Financing election promises 
The data also suggest that the ministry argued for raising deposit caps as a 
mechanism for relieving pressure on state finances. The DPJ’s election manifesto 
promised a number of fiscally expensive transfers including monthly children’s 
allowances, fuel tax cuts, and subsidies for farming and education. Assuming JPB 
would commit the vast majority of its assets to Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme bonds, raising the cap was expected to bolster funds travelling into the 
programme and permit greater government spending in light of poor tax income. 
As such, the data indicate that the declining sales of bonds and increasing deposit 
cap were not coincidental events. 
Other changes included halting asset sales, particularly the Kampo-no-yado 
resorts and wedding halls in September 2009. Instead of disposing of these non-
performing assets, the intention was to bring them to profit by expanding services. 
The People’s New Party suggested that they be converted into nursing centres, thus 
further increasing the presence of the state. At the same time, Saito announced that 
he was seeking to expand the post office to include provision of public services. 
This was in addition to the People’s New Party’s plans to use postal deposits to 
revitalise regional economies and rural areas. These statements implied that closing 
loss-making outlets would become even more difficult.  
6.8.2 Temporary worker conversion 
A major change in staffing was also enacted at the behest of Kamei and the 
People’s New Party. JP made extensive use of temporary workers: the Japanese 
equivalent of part-time labour. Temporary workers do not have the same 
employment status as regular workers and in April 2010, an amendment was 
included that subject to passing a written exam and having served for three years, 
an employee would be granted ‘regular’ status. This expanded JP’s full-time 
employee payroll by an additional 200,000 to 430,000. It has been suggested that 
this action was taken to strengthen support for the People’s New Party. Results from 
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the interviews provided a more revealing analysis of underlying motivations that 
can be divided into three categories: 
6.8.2.1 Philosophical views 
Kamei was fiercely anti-free market and often called for a return to 
traditional values. He argued that structural reforms were a primary cause of Japan’s 
social ills and that unravelling privatisation could reduce the harm done. His views 
may have served social purposes in ailing rural communities but had a negative 
impact upon government finances hence a larger state-run postal service was 
needed to fund his various campaigns. 
6.8.2.2 Public image  
Positioning himself as a stalwart defender of nostalgic, community-oriented 
values was a stratagem Kamei used to increase his appeal in rural Japan. Promoting 
traditional ideals and methods was expected to strike a chord with older residents 
—recall Japan has one of the world’s oldest populations—and would strengthen his 
control in the Diet. This links in with the coalitional deal brokered between the DPJ 
and the People’s New Party. 
6.8.2.3 Coalitional support 
The number of temporary workers at the post office and their affiliations 
secured many votes for the People’s New Party. More importantly, this group 
exhibited tendencies to vote en masse and in Japan’s hybrid electoral system where 
parties could be listed, gave smaller groups considerably more power (Participant 
5, personal communication, May 15, 2013). The DPJ and the People’s New Party 
reached an accord promising further rounds of reform unravelling in exchange for 
support in upper house elections. Ultimately, the People’s New Party gave the DPJ 
the postmasters and increased Kamei’s influence considerably (Participant 8, 
personal communication, January 17, 2013). 
6.8.3 Other developments  
In the face of shrinking deposits, Yoshiyuki Izawa, the head of JPB noted 
that the public could not be served unless profits could be generated and there was 
a realisation that reintegration would impose the greatest financial burden on the 
bank itself. Staunching the outflow of capital therefore needed addressing. In an 
effort to allow JPB to cover its increased costs, the DPJ formulated a clause to 
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include in its overall reform bill that enabled entry into new businesses merely by 
notification to the Financial Services Agency (FSA). Together with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications, JPB unveiled a plan that included 
investments in foreign infrastructure. Kamei, however, opposed the idea, arguing 
that a lack of experience might result in JP being ‘burned’. 
The People’s New Party supplied a counterproposal, exempting JP from 
consumption tax. They also suggested that anyone living within a five-kilometre 
radius of a post office be permitted to borrow ￥500,000 interest free. At this point, 
Hatoyama and others began to exhibit hesitation in accommodating the wishes of 
Kamei. The Minister and Vice Minister of Finance in particular opposed the 
exemption to consumption tax. Unrelenting, Kamei threatened to resign if his 
proposals were not enacted.  
The new postal reform bill was approved by the cabinet in April. This 
covered the reunification of the business units, extended universal service 
obligations to include financial services, and changed regulations surrounding entry 
into new business activities. Ultimately, the Hatoyama administration was able to 
arrest the changes made to date and began a reversal that saw renewed state control 
of postal services, and increased government budgets. Figure 6-10 describes the 
major events to postal reform that occurred under the Hatoyama administration. 
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Figure 6-10 Major events under Hatoyama 
 
  
 
6.8.4 Summary 
 Hatoyama’s government marked a significant reversal in postal reform. 
Influenced by the postal lobby, Ozawa and Kamei in particular, a large number of 
political interventions were made, including the reintegration of JP management, 
blocking of asset sales, and a requirement to provide universal financial services. 
Pro-privatisation board members were ejected whilst the board itself was expanded 
and quickly filled with selected ex-bureaucrats sympathetic to the anti-reform 
movement. Postal deposit and life insurance payout caps were raised and the 
temporary worker conversion scheme emplaced. In less than a year, many of 
Koizumi’s efforts had been effectively undone although these actions (among many 
others not connected with the post office) caused Hatoyama’s public approval rating 
to decrease to one of the lowest ever witnessed in Japan. 
Hatoyama Administration: Timeline of significant events
Sep-2009 DPJ blocks JP asset sales.
Hatoyama appoints Haraguchi to MIAC, Kamei as minister for posts.
Oct-2009 Saito announces plan to expand postal services. 
JP board changed to have four VPs, two appointees are ex-bureaucrats.
DPJ reintegrates unit management, blocks share sales. 
Kamei appoints Saito as head of JP.
Three out of the five directors appointed to JP board are ex-bureaucrats. 
Universal financial services put into law.
Board of directors increased to 18, largely populated by ex-officials. 
Nomination committee reduced to one.
Nov-2009
Dec-2009
Jan-2010
Feb-2010 Proposal to grant full-time status to temporary workers announced.
Mar-2010
Deposit cap lifted to 20 million yen.  Insurance payout increased from 13 to 25 
million yen.
Hatoyama expressed concerns over some of Kamei's proposals.
Apr-2010 Proposal to transfer temporary workers to full employees passes.  
New postal reform bill passed.
Plan announced to allow JP Bank to expand operations by notification only. MIAC 
releases plan that would see JP involved in foreign infrastructure, Kamei resists it.
May-2010
Jun-2010  <end of Hatoyama's term in office>
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6.9 Changes Under Prime Minister Naoto Kan 
 Naoto Kan took the office of Prime Minister following Hatoyama’s 
resignation and served from June 8, 2010 to September 2, 2011.  
6.9.1 New postal reform bill (June 2010) 
 Pressure from Kamei and his associates to pass the DPJ/People’s New Party 
revised bill was immediate following Kan’s ascendency. If passed, it would 
integrate the delivery and network units into a single entity, require nationwide 
provision of financial services, raise deposit caps and life insurance benefits, and 
preserve a greater government-owned share in JPH. Barriers preventing JPB 
entering private lending would be relaxed, much to the chagrin of private banks, 
some of whose shares sank to 10-year lows on the news. Nevertheless, the Nikkei 
reported that some DPJ lawmakers were unhappy with the bill’s stipulations, which 
suggested that the party was not united in calling for the return of a pre-2007 model. 
Taking advantage of the DPJ’s weakened position, Kamei threatened to 
resign his cabinet portfolios and withdraw his party’s support if the bill was not 
given precedence and passed before the June Diet session ended. The DPJ, however, 
was more concerned about the upcoming election; the postal bill was not passed, 
prompting Kamei’s resignation and a rebound in bank share prices. Shozaburo Jimi 
(also from the People’s New Party) assumed Kamei’s responsibilities as Financial 
Services Minister in June 2010.  
 In sharp contrast with Koizumi’s legislation, the government decided not to 
privatise the financial arms, directly preserving cross-subsidisation to the loss-
making delivery units. The government was also criticised for freezing share sales 
as doing so reduced incentives for good corporate governance practices and 
efficiency drives. 
 Despite the DPJ’s version of the postal bill not passing in either the ordinary 
or special Diet sessions in 2010, intentions to roll back privatisation efforts 
remained.  
6.9.2 Political stability 
The DPJ was in an untenable position; public support for the party had fallen 
markedly in the wake of various scandals and broken election promises. The Social 
Democratic Party had severed ties owing to the failure to remove the American air 
base in Okinawa and the loss of the upper house election in July meant that new 
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partners had to be found, which required policy shifts (Participant 6, personal 
communication, July 10, 2013).  
Internal ructions also undermined the DPJ as the views of Ozawa differed 
widely from other DPJ representatives. Kan reorganised his cabinet to place as 
many foes of Ozawa as he could in key positions, which temporarily reversed 
falling public approval ratings. Kan also reinstated the Policy Research Committee 
in an effort to consolidate power in cabinet. Ozawa was still expected to influence 
Diet affairs indirectly however.  
One of the reasons for the fractures in the coalition was the presence of pro-
reform members in the DPJ; Cabinet Secretary Yoshihiko Sengoku publically 
voiced his views that JP should not be expanded. Some commentators mentioned 
that Kan himself may have been hesitant to roll back Koizumi’s efforts as the size 
of JP and its holdings of JGBs was linked to sovereign risk; JP held almost twice as 
many as the Bank of Japan. 
6.9.3 Activities at JP Group 
Continuing the mixed messages of the DPJ’s term in office, businessman 
Yoshiyuki Izawa was appointed vice president of JPH in an effort to show that it 
was still on track to privatise. Interestingly, the Nikkei noted that over the three 
years since the 2007 legislation JP Group had returned ¥1Tln in taxes and dividends 
as opposed to ¥0.96Tln in the four years as a public agency. This was despite falling 
revenues from all business units.  
As expected, deposits at JPB had fallen to ¥175Tln from a high of ¥265Tln. 
On an operational level, the bank gradually increased the diversity of its asset pool, 
investing in municipal bonds and shares in emerging nations as JGB yields fell, see 
Figure 6-11 87 . Even so, the proportion of ‘alternative’ investments still only 
accounted for 4% of total assets. Nevertheless, profits rose 6.5% over nine months, 
partially due to these higher performance assets.  
  
                                                 
87 Even though the 2013 figure represents the smallest percentage in the data range, the actual 
amount is ¥144Tln. 
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Figure 6-11 Percentage of JPB total assets invested in government bonds 
 
Source: Japan Post Group (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) 
 
Similar patterns were observed for JPI: total assets had fallen to ¥98.8Tln 
from ¥126Tln in March 2002, although operating profits were 20% larger. Overall, 
in spite of the efforts of the People’s New Party and others, the benefits of a more 
market-oriented JP were becoming apparent for the financial arms. 
The postal operations however continued to generate losses and make poor 
managerial decisions. The company acquired the defunct ‘Pelican-bin’ parcel 
service and its 4,100 employees – even though its parcel volumes were falling. 
These workers were then paid going-rates at JP, 20% higher than private operators. 
Differences in the sorting systems immediately led to delayed deliveries of 320,000 
parcels. All told, parcel delivery created losses of ¥12.7B in fiscal 2009 although 
other mail operating margins improved.  
In September, the Nikkei reported that without the financial arms, JP would 
stand to lose ¥330B per year; stamp and postcard prices would have to increase by 
¥22 and ¥17 respectively to cover the difference. The network unit also expected to 
lose ¥11B in fiscal 2011 as outsourcing revenue received from JPB and JPI fell. 
The temporary worker scheme saw 34,098 applications for transfer to permanent 
status, more than half of the total eligible number. A dispassionate observer would 
possibly conclude therefore that whilst the financial units were making every effort 
to turn a profit in light of government restrictions, postal services continued to be 
as inefficient as ever. 
6.9.4 Competitor reactions 
Unsurprisingly, the business community was wary of the new postal reform 
bill. The Japan Business Federation, Keidanren, argued that a nationalised post 
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system would disadvantage private businesses, as greater deposit caps would create 
credit shortages amongst private banks. Nevertheless, the Banker’s Association 
held talks with JPB to discuss their participation, citing the need for disaster 
coordination88 and customer security.  
Concerns about level playing fields continued to draw singular attention; one 
article mentioned that some of the operational proposals threatened to violate a 
number of treaty agreements (NW Interview: Is ACCJ on the same page as Japan 
Inc.?, 2010). The United States also voiced concerns about competitive fairness 
surrounding insurance sales and government ownership of JPI. This comment came 
as Japan sought entry into TPP negotiations and became a contentious issue later 
on. 
6.9.5 Summary 
 The revised postal bill was designed to solidify the alterations made by the 
Hatoyama administration but it failed to pass through the Diet sessions – partially 
due to the government’s declining power. In response Shizuka Kamei resigned, an 
action that may have in fact benefitted reformists. Financial operations were 
showing improvements in performance but postal operations continued to book 
losses and needed the support of JPB and JPI. In terms of major changes, Kan’s 
government froze share sales and moved to retain ownership of the financial units  
6.10 Changes Under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda 
Power passed to Yoshihiko Noda following poor performances in the polls 
and crisis management of the Tohoku disaster in March 2011. He served as Prime 
Minister from September 2, 2011 to December 26, 2012.  
Estimates for reconstruction costs following the magnitude 9.0 earthquake 
were initially set at roughly ¥15Tln. In terms of funding options, share sales from 
JP and Japan Tobacco were suggested as well as increased tax rates. Kamei saw 
this as an opportunity to renew focus on the DPJ/People’s New Party postal reform 
bill; he stated that he would support selling shares to finance reconstruction and 
thus avoid raising taxes – although he wanted the bill passed first. The LDP and 
New Komeito opposed the bill but were supportive of unloading shares.   
Kamei’s enthusiasm to sell shares in JP may have been motivated by genuine 
concern for those affected, but it also produced an opportunity to advance the 
                                                 
88 This was particularly salient at the time, owing to the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. 
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wishes of the postal lobby. Under Hatoyama in 2009, legislation had been passed 
that imposed a moratorium on share sales. Therefore, before any IPOs could be 
initiated the moratorium would have to be overturned. Understandably, asset sales 
were viewed as more politically palatable than increased tax rates, and with the sale 
of JP shares being far more likely, Kamei saw an opportunity to pass his bill in 
exchange for supporting share sales.  
Share sales would be problematic however; notwithstanding the current laws, 
there were doubts that shares would fetch book value as no earnings models from 
the group were available. Any further ‘reforms’ solidifying ties between financial 
and delivery arms, along with universal service obligations would also be likely to 
reduce expected receipts from sales. 
6.10.1 2012 postal reform bill 
Debate around the bill in 2012 saw a number of conflicting agendas. The 
People’s New Party wanted it passed as it would solidify a reversal of the changes 
wrought by Koizumi’s government, lift deposit caps, guarantee universal financial 
service89, and increase state control over postal affairs. In this, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications sided with the People’s New Party. The 
Ministry of Finance however opposed the sale of shares; doing so would postpone 
discussions surrounding tax rate debates. The LDP, New Komeito and even certain 
elements of the DPJ opposed the bill.  
In April 2012, a lower house committee submitted new proposals suggested 
by New Komeito for a bill to facilitate asset sales. The proposed bill stipulated that 
postal service and network units would be merged, the requirement to sell all shares 
by 2017 would be replaced by a pledge to sell them ‘as soon as possible’ and the 
state could reserve a 33% stake in the holding company. Washington expressed 
concerns about the vague terms of the bill’s language: it did not specify whether 
shares in the financial arms would be sold or not. Also included were terms that 
eased entry into new business operations: once the majority of shares in JPH had 
been liquidated, JPB and JPI would be permitted to start new operations simply by 
informing the government.  
Heizo Takenaka pointed out that the bill created problems in the sense that it 
pooled accounting for postal services and preserved government involvement in 
                                                 
89 Although no other developed nation provides universal financial services. 
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financial services. No changes to cross-shareholding conditions were mentioned. 
Nevertheless, the bill passed on April 27 with support from the LDP and New 
Komeito, thus the 2009 moratorium was overturned. The new essential structure is 
pictured in Figure 6-12. 
 
Figure 6-12 Corporate structure of JP Group as per 2012 legislation 
 
Source: Japan Post Group Annual Report 2013, Uniglobal union 
 
6.10.2 State of the playing field 
 Lincoln (2013) highlights a number of issues in respect to the private sector. 
Financial organisations were regulated by the FSA, whereas JPB and JPI were 
regulated by the subordinated Office for Postal Savings and Insurance Supervision, 
which also happened to be largely staffed by Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications personnel.  
 Interest rate controls had been removed several years earlier but JPB still 
had advantages over private firms: ten year deposits could still be broken without 
penalty, fees were lower than most private banks and the postal network gave 
unparalleled market exposure (Lincoln, 2013). 
 The existence of JPH was inconsistent: holding companies in Japan were 
not permitted to own banking and insurance stocks at the same time. Similarly, as 
long as JPH maintained shares in JPB and JPI there was an implicit government 
guarantee of deposits (Lincoln, 2013). The doubling of postal deposit caps further 
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incentivised households to bank with JPB. As of this writing, all of these issues are 
still current. 
6.10.3 Activities at JP Group 
In expectation of IPOs, the banking and insurance arms began efforts to 
improve profitability. JPB offered loans to areas private banks had largely ignored: 
the self-employed, women, and the elderly. In September 2012, it submitted 
proposals to the FSA and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to 
approve private and corporate lending, setting five year targets of ¥790B and ¥350B 
respectively. The Bankers’ Association in conjunction with six other groups held a 
press conference nine days later and voiced concerns about JPB’s effects on the 
private sector whilst still government owned. Their greatest concerns centred on 
corporate lending; JPB did not specify how their impact would be minimized.  
JPI also applied for approval to start new business operations centred on 
cancer and educational endowment products. Initial approval for educational 
endowment insurance was given although eight separate conditions were attached, 
mostly regarding benefit payments. Expansion into cancer insurance however was 
abandoned following pressure from the United States regarding the unfair position 
JPI occupied in the industry90. 
The merging of the delivery and network units was officially completed on 
October 1st, assuming the name Japan Post Co. One of the first actions conducted 
as a combined entity was to reinstate remote banking services at 52 locations, which 
had been removed as part of the 2007 legislation. Efforts were made to improve 
performance as the unit renewed focus on real estate development. Even so, profits 
would be elusive; under the five-company system JP Service contributed only one 
percent of total group returns whilst making up almost half of all the group’s 
employees (230,000). 
At the executive level, the DPJ appointed ex-Ministry of Finance Atsuo Saka 
as president of JPH in spite of election promises to curb amakudari and bureaucratic 
influence. This was probably not coincidental as Participant 6 noted that the 
Ministry of Finance was one of the DPJ’s few remaining allies towards the end of 
their time in power (Personal communication, July 10, 2013). 
                                                 
90 The U.S. required concessions from Japan regarding insurance as one of the conditions for 
granting approval to join TPP negotiations.  
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6.10.4 Summary 
 The greatest change under Noda was the 2012 postal reform bill, which 
merged the postal delivery and service units, installed universal financial services, 
removed binding targets for share and asset sales, and eased the conditions for entry 
into new businesses. The playing field remained tilted in favour of JP and 
amakudari landings continued. The path to privatisation had technically been 
reopened but with so many requirements and inefficiencies, it was difficult to 
anticipate fervent demand for shares.  
6.11 Changes Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe  
The LDP returned to power after securing 294 of the 480 seats in the 
December election. Shinzo Abe resumed duties as prime minister on December 26, 
2012, and is incumbent as of this writing. In contrast with his last term in office, 
Abe appears to be a much more forceful leader. His time in opposition likely 
allowed him time to reflect on past failings and to re-emerge as a stronger, more 
pro-reform minded premier (Participant 8, personal communication, March 4, 
2014). 
6.11.1 Reconstruction budget and IPO dilemma 
By January 2013, the government had expanded the Tohoku reconstruction 
budget by a further ¥3Tln and expressed a desire to produce these funds through 
further asset sales. JP countered, arguing that wider business operations and 
profitability were necessary to induce better share prices. Whilst initial intentions 
were to begin listings by spring 2015, delays in approval processes and influence 
exerted by the US in terms of granting Japan access to TPP negotiations reduced 
anticipated market values. 
One of the greatest issues surrounding stock listing is profitability. JPB for 
instance has ¥60Tln more in deposits than Mitsubishi UFJ although net earnings 
are 50% smaller, largely due to the majority of funds being invested in low-yielding 
JGBs (approximately 70% of total assets). Listing now would result in suboptimal 
receipts for the state hence the group wishes firstly to increase net income. However, 
the group needs to expand operations, drawing concerns from private businesses 
who argue that the group should not be permitted to expand whilst under 
government control. The FSA has been hesitant to grant approval for new 
operations, citing weak internal controls.  
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In addition to concerns from the private sector, the US raised the issue of 
insurance during prerequisite bilateral negotiations as a primer for greater TPP 
involvement. In exchange for approval to join TPP talks, Japan agreed to 
concessions in the automotive industry and prohibited JPI from offering cancer and 
educational insurance where the American Family Life Assurance Company 
(AFLAC) dominates the Japanese market. JP then struck a deal with AFLAC to 
allow sales of products through 1,000 of its post offices, receiving commission 
revenue in return91. Further outlets would follow later. Approval for entry into 
private mortgages was also withheld. 
To date, JPH has not elaborated on whether savings and insurance shares will 
feature in IPOs. Whilst these would probably attract more interest, disaggregating 
the offering would leave shares in JPC exposed and unlikely to find willing buyers. 
6.11.2 Activities at JP Group 
2013 saw a number of profitability and efficiency actions occur within the 
group. JP undertook a number of real estate developments, notably including the 
Japan Post Tower in Marunouchi, Tokyo, a 40-storey tower close to Nagoya station, 
and conversion of the central post office in Hakata into a commercial building. The 
company detailed intentions to close down 100 loss-making or unsalvageable post 
offices, the first action of its kind since 2007. Proposed divestment in unprofitable 
hotels and hospitals resurfaced too. Whilst Mr Hatoyama was not present to oppose 
sales this time, the company nonetheless presented a more cautious approach and 
stated that they would not be engaging in packaged sales; if buyers could not be 
found, the assets would remain under JP control. 
Solar energy sales were also considered as an alternative revenue stream. 
Scheduled for installation at 286 locations, and estimated to cost ¥3-4B, projected 
revenues were ¥500M. Other investments within the group included upgraded 
computer systems, collection and delivery systems, and post office refurbishments 
with a cumulative investment budget of some ¥1Tln spread over three years.  
JP also detailed intentions to restructure labour costs, focussing more on a 
merit-based system of remuneration. Whilst labour rates would fall to levels closer 
to private sector figures, provisions existed for greater performance-related bonuses. 
                                                 
91 The US drew criticism in this regard, as some argued that it amounted to Washington providing 
special treatment to a single company. 
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These negotiations were only made possible as employees no longer held public 
servant status. 
In terms of banking, JPB postponed plans for loan entry after delays in 
approval from the FSA and TPP concessions. Diversification away from JGBs 
continued but only gradually: the company noted that carrying such a vast quantity 
of bonds (some ¥200Tn) affected the creditworthiness of the asset itself. 
Nevertheless, four months later it was observed that bond holdings had decreased 
by 7.5%. 
Owing to complications surrounding TPP, JPI was unable to launch any new 
products per se but the strategic partnership with AFLAC produced revenue 
through receivable commission. The arrangement to offer AFLAC products 
through 1,500 locations was scheduled to encompass the entire network at an 
undisclosed later date. Contract and payout system investments of ¥200B were 
announced with expectations of long-term efficiency gains.  
Overall, the group returned ¥560B in profits for the financial year of 2012, 
which also included the first mail delivery profit in four years following cost-cutting 
measures. The group employed 223,539 full-time workers as at March 31, 2013; 
3,227 at JPH, 200,601 at JPC, 12,922 at JPB, and 6,789 at JPI (Japan Post Group, 
2013). 
6.11.3 Executive staffing 
Political interference in a state owned enterprise is an ever-present risk. The 
Abe administration drew criticism as it conducted a purge of the DPJ-appointed 
board members as incumbency terms expired. The actions taken by the LDP present 
the reader with something of a conundrum. Replacing 17 of the 18 members after 
tenure expired, including a change in presidency from DPJ-appointed Saka to ex-
Toshiba and chair of the PSPC Taizo Nishimuro was observed by many as an 
example of political interference. Nevertheless, the renewal of outside leadership 
and the conspicuous absence of Ministry of Finance representation on the board 
leaves the impression that the LDP was committed to a degree of market-oriented 
governance. 
6.11.4 Other political developments 
Despite progress, there were potential risks that accompanied the LDP’s 
resurgence. The party’s strength in both houses increased the influence of special 
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interest groups. Tellingly, Zentoku defected from the ailing People’s New Party and 
renewed support for the LDP for the first time in eight years in January 2013. 
Similarly, People’s New Party President Shozaburo Jimi requested that the LDP 
absorb the People’s New Party prior to the upper house election in the summer 
(PNP seeking merger with LDP before upper house election, 2013). Both of these 
actions appeared to be motivated by a desire to capitalise upon the LDP’s majority. 
As it happens, the LDP declined Jimi’s request (PNP Jimi's request to return to LDP 
rejected, 2013) and the People’s New Party was officially disbanded on March 21st 
whereupon its two remaining members became independent (PNP head Jimi 
dissolves small opposition party, 2013). 
6.11.5 Summary 
Abe’s second administration was still bound by the 2012 postal reform bill 
enacted by the Noda administration. In terms of operations, the group made efforts 
to raise profitability through new business ventures, strategic asset management, 
and labour cost reduction. The board of directors was purged of DPJ influence but 
this action in itself could also be observed to be an example of political interference. 
It is also potentially troubling to note that this purge occurred after Zentoku renewed 
support for the LDP. The evolution of postal reform has now been traced to the 
present day and the simulation can now be applied to estimate future developments. 
6.12  Chapter Conclusion 
Japan Post supplanted the Postal Services Agency in 2003. It was incorporated 
in an institutional environment that skewed household savings incentives towards 
postal deposits and diverted funds from the private sector into government bonds. 
Koizumi and other liberal-minded reformers were particularly critical of the role 
the post office played in the ‘iron triangle’: the relationship that saw postal savings 
channelled into inefficient public works projects and special corporations. 
Postmasters played a vital role in this arrangement, collecting postal savings and 
gathering votes for their patron representatives. In return, they were rewarded with 
prestige, material benefits and elevated post-retirement employment. The post 
office itself relied on the performance of the financial units to subsidise loss-making 
postal operations. 
The institutional setting produced a number of issues that privatisation would 
address. Among these issues were the losses of competitiveness, ballooning public 
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debt, growing default fears, capital scarcity in the private sector, heavy interest 
group representation in policy formation, and skewed incentives leading to poor 
resource allocation. The Koizumi administration sought to redress these issues by 
destroying the linkages in the iron triangle; by placing shares in private hands, 
outsider governance practices and increased transparency were expected to separate 
postal deposits from special interests. In doing so, the private sector would be 
invigorated and the size of government would fall by some quarter million staff.  
In the face of strong opposition, Koizumi used a number of strategies to push 
his bills through the Diet. These included a mixture of concessions to the postal 
lobby, notably, the inclusion of the 100,000-mailbox requirement, the incorporation 
of JPH, cross-shareholding, and a national postal savings unit. He also made use of 
credible threats, ejecting opponents within his own party and calling a snap election 
phrased as a referendum on change. At times, he also crossed the floor and courted 
opposition parties in order to silence rebellion in his own party. According to the 
data, his personal leadership style was also a critical factor in passing the reform 
bills. The group was then split into four business units with JPH maintaining a grip 
on all outstanding shares. 
Succeeding LDP administrations did not greatly alter the bills but political 
interference became more common as time progressed, culminating in Prime 
Minister Aso’s willingness to review the process. The greatest apparent areas of 
political interference were appointments to the executive and board level, and 
hindrances to autonomous asset management. 
The DPJ took power in 2009, which marked a turning point in postal reform. 
Along with coalition partner and ardent defender of the state-owned system, 
Shizuka Kamei, a moratorium on share sales was introduced and new reform bills 
were proposed. Under DPJ rule, deposit caps were raised, units were given freer 
access to new business ventures even though the playing field was significantly 
tilted, and a scheme to convert temporary workers into full-time workers was 
installed.  
In 2012, an amended bill merged the two mail units into a single entity, 
obligated universal mail and financial services, preserved a share of JPH for 
government, and replaced the obligation to sell shares by 2017 with a non-binding 
target. The ruling coalition also made a number of amakudari appointments despite 
promises to end the practice. Ultimately, the public felt that the DPJ had not been 
trustworthy and the LDP returned to power in December 2012. 
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Abe’s second term in the prime minister’s office saw a replacement of many 
executive-level staff, but the 2012 reform bill still stands in place. Whilst his 
government’s actions did help to bring about some change in the institution of 
outsider governance, many of the other institutions remained largely intact. This 
brings the analysis up to the present day where it now falls to the simulation model 
to estimate how much effective change can be wrought from the current setting 
using the issues identified here after being vetted by expert participants. 
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7 Simulation 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the actual mechanics of the simulation model first 
introduced in Chapter Four. Its purpose is to estimate the likely outcomes of 
negotiations where an array of stakeholders (referred to as ‘players’ or ‘player 
groups’) interact with each other over a specified range of issues. The likelihood of 
‘winning an issue’, that is, realising a desired position, is directly tied to player 
strength, the amount of support that can be mustered, and the degree of consensus 
or disagreement over an issue.  
The model allows for a wide range of possible scenarios. Describing one 
issue in terms of one player’s position, salience and clout in increments of 0.1 
produces over 2,000 permutations. Increasing either the number of players or issues 
raises the total number of possible input scenarios exponentially. For this study, it 
was necessary to construct a model with seven issues populated by eight players. 
Ignoring political persuasion, this produces over 300 trillion input permutations and 
some 3,000 pages of code. This is clearly far too much information to handle via 
thought experiment and therefore requires a powerful processing engine and 
considerable reserves of computer memory. The Vensim© suite developed by 
Venata Systems Inc. is well suited to such applications and my model is coded in 
this programming language92.  
The process begins by identifying the number of relevant issues and players. 
Inputs are entered for each player’s three metrics over each issue. All issues are 
simultaneously analysed in the LOS where outcomes are expressed in terms of final 
positions. Interactions can span multiple issues via position exchange strategies or 
concessions offered on a lobby candidate’s primary issue (see active player 
strategies).  
Upon generating lower order outputs, these are automatically fed into the 
HOS where an overall probability of reform effectiveness is calculated. This stage 
determines whether certain issues will be instrumental in overall success or failure, 
or if the proposed package can withstand significant lobbying and concessions. In 
terms of complexity, the LOS is the more involved phase but the same process and 
                                                 
92 For readers unfamiliar with Vensim’s programming language, equations have been expressed in 
more common syntax. 
 199 
calculations are used for each issue present. Figure 7-1 offers a simplified guide to 
the overall process. Whilst three issues are depicted, any number of issues could 
theoretically be analysed in the LOS given sufficient computing power. 
 
Figure 7-1 Overview of HOS and LOS with three issues 
 
 
Issues in the LOS are linked together through strong ally lobbying in terms 
of concessions over the candidate’s primary issue and through position exchange 
between rivals. Beyond this, I recognise that economic links can arise such as postal 
network maintenance affecting managerial autonomy. These links however are 
held as exogenous in the present model. Further research could examine these links 
more fully but will require a different metric than measurements of position. 
7.1.1 Opening notation 
  n ..., c, b, a,N   refers to the set of players present within the simulation. 
A player can represent an individual, a group or faction, or any other collection of 
stakeholders. When depicting a group the inputs describe the consensus action that 
group exhibits.  
  i ..., 3, 2, 1,I  is the set of key issues that the actors are conducting a 
multilateral negotiation over. 
 Pai is the position of a given player a in regards to the specified issue i 
 Sai is the salience of a given player a in regards to the specified issue i 
 Cai is the clout of a given player a in regards to the specified issue i 
 
Please note that Vensim does not have the capacity to display superscript or 
subscript fonts.  
 
Higher Order 
Simulation 
Lower Order 
Simulation: Issue 1 
Lower Order 
Simulation: Issue 2 
Lower Order 
Simulation: Issue 3 
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7.2 Lower Order Simulation 
For each issue analysed in the LOS, a number of distinct elements are 
considered. Issues are phrased in terms that allow for support or opposition against 
the issue. For example, the issue of ‘Business Unit Separation’ refers to splitting JP 
into its respective business units: savings, insurance, and postal operations. Players 
can support this decision, oppose it, or remain neutral. Fundamentally it is the value 
of the Median Voter Location over issue i (abbreviated to MVLi) that produces the 
expected output over an issue, which is the likelihood that the business units will 
be separated in this example.  
MVL is determined by the players in terms of how support or opposition is 
spread, how important the issue is relative to other issues, and the power of players. 
Active players will attempt to change the MVL to a more favourable location by 
negotiating with other players using one of three strategies determined by the 
relationship they share. MVL is the key output in each issue of the LOS as it is a 
measurement of the likelihood of the proposal occurring or not; values greater than 
zero suggest that action will be taken, less than zero implying no change will occur 
with greater polarisation implying increasing likelihoods of success or failure. 
Figure 7-2 provides a very brief visual overview of the processes that take 
place within the LOS of an exemplar Issue 1. 
 
Figure 7-2 Calculation centres and flow of information in one issue 
 
 
Player inputs
MVL1
Alliance testing
Activation
matrices
Strategy selection
Lobbying and
exchanges
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Described briefly, the initial player input values determine MVL1 at the start 
of the first round. From this point, players pass through the activation matrices that 
determine which players will seek to alter the outcome. Alliance testing establishes 
the type of relationship pairs of players exhibit: strong allies, weak allies, or 
adversaries. The lobbying and exchanges process is where the actual negotiation 
occurs, and the results of this stage pass through a series of filters and integrate into 
the player inputs – causing the MVL to move at the end of the round. The process 
repeats until an equilibrium is reached (where MVL remains static). The same 
process is repeated for every other issue simultaneously; further issues are identified 
by the addition of an increasing Arabic numeral at the end of each variable. 
7.2.1 Calculation of expected outcome: MVL 
This preliminary figure is the result of each player applying their stated clout 
with regard to the position they favour and is conducted in isolation, with each 
player acting autonomously without bargaining or lobbying any other player. 
Mobilizing clout for a position is often referred to as casting ‘votes’ and if we 
consider position of an issue on a one-dimensional continuum, the location of the 
outcome is determined by the number of votes cast by each player. Figure 7-3 shows 
a simplified sketch of this first element of the simulation. 
 
Figure 7-3 MVL calculation element from LOS 
 
 
The outcome (MVL1 in this case) is determined by inputting each player’s 
position, salience and clout figures. Position and salience can be input directly into 
the MVL1 calculation. Clout however must first be passed through a scalar: this 
MVL1
Pa1
Sa1
WCa1
Pb1
Sb1
WCb1
Pc1
Sc1
WCc1
Ca1
Cb1
Cc1
Player 1 inputs
Player 2 inputs
Player 3 inputs
Clout scalar 1
Unscaled clout
from all players
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mechanism has been installed to assign each player their proportionate fraction of 
power relative to other relevant players and is given the notation clout scalar 193. 
The sum of all players’ weighted clout (WC) sums to one. Each player group is then 
given a weighted clout figure representing their fraction of total power. 
 Notation as it appears in the diagram: 
 MVL1 Median voter location of issue 1 (outcome) 
 Pa1 Position of player a over issue 1 
 Sa1 Salience of player a over issue 1 
 Ca1 Clout of player a over issue 1 
 WCa1 Weighted clout of player a over issue 1 
 Replace ‘a’ for ‘b’ to represent player two and so on.  
 
Any number of players can be entered into the model providing at least two 
are present. A unique advantage of this model is that a given player need not be 
involved in every issue being analysed. For example, the Ministry of Finance may 
have a strong interest in raising postal savings caps but may have no role in the 
debate on maintaining at least one post office in every village. Under such 
circumstances, it is possible to set initial salience and/or clout values at zero for 
irrelevant issues and non-zero values for relevant issues: the model excludes or 
includes the player as appropriate. 
Position is measured from negative one to positive one: -1 meaning that a 
player is totally opposed to an issue, +1 meaning that a player displays complete 
and total support for the issue and zero referring to a neutral player. Salience is 
measured from zero to one: zero implying no importance at all to the player, one 
meaning that the issue is of the utmost importance relative to the other issues. Clout 
is also measured from zero to one with zero meaning no power to influence the 
outcome and one meaning the most amount of power to influence the outcome. 
To determine the expected outcome, as mentioned above it is necessary to 
transform clout into a weighted figure which returns a value where if all players’ 
weighted clouts are added together they sum to one. For instance, if all three players 
were to have exactly the same raw clout figures then each player would control 
                                                 
93 Some variables have long names and include multiple actors/issues. Variables are italicised for 
readability.  
 203 
33.3% of the total authority over the issue. The determination of weighted clout for 
an individual player (WCni) can be completed with two calculations: 



n
a
aii Cscalar Clout
1
 
Where Cai is the raw clout figure for a given player (a) over an issue (i) and n is the 
total number of players. The weighted clout for player a (WCai) is then: 
i
ai
ai
scalar Clout
C
WC   
The expected outcome is then determined by the weighted average of player inputs 
and the calculation of MVL is therefore:  



n
a
aiaiaii WCSPMVL
1
 
The calculation is bounded between -1 and 1 with positive numbers implying the 
proposition achieves varying degrees of net support and negative numbers implying 
the proposition is defeated by varying degrees. 
7.2.2 Player activation 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, when players are dissatisfied with an 
outcome, they are likely to challenge it. Dissatisfaction is defined as: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖 =
𝑀𝑉𝐿𝑖 − 𝑃𝑎𝑖
2
 
The denominator is included to normalise the outputs once again between zero and 
one (owing to position having a range of two); an output of zero meaning that the 
player is not dissatisfied at all and outputs of positive or negative one implying 
maximum dissatisfaction. Whilst the principle of positive or negative 
dissatisfaction may seem arbitrary, the sign can be used to indicate the direction of 
a change in the outcome that the player prefers: a positive value would suggest the 
player would prefer the outcome decrease to a value closer to zero, a negative value 
implying an increase in the outcome is preferable.  
The degree to which lobbying is successful relies upon changes to 
dissatisfaction; an ally is likely to mobilise more resources for an issue if their 
dissatisfaction can be shown to decrease. This is why it becomes necessary to 
separate salience from the measurement: if an ally were lobbied successfully, they 
would raise their salience value and this would move the MVL closer to both the 
lobbyer and the lobbied. An outcome closer to one’s position value must make the 
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player better off. However, since clout is indexed to one and divided amongst the 
players, any given change in salience from one player results in less than that given 
change in the outcome. For example, a 5% increase in salience might result in a 
2.5% change in the outcome. Given that the change in salience is greater than the 
change in outcome, dissatisfaction weighted by salience would rise.  
In any case, the model assumes that the inputs used are the actual figures 
that describe a player, as utility is derived from the actual position, not the revealed 
position. The term ‘actual’ refers to the true value of the player’s input and the term 
‘revealed’ refers to the value of the player’s input exhibited to other players. The 
model assumes there is enough transparency to expose behaviour such as ‘position 
polarising’. The assumption of transparency is maintained as input values are 
collected from experts who are disassociated from the players. 
Being dissatisfied with an outcome alone does not guarantee the player will 
take action; the issue must be important enough to warrant more attention and the 
player must feel that they have a reasonable chance of swaying the outcome. This 
becomes an application of clout and salience. An active player is assumed to 
consider strategies of lobbying allies for additional support and offering exchanges 
to rivals to soften opposition for the current issue.  
Determining activation is a logic function; players who are both more 
dissatisfied than the ‘average’ player and have higher combined salience and clout 
are assumed to take action. The absolute value of dissatisfaction is used to facilitate 
easier visualisation as the sign is not important: how the player acts is irrelevant, 
only that they act. Activation factors are given as follows: 
aiaiaiai WCSctionDissatisfafactor Activation  ||   
Once this is done an activation threshold can be determined, which is an 
average measurement of dissatisfaction weighted by both salience and clout of all 
relevant players. 
n
0WCni if
n
a
ai
i
factor Activation
threshold Activation



 1  
Relevant players are assumed to be players who have at least some influence over 
the outcome. The denominator is the total number of players who have a weighted 
clout value greater than 0. 
Once a player crosses the activation threshold, they become active and begin 
the process of lobbying and exchange. Expressed in logical terms: 
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𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑖 ≥ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 ⇒ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖 = 1 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑖 < 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 ⇒ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑖 = 0 
This means that the model assumes player a will take action over issue i only if 
their individual activation factor is at least as much as the average player. An active 
player is coded with the coefficient 1, and an inactive player is coded with 0. The 
use of ‘at least as much’ is preferred over ‘more than’ to include players on the 
margin: two diametrically opposed players with equal clout and salience would 
actively try to influence each other. In such a case, their individual activation factors 
would be equal to the activation threshold.  
7.2.2.1 Activation override: The ‘panic button’ 
This model includes a unique feature that grants the researcher increased 
flexibility during sensitivity analyses by allowing the user to override default 
activation behaviour.  
Using this feature, a number of scenarios can be synthesised. For instance 
during the middle of a government’s term, not all players may be interested in an 
issue. However, during election campaigns players could have sufficient incentives 
to involve themselves with a wider range of issues. Use of the override for a certain 
number of rounds can replicate conditions if an election were to occur in the middle 
of a year. Similarly, should public concern swell over a particular issue, it is 
possible to activate all players for a certain number of rounds – or indefinitely. By 
comparison, some issues may be of such great importance that they warrant action 
from all players whilst other issues may be less the focus of attention. 
By default, the overrides are disengaged but feature prominently in the 
interface, granting the ability to explore a range of hypothetical conditions. 
Programming the overrides, known as the ‘Panic Button’ and ‘System Panic’ is a 
simple matter of inserting a conditional clause into each player’s activation equation 
such that: 
     
1
11


ai
iiai
Activation
Panic SystemButton Panicthreshold  Activationfactor  Activation
Panic buttons are issue specific. The ‘System Panic’ is a global override and 
activates every player over every issue; its function is simply to reduce the number 
of commands the user needs to make as opposed to engaging each ‘Panic Button’ 
for global testing.  
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7.2.3 Alliance testing 
 This section examines the relationships one player has with all others in 
order to determine the type of strategy to employ. The alliance test measures the 
type of relationship and is determined via logical conditions. It is a complex variable 
and therefore is explained here in stages. In simple terms, the full equation 
calculates relationships based on the following: 
1. Are the players on the same side of zero on the position continuum? 
2. Are they strong allies? 
3. Are they weak allies? 
4. If none of the above, they must be adversaries. 
 
Determining if a pair of players are on the same side of zero is a simple 
matter of multiplying their respective positions. Thus, the first condition is satisfied 
simply by requiring that cross multiplication needs to be positive. Figure 7-4 
provides a visual example of a pair of adversaries: 
 
Figure 7-4 Adversaries over issue 1 
 
 
 Irrespective of the location of the MVL, these two players are on opposite 
sides of zero and therefore must be adversaries. By comparison, allies could be 
pictured as either of these two cases pictured in Figure 7-5: 
 
Figure 7-5 Allies over issue 1 
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 Whether a or b takes the more extreme position is irrelevant, only that they 
are on the same side of zero. At this stage, the type of alliance has not been identified.  
This model assumes that self-serving interests are a more powerful 
motivating force than selfless concerns. As a result, players will not form alliances 
with other players who have opposing views even in the event of two fairly central 
players who are only slightly separated by sign. Figure 7-6 provides an example:  
 
Figure 7-6 Closely separated but ideologically opposed players 
 
 
 The positions of players a and b are not very dissimilar, perhaps Pai is -0.05 
and Pbi is 0.01, yet these two players will not form an alliance with each other as 
they are on opposite sides of zero. Player b would consider an alliance with player 
c however even though the difference in positions is far greater.  
The strength of a potential alliance is now examined. Two players who find 
themselves on the same side of the expected outcome would both be better off if 
the outcome were to move towards them, up until the point where the outcome is 
equal to one of the player’s positions. This is labelled a ‘strong alliance’ and coded 
as ‘1’. Two players who are both on the same side of zero on the position continuum 
but have the expected outcome between them could potentially foster a ‘weak 
alliance’ and are coded as ‘0.5’. For convenience, the positive cases are illustrated 
in Figure 7-7; the negative cases are simply a matter of switching signs. 
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Figure 7-7 The division between strong and weak allies 
  
An extended view of the equation specifying all possible outcomes follows. 
The first two lines represent cases one and two respectively, the next two are their 
negative mirrors. If a pair of players are on the same side of zero but are not strong 
allies, they must be weak allies. Finally, if two players are not allies, they must be 
adversaries. 
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 Explaining the first line in words: if the product of Pai and Pbi is equal to or 
greater than zero and ( ) their positions are both greater than zero, and their 
positions are greater than the MVL, then ( ) the alliance test equals one. 
The actions available to an active player differ depending upon the type of 
the alliance. In the pictured weak alliance, if player b lobbied player a and 
successfully increased a’s salience the outcome would move rightwards, making b 
better off and a worse off assuming a’s position remains unchanged. The action b 
might therefore take would be to try to convince a to revise a’s position rightwards, 
making b better off. Also, a’s shift in position would bring it closer to the outcome, 
making a better off too. 
 
 
Position 
0 
       MVL      a         b 
Strong Alliances 
0 
           a       MVL   b 
Weak Alliance 
Position 
Position 
0 
        a         b    MVL 
Case 1 
 
 
 
Case 2 
 209 
7.2.4 Post activation: Behavioural matrices  
Once a player is active, behaviour depends upon the relationship shared with 
other players. The model accounts for this by specifying a coded output of 1, 2, or 
394  for a given player with each number representing a different strategy. An 
example behavioural matrix for player a over issue 1 appears from the Vensim 
sketch here (see Figure 7-8): 
 
Figure 7-8 Behavioural matrix inputs 
 
 
The notation a->b195 can be read as “a lobbies b over issue 1” and is subject to this 
algorithm: 
  03,2,1
3]0[]1[
2]5.0[]1[
1]1[]1[
,
,
,




biabia
biatest AllianceActivation
biatest AllianceActivation
biatest AllianceActivation
biaiai
biaiai
biaiai
 
 Row one states that if a is active and the alliance test returns a ‘1’ the two 
players are strong allies and the active player attempts to lobby the other player’s 
salience over the issue (strategy 1). Row two states that there is a weak alliance and 
the active player attempts to change the position of the other player (strategy 2). 
Row three shows that they are adversaries and a position exchange strategy is 
employed (strategy 3). The last row states that if the output is not 1, 2, or 3, no 
action is taken; this can only occur if the player is inactive. The algorithm is applied 
to every pairing of players in the simulation, producing an exhaustive list of 
strategies for each player every turn. Strategies can change as relationships evolve: 
                                                 
94 Vensim cannot output worded phrases. 
95 Vensim does not provide for arrows but is substituted by ‘->’ as text characters. 
Behaviour
matrix a1
a->b 1
a->c 1
<Activation a1>
<Alliance test a,b 1>
<Alliance test a,c 1>
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it is possible for an active player to lobby a weak ally’s position in one turn and 
increase their salience under strong ally lobbying in the next. Engaging the 
activation override does not alter the strategy employed but ensures the output of 
the above equation will always be 1, 2, or 3. 
7.2.5 Post activation: Lobbying salience (strong allies) 
 An active player will attempt to change the salience of their strong allies. 
As strong allies are already located on the same side of MVLi it is less costly to alter 
the candidate’s salience than their position: if a has a potential candidate b, it is 
assumed to be simpler to increase b’s commitment than it is to influence b’s position.  
Suppose that two players, the Koizumi cabinet and the Ministry of Finance 
both support the issue of business unit separation. Suppose also the MVL is less than 
both players’ positions (pictured below in case 1). Finally, assume that the Koizumi 
cabinet is the active player and the Ministry of Finance has a relatively low salience 
in this issue. In an effort to increase MVL, the Koizumi cabinet simply needs to 
convince the ministry that this issue is an important one and that more resources 
should be mobilised to secure a more desirable outcome. Two types of strong 
alliances can occur and are displayed in Figure 7-9. 
 
Figure 7-9 Two cases of strong alliances 
 
 Case one on the positive side demonstrates a typical example where both 
players are better off with a higher outcome and the active player would seek to 
increase the salience of the ally. Case one on the negative side shows two players 
who desire a lower outcome. Since their positions are negative, increasing salience 
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will shift MVL leftwards. Case two is said to be the special case, representing a 
scenario where the lobbying player would seek to decrease salience, thereby 
moving the outcome closer to both parties. This is true in both the positive and 
negative case. 
The process of strong ally lobbying is described below using player a and 
player b as an example. The same process is also applied to every other pairing of 
strong allies, replacing player and issue notation as necessary.  
7.2.5.1 Lobbying to increase salience: Case one 
 Fundamentally, strong ally lobbying is an application of utility theory and 
is governed by the principle of self-interest. The model assumes that an active 
player cannot influence a candidate to mobilise more resources over an issue than 
the active player itself. For example, player a is active and has a salience value of 
0.8. A lobbies b, who has a salience value of 0.2. At most, player b’s maximum 
salience over issue i would be 0.8 – it is assumed that one cannot convince another 
to work harder for an outcome than oneself.  
When a player receives a request to alter salience he/she/it is presented with 
a trade-off: how much utility is gained from applying more resources to issue i, and 
how much utility would be realised from applying extra resources to the candidate’s 
own primary issue96? Thus, the model considers the lobbied player’s opportunity 
costs and a successful lobby attempt only occurs when the net gains (including any 
concessions received) are at least equal to the next best forgone alternative. Figure 
7-10 shows the algorithm that governs case one. 
 
                                                 
96 Noted as b prime for player b. 
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Figure 7-10 Strong ally lobbying algorithm 
 
7.2.5.1.1 Checking whether salience can be increased 
Increasing the salience of a candidate requires that two separate conditions 
be satisfied: case one must apply and the candidate’s salience must be less than the 
active player. The equations to determine this are as follows: 
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An output of ‘1’ indicates that salience should be increased. Row one confirms that 
case one applies when satisfying these criteria: a is active, Sai is more than Sbi, both 
players’ positions are more than zero and more than the current MVL. Row one is 
the positive scenario whilst row two is the negative scenario. Row three states that 
salience cannot or should not be increased. A later equation depicted in case two 
describes whether salience should be decreased.  
7.2.5.1.2 Determining the proposed shift in salience 
The equation is as follows: 
   
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Assuming that a should increase b’s salience, the shift is assumed to be the 
difference in their salience values multiplied by 0.5 after being raised to the power 
of their respective clout figures. If not, or if WCa1 should happen to be zero97, the 
equation is programmed to return a zero. The inclusion of relative clout values is 
assumed to represent power differentials whereby a powerful player is able to 
extract more effort from less powerful allies and vice versa.  
7.2.5.1.3 Identifying the candidate’s primary issue  
The process of primary issue identification is based on a simple assumption: 
a player’s primary issue is the one with the highest salience. It is necessary to 
determine the primary issue as strong ally candidates will be comparing utilities of 
the lobbied issue and the primary issue to establish whether the first offer is good 
enough or if a concession is needed. Continuing the example of player a lobbying 
player b, the process is conducted over three stages: 
1. Identify the primary issue and code by number. 
2. Identify the candidate’s inputs over the primary issue. 
3. Identify the lobbyer’s inputs over the candidate’s primary issue. 
 
Step one is evaluated by the following: 
nb primarySSSS
b primarySSSS
b primarySSSS
bnbnbb
bbnbb
bbnbb



]},...,,[max{
...
,2]},...,,[max{
,1]},...,,[max{
21
221
121
 
Meaning that if issue one has the highest salience, primary b is coded as ‘1’ and so 
on. Should two issues have the same salience then the first in the sequence is chosen. 
The next step is to associate the candidate player’s primary issue input 
variables necessary for comparison. In this example these are: position (Pb prime), 
salience (Sb prime) and weighted clout (WCb prime). The process is the same for each 
variable with position given below as an exemplar: 
 
 
  bnprime b
bprime b
bprime b
PPnb primary
PPb primary
PPb primary



...
,2
,1
2
1
  
                                                 
97 This is a logical stop point in the model: a player with no clout is not part of the negotiation over 
that issue and thus calculations must halt. 
 214
Meaning, if issue one is the primary, use Pb1, if issue two is the primary, use Pb2 
and so on. 
The final step is to identify the active player’s inputs over the candidate’s 
primary issue. These inputs are necessary as if a concession is made to the 
candidate’s primary issue, we must know how strong the appellant is. Assuming 
player b is being lobbied by player a and noting a’s position on b’s primary issue 
as
prime b aP : 
 
 
  anprime b a
aprime b a
aprime b a
PPnb primary
PPb primary
PPb primary



...
,2
,1
2
1
 
In words: if b’s primary issue is issue one, a’s position on b’s primary is Pa1. If b’s 
primary issue is issue two, a’s position on b’s primary is Pa2 and so on. The same 
process is carried out for salience and weighted clout and repeated for all player 
pairings. 
7.2.5.1.4 Considering the first offer and making concessions 
 To reduce visual clutter in the build window, first offer consideration and 
concession processing are determined within a single auxiliary variable termed 
a→b1 concession to b. The following explains the mechanics and assumptions 
piece by piece. 
 Utility from round outcomes is considered to be a single peaked linear 
function based on the difference between position and MVLi. As a result, it is not 
essential to know the utility functions of individual players; rather utility is indexed 
between zero and one.  
2
1 nii
in
PMVL
U

   
 Uni is the utility of player n over issue i. Maximum utility occurs when the 
player’s position is equal to the MVL in which case the utility is one. As MVL moves 
away, either leftwards or rightwards, utility decreases. Minimum utility (zero) 
occurs when, for example, the player exhibits a position of +1 and the MVL is -1. 
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 Figure 7-11 provides a visualisation98. Player b’s utility curve is labelled as 
Ubi and maximum utility is realised where MVL is 0.5. The current MVL is less than 
0.5. As the MVL increases so does utility until maximisation at 0.5. If the MVL were 
to rise further, the likely outcome becomes more radical than b would prefer and 
utility begins to decrease. Note that an extreme MVL of ‘1’ is still better for b than 
an extreme MVL of ‘-1’ as b supports the issue in question.  
 
Figure 7-11 Maximum utility when Pb1=0.5 
 
 
 Changes in the issue’s outcome therefore directly affect the player’s utility 
and as the lobbied player is considering changing their salience, the change in utility 
for player b over issue ‘1’ can be presented as follows: 
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 Salience cannot exceed one. If the change in salience plus the current 
salience of the primary issue is more than one, the extra effort that can be applied 
                                                 
98 The slope of the utility curve is held to 0.5 and -0.5 to ensure the maximum change is equal to 
one. 
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is the difference between the current value and one. To provide an illustration, 
picture a player who already exhibits a salience of one over their primary issue: they 
are already applying as much effort as they possibly can to this issue. As a result is 
it not possible to realise any more utility by expending more effort on the issue; 
other methods such as challenges and exchanges must be considered. Gains through 
salience may however be realised on other issues, thus the model includes a degree 
of dynamism by assuming players will prefer to increase salience over their primary 
if they can but if not, they will seek to realise gains elsewhere. Similarly, players 
who find themselves with very little influence over their primary issue may be able 
to raise their overall utility by agreeing to increase salience over other issues where 
they have greater influence. 
 If the inequality    prime blobby after prime bblobby after b UUUU  11  holds then the 
first offer is accepted and no concession from the appellant need be made. If not, 
the appellant must change their salience over the candidate’s primary issue to make 
up the difference in utility and this difference can be calculated from changes in 
output. The change in output for issue i via a change in salience from any player (b 
in this example) can be shown as: 
bibibii WCSPMVL   
 Where a needs to match the difference from the change in the candidate’s 
primary issue and the active issue, by simplifying the equations above the 
concession needed by the appellant can be written as: 
 
   
    000
00:
11
1



prime b aprime b aprime b a
prime b aprime b a
prime b aprime b a
prime bprime b a
SPWC
or
PWCwhere
WCP
MVLMVLS
 
 In words, a needs to change their salience enough over b’s primary issue to 
reduce the differential to zero. If a has no position or no clout over b’s primary issue 
they are not able to offer a concession. Phrasing the equation this way also allows 
the model to include cases where a player may have to lessen their salience over the 
candidate’s primary issue if positions are opposed. For instance, player a asks 
player b to further support industrial deregulation, who then agrees but only if a 
becomes less vocal in calling for reduced deposit account limits. 
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7.2.5.1.5 Ensuring all conditions are met 
Following the calculations for proposed salience change and any necessary 
concessions, a conditional test is performed to ensure the following conditions are 
met: 
1. The concession offered by a and a’s salience over b’s primary does not 
exceed the salience of the lobbied issue. 
2. The concession offered by a over b’s primary does not cause a’s salience to 
become less than zero. 
3. The salience shift plus b’s salience over the lobbied issue does not exceed 
a’s salience. 
4. Both players must have some influence over the two issues under 
negotiation.  
5. The ‘increase salience’ variable must return a ‘1’. 
 
The first condition represents an assumption that the player will be willing 
to make a concession over an ally’s primary issue so long as the effort expended on 
that primary issue does not become greater than effort expended on the issue they 
are currently lobbying, otherwise it becomes too expensive to lobby allies. The 
second condition states that it is not possible to have salience less than zero. An ally 
could potentially ask for a very large concession (particularly if they carry a lot of 
clout over their primary) and in certain cases may require the appellant to make 
such a change to their salience it pushes it into negative integers. Such a situation 
is physically impossible, thus a conditional check has been introduced. The third 
condition represents an assumption that an ally cannot be made to work harder for 
an issue than the appellant. The fourth condition exists to remove ‘floating point 
errors’ – the model is large enough to encompass many issues and if players have 
no clout over a particular issue they cannot participate in negotiations over that issue.  
Assuming all of these conditions are met, the variable a→b1 conditions 
returns a ‘1’ and will return a ‘0’ if any are not. All that remains now is to account 
for case two and process all offers before establishing how much salience values 
change. 
7.2.5.2 Lobbying to decrease salience: Case two 
Case two represents a situation where two players are strong allies and the 
MVL is on their side of zero but the outcome is more extreme than either of the two 
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players would wish. In such a case, the players would be better off reducing their 
salience. This principle has been termed disengagement. Case two is governed by 
the following algorithm: 
     
     
     
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11
10
010?
10
010?
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


case special biaDisengage
factor entDisengagemScase special biaDisengage
DisengagePMVLPMVLP
Pbiasalience increase bia
DisengagePMVLPMVLP
Pbiasalience increase bia
bi
biiaiibi
ai
biiaiibi
ai
 
In order to disengage, a number of conditions have to be satisfied: a must 
not increase b’s salience, they must be strong allies, a must be active, their positions 
must be on the same side of zero, and the outcome must be more extreme than both 
of their positions. So long as these conditions are met, the effect of the special case 
is to multiply the candidate’s salience by a disengagement factor that causes a 
decrease in the candidate’s salience. The value of the disengagement factor is 
arbitrarily assigned as an input into the simulation and all special cases use the same 
disengagement factor value. The output from the special case then feeds into the 
candidate action algorithm where the candidate decides which action is best. Should 
any of the conditions not be met then case two lobbying returns a ‘0’ and has no 
further effect. 
7.2.5.3 Associating changes with issue inputs 
Making a concession to a candidate does not guarantee that the lobby will 
be successful. In a given iteration of the simulation, a candidate may receive 
multiple offers to change salience. The mechanics of offer selection will be 
explained shortly but is based upon accepting the most ‘profitable’ offer. Assuming 
for a moment that player a’s offer is accepted, the active player must alter their 
salience value on the candidate’s primary issue. This is measured by
prime bi aS change bia   , meaning ‘the change in a’s salience over b’s primary 
issue when a lobbies b over issue i’: 
   
    0101
1
111
1
1



prime b a
prime b a
S change biab offer Acceptedconditions ba
b to concession baS change bia
b offer Acceptedconditions ba
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The first equation states that if the conditions are met and b accepts a’s offer, the 
change to a’s salience over b’s primary is the output of the concession variable.  
Finally, the effects upon the candidate player’s salience are determined by 
accepting the first offer, the offer with a concession, or the special case two with an 
offer of disengagement. If none of these apply, no change in salience is made. 
Rephrased from the Vensim software: 
 
   
    0110101
1111101
11101



Sb Influence baconditions bacase special ba
shift salience baSb Influence baconditions bacase special ba
case special baSb Influence bacase special ba
meaning that if a special case applies, the influence on b’s salience over issue one 
is the predetermined special case output. If there is no special case and the 
conditions are met, the change is the predetermined salience shift. If there is no 
special case and the conditions are not met, there is no change. 
7.2.5.4 Candidate action algorithm: Strong ally lobbying 
The equations listed above describe the scenario of player a lobbying player 
b. However, in any given iteration of the simulation there may be several players 
vying for player b’s attentions over issue i. Every instance of strong ally lobbying 
for every pair of players is calculated each round.  
At the end of each round, every lobbied player compiles the offers received 
and selects one offer per round. The selected offer will have the largest influence 
on the candidate99. This is because the greater the influence, the greater the change 
in utility for the candidate. The model processes the value of the offers tendered 
and returns a number equivalent to the player’s letter (a being 1, b being 2, etc.) to 
indicate which offer has been accepted. If a player receives no offers then a zero is 
returned. Offer selection is calculated by: 
                                                 
99 The squared value is used because special cases decrease salience and thus need to be made 
positive for purposes of comparison using a MAX equation. The effect is the same as using the 
absolute value but reduces the length of the equation. 
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meaning that if the greatest influence to Sbi comes from the offer made by player a, 
the accepted offer is coded as 1. If the greatest influence comes from player c, the 
accepted offer is coded as 3. Player j’s offer being accepted would be coded as 10 
and so on. Finally, if no offers sway the candidate, no offer is accepted.  
Having selected an offer, the last stage of strong ally lobbying is to add the 
results of the round’s action into the candidate player’s salience. This is done in two 
stages: associating the selected offer with the influence it will have on the 
candidate’s salience and incorporating the change in salience to the candidate’s 
input value. Also at this point it is expedient to include any concessions that a player 
has had to make on other players’ primary issues and include a two-stage limiter to 
ensure global effects on salience cannot cause breaches of the range. 
The first part of the process is to determine the ‘Strong ally effect’ for a 
given player over a particular issue, which measures the total change in salience 
from a round of negotiations: 
1bilimter  Concession if
bi
 bi Limtier  if
bii sConcessionSInfluence binbeffect ally Strong


1
 
This means the strong ally effect upon player b over issue i is the sum of any offer 
b accepts in the case it has received offers and any concessions b has had to make 
over issue i in the case b has lobbied another player whose primary issue happens 
to be issue i.  
The Concessionsbi variable applies the primary issue identification 
algorithm to associate concessions to individual issues, written as for issue i as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑏𝑖 = ∑ 𝑏 → 𝑛𝑖
𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑛=𝑖
 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑏 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 
This means the concession b has to make over issue i is the sum of all concessions 
required where b lobbies other players whose primary issue is issue i. Since the 
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variable 
prime n bi S change nb   only returns a non-zero result if candidate n accepts 
the offer, no other logical conditions need apply. 
The two-stage limiter is a check to ensure salience cannot be more than one. 
In a sufficiently large model, a player may have to offer concessions to a number 
of players in a given round. If the combined effects cause salience to rise too much, 
a temporary stop is triggered. The first stage of the limiter is used to establish 
whether changes in salience proposed to the player and the concessions the player 
has to make themselves are within the bounds of zero and one. 
 
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Limiter
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Limiter
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If the limiter returns a ‘0’ it implies that the proposed changes are too great and the 
player will not accept any offers this round. After the current round’s changes have 
been accounted for the player is free to continue the offer process if it is in their 
interests. Providing the limiter yields a ‘1’ in the next round they can select offers.  
The second stage of the limiter determines whether concessions alone will 
cause a breach in salience range. It is assumed that if the total effect on salience 
from making and receiving offers causes a breach but concessions themselves do 
not, the player will give preference to the offers they have made to other players 
and corresponding concessions rather than offers received.  
 
    010
110


bibibibibi
bibibi
limiter ConcessionsConcessionSsConcessionS
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 If this limiter is triggered it cancels the effect of concessions on the player 
for the current round. The total effect to a player’s salience over issue i at the end 
of each round can then be applied: 
ibitbi beffect ally  StrongSS 1,  
The notation of 
1, tbiS indicates the salience of player b over issue i at time plus one, 
which is the beginning of the next round. The process then begins anew. 
7.2.6 Post activation: Lobbying position (weak allies) 
Challenging the position of a weak ally has the potential to shift their 
position closer to the active player’s position, causing the MVL to move closer to 
the active player thus making them better off. How important the issue is to each 
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player and the levels of support they can draw on are key determinants in the 
challenge process. 
Weak alliances occur when both players are on the same side of the position 
continuum and the MVL is located between them. The four potential cases in this 
model are shown in Figure 7-12. 
 
Figure 7-12 Four cases of weak alliances 
 
The diagram depicts player a as the active player who is attempting to 
influence player b to adopt a position closer to player a’s. The term ‘challenge’ is 
used synonymously with ‘lobbying’ in the case of weak allies and represents the 
active player (a) asking the candidate player (b) to change position to match that of 
the active player. Determining the change in position is then achieved via an 
application of probability theory and utility theory.  
For the purposes of explaining the challenge process, an illustrated example 
of case one appears below where player a is the active player and player b is the 
candidate challenged to change position. This necessitates three criteria: 
Activationai=1, Alliance testai,bi=0.5 and therefore from the behavioural matrix: 
2bia . 
The essential considerations of a given player are pictured in Figure 7-13:  
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Figure 7-13 Flowchart of weak ally lobbying algorithm 
 
Source: Scholz et al. (2011) 
The decision to issue a challenge or not is governed by determining if it 
makes the player better off. The expected utility from the challenge process is 
deducted from the utility derived from the status quo. A positive value implies that 
it is worth pursuing, whilst values of zero or less result in no action. Zero is included 
under the assumption that transaction costs are not free. Both players calculate their 
own expected utilities and the outcome of the bilateral contest is determined by 
which party has more to gain. 
7.2.6.1 Adapting the BDM model for Vensim 
Changes to player positions are conducted by processing each pair of players 
actively involved in weak ally lobbying. The process can be reduced to the 
following stages: 
1. Determine applicable case. 
2. Calculate probability of winning challenge. 
3. Calculate player utilities. 
4. Determine output type: conflict, compromise, capitulate. 
5. Process offers received from all active players, select applicable offer. 
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Player a does not challenge 
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7.2.6.1.1 Case determination 
Case determination is the process of identifying which side of zero the 
parties are on and which has the more extreme position. The variable Case 
evaluator a->b1 describes the process as: 
           
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Explaining the first line in words: if a uses strategy number two and both positions 
of a and b are more than zero and the MVL is more than zero and the position of a 
is more than MVL and the position of b is less than MVL then case one applies. The 
last line states that if cases one through four do not apply the output is zero, thus 
stopping the algorithm. 
7.2.6.1.2 The probability of winning a challenge 
When negotiating between weak allies, part of the process depends upon 
who is with you and who is against you, how power is distributed, and how 
interested each player is. For instance if a player with very little clout receives a 
challenge from a very powerful player, it is more likely the challenge will succeed. 
In terms of power distribution, only players on the two involved players’ side of the 
position continuum are considered (see Figure 7-14).  
Figure 7-14 Weak ally challenge division 
 
As Figure 7-14 shows, any player with a position greater than the current 
MVL would prefer b to increase their position and any player with a position less 
than the current MVL would prefer a to decrease their position. Neither a nor b 
consider any player with a negative position as part of this negotiation. The model 
assumes as a matter of principle that players will not collaborate with fundamentally 
opposed players; this prevents b from counting a hypothetical player z with a 
position of -1 as an ‘ally’ in terms of resisting a’s challenge. 
To determine the relevant distribution of power in case one, the players must 
be divided into two groups: those whose positions are higher than the MVL and 
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therefore support player a, and those whose positions are lower than the MVL and 
therefore support player b. Establishing which side has greater influence requires a 
measurement of weighted clout on the positive side of the position continuum. 
Principally, this is the same as the clout scalari calculation.  

iScalarClout  is noted as the total amount of clout deployed in support 
(superscript +) of issue i.  


 
0niP if
nii CScalar  Clout  
The total amount of effective power in support of issue i can now be measured100. 
Effective power+i is the amount of effective power on the positive side of issue i’s 
position continuum. 




0niP if
ni
i
ni
i S
Scalar Clout
C
power  Effective   
It is important to weight effective power by salience as it limits the influence players 
have based upon their level of involvement in the issue. Not including the salience 
expression would imply that all players are equally – and fully – involved in the 
issue. 
The probability of winning a challenge can now be expressed by dividing 
the amount of power on the lobbyer’s side of the challenge by the total amount of 
supporting power. Thus the probability of player a winning a challenge against b 
over issue i in case one is 
𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 1 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑖 =  
i
MVLMVLP if
ni
i
ni
power Effective
S
Scalar Clout
C
iini




0
 
meaning that the model assumes the probability of a winning a challenge over b is 
determined by how much power, weighted by salience, is above the MVL expressed 
as a fraction of the total effective power deployed in support for issue i. This is a 
reasonable assumption as it suggests that having many players on one’s side does 
not guarantee victory: those supporters must have considerable clout too. Case two 
is the other half of the players on the positive side of the position continuum; the 
                                                 
100 In the case there are no players on either side of zero then the effective power variable is 
programmed to return a 0. Weak ally lobbying in this case is impossible and this stage of the 
simulation stops. 
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probability of the active player winning case two is simply one minus the 
probability of winning case one.  
Case three is given below: 
𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 3 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑖 =  
i
MVLMVLP if
ni
i
ni
power Effective
S
Scalar Clout
C
iini




0
  
 Following the principle of case two, case four is the other half of the 
negatively positioned players and thus is one minus the probability of winning case 
three. These probabilities then feed into the active player’s probability 
determination variable Prob a->b1 in the case of a challenging b 101 . The 
appropriate case’s probability of winning is then associated with the active player: 
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7.2.6.1.3 Utility calculations 
The precise resolution of a challenge depends on the expected utility derived 
from both the active player and the candidate. For the challenger, the utility gained 
from winning a challenge is the probability of winning multiplied by the effect the 
candidate’s newly adopted position has over the MVL outcome. Ua win is the utility 
a receives from winning a challenge: 
  



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
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2
11 aibibibiaiibia win
PWCSPPMVL
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By comparison, should a lose the challenge then they must adopt b’s position, in 
which case utility is defined below. Ua lose is the utility a receives from losing a 
challenge: 
 
  
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2
111 aiaiaiaibiibilosea 
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There is a chance b will simply concede the issue, which depends upon b’s salience. 
Ua comply is the utility a receives in the event b concedes: 
                                                 
101 The term Prob has been used for probability instead of the more commonly cited P to remove 
confusion with position. 
 227 
 
  





 

2
11 aibibibiaiibicomply a
PWCSPPMVL
SU  
The final element of the expected utility is the utility derived from the status quo: 
the outcome before challenging. This was defined earlier but is repeated here with 
notation indicating player a.  
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Thus, the full equation describing the expected utility from the challenge can now 
be written as 
aicomply alose awin a bia a UUUUEU   
Where  bia aEU  is the expected change in utility a receives from lobbying player b 
over issue i. The equation is phrased this way as a’s decision regarding whether or 
not to challenge b depends on whether it makes a better off. If a does not challenge, 
a receives Uai . If a issues a challenge there is a chance that a might win, a chance 
a might lose, and a chance b may simply give up; if the sum of these three 
alternatives is greater than Uai , then a will consider challenging b. With respect to 
what weights the challenge alternatives, probability weights winning and losing (the 
probabilities sum to one), and the utility from complying is weighted by salience. 
Please refer to Figure 7-13 for a visualisation. 
The same equation is also run from player b’s perspective, representing a 
counter-challenge. Reversing the notations between the two parties leaves b’s 
expected utility gain equation as:  
bicomply blose bwin bbia b UUUUEU   
As the process is conducted bilaterally, the probability of b winning is 
interchangeable with the probability of a losing, and the probability of b losing is 
interchangeable with probability of a winning. Likewise, when receiving a counter-
challenge the likelihood of a conceding is determined by Sai.  
7.2.6.1.4 Output type determination 
This is the final stage in the bilateral process before offers from other players 
are considered. Four different output types exist: conflict, compromise, capitulation, 
and stalemates. Conflict occurs when both players have positive utility differences. 
If the challenger’s utility is greater than the candidate’s, the challenger wins and the 
output is coded as one. Compromise occurs if the challenger has positive utility and 
the candidate has negative utility. In this case, if the absolute value of the 
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challenger’s utility is greater than the absolute value of the candidate’s, then the 
challenger has more to gain than the candidate has to lose and therefore a 
compromise is offered, resulting in a coded output of two. Capitulation occurs when 
the challenger’s utility is positive, the candidate’s is negative, and the candidate’s 
absolute value is greater than the challenger’s absolute value. This is coded as three. 
Stalemates occur if expected utility gains are negative for both players, in which 
case there is no reason for either player to act and the output is coded as zero. The 
zero output also covers players who are inactive and therefore will not consider 
issuing challenges. Phrasing this in logical terms, the algorithm appears as: 
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As this model uses an activation process it is possible to suggest that a could 
consider issuing a challenge and upon realising that b has more positive utility, take 
no action. The model therefore assumes that players will only engage in challenges 
they are likely to win. In the event that b is in a stronger position and would win a 
challenge but is inactive, no change to either player’s positions would occur. An 
extra degree of dynamism is therefore provided by implying that a player will not 
necessarily try to capture every victory they possibly can over every issue, rather 
just those ones that matter most to the player. 
Once the type of output has been determined, the change to the candidate’s 
position is returned by the biP change bia  variable. Conflict and capitulation 
both result in the candidate adopting the challenger’s position. A compromise is 
calculated as a ratio of the candidate’s utility in respect to the challenger’s utility. 
The change to the candidate’s position is expressed as: 
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 Note that since each player is calculated individually and challenges occur 
in pairs, there is no need to include the ‘losing’ terms in these equations as a win 
for a would necessitate a loss for b and vice versa. Thus, assuming for a moment 
that a and b are both active and that b would win the challenge, a will not issue a 
challenge to b as a knows he/she will lose. However b will challenge a – and win. 
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7.2.6.1.5 Offer processing and decision making 
As with the other models, players are assumed to select one offer per 
iteration and the selection process is based upon self-interest. The process of offer 
selection in weak ally lobbying is opting first for the smallest change in position if 
all challenges derive from players with equal clout. If this is not possible, the 
candidate must accept the challenge from the most powerful player. Applying BDM 
to Vensim requires the creation of an algorithm that summarizes the offers from all 
active players and compares their respective clout values to return the candidate’s 
selected offer in a given iteration (see Figure 7-15).  
Figure 7-15 Weak ally offer processing algorithm 
 
 
 
Determining equal distribution of power among challengers  
The first stage of the process is to identify all the players who have made 
offers to the candidate, exclude the rest, and establish if the involved players have 
the same clout. Exclusion is the result of being strong allies, adversaries, or being 
inactive. The variables Average Clout→b1 and Clout comparison→b1 are used in 
this stage. 
Finding the average clout amongst players who made an offer (to b in this 
example) is a matter of summing the clout102 of all involved players and dividing 
by the number of involved players. 
                                                 
102 It makes no difference whether weighted or un-weighted clout is used in this calculation so the 
un-weighted figure appears in the model sketch to allow more expedient sensitivity testing as 
shadow variables of inputs can have sliders in the Sythesim mode, whereas weighted values cannot. 
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The Clout comparison→b1 variable then establishes whether all involved 
players have the same clout. When the number of players who have clout equal to 
the average clout is divided by the total number of involved players, an output of 
‘1’ implies they all have the same clout. Thus: 
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Evenly distributed power and best offer selection 
In the event that clout is evenly distributed among the challengers, the 
candidate is free to choose the ‘best’ offer; that which requires the smallest change. 
Firstly, each offer made is processed to give its absolute value to account for the 
fact that some challenges raise position whilst others decrease it. Using the example 
of player a’s offer to b: 
 
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The second row states: if player a makes no offer, use ‘2’ as the offer. This ensures 
that the candidate chooses between real offers as opposed to saying, “player x is not 
asking me to change, so I will accept that offer”. 
Choosing the best offer then becomes a matter of identifying the offer 
processor with the smallest value. Affixing the condition that the clout 
comparison→b1 must first equal one, best offers are coded to the player’s 
numerical equivalent. The process can be expressed as: 
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Unevenly distributed power and strongest offer selection 
Uneven clout distribution forces the player to accept the offer from the most 
powerful player. As with best offers, outputs are coded to the player’s numerical 
equivalent. This can be shown as: 
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
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

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
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Set alpha is the group of all players whose proposed change to b is not zero (i.e., 
they have made an offer) and set beta contains the clout figures of all players. If 
player a happens to find himself/herself in the union of both sets and has the highest 
clout, the strongest offer is coded as ‘1’. If it happens to be player c then the output 
is coded as ‘3’ and so on. This process is repeated over all player pairings. 
 
Adjusting position 
The final stage in the offer selection algorithm is to associate the chosen 
offer with its required change in position. The variable “→b1 weak ally effect b1” 
means ‘the effect lobbying b over issue one has on b’ and is quantified as follows: 
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meaning that if either the strongest or best offer returns a ‘1’ then take a’s proposed 
change, if a ‘3’ is returned, take c’s change and so on. These effects are then 
incorporated into the candidate’s position value at the end of the round. 
7.2.7 Post activation: Exchanges (adversaries) 
An exchange consists of a player who offers to assume a more favourable 
position for an exchange partner over an issue with low salience. In return, the other 
player changes position to one more favourable for the first player over a more 
important issue (from the first player’s perspective). Figure 7-16 depicts an example 
of this process in the case where player a happens to be on the positive side of the 
position continuum. 
 
Figure 7-16 Possible exchange over issues 1 and 2 
 
Issue one is important for player a but not c. Similarly a supports the issue 
whereas c does not. The opposite conditions apply for issue two. The exact location 
of the MVL is unimportant except that it must fall between the two players. If, for 
example, MVL1 lay to the right of Pa1 then conducting an exchange and increasing 
Pc1 would make player a worse off. 
  
           c             MVL1                           a Position  
         c                      MVL2             a Position 
Desired change 
Desired change 
0 
0 
Issue 1 
Issue 2 
Sa1 = 0.8 
Sc1 = 0.2 
Sa2 = 0.2 
Sc2 = 0.8 
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7.2.7.1 Assumptions 
Exchanges in this model are bound by the following assumptions: 
1. Gains realised from exchanges are equally shared.  
2. Players must have fundamentally different views on the issues: exchanges 
are only initiated if the players are adversaries over the active issue. 
3. Exchanges occur as gains realised from more salient issues are preferable to 
less salient issues. 
4. Changes to position and outcome are limited to the position of the other 
player: if an exchange pushes the MVL to the position of a player then 
maximum utility has been achieved and any more will cause utility to 
decrease. Additionally a player, through the process of exchange, cannot 
cause adversaries to take a position more radical than their own. 
5. It is impossible for the active player’s issue to also be the active player’s 
exchange issue103. 
6. The issue a player is willing to trade upon is their least salient issue. 
7.2.7.2 The exchange algorithm 
The process has been programmed into Vensim to generate a distinct 
outcome each round. The stages are visually depicted in Figure 7-17. 
Figure 7-17 Adversary exchange algorithm 
 
 
                                                 
103 This is more of an axiom than an assumption but must be coded into Vensim nevertheless. 
Determine active player’s 
exchange issue and inputs 
Calculate maximum possible 
shift in outcome 
 
Ensure exchange conditions 
are met 
 
Determine change to position 
of both involved players 
 
 
Determine round outcome in 
conjunction with other 
exchanges 
 
Adjust for effects and 
associate changes with player 
inputs 
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7.2.7.2.1 Determining exchange issue and inputs 
Noted as Exchange n (read: exchange issue of player ‘n’), the model 
automatically identifies a player’s least salient and codes it by number: 
 
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10
),...,,min(
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Issues that have a salience value of zero are exogenous to the negotiation and 
therefore cannot be traded upon.104 
Automatically identifying the issue is a preferable solution to manual 
determination as lobbying from allies can alter salience hence the exchange issue 
can change. It also permits advanced sensitivity testing as pulses can be applied to 
salience inputs, causing the exchange issue to change. 
What influence the player has over their exchange issue then needs to be 
established. Using player a’s position as an example these are phrased as exchange 
issue inputs: Pax, Sax, WCax, and MVLax, the notation ax meaning “a’s exchange 
issue”: 
 
 
  aiaxa
aaxa
aaxa
PPiExchange
PPExchange
PPExchange


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...
2
1
2
1
 
The same procedure is applied to salience and weighted clout and the outcome of 
the exchange issue. 
The candidate’s inputs over the appellant’s exchange issue also need to be 
identified. Only position and salience are necessary as it is the appellant that will 
be shifting over the exchange issue, not the candidate. Using player c as an example 
candidate where Pc ax reads “The position of c over a’s exchange issue”:  
 
 
  ciax ca
cax ca
cax ca
PPiExchange
PPExchange
PPExchange


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...
2
1
2
1
 
                                                 
104Issues with salience of zero are actually coded as ‘2’ for exchange issue determination. As the 
issue with least salience is the exchange issue, a zero would cause an exogenous issue to be 
exchanged. 
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The same pattern is then applied to salience. Identification of all other 
players’ individual exchange issues, their inputs and the other players’ inputs over 
the exchange issue is done on a pair-by-pair basis. This process only need be 
performed once per round irrespective of how many issues or players are included 
in the model.  
7.2.7.2.2 Calculating the maximum possible shift in outcomes  
Referring to assumption four, there are four individual thresholds that limit 
how much influence over the two issues an exchange can have. Figure 7-18 depicts 
player a offering a decrease in position over issue two (a’s exchange issue) in 
exchange for player c increasing position over issue one (a’s active issue).  
 
Figure 7-18 Maximum changes in position or outcome for exchange 
 
 
In this example, the four maxima are: 
1. MVL1 cannot shift further to the right than Pa1, 
2. Pc1 cannot shift further to the right than Pa1, 
3. MVL2 cannot shift further to the left than Pc2, and 
4. Pa2 cannot shift further to the left than Pc2. 
 
As a result, the greatest influence this exchange can produce is the minimum 
of the four conditions, which yields: 
 axax cacccaaxaxaxax c MVLPMVLPWCSPPWCSPPca MVL  ,,)(,)(min1max 111111  
At this stage in the calculation, it is the magnitude of change that is critical, not its 
sign. Once the magnitude of the change for the two issues has been established, a 
further test of exchange conditions is performed and assuming this test is passed, 
the change in position required from each player can be determined.  
           c             MVL1                           a 
Position  
         c                      MVL2             a 
Position 
0 
0 
Issue 1 
Issue 2 
Sa1 = 0.8 
Sb1 = 0.2 
Sa2 = 0.2 
Sb2 = 0.8 
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7.2.7.2.3 Ensuring exchange conditions are met 
This part of the algorithm incorporates assumptions two, three, five, and six. 
Continuing the example of player a offering an exchange to c over issue one in 
return for a reciprocal shift over issue two, the equation deployed in Vensim can be 
rewritten as: 
             
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In words, if a’s strategy is number three, and c’s salience over a’s exchange issue 
is more than issue one, and a’s exchange issue is not issue one, and the weighted 
clout of the players is more than zero105, and the outcome of the exchange issue is 
between the two players then the exchange conditions are met and a ‘1’ is returned. 
If any of these conditions are not met, a zero is returned106.  
The condition Sc1<Sc ax is particularly important as the utility from expected 
outcomes are not weighted by salience. For purposes of internal consistency, utility 
from exchanges uses the same base equation but inserting this condition effectively 
reintroduces the effects of salience: a candidate will be willing to exchange on an 
issue only if the proposed exchange issue is more important to the candidate than 
the active issue. 
7.2.7.2.4 Determining mutual changes in position 
Assuming the exchange conditions are met the next phase is to determine 
how much each player needs to change their position to produce the predefined shift 
in MVL. The active player shifts on the exchange issue and the candidate shifts on 
the active issue. Also included in these equations is a requirement that the given 
round’s negotiation has verified that this particular exchange is the chosen offer and 
is explained shortly. In the example of players a and c the equations for a are:  
                                                 
105 This condition is imposed to prevent floating point errors. There is no point lobbying a player 
with no clout. 
106 The salience of the active player over the active issue by definition is more than the salience of 
the exchange issue – circumventing the need to include this as a distinct condition. 
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meaning if the conditions are met and the round outcome determination returns a 
‘1’ then the ΔPax is positive if the candidate’s position is greater than the appellant’s 
position, and negative in the other case. If the exchange conditions are not met or 
the round outcome determination returns a ‘0’ there is no change. The same 
equations apply to the appellant, adjusting for notation: 
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7.2.7.2.5 Round outcome determination 
Each round produces one exchange throughout the entire model. Whilst this 
may appear to be an oversimplification in an effort to converse computational 
resources107, very little accuracy is lost. As the model assigns the exchange of 
greatest magnitude as the round’s outcome it effectively creates a rank-order 
‘conveyor belt’ of exchanges. Offers from other players do not necessarily 
evaporate at the end of a round but are recycled into the next until all have been 
processed. 
The process of determining which issue is the focus of attention in a given 
round is a matter of finding the maximum change produced in each issue from 
player action, finding the issue number with the highest maximum, and then 
inserting the issue number as a criterion into each exchange processor. 
                                                 
107 A single issue requires the computer to run approximately 120,000 equations with a population 
of eight players, with an additional 20,000 equations for supra-issue calculations such as exchange 
issue determination. 
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For each issue, each player could potentially offer exchanges to any other 
player. The first stage in finding a global maximum is to determine the maximum 
change over each issue. Citing player a over issue one as an example: 

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The changes are multiplied by the ExCond variable to ensure that only valid offers 
are included in the calculation. This process is repeated for every player over every 
issue. Then finding the maximum shift amongst the players for issue one: 
 111 noffer  Exboffer  Exaoffer  Ex issue offer Max ,...,,max1  
Now all issues can be directly compared with one another to find the greatest global 
change. The output of ‘Round max offer issue number’ is coded by issue number: 
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i issue offer Maxi issue offer Max ,..., issue offer Max , issue offer Max
number  issueoffer  max Round
 issue offer Maxi issue offer Max ,..., issue offer Max , issue offer Max
number  issueoffer  max Round
 issue offer Maxi issue offer Max ,..., issue offer Max , issue offer Max






21max
2
221max
1
121max
 
Returning to the issue level, the Exchange Offer Processor 1 returns the 
number of the player with the biggest offer over issue one. It requires firstly that 
Round max offer issue number=1, meaning that the greatest change came from this 
issue. If the Round max offer issue number is not ‘1’ then the Exchange offer 
processor 1 is programmed to return a ‘0’, meaning no exchanges occur over this 
issue this round. 
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The result of this equation is then input into each player pairing to establish which 
offer is accepted. Continuing the example of a offering an exchange to c: 
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meaning that if the exchange offer processor returns a ‘1’ (indicating a had the 
best offer, it would have to be 2 if b were the active player, 4 in the case of d and 
so on) and the exchange conditions multiplied by the offer a made is the 
maximum of a’s offers, and the exchange conditions return a ‘1’ then c accepts 
a’s offer. Any other result returns a zero. In summary, it is a matter of finding the 
issue with the biggest change in the whole model and then which player made that 
offer. 
7.2.7.2.6 Adjusting for effects 
By limiting each round to a single exchange and holding all other values at 
zero, each player’s total change is simply the sum of all their interactions. Reading 
Ex effect Pax as ‘the exchange effect on the position of player a’s exchange issue’ 
(what the active player has to give away from making exchanges), and Ex effect 
Pa1 (what the candidate player is persuaded to give away from receiving 
exchanges) the change to player a’s issues are: 






n
ir
aa
n
ir
axax
ar PP effect Ex
and
ra PP effect Ex
1
1
11
 
This is done for each player, adjusting for player notation as needed. 
7.2.7.2.7 Associating exchange effects with inputs 
The exchange process is now complete and the round’s effects need only be 
integrated into the players’ inputs. The active issue simply requires addition but the 
exchange issue needs to be associated with the correct issue. Since position can also 
be influenced by weak ally lobbying, the full equation for player n’s position over 
issue i at time t+1 is: 
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As there are a number of conditions attached, each set of brackets is explained 
below. 
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The first set of brackets refers to the position of the player over the issue at 
the start of the round.  
The second bracket adds the change to position from the player actively 
making exchanges with other players if this issue is the player’s exchange issue.  
The third set of brackets adds the changes from other players having offered 
exchanges to the current player, but only if the exchange effect over Pnx is not the 
same as the exchange effect over Pni. As an illustration, imagine players a and c are 
both active and offer an exchange to one another: this would imply there is an 
exchange conducted on the part of a and another exchange on the part of c. Player 
a would count what they had to give away from their active offer, and what they 
were asked to give away from their received offer. Thus, the two effects must be 
equal and if so, there is no need to count the change in the Pni variable as it would 
have already been counted by Pnx. 
The fourth set of brackets adds the effects of weak ally lobbying. As position 
is influenced by both exchanges and weak ally lobbying there is potential for both 
to occur at the same time. Picture once again if a had made an exchange offer to c 
but also had been challenged by its weak ally, b. The two possible alternatives are 
that these effects either reinforce or cancel each other. In order to avoid these 
interference patterns, weak ally lobbying only affects the current player’s position 
if that player is not part of an exchange bargain in that round. As only one exchange 
is processed per round across all players, the delaying effects of this simplification 
are relatively small. 
7.3 LOS Summary 
The lower order simulation described here has been developed by 
synthesising facets of existing models and original material to produce a flexible 
and automated process by which the outcome of negotiations over a range of issues 
can be expressed in numerical and graphical terms.  
Individual player inputs including the position of the player, their salience, 
and their clout are combined at the start of the run to establish an initial outcome. 
From this point, players pass through an activation calculation that determines 
which players are likely to challenge the outcome and which will remain inactive. 
By default, those players who are more dissatisfied with the outcome and have the 
ability to influence it are the ones who act, although the facility to override this 
assumption exists and offers an extra avenue of sensitivity and scenario testing. 
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Following the activation process, the relationships each player shares with 
all others are established. This is because the type of action an active player takes 
is assumed to depend upon the relationship itself: strong allies are already in 
agreement and thus only need to be persuaded to mobilise more (or less) resources. 
Weak allies must first be convinced to take a more favourable position to the 
lobbyer, and adversaries must be offered something in exchange for a softening of 
their stance.  
Each active player will then proceed to lobby, challenge, and exchange with 
other players in the model according to the type of relationship. Fundamentally, all 
of these strategies are grounded in the theory of utility: players respond to offers 
only if it is in their interests to do so. In each case, a number of conditions must be 
fulfilled for the active player to incite a change in the inputs of other players.  
Offers are processed and the results cause shifts in the position and salience 
values of the relevant players, which in turn cause the outcome of an issue to 
fluctuate. This process is repeated until the outcome of all issues stabilises and no 
further actions can be taken. This point is said to be the equilibrium of the LOS.  
The LOS represents a significant advance in multi-player multi-issue 
modelling as it allows for three possible actions whereas other models limit 
themselves to a single strategy, or perhaps two. In terms of automation, it is greatly 
superior to the Allas model and incrementally more so to the MACTOR and 
MASAM models (as exchange issues must be manually entered). It offers greater 
dynamics: special cases of disengagement from issues is a feature that has not been 
explored in the surveyed literature. Each player also need not be involved in every 
issue, which permits a greater range of issues to be modelled. Coding the model in 
Vensim allows flexibility as alternative scenarios and assumptions can be modelled 
‘on the fly’ and the activation override provides an opportunity to examine the 
effects of the entire population of players being activated. 
7.4 Higher Order Simulation 
 This is the final stage and computes the nominal probability of effective 
reform. It also allows us to see at a glance the individual issues and how changes in 
outputs might affect the overall outcome. An example of an HOS with three issued 
populated by eight players is pictured in Figure 7-19. 
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Figure 7-19 HOS for three issues with eight players 
 
 Each of the variables listed along the bottom of the diagram represents an 
issue. Their values at any given time are determined by each issue’s individual MVL 
output and are expressed as the likelihood of reform. The transformation is as 
follows:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝑖 =
𝑀𝑉𝐿𝑖
2
+ 0.5 
This centres the value around 0.5: if the MVL returns a zero, reform success or 
failure are both equally likely. In terms of how a probability can be derived from an 
MVL value, consider a simple negotiation with two players: equally powerful, 
equally motivated, and equally opposed in opinions. Under such circumstances, one 
might argue that the two are equally matched and therefore the chance of the issue 
passing is 50/50. Should one of the two have more clout, the probability of passing 
increases or decreases accordingly. 
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Criticality refers to how important each issue is overall. A higher criticality 
figure implies that the issue is perceived as more important within the model. An 
advantage is that as negotiations progress and player salience fluctuates, criticality 
can change; some issues may gain importance and some may fall until an 
equilibrium is established. Criticality is determined by taking the average of all 
salience values from the set of players (where n refers to the number of players) 
over the particular issue. 
n
S
yCriticalit
n
a
ai
i

 1  
The next step is to determine a scalar metric so that each issue makes up a 
certain proportion of the total package with all elements summing to one, the 
Vensim diagram shows this as a two-stage process. The criticality scalar is the sum 
of all criticality values and acts as the denominator for individual weighted figures. 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟 =  ∑ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Weighted criticality (WCr) is then calculated by taking the individual issue’s 
criticality value and dividing that by the criticality scalar. This allows more 
important issues to be easily identified. 
𝑊𝐶 ir =
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟
 
The final stage in the calculation is to determine the nominal probability of 
effective overall reform. The mechanism is an application of weighted probability 
theory, in which pillar outputs are multiplied by their weighted criticality such that: 
𝑃𝐸𝑅 = ∑ 𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where PER is the probability of effective reform, WCri is the weighted criticality 
of issue i and Probability of reformi is the transformed MVL value from issue i. 
Changes that occur at lower levels are passed through to the HOS, once the 
LOS reaches equilibrium, the HOS also stabilises.  
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7.5 Chapter Conclusion 
 The model presented in this chapter advances the complexity of negotiations 
that can be simulated. It is comprised of two distinct modules; the LOS models 
behaviour on individual issues and the HOS combines them, providing an overview 
of outputs. 
Following the common method of describing players using three metrics the 
model produces an initial outcome for each issue in the negotiation landscape. 
Players consider this outcome and if sufficiently motivated they begin the process 
of negotiating with other players in an effort to secure a more favourable outcome. 
Three strategies are available and selection is governed by the relationship between 
pairs of players; strong allies seek to engender greater commitment, weak allies 
propose challenges to take up the position of the initiator, and exchanges of less 
important issues are offered to adversaries. In all cases, offers are processed, filtered, 
and integrated into the input metrics, which causes changes in an issue’s MVL value. 
The process continues until all issues stabilise and the final MVL value is converted 
into a probability of the issue’s embedded proposal passing.  
As discussed earlier, the model also offers a unique contribution though the 
activation override. This tool allows the researcher to alter the assumptions about 
issue activation and provides avenues for scenario testing that do not appear to be 
available in other publications.  
Having described the mechanics, the analysis now turns to the results and 
discussion of the control run and attendant sensitivity testing. The outcomes of the 
simulation offer an indication as to how effective postal reform is expected to be, 
which areas are likely to change, and which are likely to remain in place. 
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8 Simulation Results and Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents the results of the simulation where the current state of 
reforms, as identified in Chapter Six, forms its initial conditions. Populated with 
issues and player groups, the model is run and changes to JP and its regulatory 
environment are returned.  
 The chapter is structured as follows: 
 Section 8.2 describes the group today, depicting ownership structure, key 
regulations, and major issues surrounding privatisation. The links between issues 
and their influence are also discussed. Major issues are distilled into what have been 
called ‘MVL-issues’, which are negotiated within the simulation. Isolating these 
components provides a starting point; the model’s synthesized negotiations between 
players then produce changes, to which the initial setting can be compared. 
 Section 8.3 describes the player groups that populate the model and presents 
an image of the current political landscape in respect to the MVL-issues. Between 
sections 8.2 and 8.3, a complete image of the initial settings is formed, comprising 
the object of debate (JP), the players involved, and issues over which negotiations 
are conducted.  
 In addition to changes to the current state, it is also important to compare 
the simulated outputs to the ‘ideal’ reform case championed by Koizumi. Section 
8.4 therefore presents an image of postal reform detailing the ‘ideal’ ownership 
structure and regulatory environment. Establishing this arrangement as a so-called 
‘optimum’ allows not only a measurement of the fluctuations from the current status 
quo, but also gauges how close Japanese postal reform comes to Koizumi’s dream. 
 In terms of delivering effective reform, the issues that are most important 
from a political perspective may not necessarily be as important from an economic 
perspective and vice versa. Section 8.5 therefore presents the MVL-issues ranked 
by importance for effective reform from an economic viewpoint, which is 
independent of salience inputs. Based upon these rankings, section 8.6 introduces a 
metric for measuring overall effectiveness. This metric allows the comparison of 
simulated outputs against the ‘ideal’ case and provides a control benchmark for 
sensitivity runs.  
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 The results of the control run are presented in section 8.7, beginning with a 
description of the raw outputs, final location of MVL-issues and comparative image 
of the political landscape. As the variables are only displayed at initial and final 
stages, Appendix E shows how changes can be traced through the model using two 
examples of player interactions. As a result of the control run, changes in MVL-
issues are observed and the effects upon ownership and issue-linkage structures are 
shown in addition to a comparison with Koizumi’s ‘ideal’ scenario. Finally, the 
section provides a summary and intuitive discussion of the results of the control run 
in terms of effectiveness and reform consistency. 
 Following the control run, the model’s sensitivities are examined in section 
8.8. Tests are performed that measure the influence individual players have over 
the issues by altering their initial inputs. Doing so identifies the more influential 
players and more sensitive issues. It also establishes whether a player’s clout is 
positively related to influence or if smaller players can have a large impact. The 
results are summarised by providing a rank order of player influence and identifying 
which issues cause the greatest number of ripples elsewhere in the simulation.  
 Section 8.9 is an application of the sensitivity testing. It examines the effects 
of external shocks to player inputs and measures the changes in reform effectiveness. 
This section is useful as it shows how the outcomes may change from external 
pressure placed upon players and identifies the ten greatest ‘shocks’ in terms of 
changes to efficacy for both the pro- and anti-reform minded. The effects of 
combining these shocks are also explored to establish if combinations result in 
cascade effects. 
 Section 8.10 presents the results of changing the model’s internal mechanics 
through alternative permutations of overriding default activation behaviour. Three 
alternative tests are performed on the control run to examine the effects of forcing 
all players to become active over individual and all issues. 
 Finally, the chapter draws conclusions and offers possible strategies 
exogenous to the three alternatives within the model. 
8.2 Initial Conditions: The State of Reforms Today 
 Figure 8-1 presents the major ownership, governance, and regulatory links 
between the government and JP Group, as well as the major issues surrounding 
privatisation. Government sections are depicted in green, JP in orange, Fiscal 
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Investment and Loan Programme in grey, and issues108 in blue. Ownership links are 
denoted in black, official regulatory authority or supervisory links in red and more 
informal influence links in blue. Details including critical regulations appear 
alongside the issue to which they correspond. Governmental and bureaucratic 
influence and authority over issues is elaborated upon in Figure 8-2. 
 Figure 8-1 shows that the Ministry of Finance owns all shares in JPH, who 
in turn hold all shares in individual units. Regulatory authority is held by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications but overlaps with the FSA special 
office insofar that JP Group offers financial products and JPH is in part a financial 
holding company. 
Figure 8-2 presents a more detailed image of formal linkages and issues. 
Influential links between issues are also shown. Descriptions of the links to issues 
are provided in broad-stroke terms.  
The influence links pictured in Figure 8-2 amount to problems that can be 
addressed via postal reform. In general terms, the greater the number of links that 
can be eliminated, the more effective reform will be, although overall effectiveness 
also depends upon which links are broken and in what combinations. The postal 
reform package itself contains a number of elements (MVL-issues) over which 
players109 have the ability to negotiate.  
                                                 
108 These issues are not the MVL-issues, but are affected by them. 
109 Player groups were identified using the general inductive approach, sourcing information from 
literature and media reports, and were vetted by expert interview. See Chapter Four for details.  
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Figure 8-1 Ownership, influence links, and issues relating to JP privatisation 
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Figure 8-2 Extended influence links 
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8.2.1 MVL-issue definition 
 Seven MVL-issues are processed. Their numerical order corresponds to the 
order in which they were identified.  
Table 8-1 MVL-issue definition 
MVL# Title Definition 
1 Separation of 
business units 
Severing links between JPH, JPC, JPI, and 
JPB; removing the companies from JPH 
umbrella ownership and creating distinct 
corporate entities. 
2 Creating a level 
playing field 
Removing the special privileges afforded to 
JPC by removing the correspondence 
distinction, allowing JP units to enter into 
new businesses and regulating them 
consistently with their private-sector 
counterparts. 
3 Not providing 
universal financial 
services 
Removing the requirement for JPI and JPB to 
supply their services through the entire postal 
network. Universal service for postal services 
was never challenged and does not form part 
of this issue. 
4 Open sale of shares Offering shares under ‘open’ conditions, that 
is, listing shares from the banking and 
insurance units individually as opposed to 
listing just the holding company. It also 
includes allowing shares to be purchased by 
foreign investors. 
5 Autonomy – 
operations and 
personnel 
Allowing JP to conduct operations and 
personnel decisions independently without 
government intervention. 
6 Autonomy – 
network asset 
management 
Allowing JP to manage its network assets 
independently without government 
intervention. 
7 Not requiring a 
minimum network 
Removing the requirement to operate at least 
one post office in every village. 
 251 
 The phrasing of these MVL-issues is such that positive positions reflect 
support for the proposal and negative positions indicate the player is opposed. 
Figure 8-3 displays the information provided by Figure 8-2 with MVL-issue 
numbers superimposed over the links they address. Some links can be addressed 
via a single MVL-issue, others involve several. The outcomes of the simulation 
indicate how many links are likely to be broken. Positive MVL values indicate the 
link is more likely to be broken, and vice-versa. 
Elaborating upon Figure 8-3, Table 8.11 offers a brief description of each 
connection and its role in the reform package. Owing to its length, it can be found 
in Appendix D on page 367. 
Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3, and Figure 8-4 depict JP Group as having a number 
of major issues which reform should ideally address. These issues interconnect with 
each other on many levels, ranging from labour management policies to entry 
barriers. These issues have been distilled into seven MVL-issues to be included in 
the LOS. This section has therefore identified the confines of what is to be 
negotiated.  
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Figure 8-3 Extended influence links with MVL-issue superimposition 
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Table 8-2 ‘Player group’ names and description 
Player 
group # 
Group name Brief description 
1 LDP coalition reform 
elements 
This covers the sections of the LDP and New Komeito 
that support privatisation, including Mr Koizumi, Mr 
Takenaka and the committees they worked with. Also 
included is “Your Party” and other supporting 
members such as Tetsuzo Fuyushiba.  
2 DPJ coalition reform 
elements 
Sections of the DPJ that support the privatisation in 
principle even though they may not agree on the 
details. This includes individuals such as Kazuhiro 
Haraguchi and Seiji Maehara. 
3 Business community Organisations such as keidanren, the Regional 
Bankers’ Association, the Bankers’ Association of 
Japan and other institutions. Note that this does not 
include special corporations connected to the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme. 
4 Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications  
Refers to the ministry’s overall stance towards each 
MVL-issue. 
5 Ministry of Finance  Refers to the ministry’s overall stance towards each 
MVL-issue. 
6 LDP coalition 
opposition elements 
The sections of the LDP who oppose privatisation. 
Examples include Taro Aso, Seiko Noda, Kohei 
Tamura, Kenji Furuya etc. 
7 The ‘Kamei’ group 
 
This includes groups who are fiercely opposed to 
privatisation – as was Shizuka Kamei. It includes the 
Association of Commissioned Postmasters (Zentoku), 
Association of Retired Postmasters (Taiju), the postal 
workers’ union, and special corporations attached to 
the post office or through Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme. The Japanese Communist Party and The 
Social Democratic Party are included here too. 
8 DPJ coalition 
opposition elements 
The elements of the DPJ and Japan Restoration Party 
that oppose privatisation but not as strongly as the 
‘Kamei’ group. 
  
 254
8.3 Initial Political Landscape 
 The political landscape is populated by eight player groups. A ‘player group’ 
represents a collection of individuals who share the same position and salience 
values for each of the MVL-issues. The clout value represents the clout of the player 
group as a whole. Table 8-2 provides details of who is included in each group. 
 Initial values for position, salience and clout were determined by collating 
and averaging the inputs from four expert survey responses. Models of this type 
typically use between one and five respondents. Clout measurements were 
transformed into weighted clout figures using the clout scalar presented in Chapter 
Seven. 
 Figure 8-4 presents the political landscape for each issue prior to 
commencement of simulated negotiations. Position is measured on the x-axis with 
more extreme positions at both ends. Salience is measured on the y-axis and 
weighted clout is depicted by bubble size.  
 255 
Figure 8-4 Initial political landscape 
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 The LDP reform elements have the highest weighted clout and the highest 
position and salience values for all supporting players except for the business 
community regarding the playing field (MVL2); the business community’s position 
is understandable as MVL2 probably has the single greatest effect on their interests.  
 A noteworthy point is that many of the opposing players feel less strongly 
about JP management than other issues, suggesting they may be willing to grant the 
group more internal independence but are much more hesitant about changes to the 
regulatory environment. Amongst the detractors, the ‘Kamei’ group appears 
universally as the most vocal and polarised.  
 The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications for the most part finds 
itself on the negative side of the position continuum but in regards to network asset 
management is moderately supportive of more independence. This might suggest 
that whilst the ministry wishes to see JP Group become more productive, they are 
unwilling to relinquish their control over the Group or alter the regulatory 
environment. 
 Another interesting observation is that it appears that separation (MVL1) 
and playing field (MVL2) are the most polarised issues. 
 Having now identified the eight player groups and seven MVL-issues, the 
simulation can commence. Changes in the political landscape as a result of 
interactions can be plotted and observations made as to how outcomes may evolve.  
8.4 Koizumi’s ‘Ideal’  
 Defining an ‘ideal’ case permits comparison between the ‘ideal’ and 
observed results. Comparative analysis to an ‘optimal’ in addition to the current 
setting is useful as it shows how far postal reform has come, and how far it has yet 
to go. 
 Key changes in the package Koizumi envisioned appear below in Table 8-3. 
The MVL-issues that facilitate these changes are displayed in the right hand column. 
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Table 8-3 Elements required for Koizumi’s ideal reform package 
Element MVL(s) 
Separate service, banking and insurance business units. 1 
Financial units on equal footing as private firms:  
 regulated by FSA only – not special office,  
 ability to separate banking unit into regional units after 
privatisation. 
2 
2 
1, 4 
Sale of shares to public over 10 years. Financial units to be completely 
sold. 
1, 4 
Universal service obligations on delivery and prices remain. N/A 
Postal network should be maintained.  6, 7 
No universal financial services.  3 
Separate accounting systems between units.  1 
Expansion of services to even playing field for financial units 
(mortgages, loans, medical insurance, international delivery etc.).  
2 
Establishment of holding company to pursue privatisation after 
Koizumi’s term expired. State would maintain 33% share.  
1, 4 
Autonomous personnel management – decreases mostly from 
retirements. 
5 
Sale of non-core network assets: inns in particular.  6 
Removal of government guarantees, taxed as private company.  2 
Complete liberalisation of special and general correspondence. 2 
 
Ideally, entry barriers would be removed and cross-subsidisation would be 
significantly reduced if not eliminated. Koizumi also wanted to dispose of the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme and amakudari. Postal reform by itself would not 
eradicate them but would be a step towards such an aim. If reform produced 
financial units that operated identically to private firms, one would assume funds to 
be divested from Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme bonds in favour of higher-
yielding investments. Losing its single largest buyer of bonds, a privatised postal 
service would leave the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme with little 
alternative but to reform. An illustration of the ideal case appears as Figure 8-5 with 
MVL-issues placed to reflect which part they affect. 
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Figure 8-5 Koizumi’s ideal realisation of postal reform 
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 The ‘ideal’ case envisioned by Koizumi requires that every other player-
group’s position and salience values match the Koizumi group at the end of 
negotiations and that no concessions are made by the Koizumi group. Such an 
outcome is clearly fanciful given Japan’s current political climate.  
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the concept of MVL-issues are 
grounded in the BDM model which in turn is based on Black’s (1958, as cited in 
Wu & Bueno de Mesquita, 1994) median voter theorem. MVL-issues are phrased 
as proposals and assuming that the median voter exists on the positive side of the 
position continuum, there is more than an even chance the proposal will succeed. 
Assuming that matching other players’ position and salience values to Koizumi’s 
is practically implausible, it raises the question of how much change to initial values 
is needed to push all MVLs into positive equilibria. The resultant outcome, while 
not optimal, would be a reasonably close approximation. This will also illustrate 
how much adjustment in the political landscape is necessary; if it requires relatively 
small changes, passing all MVL-issues is potentially feasible.  
Table 8-4 presents three alternatives with positive MVL values. This was 
done by altering the control values of selected players over selected issues. 
Alternative 1 changes position only, alternative 2 salience, and alterative 3 clout. 
The table lists the changes made by displaying the initial control value and the new 
value required to produce positive MVLs. The notation Pa3 for example meaning 
the “Position of player a over MVL-issue 3”.  
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Table 8-4 Alternative initial values to produce positive MVLs 
Alternative 1: Position Alternative 2: Salience Alternative 3: Clout 
Input Control 
New 
value Input Control 
New 
value Input Control 
New 
value 
Pa3 0.55 0.7 Sb7 0.525 0 Cb7 0.225 0 
Pd1 -0.6 0.01 Sd1 0.7 0 Cd1 0.5 0 
Pd2 -0.3 -0.05 Sd2 0.65 0 Cd2 0.45 0.14 
Pd3 -0.425 0.5 Sd3 0.625 0 Cd7 0.525 0 
Pd4 -0.35 0.35 Sd4 0.7 0 Cf3 0.475 0 
Pd7 -0.7 0.2 Sd7 0.775 0 Cf4 0.5 0 
Pe3 -0.05 0.2 Se7 0.4 0 Cf7 0.575 0 
Pf2 -0.7 0.05 Sf1 0.8 0 Cg3 0.4 0 
Pf3 -0.75 0.6 Sf2 0.825 0 Cg4 0.4 0 
Pf4 -0.6 -0.15 Sf3 0.75 0 Cg7 0.425 0 
Pf7 -0.85 0.25 Sf4 0.9 0.59 Ch7 0.3 0 
Pg3 -1 -0.7 Sf7 0.825 0     
Pg4 -0.9 -0.3 Sg1 0.875 0     
Pg7 -1 -0.25 Sg2 0.85 0     
Ph7 -0.85 -0.6 Sg3 0.875 0     
     Sg4 0.9 0     
     Sg7 0.7 0     
     Sh1 0.7 0     
     Sh2 0.7 0     
     Sh3 0.7 0     
     Sh4 0.7 0     
      Sh7 0.8 0       
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 Within these variants, changes to initial position do not appear to be as stark 
as changes to salience and clout but recall that changes to initial values are 
tantamount to a unilateral reversal of fundamental viewpoints. The simulation 
allows for fluctuations in sign but only resulting from exchanges.  
Initial salience values must be reduced to zero in many cases as any non-
zero value includes the player within the MVL-issue, whereupon they can be 
lobbied by other active players. Changes to clout reduce the power of the player 
group over a particular issue to a point where, irrespective of their political leaning, 
they are unable to affect the outcome. 
Whilst the number of permutations for position, salience and clout is vast, 
the three alternatives presented here represent a sea-change in the political 
landscape. They require either fundamental shifts in positions from strong 
adversaries, disassociating them from issues, or reducing their power considerably; 
none of which seem particularly likely. Realising Koizumi’s vision therefore 
appears to be out of reach given the current setting. Securing gains on selected 
MVLs will likely require a number of concessions elsewhere.  
This does not imply that other applications of the model cannot produce 
largely positive outputs, but given the array of opposition forces and the power they 
collectively wield, in this case it is most unlikely. Figure 8-6, Figure 8-7, and Figure 
8-8, present a visualisation of the three options described in Table 8-4. The semi-
transparent bubbles represent initial control values; solid bubbles depict the new 
values. 
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Figure 8-6 Changing initial positions yielding positive MVLs 1-7 
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Figure 8-7 Changing initial salience yielding positive MVLs 1-7 
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Figure 8-8 Changing clout yielding positive MVLs 1-7 
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 Koizumi’s ideal shows a privatised entity operating in a competitive market 
with predominantly even-handed treatment (excepting universal service). It 
represents a situation with minimal government interference with respect to 
operations and gives all units the freedom to engage in business practices as they 
see fit. The ideal also sees the connections to Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme broken under the assumption that doing so will reduce opportunistic 
lending and revitalise capital markets. Clearly, this is a lofty vision and probably 
beyond the ability of the current administration to realise; the three alternatives 
presented above show that nothing short of a sea change can induce such a state. 
Nevertheless it provides an optimal target. Including this ‘ideal’ state in the analysis 
shows what changes may occur and how close to the ‘optimal’ outcome postal 
reform may approach.  
8.5 Most Important MVL-Issues for Effective Reform  
 The issues depicted in the political landscape diagrams do not share equal 
importance in terms of delivering an effective reform package. In consultation with 
my chief supervisor, a rank order was established. 
1st equal issue: Business unit separation (MVL1)  
Without business separation, cross-subsidisation would likely continue 
through use of internal transfers. Government and the bureaucracy would also have 
formal ownership authority extending through all units, allowing interference with 
asset, personnel, and operations management. Amakudari landings are also more 
likely if units are not separated. No separation implies a large postal presence, 
requiring extended support from financial units and reduces the likelihood that 
favouritism towards the post office will be undone. Failure of MVL1 also suggests 
that the JP financial units are less likely to downsize, which could limit the planned 
revitalisation of capital markets. 
1st equal issue: Creating a level playing field (MVL2) 
A tilted playing field includes the preservation of the distinction between 
special and general correspondence. This situation effectively prevents entry into 
general correspondence by private firms and reduces competitive pressure on JPC. 
Consequently, the condition of the playing field affects the incentive structure of 
JPC in terms of productivity and efficiency. In terms of the financial units, 
favouritism is likely to result in continued diversion of household savings away 
from private financial institutions. There is a strong possibility that these funds will 
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continue to be invested in low-yielding JGBs and Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme bonds which is a primary factor driving postal reform. Amakudari 
landings will likely be more prevalent with an uneven playing field as JP Group 
continues to make use of special corporations that provide logistical and auxiliary 
services to the group. 
2nd equal issue: Autonomous operations and personnel management 
(MVL5) 
Continued interference with postal operations will preserve inefficiencies. 
The temporary worker conversion scheme is one such example of this. 
Opportunities for growth are likely to be stifled; Kamei’s reluctance to allow JPB 
to invest in foreign capital markets is a good example of past interference. Failure 
to reform this issue will contribute to preserving the strength of the postal lobby as 
greater independence would allow outsourcing services in selected rural 
communities (as was done in conjunction with Lawson convenience stores) and 
thus reduce the number of commissioned postmasters needed. 
2nd equal issue: Autonomous network asset management (MVL 6) 
Interference with network asset management increases the need for cross-
subsidisation as growth opportunities are lost and deficit-producing assets are 
forced to be maintained. Note that Hatoyama delayed post office renovation plans 
at considerable cost and prevented the bundled sale of JPI’s inns. By extension, the 
greater need for cross-subsidisation also places pressure to keep entry barriers high. 
As with operations management, greater reform here could weaken the postal lobby 
if JP is permitted to restructure its network presence.  
3rd equal issue: Not providing universal financial services (MVL3)  
Universal financial services impose high costs upon JPB and JPI. JPC is the 
direct recipient of these agency fees and thus this issue directly influences the level 
of cross subsidisation observed. This regulation also artificially increases JPB and 
JPI market presence and therefore increases pressure on the private sector. 
3rd equal issue: Not requiring a minimum network (MVL7) 
Maintaining a minimum network presence preserves, to a degree, the 
strength of the postal lobby. As every population centre is guaranteed to have a post 
office it follows that many of these will likely be staffed by commissioned 
postmasters. This issue also increases costs on JPC who must provide facilities and 
upon JPB and JPI who are obligated to offer products universally. 
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4th issue:  Open sale of shares (MVL4) 
Listing only JPH and restricting foreign investment limits opportunities to 
incorporate greater outsider governance practices and structures. It also removes a 
layer of separation between the government and the financial units: if JPB and JPI 
were to be individually listed, their executive staff would likely be appointed by the 
new shareholders, not JPH shareholders110. A continued umbrella structure also 
allows JPH to influence transfer prices between the units, an action that can 
ostensibly be used to maintain cross-subsidies.  
Ranking the MVL-issues in this order provides a basis for measuring 
effective reform from an economic perspective. It is useful to develop a metric 
independent of the model’s salience inputs as issues that are important politically 
may not necessarily have the greatest impact economically.  
8.6 Efficacy Index: A Measurement of Overall 
Effectiveness 
 The efficacy index offers a numerical comparison of the simulation’s 
outputs against the ‘ideal’ as the Koizumi administration envisioned, and is defined: 
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where the rank fractions for MVL1 and MVL2 are 4/19, MVL5 and MVL6 are 3/19, 
MVL3 and MVL7 are 2/19, and MVL4 is 1/19. An efficacy index of ‘1’ implies 
every issue’s MVL value stabilises at ‘1’ and is the ideal case from a reform 
perspective. Conversely, an efficacy index of ‘0’ infers that every issue settles at an 
MVL value of -1. Intermediate values are affected by the rank fraction; separation 
(MVL1) and playing field (MVL2) have a much greater impact on efficacy than 
shares (MVL4).  
 The efficacy index is useful as it provides a stable comparison between 
simulation runs and Koizumi’s ideal. The HOS provides a nominal measure of 
overall effectiveness but is based on salience and therefore influenced by political 
decisions. It is also more dynamic than the efficacy index as weighted criticality 
affects the calculation. Consequently, the development of a metric independent of 
player inputs provides a secondary analysis tool. 
                                                 
110 The Ministry of Finance is a considerable holder of JPH shares. 
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8.7 Simulation Results: Control Run 
 This section details the findings of the control run. The simulation’s outputs 
are presented first, noting the changes in MVL values along with the results of the 
HOS and ensuing political landscape. The new ownership and regulatory structure 
is presented in section 8.7.1 along with expected changes to specific issue links 
resulting from positive MVLs. Comparisons to the initial setting and Koizumi’s 
ideal are also qualified here. Section 8.7.2 summarises the findings of the predicted 
outcomes and offers observations on the expected changes including consistency 
with Koizumi’s reform ideology. As the new political landscape is the product of 
all player interactions over the measured issues, Appendix E elaborates on two 
example interactions, showing how they occur and how their effects can be traced. 
Using the inputs from the expert survey, the control run represents 
prognosticated MVL outcomes through the process of lobbying salience of strong 
allies, challenging weak allies over position, and exchanging least favoured issues 
for gains over more important ones. This particular array of inputs required 10 
iterations before most outputs settled. Between rounds 11 and 19 only minimum 
network (MVL7) changed and even then only by a few tens of thousandths, settling 
at round 20. Figure 8-9 shows the evolving MVL values. 
 
Figure 8-9 Control run MVL outputs 
 
 Separation (MVL1) shows gains in the early iterations that are maintained 
throughout. Playing field (MVL2) increases through salience lobbying at first but 
both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and Ministry of Finance 
accept exchanges from other players and take negative stances. Universal financial 
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service (MVL3) is relatively stagnant. The DPJ reform elements are lobbied to 
increase salience, which marginally changes the output in the early iterations but 
the Ministry of Finance is successively challenged and this causes a decrease – 
particularly in round five.  
Shares (MVL4) appears to be caught between the two opposing sides and 
no exchanges or position challenging take place111. Salience lobbying is common 
but ultimately the anti-reform players have greater combined clout and this issue 
remains negative. 
Operations (MVL5) sees action from reform-minded players. Exchanges to 
the LDP opposition elements and the ‘Kamei’ group are made to strengthen 
independent operations and personnel management. Weak ally lobbying also sees 
the DPJ reform group and the Ministry of Finance pressed for increases in position. 
An interesting occurrence in asset management (MVL6) involves the 
Ministry of Finance first increasing position through an exchange and then 
decreasing through a later exchange that they initiate. This explains the elongated 
‘speed bump’ shape in Figure 8-9. The LDP opposition elements are later brought 
into positive position through another exchange.  
Minimum network (MVL7) exhibits a concerted effort by the extreme 
opposition elements to reduce the positions of other players through weak ally 
lobbying and exchanges. The LDP reform elements and the business community 
show willingness to concede this issue in exchange for gains elsewhere but once 
brought on side are lobbied to increase salience.  
Figure 8-10 displays the final results of the seven issues. Semi-transparent 
bubbles represent initial locations and solid bubbles the locations at equilibrium. 
Figure 8-11 draws from the HOS and displays the probability of each MVL-issue’s 
proposal passing. 
  
                                                 
111 All alliances in MVL4 are strong alliances – meaning that position challenging does not occur. 
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Figure 8-10 Initial and final MVL locations 
 
Control run efficacy index: 0.4828, PER from HOS = 0.4341 
 
Figure 8-11 Probability of MVL-issue reform from HOS 
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The greatest gains for reform-minded players are over separation (MVL1), 
and operations (MVL5). Gains to MVL1 however were exchanged for minimum 
network (MVL7), its final position indicating that the proposal to lift the restriction 
will almost certainly fail; MVL7’s probability of reform is 0.08. There does not 
appear to be enough support to positively resolve playing field (MVL2), universal 
financial services (MVL3), and shares (MVL4), whose probabilities are 0.45, 0.38, 
and 0.45 respectively. The efficacy index of 0.4828 suggests that the new setting is 
significantly lower than Koizumi’s ideal and the HOS indicates that the overall 
probability of effective reform is 0.4341. 
The political landscape at the end of the simulation appears in Figure 8-12. 
Once again, the starting locations are denoted by semi-transparent bubbles and final 
locations are solid. The greatest changes appear in operations (MVL5) and 
minimum network (MVL7); once significantly divided players are now clustered 
more tightly together, particularly so over MVL7 (bottom left). The stalemate over 
shares (MVL4) described previously can also be seen. Players exhibit increases in 
salience but no other changes are observable owing to the issue’s particular 
relationship dynamics. 
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Figure 8-12 Final political landscape 
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8.7.1 Simulation results: Issue linkages 
 Positive MVLs indicate there is a good possibility the proposal they 
represent will be implemented. Implementing changes therefore implies that 
linkages proposed in Figure 8-3 showing positive MVLs are expected to be broken. 
Linkages with corresponding negative MVLs will likely remain in place. Figure 
8-13 presents a revised image of Figure 8-3 according to the results of the control 
run. Once again, the linkage arrows indicate one part of the diagram affecting 
another and the superimposed MVL numbers refer to which MVL-issue the blue 
box issue is affected by. 
 Observe that whilst some linkages have been removed, many remain. Cross-
subsidisation and the playing field are still considerably constrained by playing field 
(MVL2), universal financial services (MVL3), shares (MVL4), and minimum 
network (MVL7). This falls significantly short of the ‘ideal’ number of linkages as 
defined in Figure 8-5. The efficacy index corroborates this observation given its 
relatively low value of 0.4828. Table 8-12 provides a list of linkage changes from 
the initial setting to the final setting. Owing to its length, it can be found in the 
Appendix D on page 374. 
 Figure 8-14 provides a qualitative description of what changes are estimated 
to occur and qualitatively rates changes in terms of favourability from the reformists’ 
perspective. Figure 8-15 then offers a comparison of the simulated output against 
the ‘ideal’. 
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Figure 8-13 Extended influence links with MVL-issue superimposition at t=10 
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Figure 8-14 Qualitative description key issue changes 
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Figure 8-15 Comparison of simulated outcome against ‘ideal’ 
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8.7.2 Simulation results: Control run summary and 
observations 
 Business unit separation is more likely than not to occur and this is a positive 
step towards reform as it affords a degree of independence from governmental and 
bureaucratic influence whilst also highlighting the amount of inter-unit cross 
subsidisation. Two significant factors, however, undermine technical separation. 
The provision of universal financial services imposes a legal requirement on JPB 
and JPI to offer their products through the postal network and therefore realises a 
continual revenue stream for JPC. Secondly, JPH is expected to retain majority 
ownership of the other units (from MVL4) and in turn, the government will still 
hold a significant share of JPH. This umbrella structure preserves a degree of 
authority for the state and bureaucracy to influence JPH and subsequently JPC, JPB 
and JPI. As a result, whilst technically separated, there are still elements linking the 
groups together and the government to the group. 
 Although Koizumi intended the financial units to be completely dissociated, 
there is a case to be made for offering financial services through a postal network. 
As evidenced in Chapter Five, declining postal volumes led NZP to pursue 
alternative revenue generating activities and executive management saw potential 
synergies arising from postal networks and banking services. The resulting 
‘Kiwibank’ increased returns significantly. Initial observations therefore might 
suggest that the continued integration between JPC, JPB, and JPI is not necessarily 
problematic. However, before using the New Zealand experience as justification 
for such a stance, several provisos must be noted. Firstly, NZ postal operations 
themselves were surplus generating and therefore not in need of subsidisation; 
Kiwibank’s incorporation merely adds to net income112. Secondly, Kiwibank is not 
required to service all locations as JPB and JPI are; that decision rests with 
management. Thirdly, and most importantly, the playing field had been levelled 
before Kiwibank’s entry. The combination of banking, insurance, and posts is 
therefore not problematic per se but the manner in which the simulation suggests it 
may be done in Japan creates inconsistencies if the government’s objectives are 
commercially oriented.  
                                                 
112 Recall, however that 2010 would have resulted in a net loss if not for Kiwibank, although this 
was due to a number of non-recurring events that were predominantly non-cash based.  
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 Greater freedom from political interference is inferred from operations 
(MVL5) and asset management (MVL6). The ability to manage operations and 
personnel more independently provides opportunities to reduce labour costs, 
expand product lines, and improve efficiency. Similarly, network asset 
management freedom allows the company to dispose of loss-making investments 
and pursue other avenues of income generation such as commercial real estate 
development. However, considering the increased liberties within the context of a 
tilted playing field (MVL2) it could produce negative externalities for the private 
sector. Pricing changes by report rather than approval, for example, could 
potentially allow JPC to encroach upon parcel delivery whilst the general 
correspondence restrictions effectively bar private entry. As mentioned previously, 
both Yamato and Sagawa Kyubin considered carrying general correspondence but 
were defeated by the requirement to establish 100,000 mailboxes. The market could 
therefore be argued to be contestable but is isolated by regulation. Preserving this 
market as the sole territory of JP whilst allowing greater freedom into other forms 
of business therefore presents a credible threat to private interests.  
 Private financial institutions also face potential threats. The government’s 
stake in JPH is accompanied by an implicit guarantee, favouring JPB and JPI. 
Providing universal services does indeed place costs upon these units but it also 
ensures an unmatched market presence, placing them at an advantage. The ability 
to offer a broader range of products whilst the playing field remains tilted is also 
cause for concern. 
 Koizumi’s ideal would have seen the financial units sold to private interests 
and thus reduced their respective size. Given the outcomes of MVL3 and MVL5, 
which suggest that there is a greater possibility of continued universal financial 
services but otherwise greater operational autonomy, it is likely that they will 
maintain their present size and perhaps expand as they encroach into areas 
traditionally serviced by the private sector. The probability of separately listing JPI 
and JPB is marginally less than 0.5 (from MVL4) and reduces the likelihood that 
full privatisation will be achieved. Additionally, the umbrella structure of 
ownership also places JPH in a position to influence portfolio management that may 
result in continued linkages between JPB/JPI and the Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme. By contrast, privately held financial units would likely redirect funds 
towards higher-yielding investments and induce a reduction of funds flowing into 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. 
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Overall, there appears to be a relatively high degree of inconsistency with 
initial intentions for the postal system and the simulation outcomes. The playing 
field is the issue of greatest concern, followed by the universal provision of financial 
services. These two issues in conjunction suggest JP will remain protected from 
competition and cross-subsidised through agency fees. Such a structure reduces 
incentives to increase productivity and efficiency, which is regrettable as the market 
it occupies could be argued to be contestable save for the protective entry barriers. 
Ultimately, the control run outcome falls significantly short of Koizumi’s vision of 
postal reform and may even result in further distortions to the industry. 
8.8 Simulation Results: Sensitivity 
Sensitivity testing provides a number of insights with respect to the outputs 
of the simulation and the placement of players within it. This section of the chapter 
examines the effects of sensitivity testing first by individual issue and then at a 
global level. 
At the individual issue level, changes to initial player parameters and the 
resultant fluctuations in MVL outputs are cross-referenced against clout. This 
illustrates the relationship between a player’s clout and their observed influence in 
the model. It also highlights whether more powerful players have a greater impact, 
or if small players can affect large changes. 
Secondly, altering a player’s initial inputs over one issue creates ripple 
effects across other issues. A natural question that arises from this assertion is 
whether those ripples affect the other issues equally. The results of sensitivity 
testing therefore also show the degree of change witnessed elsewhere as a 
consequence of adjusting the initial parameters of a particular issue.  
At the global level, issues are ranked in order of sensitivity to establish 
which ones are potentially subject to the greatest change. By combining the effects 
of individual issue testing, an image of the players’ overall influence emerges. 
Additionally, a comparison of the global impact from changing position and 
salience will demonstrate which input type is most sensitive. 
 To generate the data 1,232 runs were performed, incrementally changing 
position and salience of each player over each issue. Clout was held constant. 
Position was tested in increments of 0.1, ranging from initial values of 0.0 to 1.0 
for players whose control values were positive and 0.0 to -1.0 for negative players. 
This applies an assumption that whilst a player’s view may range from neutral to 
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extreme, fundamental shifts in initial ideologies are not possible. For example, 
whilst it is plausible that the ‘Kamei’ group may take initial positions over minimum 
network (MVL7) ranging from extreme opposition to a neutral one, it is 
extraordinarily unlikely their initial value could be positive given the interests they 
represent. In the two cases where the control values for the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications and Ministry of Finance were exactly zero over 
MVL5, a range of 0.5 to -0.5 was applied. Salience was also tested in increments 
of 0.1, ranging from initial values of 0 to 1.0 and equally applied to all players.  
8.8.1 MVL-issue level testing 
Figure 8-16 Sensitivity to changes in initial position and salience, MVL1 
 
 
 To produce an image of total influence changing a single player’s inputs has, 
the y-axis pictured in Figure 8-16 represents sum of ranges from each MVL. For 
example, the LDP reform elements group was tested with positions from 0.0 to 1.0. 
The maximum values of each MVL were subtracted from their respective minima 
and summed together. The y-axis therefore provides a representation of the total 
influence the player has. The x-axis is weighted clout, representing the player 
group’s power. Sensitivity to position from changing input values over separation 
(MVL1) appears to be relatively positive; more powerful players have a greater 
impact. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, however, has a small 
effect relative to its size.  
Changes to salience show more fluctuations. Interestingly the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications has a much greater effect through salience 
due to the mechanics of primary and exchange issue selection. MVL1 remains the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ primary issue for four rounds in 
the control run. 
 281 
Figure 8-17 Global effects: changes to position and salience, MVL1 
 
 
 Figure 8-17 presents relative sensitivity of each issue as a result of changing 
individual player inputs over separation (MVL1), offering an indication of the 
forces at work. Altering initial position of the LDP reform elements can produce 
changes in operations (MVL5) of a similar magnitude. The business community’s 
position has a significant impact on separation (MVL1) and playing field (MVL2) 
but very little elsewhere. Interestingly, altering the ‘Kamei’ group’s position 
produces only a small change to MVL1, but significant changes to operations 
(MVL5) and asset management (MVL6). The data show that salience produces a 
greater range of changes, particularly so for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications and the LDP reform elements.  
8.8.2 Summary: MVL1 
 Overall sensitivity through changes to position shares a positive relationship 
with weighted clout. Salience appears to also be positive but displays more variance. 
In terms of ripple effects, changes to position create fluctuations in other issues 
although shares (MVL4) and minimum network (MVL7) are largely unaffected. 
Salience shows higher peaks but shares (MVL4) remains the least affected.  
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Figure 8-18 Sensitivity to changes in initial position and salience, MVL2 
 
 
 Figure 8-18 shows the business community returning a particularly high 
sensitivity to playing field (MVL2) even though they are a relatively minor player. 
The ‘Kamei’ group also displays a strong effect in terms of position and salience. 
Sensitivity to salience appears generally positive.  
 
Figure 8-19 Global effects: changes to position and salience, MVL2 
 
 
 Figure 8-19 shows overall sensitivity to inputs over playing field (MVL2). 
It is interesting to note that altering position creates changes in operations (MVL5) 
for many players. This is because MVL5 is the exchange issue for many of the 
opposing player groups. Salience also produces similar results but amplifies the 
effects. Overall, MVL2 is more sensitive to changes in salience but more so for the 
players who are already active over it in the control run. 
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8.8.3 Summary: MVL2 
 Consequences of changing player inputs appear relatively chaotic. In this 
instance two of the smaller players have influence disproportionate to their clout. 
Sensitivity to position shows clustered effects for playing field (MVL2), operations 
(MVL5), and asset management (MVL6). Salience however shows some cascading 
effects, particularly for opposition players. 
 
Figure 8-20 Sensitivity to changes in initial position and salience, MVL3 
 
 The left hand side of Figure 8-20 appears to show a positive relationship 
between weighted clout and sensitivity with respect to position. Salience, pictured 
on the right, is more chaotic. The two ministries’ activation factors are particularly 
low in this issue and the sensitivity test procedure therefore quickly triggers 
activation, leading to significant changes through their actions. The control values 
for position are -0.425 and -0.05 respectively and the initial value of universal 
financial services (MVL3) is -0.1633 which places the two ministries in a position 
to be the agents of multiple lobbying types.  
 Salience shows that the DPJ reform elements, business community, and 
‘Kamei’ group have significant influence when salience is altered. This appears to 
be consistent with reported precedents as the ‘Kamei’ group argued strongly for 
universal financial services. 
 Figure 8-21 shows issue sensitivity with respect to changing inputs over 
universal financial services (MVL3). 
 
 284
Figure 8-21 Global effects: changes to position and salience, MVL3 
 
 
 Adjusting position creates small changes elsewhere but changes to initial 
salience clearly causes ripple effects over many other issues.  
8.8.4 Summary: MVL3 
 Position testing shows the bureaucracy having a much stronger impact than 
other players. Altering salience produces more chaotic results, indicating that the 
smaller players have greater influence than larger players. Ripple effects from 
salience are much greater than position and also appear to be more diffuse. 
  
Figure 8-22 displays the relationship between clout and the overall effect on 
outputs from altering position and salience over shares (MVL4).  
 
Figure 8-22 Sensitivity to changes in initial position and salience, MVL4 
 
 Excluding the ‘Kamei’ group and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, position shows a relatively positive relationship. Similar to 
universal financial services (MVL3), the DPJ reform elements, business 
community, and ‘Kamei’ group create large changes relative to their clout when 
altering salience. 
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Figure 8-23 Expanded view of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
sensitivity to MVL4 
 
 Figure 8-23 expands the results of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications’ sensitivity value. Pictured on the right are the 11 sensitivity runs 
in addition to the control run, denoted by the thick green line. The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications’ control position is -0.35. Values from -0.4 to 
-1 produce interesting results: as initial position decreases shares (MVL4) falls but 
owing to exchanges, lobbying, and challenges, a more extreme view to open share 
sales is counterbalanced by concessions to separation (MVL1) and playing field 
(MVL2). More extreme positions generally also coincide with decreased operations 
(MVL5). Minimum network (MVL7) however remains almost static. Universal 
financial services (MVL3) varies considerably as two instances of firmer resistance 
in shares (MVL4) produce a positive value for MVL3, implying that greater 
resistance over share sales can alter the landscape enough to remove the 
requirement to provide universal financial services. This observation appears to 
exhibit similarities with escalating commitment, concentrating on shares (MVL4) 
at the expense of issues one, two, and three. This is important for the reform-minded 
as separation (MVL1) and playing field (MVL2) are the most important issues for 
effective reform.  
 Figure 8-24 shows issue sensitivity with respect to changing inputs over 
MVL4. 
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Figure 8-24 Global effects: changes to position and salience, MVL4 
 
 
 The sensitivity range to position for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications is markedly higher than other players and much of the variance is 
contained within separation (MVL1), universal financial services (MVL3) and 
shares (MVL4). The ‘Kamei’ group is also interesting: the model suggests that 
changes to initial position have a relatively small effect on MVL4, but create large 
ripple effects over playing field (MVL2), universal financial services (MVL3), and 
operations (MVL5). The sensitivity of other players appears to be largely localised 
around shares (MVL4). Whilst the issue remains negative for all the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications runs, greater resistance can result in strong 
gains elsewhere, suggesting that as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications grows increasingly negative towards the open sale of shares, they 
become more flexible in regards to separate businesses, a level playing field, and 
universal financial services.  
 Salience shows a consistent pattern with the results of MVL-issues 1-3: 
changing values here produces many ripple effects. This however is not surprising 
as the control run features shares (MVL4) rarely in primary and exchange issue 
calculations. Table 8-5 elaborates: the left hand side of the table displays the 
primary issue (by number) for each player as the simulation progresses. The right 
hand side of the table shows each player’s exchange issue. For example, the most 
important issue for player a is separation (MVL1) until round six where it changes 
to minimum network (MVL7). By comparison, player a is willing to exchange over 
operations (MVL5) at first but from round one to round three this changes to 
minimum network (MVL7) and then back to MVL5. Note that shares (MVL4) 
appears in the initial stages but quickly recedes in favour of other issues in the 
control run. Altering the inputs for shares (MVL4) quickly changes these set of 
circumstances.  
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Table 8-5 Primary and exchange issues 
 
8.8.5 Summary: MVL4 
 Changes to position show little overall sensitivity with the exception of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Salience produces a larger range 
of effects and some of the middling players affect outcomes to a similar degree as 
large players. Ripple effects from position are localised for most players but the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ position creates significant 
changes. Salience produces larger changes elsewhere as a result of shifting primary 
and exchange issues.  
  
Figure 8-25 displays the relationship between clout and the overall effect on 
outputs from altering position and salience over operations (MVL5). 
 
Figure 8-25 Sensitivity to changes in initial position and salience, MVL5 
 
 
 Changes to the position of the DPJ opposition elements group shows a 
particularly large effect relative to their weighted clout. The two ministries exhibit 
a strong impact through position, which is expected as their initial values are both 
zero and hence changes into positive or negative positions create alternate scenarios. 
Changes to salience cause similar degrees of variance to other issues with the 
magnitude of change roughly following weighted clout. 
Round 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Round 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Selected variable runs: Selected variable runs:
Primary a 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 Exchange a 5 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Primary b 3 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Exchange b 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Primary c 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 Exchange c 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Primary d 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Exchange d 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Primary e 4 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 Exchange e 7 7 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Primary f 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Exchange f 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Primary g 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Exchange g 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Primary h 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Exchange h 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Control Control
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Figure 8-26 Expanded view of DPJ opposition elements sensitivity to MVL5 
 
 Figure 8-26 expands on the DPJ opposition group’s runs. Once again, the 
control run (Initial Ph5 = -0.15) is denoted by the thick green line. Two factors work 
in concert to produce the extent of fluctuations seen here: once the DPJ opposition 
group’s initial position reaches -0.5 it causes their activation matrix to engage at 
t=1. Secondly, Table 8-5 shows that operations (MVL5) is the most common 
exchange issue and together they create a cascade effect of exchanges.  
 
Figure 8-27 Expanded view of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
sensitivity to MVL5 
 
 Figure 8-27 expands on the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications’ runs. Initial positions of -0.1, -0.2, -0.3, 0.2 and 0.5 cause playing 
field (MVL2) to stabilise above zero. Positions of 0.2 or higher result in asset 
management (MVL6) becoming negative. If initial positions can be adjusted, 
reform-minded supporters therefore could potentially make gains over playing field 
(MVL2) but at significant cost to universal financial services (MVL3), shares 
(MVL4), and operations (MVL5). Initial positions of -0.1 and -0.2 result in 
separation (MVL1), playing field (MVL2), operations (MVL5), and asset 
management (MVL6) being slightly positive, all of which are the first and second 
equally ranked for effective reform. Nevertheless, the simulation demonstrates that 
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gains in some areas are most commonly associated with losses in others, which, 
given the strength of the opposing forces, seems plausible.  
 
Figure 8-28 Expanded view of Ministry of Finance sensitivity to MVL5 
 
 
 Figure 8-28 expands on the Ministry of Finance’s runs, the control run again 
being represented by the thick green line. All initial positions except -0.2 result in 
positive outcomes for operations (MVL5). Asset management (MVL6) changes 
sign with initial positions of -0.1 and -0.3. Therefore, whilst the Ministry of Finance 
is neutral over operations (MVL5), reform supporters have little to gain by 
persuading the Ministry of Finance to take up an initially positive position. Reform 
detractors, however, can cause noticeable reductions in MVL values by persuading 
the Ministry of Finance to take a negative position. 
 Figure 8-29 shows issue sensitivity with respect to changing inputs over 
MVL5. 
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Figure 8-29 Global effects: changes to position and salience, MVL5 
 
 Changing salience values have consequential effects elsewhere in the model 
for most players, largely due to the prevalence of operations (MVL5) as the 
exchange issue. Position however shows greater sensitivity owing to the ministries’ 
neutral initial stance and the chain-reaction caused by the activation of the DPJ 
opposition group. 
8.8.6 Summary: MVL5 
The simulation displays some of the greatest fluctuations observed as a 
result of altering position and it is interesting because the weakest player causes one 
of the largest changes. Both ministries also have a strong impact on outputs through 
operations (MVL5) as their initial positions are zero. Although some gains to 
important issues could be achieved through exogenous shocks to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications, they are realised at the cost of other issues. 
Similarly, whilst intuitive logic suggests that altering the Ministry of Finance’s 
initial stance from a neutral one may be beneficial for reformists, the results indicate 
that losses elsewhere outweigh the gains. For many players, salience results in 
relatively similar global effects even though their clout levels are different. In terms 
of the ripple effects, position appears to be more clustered than salience.  
  
Figure 8-30 displays the relationship between clout and the overall effect on 
outputs from altering position and salience over asset management (MVL6). 
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Figure 8-30 Sensitivity to changes in initial position and salience, MVL6 
 
 
Changes to initial positions result in fewer fluctuations than many other 
issues. The business community can engender a positive value for playing field 
(MVL2) with positions of 0 and 0.1 as can the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications with positions of 0, 0.1, 0.3, and 0.4. The LDP opposition and 
‘Kamei’ groups produce negligible changes despite being active. The DPJ 
opposition group’s tests show no change at all to any other issue. 
Salience sees larger effects and the pattern of influence again is relatively 
consistent with the power of the group. Figure 8-31 shows issue sensitivity with 
respect to changing inputs over asset management (MVL6). 
 
Figure 8-31 Global effects: changes to position and salience, MVL6 
 
 
 Variances in position display consequences for universal financial services 
(MVL3) and operations (MVL5) for the most part but have almost no impact upon 
shares (MVL4) and minimum network (MVL7). Salience produces much greater 
variations. 
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8.8.7 Summary: MVL6 
 Adjusting initial inputs over asset management (MVL6) indicates generally 
positive relationships between overall influence and clout; larger players have 
larger impacts. Operations (MVL5) contains the most variance from position 
although the LDP reform group’s tests show fluctuations in separation (MVL1), 
playing field (MVL2), and universal financial services (MVL3). Salience creates 
larger variances and these are dispersed throughout the issues. 
 
 Figure 8-32 displays the relationship between clout and the overall effect on 
outputs from altering position and salience over minimum network (MVL7). 
 
Figure 8-32 Sensitivity to changes in initial position and salience, MVL7 
 
  
 This issue shows considerable volatility with respect to position, 
particularly from the DPJ opposition (control = -0.85), ‘Kamei’ group (control = -
1) and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (control = -0.7). 
Considering the interests they represent it intuitively follows that these groups 
should have the largest impact, particularly so for the ‘Kamei’ group, who exchange 
other issues in favour of minimum network (MVL7). More neutral initial positions 
result in smaller exchanges, which explains some of the sensitivity as the four major 
opponents have particularly low initial positions. Influence with respect to salience 
appears to display a positive relationship with clout with the more powerful players 
exerting greater overall influence. Figure 8-33 shows issue sensitivity with respect 
to changing inputs over minimum network (MVL7). 
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Figure 8-33 Global effects: changes to position and salience, MVL7 
 
 
 From these two panels it is clear that minimum network (MVL7) causes far 
greater changes through position than the other issues. This is due in part to it 
commonly featuring as an exchange issue or a primary issue for many players. The 
‘Kamei’ group’s influence through salience is higher than other players since they 
play a key role in bringing other players onto the negative side and allowing for 
consequent salience lobbying. 
8.8.8 Summary: MVL7 
 Whilst overall sensitivity and weighted clout share a positive relationship 
through changes to salience, position shows chaotic behaviour. This is due in part 
to the frequent appearance of minimum network (MVL7) in the primary issue table: 
changing initial positions alters the type of relationship between players and the 
strategies they level against one another. 
 Changes to position create a number of ripple effects, with particularly high 
peaks observed in separation (MVL1), playing field (MVL2), and universal 
financial services (MVL3). Salience also creates ripples but these are of a smaller 
magnitude and tend to have larger impacts on the other issues.  
8.8.9 Sensitivity testing at the global level 
 Figure 8-34 presents the average variance from all players’ sensitivity runs 
in respect to the issue’s more influential input. Operations (MVL5) and minimum 
network (MVL7) produce the highest values, indicating these are the most sensitive 
issues. This is consistent with the results of the control run as operations (MVL5) 
and minimum network (MVL7) displayed the greatest change from initial to final 
settings. 
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 Operations (MVL5) is most sensitive primarily owing to the neutral initial 
positions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and Ministry of 
Finance, and the cascade of actions resulting from the DPJ opposition elements 
crossing the activation threshold when the initial position is -0.5. 
 Minimum network (MVL7) sensitivity is primarily explained by the 
placement of opposition elements and the exchanges they are willing to make 
elsewhere in order to secure it. Lower starting values would elicit smaller exchanges 
and the resulting alliances would be more inclined towards weak ones rather than 
strong ones, making salience lobbying in later iterations more difficult. 
Additionally, fewer instances of successful strong ally lobbying would reduce the 
frequency of minimum network (MVL7) as a primary issue. 
 
Figure 8-34 Overall issue sensitivity 
 
 
 To determine an overall measurement of global sensitivity relative to player 
clout, the maximum range of changes to every MVL from adjusting individual 
player’s input values were summed together and charted against the player’s 
average weighted clout. Figure 8-35 and Figure 8-36 present the results for position, 
Figure 8-37 and Figure 8-38 for salience. Players with larger bubbles have a greater 
effect. 
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Figure 8-35 Comparison of average weighted clout to global sensitivity: position 
 
 
 The x-axis denotes the player number. Overall, the LDP reform elements 
represent the most powerful group and exhibit high sensitivity to position. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has the greatest overall effect 
despite being of moderate clout. The ‘Kamei’ group’s position also has a large 
influence. 
 
Figure 8-36 Overall comparison of clout to global influence: position 
 
Y-axis values were determined by taking the summed value of each player’s 
maximum range over each MVL after altering their initial position on every issue. 
The relationship appears to be generally positive. Moderate correlation is observed 
at 0.5644, indicating that as power increases the overall effect on all issues also 
increases. The ‘Kamei’ group and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
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Communications however are exceptional and display higher influence on overall 
outcomes than their clout alone would suggest. 
 
Figure 8-37 Comparison of average weighted clout to overall sensitivity: salience 
 
 
Net impact is often larger for salience than position. This is due in no small 
part to the mechanics of exchange and primary issue determination: by definition, 
altering salience values alters the two algorithms whilst position does not. Once 
again, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the ‘Kamei’ group 
exhibit influence disproportionate to their clout measurement, while other players 
are generally more consistent relative to their power. 
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Figure 8-38 Overall comparison of clout to global influence: salience 
 
Using the same y-axis measurement as in Figure 8-36, salience produces a 
data cluster with a greater correlation of 0.6966. 
 
Figure 8-39 Combined comparison of overall sensitivity 
 
 
Figure 8-39 displays the net effect on all issues and orders players by 
descending weighted clout. With the exception of the DPJ opposition elements, 
salience has a larger effect than position. Table 8-6 lists players by ranked order of 
weighted clout and also returns the rank order of overall influence via changing 
position and salience. The shading is provided for easier visualisation; darker 
shades of green represent greater influence. 
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Table 8-6 Ranked weighted clout against global influence 
 
The data show the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and the 
‘Kamei’ group having the greatest overall influence despite being middling players 
in terms of clout. The LDP reform group, whilst significant, has less effect than 
their clout would suggest and this applies even more so for the LDP opposition 
elements. The Ministry of Finance’s clout is roughly reflected in sensitivity to 
position, but less so with salience. The business community and both DPJ groups’ 
effects are quite congruent with their weighted clout. In summary, larger players 
tend to have larger effects, but there are two clear exceptions with the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications and the ‘Kamei’ group – changes to their 
initial values create significant changes in global MVL values.  
8.8.10 Summary: Sensitivity testing at the global level 
The data show that operations (MVL5) and minimum network (MVL7) are 
the most sensitive issues on average, which is consistent with their respective larger 
changes from initial to final location in the control run. For the majority of cases, 
changes to initial salience values result in larger changes. This outcome is 
unsurprising as exchange issue and primary issue selection are functions of salience.  
In overall terms, average weighted clout loosely corresponds with global 
influence, which implies that more powerful players tend to have greater sway 
although the ‘Kamei’ group’s influence is disproportionate to their weighted clout. 
This result, however, is logical, as similar examples of junior coalition members 
eliciting considerable influence over policy change are not uncommon in politics. 
This group has a particularly vested interest in postal reform and given the extremity 
of their views it is not surprising that altered initial values produce very different 
results.  
Average WC Position Salience
LDP reform elements 1 3 2
LDP opposition elements 2 5 4
Ministry of Finance 3 4 6
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 4 1 3
Kamei group 5 2 1
Business community 6 6 5
DPJ opposition elements 7 7 8
DPJ reform elements 8 8 7
Ranked global influence
 299 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications also has substantial 
influence relative to its size. Part of the reason for this is due to its mixed views on 
reform, supporting some issues and opposing others.  
Despite the experimental nature of the model, is it interesting to note that 
the two most influential players include representatives of those who stand to lose 
the most, and the branch of the bureaucracy that administers and regulates the 
industry. In real-world settings, we might very well expect these two groups to be 
some of the prominent players, even if their clout is proportionately small. I am 
therefore cautiously optimistic about the accuracy with which the model represents 
the real world. 
8.9 Simulation Results: Exogenous Shocks 
 As an extension of the sensitivity testing, the efficacy index was calculated 
for each of the 1,232 runs. Changing the simulation’s initial values can represent 
exogenous shocks to players and by cross-referencing them against the efficacy 
index and control values, shocks that result in high and low efficacy can be 
identified. Note that the use of the word ‘shock’ indicates some form of external 
pressure on a player that causes a change in position or salience that is external to 
the three strategic options modelled. Table 8-7 displays input changes needed for 
the 10 shocks resulting in high efficacy. Darker shades of green in the efficacy 
column represent increasingly ‘better’ outcomes over the control value. Green and 
red shading in the Δposition and Δsalience columns offer a visual representation of 
the changes required to inputs that produce their corresponding efficacy values. 
Longer bars indicate greater changes to the respective input.  
 
Table 8-7 Top 10 single exogenous shocks for high efficacy 
 
 
 Sensitivity to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is further 
reinforced here as five of the ten shocks derive from this player. It is interesting to 
MVL Player Δposition Δsalience Efficacy Positive MVLs Negative MVLs
7 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 0.1 0.5581 1 2 3 5 6 4 7 
4 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication -0.15 0.5527 1 2 3 5 6 4 7 
7 DPJ opposition elements 0.25 0.5524 1 2 3 5 6 4 7
4 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication -0.65 0.5474 1 2 5 6 3 4 7 
4 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication -0.45 0.5421 1 2 3 5 6 4 7 
7 Kamei group 1 0.5379 1 2 5 6 3 4 7 
5 LDP opposition elements 0.475 0.5342 1 2 6 3 4 5 7 
1 Kamei group -0.375 0.5324 1 2 5 6 3 4 7 
1 LDP opposition elements -0.4 0.5304 1 2 5 6 3 4 7 
5 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 0.3 0.5287 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
Control 0.4828 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
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note that a small positive change to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications’ position over minimum network (MVL7) creates a scenario 
where five MVL values are positive. This is would represent a significant gain for 
reform supporters over the control run although shares (MVL4) and minimum 
network (MVL7) would still remain negative. Also noteworthy, all but the last of 
the shocks affecting the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications are over 
issues where the ministry is not neutral. 
The cases where the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications takes 
negative positions over shares (MVL4, control position=-0.35) show improvements 
in overall outcomes, suggesting that some shocks may result in ‘tunnel vision’: 
focusing efforts to defeat one issue at the expense of others.  
The top 10 exogenous shocks do not include the LDP reform elements, the 
business community, Ministry of Finance or DPJ reform elements, which suggests 
that the largest overall gains occur from changes to opposition forces. Changes to 
salience are as intuitively expected: lowering an opposing player’s commitment 
over an issue improves the likelihood of a positive outcome in the data range.  
These results give rise to a potential strategy for reform supporters outside 
of those described by the mechanics of this model. Appointments of individuals to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications who have stronger views on 
maintaining the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ influence over 
JP financial units could induce the shocks necessary over shares (MVL4) to 
produce a more effective outcome. 
Table 8-8 displays input changes needed for the 10 shocks resulting in low 
efficacy 
 
Table 8-8 Top 10 single exogenous shocks for low efficacy 
 
 
MVL Player Δposition Δsalience Efficacy Positive MVLs Negative MVLs
5 LDP opposition elements 0.175 0.3838 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 DPJ opposition elements -0.85 0.3861 1 6 2 3 4 5 7 
4 Kamei group -0.7 0.3896 1 * 2 3 4 6 7 
2 Business community -0.25 0.3913 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
5 Ministry of Finance -0.2 0.3986 1 6 2 3 4 5 7 
2 Kamei group 0.15 0.4021 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
4 Business community -0.225 0.4031 1 6 2 3 4 5 7 
3 DPJ reform elements -0.05 0.4037 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
2 Business community -0.55 0.4042 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
2 Business community -0.65 0.4070 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
Control 0.4828 1 5 6 2 3 4 7 
* MVL5 is exactly 0 
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The business community appears four times in the 10 greatest exogenous 
shocks for low efficacy, but not at all in the high efficacy shocks. This leads to the 
suggestion that a stronger reformist orientation from the business community will 
not produce significant changes but a withdrawal of support or complacence could 
result in noticeable deteriorations in efficacy. 
The 10 greatest low-efficacy shocks are more directly intuitive: lowering 
positions on issues from either supporters or detractors yields lower results. 
Increasing salience from detractors and decreasing salience from supporters both 
reduce efficacy. The ‘Kamei’ group’s reduction of salience over shares (MVL4) is 
an exception, however. Nevertheless, lowering the salience from a control value of 
0.9 to 0.2 completely reverses the primary and exchange issue algorithms, which, 
although possible, seems unlikely.  
Once again, the LDP reform elements are not present in this top 10 list (or 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications), which is interesting as they 
are the most powerful group: they have a significant effect on a whole but appear 
less sensitive to exogenous shocks than other players. 
 
Figure 8-40 Dual comparison of high and low efficacy shocks 
 
 Average change in position: high-efficacy shocks = 0.43 
 Average change in position: low-efficacy = 0.5 
 Average change in salience: high-efficacy = 0.39 
 Average change in salience: low-efficacy = 0.26 
 
Presenting the 10 high-efficacy and low-efficacy shocks by colour (see 
Figure 8-40) shows that in all cases modelled here, low-efficacy shocks have a 
greater effect than high-efficacy shocks. Note, however, that the average change to 
position from low-efficacy shocks is bigger than that from high-efficacy shocks and 
therefore would intuitively result in greater changes. The results from salience 
however are unambiguous; negative shocks have markedly higher impacts upon 
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efficacy and the average change required to produce them is less than for high-
efficacy shocks. 
 
Figure 8-41 Combined view of high and low efficacy shocks 
 
Figure 8-41 further reinforces the distinction between high and low efficacy 
shocks. Irrespective of input source, even the smallest low-efficacy shock is greater 
than the largest high-efficacy shock. This simulation therefore exhibits greater 
downside risk than upside risk. 
One final method of testing outcomes is to examine what changes are 
derived from the combined effects of multiple shocks. Table 8-9 combines high-
efficacy shocks. Shading is provided to more clearly illustrate ‘better’ outcomes; 
the darker the shade, the greater the efficacy index. 
 
Table 8-9 Concerted high-efficacy shocks 
Shocks imposed Efficacy Positive MVLs Negative MVLs 
1 to 2 0.5233 1 2 3 5 6  4 7  
1 to 3 0.5432 1 2 3 5 6  4 7  
1 to 4 0.4630 1 2 5 6  3 4 7  
1 to 5 0.4630 1 2 5 6  3 4 7  
1 to 6 0.4953 1 2 5  3 4 6 7  
1 to 7 0.5730 1 2 5 6  3 4 7  
1 to 8 0.5473 1 2 6  3 4 5 7  
1 to 9 0.5625 1 2 5 6  3 4 7  
1 to 10 0.4754 1 3 6  2 4 5 7  
Control 0.4828 1 5 6  2 3 4 7  
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 The figures above were calculated by applying the ten shocks for high 
efficacy from Table 8-7 to initial input values. The first row applies the first two 
shocks: increasing the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ initial 
position over minimum network (MVL7) by 0.1 and decreasing it by 0.15 over 
shares (MVL4). The second row applies the first three shocks and so on. Shocks 
two, four, and five from Table 8-7 all impose changes on the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications’ initial position over shares (MVL4) and when 
combined, produce a change that breaches the bounds of the position continuum. A 
limit was therefore applied and hence shocks one through five do not result in any 
differences to shocks one through four. 
 Note that in the case where all 10 high-efficacy shocks are applied 
simultaneously, the calculated efficacy output is actually lower than the control 
output. Although in the shocked case universal financial services (MVL3) is likely 
not to be required, operations (MVL5) is more likely to be interfered with. The 
range of outputs for concerted high-efficacy shocks is quite similar to the range of 
outputs for individual shocks particularly so in terms of the number of negative 
MVLs. At best, shares (MVL4) and minimum network (MVL7) are negative both 
in the individual and concerted ranges.  
 These results suggest that reform-minded actors may wish to engender 
favourable outcomes through ‘fine-tuning’ as opposed to overarching strategies. 
Focusing on the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications alone can result 
in greater numbers of positive MVLs than the control run and in even the ‘best case’ 
situations shares (MVL4) and minimum network (MVL7) remain negative. As 
observed previously, the dynamics of this particular application show that gains in 
one area are often associated with losses in others. Consequently, it may be 
advisable to focus on scenarios where the most important MVLs for efficacy are 
secured and losses elsewhere are suffered. 
 Table 8-10 combines low-efficacy shocks and increasingly darker shades of 
red indicate lower efficacy values.  
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Table 8-10 Concerted low-efficacy shocks 
Shocks imposed Efficacy Positive MVLs Negative MVLs 
1 to 2 0.409613 1 6  2 3 4 5 7  
1 to 3 0.393293 1 6  2 3 4 5 7  
1 to 4 0.396171 1 6  2 3 4 5 7  
1 to 5 0.423746 1 6  2 3 4 5 7  
1 to 6 0.361954 1 4 5 6  2 3 7  
1 to 7 0.35704 1 4 5 6  2 3 7  
1 to 8 0.377345 1 4 6  2 3 5 7  
1 to 9 0.413264 1 5 6  2 3 4 7  
1 to 10 0.402643 3 4 5 6  1 2 7  
Control 0.482797 1 5 6  2 3 4 7  
  
 Once again, changes to player positions were confined within the bounds of 
-1 and +1. If shocks one through seven all apply then the lowest measured efficacy 
value is returned. The negative MVLs are confined to playing field (MVL2), 
universal financial services (MVL3), and minimum network (MVL7), indicating 
very low values and therefore suggesting the likelihood of these issues passing is 
particularly low. Interestingly, as with concerted high-efficacy shocks, the 
combined shocks presented here do not produce outcomes significantly different to 
the outcomes from individual shocks. Again, the principle of exchange applies and 
gains to some issues are counterbalanced by losses over others. In this case, reform 
opponents may also consider realising gains through ‘fine-tuning’. 
 Ultimately, from the perspective of Koizumi’s definitive ideal, the outcomes 
appear to be relatively hidebound; only a great upheaval in the political landscape 
would be sufficient to drive all MVLs into the positive domain, let alone approach 
values resembling his dream. From a more moderate perspective however, outputs 
show sensitivity to shocks that alter the sets of positive and negative MVLs. These 
shocks must be engendered exogenously to the strategies covered by the simulation 
and are applied to initial values. The same shocks occurring during the simulation 
however would likely have different effects. 
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8.9.1 Summary: Exogenous shocks 
Altering initial inputs changes the final outcome. In the interests of 
examining what deviations from control inputs could benefit supporters or 
opposition, 10 shocks for maximum and minimum efficacy were found.  
The ten high-efficacy shocks highlight that a more favourable outcome can 
occur from adjustments to opposition inputs. Increasing an opponent’s position 
constitutes a softening of stance and is intuitively logical in its effects. Additionally 
however, greater resistance in certain cases can produce ‘tunnel vision’ whereby 
one issue is focussed on at the expense of others. 
The ten low-efficacy shocks show that supporters losing interest causes 
deterioration in efficacy, as does extra commitment from the opposition. 
Reductions in position uniformly result in lower efficacy amongst the shocks 
presented. 
Outputs display greater sensitivity to low-efficacy shocks than high ones. 
This is likely due to the greater number of opposing players as interactions between 
them outnumber interactions between supportive players. 
Combining shocks together does not produce results much different to 
individual shocks. Players on both sides may therefore be better off attempting to 
engender singular shocks as the range of outcomes is similar and would be less 
costly than attempts to cause multiple ones. 
The population within the simulation is such that Koizumi’s ideal appears 
unattainable; there is simply too much opposition. Whilst gains on certain issues 
can be realised, concessions elsewhere prevent all MVLs settling above zero. In 
terms of the efficacy index, one of the best outcomes (Table 8-7, row one) results 
in five positive MVLs but retains a minimum network and does not offer separate 
floats of the financial arms. Interestingly, should such an outcome occur, it would 
share a number of characteristics with New Zealand’s experience: a level playing 
field, independent management and decision making, no universal financial 
services, continued government ownership, and some type of formal requirement 
specifying minimum network penetration113.  
                                                 
113 By contract in New Zealand but likely by law in Japan. 
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8.10 Activation Override Testing 
 As described in Chapter Seven, the model includes a feature that forces 
player activation. To examine the effects, three tests were devised and applied to 
the control run.  
 The first test performed was an issue-specific step test, engaging the 
override at t=0. The term ‘step’ is applied from Vensim where levels can be forced 
from one value to another, in this case stepping the activation override from zero to 
one. The effect forces all players to become permanently active over a selected issue 
from the first round onwards. Results are displayed below (see Figure 8-42). 
 
Figure 8-42 Activation override: single issue step test 
 
 
 The control run appears as the black intermittent rings. Issues appear along 
the x-axis and their corresponding MVL values are described by the y-axis. With 
respect to the control run, separation (MVL1), operations (MVL5) and asset 
management (MVL6) are positive whereas the other issues are negative. The 
coloured bars display the MVL value of each issue when a particular activation 
override is engaged. The difference between the control run and the individual 
override test can be observed by comparing the respective coloured bar against the 
control run.  
Comparing the first light blue column of each MVL-issue, engaging the 
override over separation (MVL1) does not alter overall outcomes very much from 
the control run; the efficacy index only differs by 0.0001. Stepping playing field 
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(MVL2), universal financial services (MVL3), shares (MVL4), and operations 
(MVL5) produces significant changes in playing field (MVL2) and operations 
(MVL5). Interestingly, gains to the playing field coincide with declines in 
operational independence, which reinforces the recurring theme of advances in one 
area coming at the cost of others. Stepping asset management (MVL6) produces 
some marginal increases in the efficacy index. The largest gains to efficacy occur 
by stepping minimum network (MVL7). Activating the override consistently 
increases the number of bilateral negotiations and the simulation requires a greater 
amount of iterations to stabilise. In all cases, stability was achieved within 20 
rounds – twice as many as the control run.  
 
Figure 8-43 Efficacy index: single issue step test 
 
 
Figure 8-43 presents the efficacy index at equilibrium after stepping each 
issue and compares it against the control run. Whilst differences exist, there is 
relatively little deviation from the control run. The control efficacy index value is 
0.4828, stepping separation (MVL1) for example produces a value of 0.48274. The 
greatest change, caused by stepping minimum network (MVL7) yields 0.49995. By 
comparison, the single exogenous shocks commonly produced values around 0.4 
from low-efficacy shocks and around 0.53 for high-efficacy shocks. Engaging the 
override over single issues therefore does not have a significant impact on this 
particular application.  
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The second test performed was a pulse test applied to all issues (see Figure 
8-44). This has the effect of forcing activation over all issues for all players for a 
pre-determined number of rounds (three in this case). This can be pictured as 
resembling a short term crisis in which the focused attention of the public for 
instance forces players to act, even if they believe that they are unable to affect the 
outcome114. The pulse was first applied at t=0 and subsequently rolled through 
further rounds. Every pulse initiated after t=10 produced identical results to the 
pulse at t=10 and thus these have been omitted.  
 
Figure 8-44 Activation override: pulse test 
 
 
Once again, the control run appears as the black rings. The pulse beginning 
at t=0 produces the largest change amongst the data set. Gains appear over playing 
field (MVL2) but compared to the control run universal financial services (MVL3), 
shares (MVL4), and operations (MVL5) show considerable deterioration. It is also 
interesting to note that greater fluctuations arise from pulses originating in earlier 
rounds; pulses initiated after t=5 produce results quite similar to the control run and 
every pulse after t=10 yields identical results. This suggests that the effects of 
pulsed activation have less of an impact over time since prior negotiations create an 
increasing consensus that becomes progressively more difficult to destabilise. 
 
                                                 
114 Note that the default activation process takes into account the influence the player can have on 
the system and players less able to do so are more likely to remain inactive. 
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Figure 8-45 Efficacy index: pulse test 
 
 
Figure 8-45 shows that pulses in earlier rounds have a detrimental effect 
upon overall efficacy. This is reasonable as there is considerable opposition in the 
input array and activating more of these players increases the number of 
negotiations that draw MVL values down. 
The final test performed was a delayed step test (see Figure 8-46). This 
models a scenario much like the pulse test but whilst the pulse lasts for three rounds, 
the delayed step test forces continued activation. The first delay was set at zero, 
causing all players to activate over all issues indefinitely. Further delays occur in 
one round increments. 
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Figure 8-46 Activation override: delayed step test 
 
 
Delayed step testing produces more fluctuations than pulses, which is 
understandable since continual activation produces a greater number of negotiations. 
Similar to the pulse test, later delays in simulation-wide activation see fewer 
changes than earlier ones. Interestingly, the first delay produces the highest efficacy 
value of all delays (0.5331), which is due to strong gains over separation (MVL1), 
playing field (MVL2), and asset management (MVL6). However these gains are 
accompanied by declines in universal financial services (MVL3), shares (MVL4), 
and operations (MVL5).  
 
Figure 8-47 Efficacy index: delayed step test 
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Figure 8-47 shows the delayed step test’s efficacy outcomes. Consistent 
with pulses, greater changes are observed when delays are shorter. Many early 
delays also display lower efficacy values whilst later delays show marginal 
improvements. 
It must be noted that the delayed step test represents a strict set of 
assumptions as it implies postal reform becoming a prominent issue, which appears 
to be unlikely at the moment. Pulses are proportionately more likely as elections 
often politicise issues such as reform, but as the data indicates, later pulses are less 
likely to cause significant deviations from the control run. 
8.10.1 Summary: Activation override testing 
 The three tests derived for this data set show that the override does indeed 
affect results. In all cases, forced activation is associated with more lengthy 
negotiations before equilibrium is reached. In terms of when both pulses and 
delayed steps are applied, the simulation displays greater inertia as the number of 
rounds increase; this arises from players having already negotiated with one another 
and reached a consensus, which appears to be logically consistent. 
 Altering the activation process changes the assumptions about the model 
and as far as this research extends, the control run is considered to be more 
indicative as there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to suggest that any one 
particular issue warrants overriding. Similarly, given the lower placement of postal 
reform amongst Japan’s other current issues, pulses and delayed steps do not appear 
to describe the current context more accurately than the control run.  
 All other things being equal, simulations with smaller player populations 
may be more accurately represented by forcing the activation process as opposed to 
the default setting, since one is more likely to observe greater commitment to every 
issue from every player. As the player and issue count increases, it becomes 
increasingly probable to find players who may be interested in some issues but not 
others and therefore the default setting may be more indicative. Whilst perhaps not 
as appropriate for this particular application, the option to override behaviour is still 
a significant advancement and allows greater tailoring that could be useful for future 
research.  
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8.11 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the results of the simulation. Its purpose was to 
establish what changes might be expected as a result of negotiations surrounding 
the distilled MVL-issues. 
The simulation’s context was defined by first detailing the initial ownership 
and regulatory structure of JP Group. As of this writing, the group is still completely 
owned by the government and is affected by a number of issues. Cross-subsidisation 
of postal services through financial services is one such issue, as is the matter of the 
playing field, which is particularly tilted in favour of JPC with respect to general 
correspondence. Government interference exists in terms of operations, personnel 
and network asset management. Universal service obligations are extensive, 
covering general correspondence, some packages, and financial services. Entry 
barriers to general correspondence effectively prevent competitor entry. Amakudari 
also exists, which encourages rent-seeking behaviour. Connections are present 
between the Group and the Ministry of Finance-administered Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Programme. These issues are highly interconnected and mutually reinforcing. 
This chapter has shown that the fundamental objectives of postal reform 
were to ameliorate these issues and dissolve their connections. Seven MVL-issues 
were introduced. Embedded in these were proposals that, if successful, would 
address various sections of the initial image. The parties engaged in reform 
negotiations were distilled into eight player groups, representing political parties, 
areas of the bureaucracy, and interest/lobby groups. A pre-simulation illustration of 
the political landscape showed considerable differences in ideology with respect to 
the seven MVL-issues. 
The process of postal reform began with former Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi. As such, an image of his ‘ideal’ outcome was presented to establish a 
point of reference to which the simulation’s outputs could be compared in addition 
to comparisons against the current state. Koizumi envisioned separated, privately-
owned business units conducting themselves in a market freely accessible to 
competing firms. The state of the political landscape, as populated by the player 
groups, indicated however that this ideal was unattainable. 
The efficacy index was presented as a measuring tool; it assumes that not 
all MVL-issues are equally important in determining overall reform effectiveness 
from an economic perspective. Separating the business units and establishing a 
level playing field were identified as the most important MVL-issues, followed by 
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managerial independence, universal financial services and a minimum network 
presence, and finally the open sale of shares. The index is useful in terms of 
providing relative comparisons between expected outcomes, Koizumi’s ‘ideal’, and 
the results of sensitivity testing.  
The control run shows separation (MVL1), operations (MVL5), and asset 
management (MVL6) issues settling above zero, indicating that there is a better 
than even probability of their proposals passing. The playing field (MVL2), 
universal financial services (MVL3), shares (MVL4), and minimum network 
(MVL7) are negative, suggesting these proposals are more likely to be defeated. 
Playing field (MVL2) and shares (MVL4) are quite close to zero, however, so there 
is a close to even chance. The expected political landscape shows continued strong 
divisions over playing field (MVL2), universal financial services (MVL3), and 
shares (MVL4); moderate divisions over separation (MVL1), operations (MVL5), 
and asset management (MVL6). Minimum network (MVL7) however displays a 
high degree of consensus on the negative side of position, although this was 
conceded in exchange for gains elsewhere – particularly separation.  
As a result of positive separation (MVL1), operations (MVL5), and asset 
management (MVL6), some of the linkages between key issues are expected to be 
broken. Observers might be inclined, therefore, to suggest that some reform is better 
than none; the predicted outcome infers JP will have greater freedom to conduct 
operations and less government interference with aspects of the business. This is 
encouraging as it could suggest increased efficiency, productivity, and profitability 
within the Group. What is concerning, however, is that these changes are likely to 
occur in a regulatory environment where the playing field is uneven and entry 
barriers are not expected to be relaxed. Gains to JP may therefore be at the expense 
of private businesses, which is inconsistent with Koizumi’s aims of invigorating the 
private sector. 
 Furthermore, whilst the business units are expected to be separated, cross-
subsidisation will likely continue, firstly because universal financial services 
provide substantial agency fees, and secondly because for as long as the government 
retains a majority share in JPH, internal transfer pricing can be influenced. These 
factors may place private operators at even more of a disadvantage: as JPC’s income 
is heavily supported by the financial units there is potential to use pricing structures 
independent firms simply cannot match. 
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One of Koizumi’s key objectives was to sever the link between postal 
savings and the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme. By directing funds away 
from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, capital markets were expected to 
be revitalised and the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme would be left with 
little choice but to reform. Several links between the Group and Fiscal Investment 
and Loan Programme remain at the end of the simulation however, suggesting that 
much of the Group’s deposits will still find their way into Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Programme bonds and dampen prospects of greater access to funds on the part 
of private financial firms. Greater operational freedom for JPB and JPI could 
potentially perform a similar task but so long as government maintains control of 
JPH such advances into private sector operating areas will likely be met with 
criticism.  
The financial arms can begin new operations by notification only once at 
least 50% of their shares have been sold. This initially appears to be consistent with 
reform ideology because private owners would be incentivised to divest away from 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme bonds in favour of higher yielding 
investments. However with a less than an even chance of separately listing JPB and 
JPI shares, and continued links to Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme through 
shares (MVL4), this raises questions about whether there is a true motivation to 
reduce state share holdings.  
Ultimately, the control run depicts an outcome that falls far short of 
Koizumi’s ideal with both the efficacy index and ‘probability of effective reform’ 
from the HOS less than 0.5. With the presence of such resistance, Koizumi’s goal 
appears to be out of reach since securing meaningful gains over one issue often 
requires sacrificing another. From a reformist perspective, the single greatest 
disappointment is projected failure to level the playing field. The partial reforms 
presented by the simulation potentially threaten the private sector and therefore 
appear inconsistent with original intentions.  
Sensitivity analyses performed around the control run show that the 
relationship of clout to global influence differs from issue to issue but is generally 
positive. Whilst the LDP reform group may have the largest weighted clout figure, 
it is the ‘Kamei’ group and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
that create the greatest overall changes through adjustments to their initial inputs. 
With respect to outcome variations, operations (MVL5) and minimum network 
(MVL7) are the most sensitive, experiencing the largest change from starting values 
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in the control run. Operations (MVL5) is the most common exchange issue, which 
explains to a large extent why it shifted significantly to the right on the position 
continuum: opposing players were willing to give ground on this issue for gains 
elsewhere. Minimum network (MVL7) becomes the most common primary issue 
following a series of exchanges, challenges and lobby actions. In terms of which 
input creates greater overall fluctuations, salience proves more volatile in the 
majority of cases. This is principally due to the mechanics of primary and exchange 
issue identification. 
The two ministries involved in postal reform displayed an initially neutral 
position over operations (MVL5). Whilst this may appear to represent an 
opportunity for reformists to gain an ally, the sensitivity tests show that changes to 
their initial position over operations (MVL5) result in significant losses elsewhere 
and thus such a strategy is unadvisable.  
Further tests to sensitivity showed that in some cases stronger resistance 
over a particular issue can create a chain of events whereby the MVL of the issue 
in question falls, but is accompanied by significant increases in other MVL values. 
This phenomenon appears to resemble a form of ‘tunnel vision’ whereby opposition 
is concentrated on one issue to the exclusion of others.  
The shock analysis found that this particular application is more sensitive to 
negative shocks than positive ones. Reformist groups therefore cannot afford to 
become lax. Whilst more radical stances or commitments from reformist groups 
may not be among the largest high-efficacy changes, reductions result in substantial 
losses in efficacy. It would appear that the analogy of an uphill battle is an accurate 
description; ground is hard to gain but easy to lose.  
Combining shocks produced results not dissimilar to singular shocks in both 
high-efficacy and low-efficacy cases. We could therefore infer that reformists and 
detractors both may be better off attempting to engender individual shocks and thus 
‘fine tune’ overall outcomes as such actions would be less costly than wider 
campaigns.  
The shock of changing the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ 
initial position over minimum network (MVL7) produces one of the highest efficacy 
indexes observed in the data range and only requires a change of 0.1. This particular 
scenario results in positive values for separation (MVL1), playing field (MVL2), 
universal financial services (MVL3), operations (MVL5), and asset management 
(MVL6). Interestingly, this particular scenario presents a number of similarities to 
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the New Zealand experience: separated units, a level playing field, no universal 
financial services, and freedom from government interference. The trigger of this 
shock however must reside outside of the strategies programmed into the model. 
The endogenisation of these shocks presents a fascinating opportunity for further 
research and may allow a broader range of options to be included to address future 
research questions. Attention now turns to identifying the post-simulation 
institutional environment and final comparison against New Zealand. 
  
 317 
9 JP’s New Institutional Environment and a Way 
Forward 
9.1 Introduction 
 A key contribution of the thesis is the construction of a model that simulates 
negotiations over a range of issues populated by an array of players, yielding 
probabilities of changes and relative measurements of effectiveness. Through this 
approach, it becomes possible to estimate if the outcome represents a ‘full’ 
reform115 or a ‘partial’ reform. In this study, the model is used to estimate the 
outcome of Japan’s postal privatisation negotiations and produce a post-simulation 
institutional environment. Comparisons against New Zealand are useful as New 
Zealand represents a successful case in terms of overcoming reform resistance and 
may offer potential lessons for Japan. 
Section 9.2 elaborates on the expected changes to the Japanese institutional 
environment derived from the simulation. The degree of internal consistency is 
analysed and discussed in section 9.3. Section 9.4 compares the new Japanese 
institutional environment against New Zealand’s, offering explanations of the 
differences and why New Zealand was able to enact successful reforms whereas 
Japan appears to be unable to. Section 9.5 measures the effects of a potentially 
transplantable reform lesson that could be used to overcome some of the resistance 
in Japan. Finally, section 9.6 explores other strategic options to increase the 
probability of reform through changes to initial positions over all MVL-issues.  
9.2 Changes to JP Institutional Environment 
 This section is the culmination of the analyses presented in Chapter Six and 
Chapter Eight. From Chapter Six, the initial institutions constraining JP were 
identified and illustrated, reproduced here as Figure 9-1 for convenience. Koizumi’s 
reforms were designed to address the problems created by these institutions by 
installing new ones, just as New Zealand had done in the 1980s. By incorporating 
the changes thus far and the results of the simulation model in Chapter Eight, it now 
becomes possible to describe an image of the expected institutional environment of 
JP and discuss the changes and internal consistency. 
                                                 
115 A ‘full reform’ meaning that all MVL-issues settle in positive values.  
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Figure 9-1 JP initial institutional environment  
 
 
 
The 2003 environment catered to special interests and stakeholders at the 
cost of efficiency by distorting savings incentives and channelling funds into Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme budgets. Amakudari landings also helped 
maintain the system. Using the final MVL locations from the simulation and the 
linkages they are expected to break116, institutional changes resulting from both the 
reforms to date and simulated changes are presented in alphabetical order.  
9.2.1 Amakudari 
 Operations (MVL5) suggests greater independence over operations 
management, which extends to outsourcing and support business selection 
processes. Separated business units should also help increase transparency to a 
degree and in turn make amakudari landings more conspicuous. These factors are 
expected to reduce amakudari pressure. Nevertheless, continued government 
influence through issues concerning shares (MVL4), minimum network (MVL7), 
and playing field (MVL2) does not eliminate amakudari pathways. The failure to 
completely remove insider governance also contributes to the continuation of 
amakudari.  
 In summary, JP has greater ability to resist amakudari by virtue of 
operational independence, but there needs to be more reform at a higher level to 
                                                 
116 See Table 8-7 for the changes suggested by the simulation. 
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disincentivise amakudari. Such changes are beyond the scope of this study however, 
as amakudari extends much further than just postal reform. 
9.2.2 Cross-subsidisation 
JPC received commissions from JPB and JPI amounting to approximately 
48% of all operating revenue in 2013 and MVL3 suggests that universal financial 
services will continue. Likewise, minimum network (MVL7) suggests that the 
minimum network clause will be preserved, placing a financial burden on the 
financial units. Separate listings of the financial units are marginally unlikely given 
the result of the shares (MVL4) and since the government is expected to maintain 
significant holdings in JPH as a result of the 2012 postal reform bill, this further 
increases the likelihood of cross-subsidisation continuing. 
Operations (MVL5) and asset management (MVL6), however, present a 
mitigating factor: the increased freedom to manage the network without 
interference, including post office closures and other real-estate ventures, may 
bolster operating revenue and reduce reliance on the financial arms. Ultimately 
however, the requirement to offer financial services through the network effectively 
guarantees sizable income and cross-subsidisation is expected to continue as mail 
volumes fall. 
9.2.3 Distorted savings incentives 
 This institution shows some signs of progress but other factors limit the 
amount of expected reform. Encouragingly, the removal of interest rate controls 
allows private banks to match JPB, however the raising of deposit caps permits 
individuals to save up to ￥20M in JPB. Whilst not technically guaranteed, 
government ownership has been argued by business circles to constitute an implicit 
guarantee that places JPB at an advantage. 
 Imposing universal financial services infers that JPB will have greater 
market exposure than other banks and this factor may play a role in the depositor’s 
choice. Similarly, as was noted in Chapter Three, the depth of the financial system 
is likewise important for savings decisions in addition to interest rates. Postal 
reform provides opportunities for JPB to expand its services and offer new products 
which lessens the service gap between JPB and private banks. 
 In summary, whilst some of the reasons to convert to postal savings have 
been removed, there is also little reason to leave JPB as it expands to cover 
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traditional banking products. Consumer decision-making is now based more on 
competitive advantage, although the implicit guarantee and forced national 
presence still artificially distort the market. 
9.2.4 Diversion of public funds 
 Postal links to the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme have been 
weakened, but the connections through playing field (MVL2) and shares (MVL4) 
are still in place. Government holdings in JPB and JPI limit their ability to enter 
new businesses117 and therefore Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme bonds still 
represent an attractive investment option for the units. For the time being, the 
majority of JPB and JPI funds are still placed in Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme bonds and therefore this institution is only moderately weakened. 
9.2.5 Insider governance 
 Progress at the executive level is encouraging. Following Abe’s purge of 
the DPJ-appointed board, outsider leadership was greatly increased. The Ministry 
of Finance does not have representation on the board, constituting a significant step 
towards separation of governance and ownership. Nevertheless, the influence of the 
postal lobby is not dismissible as they have since reunited with the LDP following 
the disbanding of the People’s New Party. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications still has freedom to appoint commissioned postmasters and there 
is not enough evidence to suggest these positions will not be influenced by political 
motivations. Operations (MVL5) suggests that JP will have greater autonomy with 
respect to employment. This, too, is encouraging but it does not preclude politically-
influenced postmaster appointments. 
 Overall, outsider governance structures have been implemented but there 
still remains work to be done at lower levels. As such, outsider governance is argued 
to replace the incumbent institution, at least at the executive level. 
9.2.6 Lobby influence 
 The postal lobby’s influence has decreased by way of supra-cabinet policy-
making organs where the lobby has less representation. The loss of public servant 
status has also reduced their power although at the same time it allows them to 
                                                 
117 Whilst the government maintains a majority shareholding, expansion is subject to approval. If 
over half the shares are sold, entry into new operations is by notification. 
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legally mobilise; in Japan, public servant status forbids mobilising for political 
goals. Union mergers and subsequent alliance with postmasters in opposing 
privatisation does mitigate losses of influence in policy debates to a degree however.  
 Overall, the lobby is still strong but has lost some of its most vocal 
supporters after the dissolution of the People’s New Party, although ties with the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications still appear to be present. The 
greatest progress in removing this institution is suggested to be the loss of influence 
in policy formation. 
9.2.7 Stakeholder wealth maximisation 
 A number of factors suggest that stakeholder wealth maximisation will 
persist. The requirement to provide full universal services, forced reopening of 
selected rural post offices, maintenance of a minimum postal network, 
implementation of the temporary worker conversion scheme, and unwillingness to 
lower entry barriers indicate that the government still places value in providing for 
those connected to JP Group over returns to shareholders. The separation of social 
and corporate objectives does not appear to have been successful, if even considered. 
9.2.8 Stable shareholding 
Shares (MVL4) suggests that the government will continue to hold a large 
percentage of JPH. The 2012 bill lessens obligations to sell and preserves a greater 
government stake. The financial units can engage in new business operations by 
notification once at least half of their shares are unloaded; in such an event 
purchases of Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme bonds would likely fall. 
However, the apparent unwillingness to list JPB and JPI separately may be linked 
to a reluctance to sever postal links to the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
as it would lessen the flow of capital into the so-called ‘second budget’. Resistance 
to foreign ownership has also been observed, particularly from the People’s New 
Party and former JP head Yoshifumi Nishikawa. The culmination of these points 
suggests that stable shareholding is likely to continue.  
9.2.9 New institutional environment 
 As a result of the aforementioned changes, an updated illustration of JP’s 
institutional environment appears as Figure 9-2: 
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Figure 9-2 JP simulated institutional environment  
 
 
9.2.10 Observations 
 The instalment of outsider leadership at the executive level is promising as 
it is often accompanied with increases in efficiency and productivity. Outsider 
leadership is expected to reduce the likelihood of amakudari landings occurring and 
whilst total preclusion is doubtful, this is consistent with reform ideology. However, 
JP’s objectives remain convoluted as stakeholder wealth maximisation governance 
principles still apply and this raises questions as to whether profitability incentives 
may be eroded.  
Requiring universal postal and financial services is a socially oriented 
policy and permeates many of the institutions listed above, stakeholder wealth 
maximisation in particular. Universal service limits flexibility and efficiency 
(Heitzler, 2010) and therefore dampens the positive influence of outsider 
governance. A second issue associated with universal service is the divergence 
between its cost of provision and revenues received as mail volumes decline. 
Mizutani and Uranishi (2006) estimate that the cost of universal service is large, 
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approximately JPY 348 billion118. Data from Japan Post Group (2013) also show a 
continual decline in mail volumes from 23.9 billion items in 2009 to 22.3 billion in 
2013: a 6.7% decrease in four years. Considering these data, it is likely that cross-
subsidisation will continue. Additionally, as a large proportion of the financial 
burden is absorbed by JPI and JPB, this reduces the likelihood that distorted savings 
incentives will be removed. This system is comparable to the pre-reform 
institutional context and therefore inconsistent with Koizumi’s ideology.  
A third issue is the opaque nature of universal service. Mizutani and 
Uranishi (2006) arrived at their results through estimation and whilst this is a 
considerable effort, it still infers that the exact figure, its sources and applications, 
are uncertain. Without transparency, there is the potential for opportunistic 
behaviour and inefficiency. 
Fourthly, universal service obligations are a primary reason for the 
maintenance of entry barriers. The 100,000 mailbox requirement was installed in 
direct response to universal service commitments. Distortions in the market are 
therefore directly linked to the continued entanglement of social and commercial 
objectives arising, at least in part, from universal service obligations. The failure to 
separate these conflicting goals therefore represents a major factor limiting reform 
effectiveness. In addition to all these points, the continuation of universal service in 
an environment where new communications technologies are steadily replacing 
physical mail correspondence grows increasingly questionable, particularly so 
when Japan’s national telecommunications provider, NTT, is also bound by 
universal service obligations that ensure access to such technologies. 
Nevertheless, greater operational freedom and expansion into new forms of 
business may result in funds moving towards investments other than JGBs or Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme bonds; this contributes to one of the goals for 
privatisation but it does not necessarily achieve a secondary objective of revitalising 
capital markets. The projected increases in profits for JPI and JPB may be to the 
detriment of private financiers and the possibility these profits might be utilised to 
provide socially desirable but commercially unjustified outcomes is concerning. 
Such an outcome was precisely one of the factors the New Zealand reforms sought 
to address. 
                                                 
118 This figure is presumably more today given the more recent requirement to include financial 
services. 
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 Given the stakeholder-leaning aspects of the proposed outcomes and the 
costs involved in maintaining them, it raises doubts with respect to finding private 
buyers for JPH. Performance measurements indicate the return on equity for JPH 
was 1.7% in 2013 and return on assets 1.5%. Return on assets for the group as a 
whole were 0.19% (Japan Post Group, 2013). Banking and insurance returns to 
equity were 4.05% and 6.95% respectively. The universal service and network 
obligations further enhance the social aspects of the business, potentially reducing 
the likelihood of finding buyers. Mizutani and Uranishi (2006) argue that by 
removing special post offices, costs could be decreased by JPY 75 billion per year. 
Profits could therefore be increased should more aspects of shareholder wealth 
maximisation be adopted, but this appears unlikely as the institution of stable 
shareholding is more likely to continue. 
 The findings of the simulation suggest that entry barriers will persist and the 
lack of full privatisation will preserve the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications’ involvement in the financial units through JP’s special regulatory 
office. These constitute two significant factors in the continual favouring of JP 
Group, representing an inconsistency with reform ideology considering the extra 
freedom afforded. Nevertheless, even though JGBs and Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme bonds still make up the vast majority of JPB and JPI investments, the 
percentage is gradually decreasing. The influence of the postal lobby has also 
decreased but still remains strong. Both of these points are consistent with reform 
ideology but require ongoing attention.  
 Ultimately, between the changes witnessed to date and the projections of 
the simulation, the reforms appear to be diverging from the course laid by the 
Koizumi government, whose objectives could be described as more akin to the New 
Zealand experience in terms of commercial orientation. Whilst not to the same 
degree historically speaking, there still appears to be remnants of a paternalist state 
visible in the regulatory structure, and JPC continues to be funded to a large extent 
by the financial units. This is not necessarily undesirable but the units are the 
recipients of artificial distortions that place them at an advantage; entry barriers to 
general correspondence are by far the greatest and effectively block private firms 
from operating in a market that would otherwise be contested. Whilst some progress 
has been made to weaken the institutions that first bound the post office, there is 
still much to be done and greater progress could have been achieved if not for the 
resistance encountered both during Koizumi’s term and subsequent administrations.  
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9.3 Inconsistencies in Partial Reform 
 With respect to the study’s overarching questions, it would seem that reform 
can be implemented in Japan but the outcomes are anticipated to fall significantly 
short of Koizumi’s goals. His administration appears to have exhibited a partial 
commitment to neoliberal ideals although stakeholder concerns were still prevalent. 
Subsequent administrations have been shown not to hold to the same ideology and 
thus the changes begun by Koizumi have been diluted to the point where only a 
partial reform is observed.  
 The debate of whether partial reform is preferable to none is both a matter 
of perspective and circumstance. In the case of the simulated changes, the study 
contends that there may be some marginal benefits although serious concerns exist. 
The additional freedom of operations and ability to expand into new businesses 
potentially threatens private sector interests, while preserving entry barriers and 
continued tilting of the playing field in favour of JP amplifies the risk. Increased 
deposit caps at JPB and universal financial services may also weaken the 
competitive positioning of private banks against JPB. From the perspective of the 
private sector therefore, no reform may indeed have been better than some. 
 Reforms can sometimes be visualised as representing a wall or a bridge; 
inconsistencies, compromises, and dilutions can be considered as damage to the 
structure. In the case of a wall, significant damage may be sustained yet, overall, 
the wall remains structurally sound. However, if one pictures an arched stone bridge, 
removal of the keystone can easily lead to collapse. In the case of New Zealand, the 
disentangling of social and commercial objectives formed such a keystone, and the 
manifest outcome of that desire was the SOE Act. Without this legislation, NZP, 
and many other SOEs, would likely have continued to operate as they had done, 
possibly becoming recipients of targeted legislation to ensure that their non-
commercial activities would continue to be provided should they be sold. 
 Japan appears to face a similar problem and many of the issues presented in 
Chapter Six stem from debates concerning the continued integration or separation 
of social and commercial objectives. The partial reform observed thus far is likely 
to be ineffective as long as these objectives remained intertwined. For example, 
creating a level playing field would presumably encourage more competition 
although simultaneously imposing socially-motivated constraints upon JP would, 
by their very nature, countermand such actions. It therefore may be preferable for 
Japan’s lawmakers to oblige JP to either serve as a social agency or a commercially-
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oriented organisation, but not both simultaneously. As it is, the continued 
integration of objectives perpetuates pre-reform institutions that have been shown 
to be problematic. 
 Universal service obligations also illustrate inconsistencies in the proposed 
partial reform. Postal services aside, forcing the provision of universal financial 
services directly contributes to the continuance of a number of problematic 
institutions. Through these services, financial markets are distorted, household 
incentives are warped, and cross-subsidisation is maintained. The rationale for 
including universal financial services stems from a desire to care for stakeholders. 
Such motivations are laudable although the government’s delivery mechanism, JP, 
creates a fundamental reform inconsistency as long as the two objectives are 
intertwined. Until this matter is addressed, the observed partial reforms will likely 
remain ineffective. 
 To reinforce the point, consider also some of the other stakeholder wealth 
maximisation principles that create inconsistencies with reform ideology, such as 
the minimum network requirements and the temporary worker conversion scheme. 
Whilst they doubtlessly provide benefits for their recipients, they reduce the 
efficacy of Koizumi’s envisioned reforms by further integrating socially-oriented 
policy into what was hoped to be a commercial operation. If the Japanese 
government wishes to continue advancing social policy through JP, it may be 
preferable for the state to purchase those services at full cost or provide subsidies 
to the equivalent value, perhaps even extending to all postal operators. Alternatively, 
if the government intends to allow JP the same liberties that private firms enjoy and 
the ability to compete within the same markets, the organisation should not be 
conflated with social and commercial objectives. This distinction was a vital 
component of the New Zealand reforms, a figurative keystone. As Koizumi’s goals 
shared a number of similarities to New Zealand, this distinction is also vital for 
Japan.  
9.4 New Zealand-Japan Comparison 
At the beginning of their respective processes, both the New Zealand and 
Japanese cases were governed by insiders, isolated by protective monopolies, and 
cross-subsidised by non-postal operations. Both were also inefficient providers of 
postal services, due in part to a lack of capital investment that was arguably 
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attributable to the motivations of both governments to use their respective agencies 
as a source of employment creation.  
The corresponding goals of the Lange and Koizumi administrations also 
display a number of parallels: a desire to reduce the size of the state, improve 
efficiency and remove cross-subsidisation, level the playing field, and introduce 
competition. In the Japanese case, an additional key objective was to separate the 
post office from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme and its inherent issues. 
Although the Post Office Savings Bank in New Zealand also held a high proportion 
of government bonds, the amount was insignificant to the economy when compared 
against Japan Post. The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme also created a 
number of issues for Japan that were not mirrored in New Zealand but nevertheless 
postal reform in both countries was considered part of wider structural reforms.  
At a fundamental level, the two administrations essentially pursued the same 
goals: greater transparency, accountability, self-reliance, and a separation between 
ownership and governance. Chapter Five showed that NZP represents a case where 
opposition to reform was overcome via an array of factors. The analyses presented 
in Chapter Six and Chapter Eight, however, suggest that Japan’s case falls 
significantly short of Koizumi’s goals and that whilst some of the changes enacted 
are promising, more work is needed yet. 
9.4.1 Key factors explaining the differences in outcomes 
 There are some factors that aid in explaining the disparate outcomes. At the 
broadest level they can be categorised as either resistance-based or ideology-based. 
 One of the most important factors in explaining the ‘failure’119 of Japan’s 
reforms lies in resistance levied against them. Although it has since been weakened, 
the postal lobby had the ability to exert considerable influence over 
parliamentarians and policy making. Resistance from postmasters in Japan was 
considerably stronger than New Zealand as they were more involved in the political 
process and had deeper interests in the continuation of the status quo. Postmasters 
in Japan had their own union; New Zealand did not. This would have allowed 
postmasters to highlight issues that directly affected them more so than had they 
been part of a broader, more inclusive union where their interests would be diluted 
among the collective. Japanese postmasters also frequently owned the physical 
                                                 
119The term ‘failure’ is used in this case to describe the inability to achieve Koizumi’s vision for JP. 
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premises themselves, were connected to special postal corporations, collected votes 
for their respective patrons, and held positions of regard with the possibility of 
ascending into political office. All of these points serve to strengthen incentives to 
maintain the pre-reform arrangement. New Zealand by comparison did not have 
such a system, although postal employees did hold the title of ‘civil servant’. 
Nonetheless, the entwining of private interests and possibilities of economic rents 
help explain why internal resistance in Japan was so much stronger. As a result, 
New Zealand’s reforms were less vulnerable to the pressures of special interests as 
their opportunity costs were less. 
 Intrinsic factors aside, New Zealand took a number of deliberate actions that 
helped overcome reform resistance. The scale of reform was critical. Had reforms 
been implemented on a piecemeal basis it is quite possible that opposing 
stakeholders could have capitalised on the focused attention and politicised it to 
their advantage. As it was, such a broad package reduced the ability for particular 
groups to promote their cause over others. In effect, the scale of reform effectively 
diluted the relative power of interest groups. Japan’s case differs as it appears to 
exhibit a more sequential approach.  
 Another key difference was the speed of the New Zealand reforms. To offer 
perspective, consider that Koizumi intended for JP to be privatised 12 years after 
his bills initially passed, and even that was considered too rapid by many within his 
own party, let alone the opposition. In the same time period, New Zealand had 
corporatized and privatised some 30 SOEs, completely overhauled the public sector, 
deregulated banking, and rewritten regulations surrounding trade, industry, and the 
labour market. Such speed allowed the government to capitalise on political power 
and enact changes such that by the time that transition costs began to mount, the 
most painful aspects had already been implemented. Speed was critical to 
overcoming resistance; changes were occurring so rapidly that opposition forces 
had little time to respond. In this respect, Koizumi’s approach was reminiscent of 
New Zealand’s, but was subsequently undermined by successive administrations. 
 The State Owned Enterprises Act was also an important point for reducing 
resistance when compared with Japan. The Act encompassed all SOEs, creating a 
consistent regulatory framework between them (notwithstanding industry-specific 
rules). Japan’s approach differs. Public corporations often have legislation 
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specifically drafted to them, including Japan Post 120 . Targeted bills provide 
advantages in terms of tailoring specific clauses to specific organisations but also 
present opportunities for special interests to influence policy formation. The postal 
lobby has been argued to possess less sway in policy but less must not be confused 
with none. If special interest groups had sought to influence the SOE Act it would 
have affected every SOE, and manipulating overarching policy would likely be far 
more difficult than organisation-specific policy.  
 Other critical factors stem from differences in ideologies. Again, the SOE 
Act served a number of purposes, chief among which was the requirement to 
produce profits and operate as private businesses would. This was a particularly 
important factor for countering resistance from the rural sector. The requirement to 
focus on efficiency and profitability as opposed to providing social benefits gave 
the company a clear set of objectives, diminishing the justification for the counter-
argument. Postmasters in Japan often praised the socially-leaning aspects of the 
post office, using such points as evidence that the status quo should be maintained. 
Such notions would conflict with the SOE Act and therefore be rendered impotent. 
Indeed, the lawsuits brought against NZP with respect to rural delivery were 
dismissed on those very grounds and hence the Act was an important factor in 
overcoming resistance.  
  The Act was also a critical component in separating ownership from 
governance and shareholder wealth maximisation played an important role in its 
ideological foundation. The New Zealand Government wanted to disentangle 
commercial and social objectives; SOEs would focus on the former and government 
agencies the latter. Japan by comparison still exhibits behaviour indicative of a 
desire to realise social objectives through JP. The effective separation of objectives 
can be observed in terms of postal network penetration. In New Zealand, the 
number of PostShops121 decreased by 17.33% between 2008 and 2011, largely in 
response to changing market dynamics, implying that NZP responded to 
competitive pressures as a private company would by reducing fixed costs. Over 
the same time period, JP’s network only decreased by 0.06% despite considerable 
decreases in consigned mail deliveries. The language of the respective annual 
reports also differs: NZP’s 2012 report refers to ‘social responsibility’ on three 
                                                 
120Although JPB and JPI are subject to the industry-wide Banking Act and Insurance Business Act, 
they are still administered by the FSA special office. 
121 Post offices in New Zealand are referred to as PostShops. 
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occasions whilst JP’s 2012 report promotes its ‘social contribution’ and ‘social 
mission’ approximately 27 times. As of their most recent annual report, NZP is also 
engaging with the government to propose changes to the Deed of Understanding to 
increase flexibility, indicating that the company is pursuing multiple avenues to 
streamline the business. Negotiations are still ongoing. Finally, it must be noted that 
whilst NZP is contractually bound to certain delivery and network criteria with 
respect to postal operations, the provision of financial services is at the discretion 
of the company. JP however is obligated by legislation to provide both universal 
postal and financial services. All of these points contribute to the observation that 
commercial and social objectives have been disconnected in New Zealand but not 
in Japan.  
 The differences in ideologies can perhaps most clearly be seen in the 
comparative approaches to universal service. Under Koizumi’s leadership, the LDP 
pressed for universal postal service but Taro Aso122 and other sections of the LDP 
supported by the postal lobby argued for the inclusion of financial services too123. 
Universal service became the first clause of the postal reform bill, although 
financial services were not included. When the DPJ rose to power and the postal 
lobby defected to the People’s New Party these two parties also favoured universal 
service, as did other minor parties including the Social Democratic Party and the 
Japanese Communist Party. In summary, universal service appears to be supported 
by the majority of the Japanese political spectrum, although the strongest opposition 
forces also wanted financial services included in the obligations; under the 
DPJ/People’s New Party coalition they were. In New Zealand, the issue was far less 
inflammatory and addressed via simple contractual agreement. Even then, the limits 
it imposed (including 240 post offices) are loose ones which NZP outperforms by 
a comfortable margin even today. 
 Traditional Japanese government/business ties and cultural attitudes 
significantly contribute to explaining the observed rationale. The ties between 
government and businesses in Japan have long been recognised and are enduring 
practices, which also extend to providing stakeholder benefits. Lifetime 
employment, company loyalty, and government subsidies to maintain employment 
levels are hallmarks of Japanese corporate governance. The development of ‘iron 
                                                 
122 Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications from September 2003 to October 2005. 
123 The postal lobby still supported the LDP at this time. 
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triangles’, amakudari, and other opportunistic behaviour associated with the 
government/business interconnect is not despite this arrangement, but rather 
because of it. To the Japanese government, the separation of social and commercial 
objectives appears to be a difficult concept to adopt as it runs contrary to well-
established practices and cultural values. These practices and cultural values must 
not be lightly dismissed either as they formed a part of Japan’s highly successful 
post-war economic growth model. Despite many years of economic recession, the 
Japanese still enjoy a high standard of living. The general support for universal 
service across the political spectrum suggests that, for the majority of Japanese 
politicians, they are as yet unwilling to relinquish these cultural values.  
 One final point was the continuation of reform despite a change in 
government. New Zealand’s process began in 1984 under Labour; when National 
took power in 1990 they did not seek to undo the changes made. This was not the 
case in Japan. Two factors aid in providing an explanation. Firstly, New Zealand’s 
two major parties shared an ideological grounding in neoliberalism, favouring 
greater economic freedom and liberalisation. Secondly, interest groups had been 
largely rendered impotent by the scope of reform. In Japan, the DPJ originally 
began as a reform-oriented party but reversed course following coalition 
agreements with the People’s New Party who had captured the support of the 
postmasters. Further progress may have occurred had the Japanese government 
undertaken a more holistic approach rather than a piecemeal one. It must be noted 
however that whilst the successive reform efforts in New Zealand contributed to 
the observed outcome, it is unclear whether a similar result would occur should the 
New Zealand experience be ‘run again’. 
9.4.2 New Zealand-style reforms in Japan 
 New Zealand-style reforms could potentially be used in Japan but hinge on 
three crucial elements. The regulatory environment needs to be neutral regarding 
private businesses and entry barriers must be removed. Transparency of the public 
sector is critical, particularly so if the government intends to maintain ownership of 
JPB and JPI whilst the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme still operates. 
Incidentally, New Zealand ranks first on the political corruption index 
(Transparency International, 2014). Finally, there must be a clear separation 
between social and commercial objectives as opposed to a mixture of the two. In 
this respect, New Zealand’s experience goes much further towards achieving a 
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neoliberal ‘ideal’ and given the current landscape of Japanese politics it seems 
unlikely that Japan could enact similar changes. Nevertheless, the New Zealand 
experience has often been criticised for marginalising social concerns; between that 
and the unadulterated Western ideals neoliberalism embodies, there is also the 
question of whether such reforms are congruent with Japanese cultural values.  
The scope of New Zealand reforms was more encompassing, covering SOEs 
and the public sector as a whole; they were also enacted more rapidly. Given the 
scale of the Japanese economy and public sector, New Zealand-style reforms would 
be much more difficult to implement and carry substantially higher levels of 
inherent risk. Nevertheless, the nature of implementation in New Zealand was an 
important factor in reducing resistance and represents a key point of difference in 
explaining why New Zealand was successful whereas Japan was not. 
Whilst the political setting may make it difficult to enact similar reforms in 
Japan, the management practices employed at the time by NZP would be less 
provocative. The combination of exit packages, close working relationships with 
the unions, employee investment, and potential career opportunities may assist in 
fostering a change in corporate culture. Greater changes in the wider economy at 
the same time would likely help in instilling a recognition of the need for change, 
although without greater structural reform this may prove more challenging.  
Nevertheless, the SOE Act offers Japanese lawmakers a potentially useful 
alternative. Section Seven compels the state to adequately compensate the SOE for 
imposed non-commercial activities. In effect, the ‘social service’ aspects could still 
be provided through JP but directly financed by the state. This would allow the 
government to revise the postal reform bill and disentangle the conflicting 
objectives. JP could then be permitted to operate more like private firms and focus 
on profitability and efficiency. Secondly, as the distortions to the playing field arose 
out of the need to insulate JP with respect to its universal service obligations, 
government funding for universal services would alleviate the need for such barriers 
and the market could therefore be deregulated. This alternative arrangement is 
explored further in the following subsection. 
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9.5 ‘Section Seven’ Runs 
 Under Section Seven, the New Zealand SOE Act provides an avenue for the 
government to deliver socially-motivated policies through SOEs, providing they are 
appropriately compensated. Should the Japanese government employ a similar 
legislative device it is possible that some of the players may soften their attitudes 
over selected issues. It is assumed that part of their rationale stems from fears of 
losses of socially desirable services. The postal lobby for instance has cited 
universal financial services as a desirable facet of JP, particularly so with respect to 
elderly and rural residents. Likewise, maintaining at least one post office in every 
village ensures all citizens have access to a range of essential services. They are 
concerned that privatisation may endanger these services and hence oppose the 
reforms. 
 As these examples serve social purposes, the SOE Act would compel the 
New Zealand Government to pay NZP for their provision or tender with all 
providers to maintain universal services. Were Japan to adopt a similar strategy, 
service levels would be maintained, assuaging opposition fears, and JP would be 
directly compensated by the state. This alternative would also relieve pressure on 
the financial units to cross-subsidise postal operations. Under such a hypothetical 
arrangement it is assumed that players aligned against universal financial services 
(MVL3) and minimum network (MVL7) would review their opposition and shift 
position upwards over these two issues. 
 Using the simulation model, two alternate series of data were created; the 
first adjusted the positions of all players opposing universal financial services 
(MVL3) in 0.1 steps. This included the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication, the Ministry of Finance, the LDP opposition elements, the ‘Kamei’ 
group, and the DPJ opposition elements. The second adjusted positions of all 
players opposing universal financial services (MVL3) and minimum network 
(MVL7) in 0.1 steps, including all the previously mentioned groups plus the DPJ 
reform elements. 
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Figure 9-3 MVL differences to control run from stepping MVL3 
 
 
 Figure 9-3 shows that stepped increases in positions over universal financial 
services (MVL3) produce increasingly larger changes; this is expected as greater 
support implies a greater chance of reform. Upward steps also have positive effects 
upon issues involving playing field (MVL2), operations (MVL5), and asset 
management (MVL6). What is interesting is that these secondary effects have the 
same magnitude, suggesting that the first step sparks a critical event. Excluding 
universal financial services (MVL3), 18 other player inputs are affected as a result 
of stepping universal financial services (MVL3), six of which relate to the Ministry 
of Finance. The ministry’s initial position over universal financial services (MVL3) 
is -0.05 and therefore the first step allows other reform-oriented players to lobby 
and challenge them. In other words, a small change in the ministry’s attitude 
regarding universal financial services changes their fundamental view point from 
very marginal opposition to very marginal support. This provides an opportunity 
for other reform-supporting players to apply further pressure to the ministry and 
capture gains over other issues. 
 Also of interest is the point that increasing positions on the universal service 
issue causes decreases in MVL values for separation (MVL1) and minimum 
network (MVL7), suggesting that if universal financial services are purchased by 
the state, resistance forces move on to other concerns. The first data series assumes 
only universal services are state-funded, not the minimum network. It therefore 
intuitively seems that opposition forces would harden their attitudes over the 
minimum network as this becomes their new centre of attention. 
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Figure 9-4 Probability of issue reform after stepping MVL3 
 
 
 Figure 9-4 displays the probability of each issue’s reform. The control run 
is represented by the black crosses. Stepping universal financial services (MVL3) 
produces slightly higher probabilities of reforming playing field (MVL2), 
operations (MVL5), and asset management (MVL6). Separation (MVL1) is 
slightly less likely but retains a better than even chance. Minimum network (MVL7) 
probability is very low. As expected, universal financial services (MVL3) shows 
the greatest sensitivity but only rises above 0.5 with a step of 0.6, meaning that 
opposing players would have to be quite confident of promises that universal 
financial services would be suitably delivered. Nevertheless, the efficacy index 
rises from 0.4828 to marginally over 0.5 following steps of 0.2 or more, indicating 
that this alternative is at least partially effective.  
 The second data series assumes that both universal financial services 
(MVL3) and minimum network (MVL7) will be state-funded.  
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Figure 9-5 MVL differences to control run from stepping MVL3 and MVL7 
 
 
 Figure 9-5 shows that stepping opposition players over universal financial 
services (MVL3) and minimum network (MVL7) produces more varied outcomes 
than universal financial services (MVL3) alone. More often than not, higher 
positions over these two issues lead to increases elsewhere. Interestingly, by 
offering to secure universal financial services and a minimum network, it is possible 
to realise gains over separation (MVL1) and playing field (MVL2). This may 
reflect a change in attitude amongst opposition players whereby once the social 
aspects of the organisation have been addressed they feel more comfortable with 
the idea of a more commercially-oriented JP.  
 Shares (MVL4) presents an interesting outcome. Whilst it did not change at 
all in the first data series, here we observe considerable decreases in its MVL value, 
particularly at higher steps. This suggests that as the government becomes 
responsible for financing the social aspects, parties become less willing to offer 
individual floats of JPI and JPB, and a greater likelihood of restricted foreign 
ownership arises. Intuitively, this might be interpreted as reluctance to allow others 
to profit from a more commercially-oriented JP whilst the state supplies non-
commercial activities through it.  
 
 337 
Figure 9-6 Probability of issue reform after stepping MVL3 and MVL7 
 
 
 As with Figure 9-4, Figure 9-6 presents the likelihood of each issue 
reforming. By comparison there is considerably more variance in each step’s 
respective probability values. Steps of 0.3 and 0.4 produce four issues with a greater 
than even chance of reform whilst a step of 0.6 yields five issues with probabilities 
greater than 0.5. Steps of 0.4 to 0.6 produce efficacy index values of 0.5946, 0.5999, 
and 0.5669 respectively, suggesting that whilst still short of the ‘ideal’, applying 
Section Seven of New Zealand’s SOE Act represents a significant improvement in 
the overall likelihood of reform. 
9.6 The Impact of Changed Attitudes to Reform 
Another possible alternative examined here is to analyse the effects of 
changing attitudes to reform by adjusting initial player positions over every issue, 
singularly, in groups, and finally by raising consensus. This is done by 
incrementally increasing positions over all MVL-issues in steps of 0.1, representing 
increasing support for reforms124. However, as players have different positions on 
each of the issues, a limiter was installed whereby once position over a particular 
issue reached +1, no further steps could be applied to that issue125. The maximum 
step applied in these tests had a magnitude of 1. Data were generated for individual 
                                                 
124 Or, depending on the player, less opposed to the issues, but this is a matter of semantics.  
125 For instance, if a player had a position of 0.7 over MVL1 and 0.4 over MVL2, a step of 0.4 would 
raise the initial positions to 1 and 0.8 respectively; the limiter ensures that only 0.3 can be added to 
MVL1 and 0.6 added to MVL2. 
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players, joint action from the three major reform groups, and finally all player 
groups shifting simultaneously. The figures are presented in Table 9-1 
Table 9-1 Incremental steps to position over every MVL-issue 
 
9.6.1 Shifts in the reform attitudes of individual players 
Table 9-1 shows the greatest changes to average efficacy from unilateral 
action deriving from opposition players. In rank order, the best results for reform 
supporters come from changes to the ‘Kamei’ group, the Ministry of Finance, the 
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Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the LDP opposition elements, 
the LDP reform elements, the business community, and finally the DPJ reform 
elements. The findings appear logically consistent as players who already support 
reforms have less ‘headroom’ than opposition forces. Similarly, larger steps are 
more likely to cause a change in MVL sign whereby reform forces can then bring 
other strategic options to bear. Larger steps are also generally associated with higher 
efficacy values, particularly for the ‘Kamei’ group, LDP opposition, and DPJ 
opposition elements, however larger steps also imply greater changes in attitude 
and therefore become proportionately less likely for these players given their views 
on privatisation.  
Without exception, changing attitudes of single players resulted in some 
MVL values rising and some MVL values falling, indicating that a single player 
acting in isolation does not have the capacity to cause global gains; some 
compromises must be made as Figure 9-7 and Figure 9-8 exemplify. 
 
Figure 9-7 Probability of issue reform: stepping all issues - LDP reform elements 
 
By increasing the LDP reform element’s initial position to reflect a stronger 
reform attitude over all issues, separation (MVL1) increases over all runs although 
losses can occur elsewhere, particularly in operations (MVL5). Nevertheless, all 
runs except step 0.5 produce slightly higher efficacy values than the control run. 
Whilst this player is the most supportive of reforms and therefore has the least 
‘headroom’ for position steps, it is also the most powerful, meaning that the 
exchanges, challenges, and salience lobbying it enters into have proportionately 
more impact on other players.  
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Figure 9-8 Probability of issue reform: stepping all issues - 'Kamei' group 
 
 
The ‘Kamei’ group runs display considerably more variance than the LDP 
reform group runs. In this sense the results comply with expectations as higher 
positions are associated with disengagement of its activation matrix126, meaning 
that as their attitudes shift more towards support they take less opposing action. For 
the most part, reducing this player’s opposition has significant positive effects on 
the first three issues although shares (MVL4) and operations (MVL5) decrease 
considerably. Nevertheless, the weighting coefficients of the efficacy index are 
such that, overall, the gains in the first three issues more than compensate for losses 
over shares (MVL4) and operations (MVL5).  
It is also interesting to note that of the DPJ reform group’s nine runs, seven 
of them result in worse outcomes. This is due in part to its relatively weak clout 
value whereby it must give significantly more ground than more powerful players. 
Excluding the DPJ reform elements, increasing support for reforms via unilateral 
action can improve outcomes. However, as the largest gains result from changing 
the attitudes of opposition forces these scenarios are probably more difficult to 
engender than changes to reform-oriented players.  
9.6.2 Shifts in the reform attitudes of groups of players 
The three player groups that most support reform are the LDP reform 
elements, the business community, and the DPJ reform elements. From this 
                                                 
126 Even the first step of 0.1 disengages the ‘Kamei’ group’s initial activation over MVL5 and MVL6. 
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triumvirate, four possible combinations arise and the results are summarised in 
Table 9-1. For the most part, multilateral action affects outcomes positively 
however out of the 39 runs performed, two create slightly worse outcomes when 
the DPJ reform elements are paired with another partner. Table 9-1 also indicates 
that best results for reform occur from the combination of all three reform-oriented 
parties followed by joint action from the LDP reform elements and the business 
community. 
 
Figure 9-9 Probability of issue reform: stepping all issues - LDP reform elements 
& business community 
 
 
Figure 9-9 shows joint action from the LDP reform elements and the 
business community producing better outcomes than the control run for most issues. 
Steps of 0.2, 0.4, and 0.7 produce four MVL-issues where the probability of reform 
is greater than 0.5. The step of 0.7 offers the highest efficacy value from this series 
where separation (MVL1), playing field (MVL2), operations (MVL5), and asset 
management (MVL6) issues are more likely to pass. 
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Figure 9-10 Probability of issue reform: stepping all issues - LDP reform elements, 
DPJ reform elements & business community 
 
 
Figure 9-10 shows action from the three reform-oriented players improving 
outcomes for most issues except operations (MVL5) and minimum network 
(MVL7). However, even though concessions over operational independence are 
made, it is still more likely than not to pass. The step of 0.3, representing a moderate 
increase in reform attitudes, has the highest efficacy index of 0.5833. However, 
steps of 0.4 to 0.8 yield five MVL-issues with probabilities of 0.5 or greater and 
steps of 0.9 and 1 yield six. These results suggest that multilateral action can 
significantly affect reform outcomes. Figure 9-11 offers a comparative illustration 
of the effects of multilateral action against the control run in terms of the efficacy 
index. 
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Figure 9-11 Efficacy values from multilateral action 
 
 
For the most part, multilateral changes in reform attitudes increase the 
efficacy index above its control value. Bigger gains are generally associated with 
greater shifts and between the four possible combinations joint action from all three 
players is most preferable followed by the LDP reform elements/business 
community pairing. 
9.6.3 Shifts in the reform attitudes of all players 
The last series of runs measures the effects of stepping the initial positions 
of all players upwards, representing a greater consensus favouring reform. 
Logically inferring higher outcomes, this test would therefore also expose 
anomalous behaviour in the model. Without exception, every step resulted in higher 
probabilities than the control run. Probabilities for individual runs are compared 
against the control run in Figure 9-12. 
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Figure 9-12 Probability of issue reform: global position steps 
 
 
Whilst the probabilities of MVL-issue reform universally increase, the gains 
themselves do not uniformly increase as Figure 9-13 illustrates: 
 
Figure 9-13 MVL values from global position steps 
 
 
The control run appears at the extreme left and the progression of each issue 
follows its respective colour-coded line as step magnitude rises. At no point do steps 
result in values lower than their control probabilities but the changing dynamics 
create some peaks and troughs. The most difficult issues to cross into positive 
values (where the probability of reform is greater than 0.5) are the minimum network 
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(MVL7) and universal financial services (MVL3) issues, although universal 
financial services (MVL3) requires a smaller step. This is interesting as it was these 
very issues that were addressed earlier through the ‘Section Seven’ runs.  
9.6.4 Summary: Global position shift  
An increasing consensus favouring reforms produces the greatest increases 
in MVL values and accompanying efficacy index values. Whilst this would be most 
preferred for the reform-minded individual, it is also the least likely as it represents 
all factions moving towards Koizumi’s viewpoint. Changing attitudes for individual 
players can also produce gains although there are many cases where the actions of 
weaker players can result in outcomes worse than the control run. Even for the 
strongest players, compromises have to be made, which indicates that a player 
acting in isolation is insufficient to foster positive change across all issues. However, 
when a coalition of reform-minded players simultaneously revise their attitudes, 
compromises become comparatively smaller relative to observed gains. Joint action 
between the LDP reform elements, DPJ reform elements, and business community 
represents the better option, although the outcomes from the LDP reform elements 
and business community pairing is also preferable to the control run. The likelihood 
of these ‘coalitions’ arising is greater than fostering a change in consensus; they are 
also more effective than players acting individually and therefore represent an 
attractive strategic alternative to increase the probability of reform.  
9.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 By integrating the analyses presented in Chapter Six and Chapter Eight, 
Chapter Nine has developed a simulated institutional environment for Japan Post. 
Whilst the institutions of distorted savings incentives, diversion of public funds, 
and lobby influence have been weakened and outsider governance has been 
installed at the executive level, stakeholder wealth maximisation, cross-
subsidisation, and stable holding are expected to remain. When viewed in their 
entirety, the reforms enacted to date and the model’s simulated outputs constitute 
only a partial reform that creates a number of internal inconsistencies. One of the 
greatest concerns is the increased freedom and scope to expand into new business 
and thus infringe upon the private sector whilst retaining a number of artificial 
advantages, entry barriers being a chief example. 
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 It is argued that a critical factor hampering the effectiveness of Japanese 
reform is the continued entanglement of social and commercial objectives. A 
clearer distinction is suggested to be superior to the current arrangement as it would 
clarify objectives and separate otherwise incongruent governance principles and 
incentives. The delineation of social and commercial objectives is argued to 
represent a ‘keystone’ for the Japanese experience and the ineffectiveness of the 
observed partial reform is largely due to their continued amalgamation. The basis 
for this claim derives from a comparative analysis of JP and NZP. Separation of 
social and commercial objectives was a key part of the New Zealand experience 
and was achieved through the SOE Act. The importance of this point becomes 
clearer when noting that the initial goals of the Japanese and New Zealand 
governments displayed marked similarities. In New Zealand, where social and 
commercial goals had been separated, NZP has since become a commercially 
successful company, returning dividends and taxes to the state almost every year 
whilst simultaneously improving service performance and even claiming the title 
of “Company of the Year”. Such results would likely not have materialised if not 
for the effective separation of objectives. 
 Reforms in Japan have been shown to suffer more delays and dilution at the 
hands of opposition forces than New Zealand. In New Zealand, resistance was 
overcome by a combination of factors including reform speed and scope, legislative 
support, a continued commitment to neoliberal ideology from both major political 
parties, and a conciliatory approach from management.  
 Whilst some of these lessons may be difficult to implement in Japan, Section 
Seven of the SOE Act offers a potentially viable alternative. Using this legislative 
device, the Japanese government could ‘purchase’ the non-commercial activities, 
represented in the simulation by universal financial services (MVL3) and minimum 
network (MVL7). This would maintain current service levels and assuage (some) 
opposition fears, thereby increasing the likelihood of reform. It would also be a step 
towards objective separation; if the government were to finance the socially-leaning 
aspects, JP would be more able to focus on commercial concerns and apply 
corresponding models of corporate governance. This arrangement would, however, 
require transparency and proper accounting methods to ensure that the true cost of 
providing such non-commercial activities is correctly estimated and properly 
communicated. 
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 The chapter also found that changing attitudes towards reform, represented 
by increasing position on all issues, also produced higher MVL values. If this were 
to occur there is a corresponding greater probability for reform. Nevertheless, to 
claim truly successful separation of social and commercial objectives with 
reasonable conviction would require changes in reform attitudes to a point where 
all MVL-issues are positive. Although this is not impossible, it would be difficult. 
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10 Conclusion 
 This thesis conducts a comparative study of institutional change and in 
doing so examines the economic issues in reforming New Zealand and Japanese 
postal services. Using Institutional Economics as a theoretical foundation, it 
examines the initial institutions that constrained both systems and tracks reform and 
institutional evolution. The study is important as Japan is currently privatising its 
postal system, which is widely considered a significant milestone towards greater 
structural reform. The work represents a more timely approach to studies of 
institutional change as many focus on comparative institutional changes 
retrospectively. Through the use of the simulation model, however, comparisons 
can be drawn against simulated outcomes. 
10.1 The Story So Far 
 Constructing a comparison begins with the New Zealand case described in 
Chapter Five. By the 1980s, the initial institutional environment had become ill-
suited to efficiency, constrained competition, and served state welfare objectives 
relating to employment creation. Reforms were implemented in response to a 
declining economy and falling international competitiveness; covering broad 
swathes of the economy, they included the landmark State Owned Enterprises Act, 
which this study identifies as a critical element in separating ownership from 
governance and disentangling commercial and social objectives. The separation of 
social and commercial objectives was found to be one of the highest ranking 
objectives of the state and I contend that their division represented a ‘keystone’ of 
the reforms as their integration had created many of the problems faced by NZP.  
 One of the major gaps in New Zealand’s reform literature was the matter of 
how resistance was overcome. To address this issue, I conducted a series of 
interviews with range of participants who had intimate knowledge of the New 
Zealand experience. It was found that resistance was minimised through careful use 
of legislation, the wide scope of reform, rapid implementation, and managerial 
acuity. The resulting post-reform institutional environment represents a paradigm 
shift and is much more conducive to efficiency and competition. 
 This study also offers an answer to the question of why NZP was 
corporatised, but never privatised. Interview data suggest that a number of factors 
culminated in the decision not to privatise NZP, the most significant of which were 
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the ongoing commercial success of NZP and a change in the political landscape that 
reflected the public’s hesitance regarding further asset sales. 
 The analysis then turns to tracing the Japanese experience and is described 
in Chapter Six. Expert interviews were conducted here as well to establish a better 
understanding of changes made since 2005. A similar pre-reform institutional 
environment was found although one key difference was the connection between 
JP and the Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme, a primary source of economic 
inefficiency. Whilst government bonds did make up a similar proportion of New 
Zealand’s postal savings bank, the size of the bank, and the actual amount of 
government bonds held was trivial by comparison. Prior to reform, the amount of 
money Japan Post had invested in JGBs was over 1,700 times more than its New 
Zealand counterpart. 
Discussions with interview participants indicated that postal privatisation 
was considered to play a key role in greater structural reform and capital market 
revitalisation. Reform implementation occurred but only by way of concessions, 
coercion, and Koizumi’s leadership. Delays and interferences from successive 
administrations hindered progress. The chapter concluded by charting reform 
evolution to the present date, providing the basis for the simulation model 
developed in Chapter Seven to predict final expected outcomes. 
 The model simulates negotiations between an array of players over a 
selection of issues. It is based upon the principle that greater support for an MVL-
issue’s proposal corresponds with a greater likelihood of that proposal being 
adopted. Initial inputs are derived from expert opinion. The model synthesises 
approaches used in other investigations and supplements them with additional 
player strategies and functionality. Extensive original contributions are made 
through the algorithms developed for salience lobbying and position exchanges. 
The facility to override default behaviour also represents a significant innovation in 
this field as it allows a wider range of underlying assumptions to be explored. Its 
complexity127  is such that it can process much more information than thought 
experiments and therefore can return interesting and potentially counter-intuitive 
results. 
                                                 
127 Recall that for this application covering seven issues with eight players, 1.2 million equations are 
processed in 3,300 calculation centres. 
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 Detailed results of the simulation appear in Chapter Eight where the control 
run estimates final outcomes. The group is expected to maintain its three-unit 
structure in addition to the holding company, the playing field remains tilted in 
favour of JP, and universal service extends to financial products. Share sales will 
likely not include separate floats of JPB and JPI, although the units are expected to 
be given greater freedom with less government interference in terms of operations, 
personnel, and asset management. Finally, the simulation also shows that there is a 
very high likelihood that the minimum network presence clause will remain in place.  
 Using the simulation’s outputs, Chapter Nine presents an image of the 
expected institutional environment. Whilst some of the institutions are weakened 
relative to the pre-reform arrangement, many of them remain in place; cross-
subsidisation, stable shareholding, and stakeholder wealth maximisation in 
particular. Comparing the two countries shows that the progenitors of reforms 
shared a number of similar goals. Nevertheless, the study shows that New Zealand 
was able to enact proposals and conclude reforms. Only a partial reform appears in 
Japan and produces a number of inconsistencies, not least of which is the threat to 
the private sector an expanding JP constitutes.  
 I contend that one of the primary factors hampering reform efforts in Japan 
is the continued intertwinement of social and commercial objectives as this 
obfuscates corporate governance practices, misaligns incentives, and perpetuates 
many of the pre-reform institutions. As the goals of the original reformists in New 
Zealand and Japan shared many similarities and the separation of objectives was a 
vital part in the New Zealand experience, I suggest that separation of social and 
commercial objectives is also a ‘keystone’ of the Japanese reforms and without it, 
reforms may remain partial and ineffective. With respect to this point, Chapter Nine 
offered an alternative whereby the socially-leaning MVL-issues were assumed to 
be purchased by the state; the resulting outputs yielded a higher probability of 
overall reform. This is doubly encouraging when considering Boycko et al. (1996), 
who note that the cost of subsidies from the Treasury are related to monetary policy. 
A loose monetary stance reduces the costs of subsidisation. Japan’s stance is very 
loose. A secondary alternative was also proposed whereby if reform forces were to 
polarise initial positions over all issues, the likelihood of reform also increases 
although the requisite actions leading to such changes in initial positions would be 
the subject of further research. 
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10.2 Implications 
The findings of this study present some contributions to institutional change 
theory within IE, primarily by supplying empirical evidence from two separate 
reform instances. The study finds that external changes in the pre-reform 
institutional environments created problems and in response a series of changes 
were proposed. Furthermore, in the case of New Zealand, the interlocking 
institutions were reformed simultaneously and with NZP having relatively high 
cognitive openness, successful changes were made very quickly. In Japan, it 
appears that there is a degree of inconsistency that may result in a longer transitory 
period. Both of these two conclusions support the notions presented in institutional 
change theory. 
There are also some implications for the privatisation literature. Whilst the 
Japanese section of the work concurs with Peng (2002) in the sense that reforms 
can be diluted following the departure of their progenitors, it also presents evidence 
to the contrary via the New Zealand experience whereby reforms were continued 
despite a change in government. This was perhaps due to the pervasiveness of 
neoliberal ideology in both major parties at the time.  
Child-Hill and Fujita (2000) contend that close ties between politicians and 
the bureaucracy can hamper reform efforts. This study supports the claim in both 
the positive and negative contexts as dilutions were witnessed in Japan where close 
ties exist, but not in New Zealand, where reforms were implemented as intended. 
 The simulation model used to complete a pre-reform/post-reform image of 
Japan has a number of implications for advancing multi-player multi-issue 
negotiation theory. At the time of writing, it is one of very few models of this type 
to numerically process three distinctive strategic options, which therefore places it 
amongst the most sophisticated alternatives. Although the Stokman model also 
proposes three strategies, some components are manually processed, which limits 
the number of players and issues that can be analysed. Similarly, some models 
consider only the more motivated and able players to be active, while other models 
assume that all players are active over all issues. The model provided here has the 
facility to accommodate both sets of assumptions and can do so on a player-specific, 
issue-specific, and round-specific basis128. Thus, whilst inspired and adapted from 
                                                 
128 The override can be engaged at the start of, or during negotiations. 
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existing work, the model proposed here represents an advanced alternative for 
future negotiation analyses.  
10.3 Limitations and Further Avenues of Research 
 Despite the contributions offered by the model, it must be noted that there 
are a number of limitations surrounding it. Offering three strategies to players 
increases the complexity of the simulation and as such it necessitates a greater 
number of behavioural assumptions than more simplistically elegant ones. Whilst 
great effort has been expended to make them as logical and plausible as possible, it 
may result in a constricted view of behaviour. 
 The three input metrics are taken as given and their drivers remain 
exogenous. Position, for example, as determined by expert opinion, plays a critical 
role in many elements of the mechanics. The shock analysis indicates what might 
happen if inputs were to change due to exogenous forces but these forces remain 
unexplored. Examining the drivers of player inputs therefore presents an 
opportunity for further research and greater application. Investigating, for instance, 
the effect the intensity of media coverage has on position and salience could 
endogenise more factors and improve future designs. Exploring drivers for all 
inputs would likely require a series of studies. 
Whilst the facility exists, the model has not been tested on different scales. 
It is hypothesised that the populations of smaller negotiations are more likely to all 
be active than larger ones but this is a matter beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless it remains a fascinating question that could be addressed. 
 Being experimental, the model has not been applied to many other 
applications and whilst based on successful pre-existing constructs, it remains to be 
seen if such a complex alternative produces results that are more accurate. This in 
itself offers an opportunity for future research; the position/salience/clout input mix 
is common to models of this type and with a few minor transformations, initial 
values from other studies could be transferred and ensuing results compared to 
actual outcomes. Similarities and discrepancies might then be used to produce more 
sophisticated designs and augment our understanding of the dynamics of 
multilateral negotiations. 
 In Chapter Three, one point the literature raised was the notion of value 
differentials between the government and the private sector, and the consequent 
influence upon receipts that can be expected from share sales. Given that the 
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simulation shows a number of factors constraining JP (universal service obligations, 
maintaining a minimum network presence, and possibly less-than-open share sales) 
it may prove interesting to examine the links between these constraints and the 
perceived value of shares in JP.  
 Another line of enquiry that this study identifies but does not pursue is the 
matter of whether ‘full’ privatisation is necessary for effective reform. This study 
shows that NZP has been made into a competitive organisation but questions of 
whether even greater performance may ensue from private ownership still remain 
unanswered. These questions could also extend to the institutional environment as 
well: given an appropriately constructed institutional context, does state ownership 
or private ownership make a considerable difference? 
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Appendix A: Expert Interview Questions for New 
Zealand 
Question 1:  
In the early 1980s New Zealand’s macroeconomic conditions could be summarised 
as follows: 
 growth approaching 0%, 
 high levels of protectionism and government intervention, 
 weakening domestic competitiveness, and 
 high inflation and large levels of public debt (32% of GDP by 1984). 
Do you think the underlying macroeconomic conditions in the early to mid-1980s 
were a contributing factor in the perceived need to reform the post office? How so? 
 
Question 2: 
During the early 1980s to the early 1990s the government exhibited a desire to 
reform the overall economy. Did the government’s desire to reform the rest of the 
economy translate into a desire to reform the post office, or was it just more 
convenient to do it at the same time? Was it seen as a critical part of the overall 
reform process? 
 
Question 3: 
A major part of the reforms carried out was the separation of mail operations, 
banking, and telecommunications, which then followed their own distinct reform 
processes. What made it possible to separate these units? 
 
Question 4: 
The post office was corporatised, but never fully privatised. Why do you think that 
was? 
 
Question 5: 
In studying the literature surrounding the corporatisation of New Zealand Post, I 
was unable to firmly identify major opposition to the reforms. Overall, the reforms 
seemed to be implemented with a minimal amount of dilution: meaning that the 
actions taken were what was initially proposed, there were very few (if any) 
concessions made to interest groups.  
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 Do you think there was any resistance to the move to corporatise NZP? If 
so, where from and how strong do you think that opposition was? 
 Do you know of any reasons why the reforms were so easily implemented? 
 Do you think there were any dilutions/concessions made? 
 Do you think there were any factors that made the reforms harder to 
implement? 
 
Question 6: 
How did the staff react to the prospect of reform? Was there much opposition to 
reform at a managerial level? What about at operational levels? Do you know if 
they actively opposed the prospect of redundancies or were they more accepting (if 
only begrudgingly so)? 
 
Question 7: 
Outside managers and directors were appointed to the post office. What do you 
suppose the reason was for appointing outside managers and directors? Do you 
think they were able to help placate internal opposition? How so? Do you know if 
these managers and directors had any pre-existing relationships with the post 
office? 
 
Question 8: 
Were the unions involved in decision making processes at the post office? How 
much power do you think they possessed in relation to management?  
 
Question 9: 
The rural sector appeared to oppose the reforms. Do you know how that opposition 
was overcome? Were their concerns addressed? 
 
Question 10: 
Did postmasters in New Zealand have their own unions? Were they in a position 
where they had political power? How do you think the community perceived 
postmasters? 
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Question 11: 
The post office agreed to the removal of the rural delivery fee in the Deed of 
Understanding. Why did they agree to it? Did they oppose it? To what degree? 
 
Question 12: 
If we were to assume for a moment that the corporatisation of New Zealand Post 
could be called ‘successful’ on the criteria I have specified:  
 being turned into a profitable company, 
 producing those profits in a competitive, lightly regulated market open to 
competition, 
 being able to act like a private company with a minimum of political 
interference, and 
 increasing delivery efficiency and reducing overheads.  
What do you think were the key features behind that success? Are there any 
reservations you have about labelling it as ‘successful’? 
 
Question 13: 
As far as I can tell, the state seemed to have four major objectives for the reform of 
the post office: 
(1) to reduce the presence of the state within the economy, 
(2) to raise profitability of the post office, 
(3) to increase efficiency, and  
(4) to disentangle social and political goals from commercial concerns. 
If we limit ourselves to these objectives, would you mind putting these in what you 
think the order of importance was to the government? 
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Appendix B: Expert Interview Questions for Japan 
Question 1: 
In your mind, who are the major factions for postal privatisation? These could be 
whole parties, groups within the parties, or their support groups. 
 
Question 2: 
In your mind, who are the major factions against postal privatisation? These could 
be whole parties, groups within the parties, or their support groups. 
 
The next few questions specifically relate to the time when Koizumi was Prime 
Minister. 
 
Question 3: 
From the government’s perspective, how was the privatisation of the post office 
seen? That is, was it designed to be part of an overall package or a stand-alone 
project? 
 
Question 4: 
How did Koizumi manage to push his reforms though? 
 Follow up: What methods did he use to overcome resistance? 
 Follow up: Was his personal leadership a factor? 
 Follow up: What concessions did he make? 
 
Question 5: 
It has been suggested that during Koizumi’s term, one of the reasons for the delays 
to the programme was due the government’s reluctance to confront LDP members 
who had strong connections with the post office and/or its support groups. What are 
your thoughts on that? 
 
Question 6: 
During the Koizumi administration, the initial proposal was to separate postal 
savings into regional units – not unlike the case of Japan Rail. LDP members were 
cautious about regional units. Eventually, it was decided that postal savings would 
remain a single unit nation-wide. Why do you think that members within the LDP 
would have been hesitant towards regional providers? 
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Question 7: 
Whilst Koizumi was in power, the DPJ did not out-rightly oppose privatisation. Do 
you think there was a political or strategic motivation behind this? 
Follow up: Do you think there was any link in wanting to break the 
LDP’s relationship with the postmaster support group? 
 
Question 8: 
Was there anyone under the Abe administration who really pushed against 
privatisation? 
 
The next few questions relate specifically to the Aso administration 
 
Question 9: 
Political interference with respect to the post office seems to be more prevalent 
under Aso than the other LDP led administrations. Why do you think that is? 
 
Question 10: 
During Taro Aso’s term as Prime Minister, the Association of Commissioned 
Postmasters had switched their support from the LDP to the PNP and DPJ. The 
newspapers at the time also suggested Zentoku’s ability to influence votes was a 
key factor in explaining some of the dissenting views in the LDP. What do you 
think?  
 
Question 11: 
How much dissent was there in the LDP under Aso? 
 
The next two questions focus on the Hatoyama administration 
 
Question 12: 
During the DPJ’s term in office, the deposit cap was raised to 20 million yen. Do 
you think there was any relation between the raising of the cap and the falling 
revenue of the post office and declining sales of JGBs? 
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Question 13: 
In April 2010, the DPJ arranged for temporary workers to become full-time workers 
under a scheme suggested by Shizuka Kamei. What do you think the motivation 
behind it was?  
 
These questions are not specific to any particular administration 
 
Question 14: 
How strong is Zentoku? How do they apply pressure? Did they pressure the LDP? 
What are their aims? How do they apply pressure: to individuals or to parties? 
 
Question 15: 
How strong are the postal labour unions? Are they factional or are they united? 
 
Question 16: 
Is there any relationship between the pro-farm LDP politicians and the pro-post 
office? 
 
Question 17: 
Are members of various factions in the political parties likely to defect to other 
factions able to gain more influence? What I mean is that if one faction begins to 
enjoy a greater amount of influence, does this bring in members from rival factions? 
Is there a chain reaction? 
 
Finally, I have a few questions to ask you that will be used to fine-tune my 
simulation model: 
 
There are three variables I include in the model: 
1. Position: whether they are for or against something – like being for or 
opposed to raising the deposit cap. 
2. Salience: how important an issue is to a player. 
3. Clout: the amount of power the player has to influence the outcome of a 
negotiation over a given issue. 
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Question 18: 
When a player forms a position over an issue, what do you think drives it? What 
sorts of factors are important in determining whether someone will support or 
oppose a given piece of reform? 
 
Question 19: 
What sort of things might cause a player to change their minds about an issue? For 
instance, if the public began to support privatisation more, would that change a 
player’s mind? 
 
Question 20: 
What would it take to alter a player’s salience over an issue? What would need to 
happen to make them fight harder (or less hard) for an issue? 
 
Question 21: 
What do you suppose determines the amount of power a player has in a negotiation? 
Where do they get power from? I mean, is it related to the amount of votes they can 
gather for the party for instance. 
 
Question 22: 
How do you suppose that players would attempt to change other players standing 
on an issue? How would they try to influence the perceived importance of an issue 
to other players? How (if indeed they can) would they influence the power of other 
players? 
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Appendix C: Expert Survey 
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Appendix D: Chapter Eight Tables  
Table 8-11 MVL links at initial setting 
Links to cross subsidisation  
From: MVLs Comment 
Ministry of 
Finance 
1, 4 The Ministry of Finance owns JPH, which in turn owns JPC, JPI 
& JPB. Separating the business units reduces the Ministry of 
Finance’s influence over internal transfer pricing. Selling shares 
in JPH removes the ownership influence of the Ministry of 
Finance to propagate cross-subsidies. 
JPH 1, 4 Separating units removes the ownership influence of JPH over 
other units and reduces risk of cross-subsidies through internal 
transfers. 
Universal service 3 Not requiring universal financial services allows JPI & JPB to 
focus on profitable locations, eliminates the need to offer services 
everywhere and reduces accompanying commissions to JPC. 
Universal service 7 The minimum network clause imposes considerable costs on JPC, 
which are subsidised by the financial units and the Social 
Contribution Fund. Removing the clause would reduce the need 
for cross-subsidies as presumably JPC would reduce the number 
of post offices. 
Network asset 
management  
6 Allowing freer management of network assets (deficit making 
post offices, inns, etc.) and their presumable divestiture lessens 
the need for cross-subsidies. 
Links to network asset management  
From: MVLs Comment 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications 
1 Separating business units gives a clearer view of precisely where 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ influence over 
network asset management takes place. 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications, 
government 
6 Independent management of network assets allows JP to divest 
away from deficit incurring assets and move cost centres from 
fixed to variable ones. 
Government 7 Not requiring a minimum network presence (≥1 post office per 
village) provides significant abilities to reduce deficit-generating 
post offices and possibly replace them with ‘mobile’ post offices 
or outsourcing arrangements. 
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Table 8-11 continued 
Links to playing field  
From: MVLs Comment 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications 
2 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications regulates JP 
and private delivery firms through different legislation. 
Consistent regulation would help level the playing field. 
FSA special office 2 JPI and JPB supervised by special office in FSA (heavily 
staffed by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) 
and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications itself 
until privatised. Private businesses are regulated by FSA only. 
Consistent supervisory organs would be more even-handed. 
JPH’s allowance to hold non-financial businesses would be 
illegal for private firms; this favouritism should be removed if 
level playing field desired. 
FSA special office 4 Sale of shares will remove Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications supervision from financial units. 
Amakudari 1 Separation of business units makes amakudari appointments 
more difficult to conceal. Fewer ex-Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications officials connected to special 
corporations would reduce pressure to maintain tilted playing 
field. 
Amakudari 4 Sale of shares would lessen Ministry of Finance influence over 
units and allow outside governance mechanisms to operate, 
weakening power of bureaucracy to conduct amakudari. 
Amakudari 5 Permitting postal business units to appoint personnel and 
conduct operations autonomously reduces Amakudari 
likelihood by reducing vulnerability to bureaucratic influence 
over appointments and circumventing special corporations 
altogether via competitive bidding process. 
Network asset 
management 
7 Removal of the requirement to maintain a minimum network 
would contribute to a level playing field. Requiring JP to 
operate in all population centres creates an unequalled market 
presence that artificially maintains a point of competitive 
difference for JP Group. 
Entry barriers 2 Abolishing the distinction between special and general 
correspondence would greatly level the playing field. 
Universal service 2, 3 Not requiring universal financial services through postal 
networks would help level the playing field between financial 
units and private firms. JP has advantages in terms of network 
presence and implicit government support. 
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Table 8-11 continued 
Links to universal service 
From: MVLs Comment 
Network asset 
management 
3 Maintenance of a broad postal network places strain on 
financial units. A smaller network reduces fixed costs of JPC 
and variable costs of financial units. 
Network asset 
management 
6 Autonomous network management decision making allows 
JPC to adjust size of network to suit, using outsourcing where 
needed, reducing fixed costs. 
Network asset 
management 
7 Requirement to operate at least one post office in every 
population centre places considerable costs on JP Group. 
Removing the clause would reduce costs on postal, banking, 
and insurance units for every post office displaced. 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications 
None Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications regulates JP 
operations and imposes universal service obligations. 
Links to entry barriers 
From: MVLs Comment 
Universal service 2 Universal service obligations give rise to entry barriers 
(special/general correspondence distinction). A level playing 
field would ease USOs and lower entry barriers. 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications 
None Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications regulates 
postal industry and has authority to impose entry barriers. 
Amakudari 5 Outgoing Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
officials have incentives to maintain high entry barriers; 
preventing competitive pressure allows for easier descent. 
Greater operational independence would likely see less of these 
connections and reduce Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications opportunism to maintain barriers. 
Links to Japan Post Co. 
From: MVLs Comment 
JPH 1, 4 Selling shares in JPB is a critical part of creating a distinct 
business entity and removing bureaucratic ownership 
influence. 
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Table 8-11 continued 
Links to operations and personnel management 
From: MVLs Comment 
Entry barriers 2 High entry barriers protect JPC from competition in general 
correspondence, potentially reducing incentives for efficiency. 
A more even playing field suggests opening general 
correspondence, imposing competitive pressures and 
incentivising greater efficiency in terms of personnel and 
operations management. 
Amakudari 5 JP is hampered by contracts to special corporations for support. 
These corporations are a popular landing pad for amakudari 
positions. Greater freedom in this area opens support 
businesses to competitive tenders, reducing amakudari 
pressure. 
Government 4 Sale of shares to private investors weakens government 
influence and allows outsider governance practices a chance to 
operate. This would increase operations and personnel 
management independence. 
Government 5 Less government involvement in postal operations by 
definition increases managerial autonomy. 
Links to Japan Post Holdings 
From: MVLs Comment 
Ministry of Finance 4 The Ministry of Finance owns JPH, affording the ministry great 
authority over management. Selling shares reduces this 
authority. 
Entry barriers 2 Entry barriers to general correspondence artificially bolster 
JPH revenue from postal operations. A level playing field 
would reduce these distortions. 
FSA special office 2 JPH operates under a special exemption forbidding other 
financial holding companies holding stocks in non-financial 
businesses. A level playing field would ideally see this 
inconsistency removed. 
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Table 8-11 continued 
Links to Japan Post Bank 
From: MVLs Comment 
JPH 1, 4 Selling shares in JPB is a critical part of creating a distinct 
business entity and removing bureaucratic ownership influence. 
Cross 
subsidisation 
1 Ownership connections through JPH increase the likelihood of 
cross-subsidisation. Separating these units and selling shares 
removes these connections and untangles financial services. 
Universal service 3 JPB is constrained by obligations to provide financial services 
through the whole network, adding considerable costs to the 
company through commissions (JPY 609,578M in 2013). 
Removing USOs could raise profitability of JPB. 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications, 
FSA special 
office 
2 JPB is regulated/supervised jointly by Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications and FSA special office. Private banks are 
subject only to FSA regulation. A level playing field would 
require JPB to report to FSA – and not through the special office. 
Links to Japan Post Insurance 
From: MVLs Comment 
JPH 1, 4 Selling shares in JPI is a critical part of creating a distinct business 
entity and removing bureaucratic ownership influence. 
Universal service 3 JPI is constrained by obligations to provide financial services 
through the whole network, adding considerable costs to the 
company through commissions (JPY 378,507M in 2013). 
Removing USO’s will raise profitability of JPI. 
Cross 
subsidisation 
1 Ownership connections through JPH ensure that cross-
subsidisation of JPC continues. Separating these units and selling 
shares removes these connections and untangles financial 
services from JPC. 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications 
and FSA special 
office 
2 JPI is regulated/supervised jointly by Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications and FSA special office. Private insurers are 
subject only to FSA regulation. A level playing field would 
require JPI to report to FSA – and not through the special office. 
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Table 8-11 continued  
Links to Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
From: MVLs Comment 
Government 1, 4 Separation of business units allows greater identification of source 
of Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme funding. Sale of shares 
reduces government influence over JP Group and installation of 
outsider management practices may reduce purchases of Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Programme bonds. Sale of shares will also 
permit entry to other business lines, presenting opportunities for 
higher-profit investments. 
Government 2, 5 A level playing field and operational autonomy will allow financial 
units to revise investment in Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme bonds and permit investiture into other areas. 
Links to Amakudari 
From: MVLs Comment 
Ministry of 
Finance 
1 Breaking the ownership connection between JP Group and the 
Ministry of Finance will help reduce the number of amakudari 
landings in special corporations. 
Network asset 
management 
7 A relatively minor link, but removing the requirement for minimum 
postal network presence also reduces need for supporting special 
corporations, which in term helps limit the preponderance of 
amakudari. 
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Table 8-11 continued 
Other MVL-free connections 
From To Comment 
Government Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications 
Government influence of Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications is ongoing and exogenous to 
simulation. 
Government  Ministry of 
Finance 
Government influence of Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications is ongoing and exogenous to 
simulation. 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications 
FSA special 
office 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
provides many staff for special office. Technically not 
amakudari or yokosuberi but places Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications influence inside the 
regulatory organ of the Ministry of Finance. Exogenous 
to simulation. 
Ministry of 
Finance 
FSA special 
office 
FSA special office and FSA proper are organs of the 
Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Finance therefore has 
authority over both. Link is exogenous to simulation. 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Fiscal 
Investment and 
Loan 
Programme 
Ministry of Finance controls Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme. Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
reform per se exogenous to simulation. 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications 
JPH, JPC, entry 
barriers and 
universal service 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
regulates postal industry and will continue to have 
regulatory authority irrespective of simulation output. 
 
The rows under ‘Other MVL-free connections’ indicate that either they are 
certain to remain in place after postal reforms or are exogenous to the scope of the 
model.  
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Table 8-12 Changing linkages from initial setting to estimated setting 
Links to cross subsidisation  
From: MVL Comment 
Ministry of 
Finance 
1 Separating the units and diluting the Ministry of Finance’s 
ownership stance reduces their authority to maintain cross-
subsidies. 
JPH 1 Separating units narrows some avenues for cross-subsidisation by 
installing a management board for each unit but listing only JPH 
for sale and maintaining 100% ownership of the other units 
undermines the effects of separation. 
Network asset 
management 
6 The simulation suggests that JP will be able to manage the network 
assets without government interference. This will contribute to 
profitability assuming loss-making assets are disposed of, 
relieving some of the pressure for cross-subsidisation. 
Links to playing field 
From: MVL Comment 
Amakudari 1 Separation of business units makes amakudari appointments more 
difficult to conceal. Fewer amakudari landings may reduce 
bureaucratic resistance to level the playing field as economics 
rents are lessened. 
Amakudari 5 Permitting postal business units to appoint personnel and conduct 
operations autonomously may reduce amakudari likelihood, as JP 
can circumvent special corporations altogether via competitive 
bidding processes or outsourcing to other private operators. 
Links to network asset management 
From: MVL Comment 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications 
1 Separating business units gives a clearer view of where Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications’ influence over network 
asset management takes place. 
Links to network asset management 
From: MVL Comment 
Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
and 
Communications, 
Government 
6 Assuming MVL6 passes as the simulation suggests, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications and government should 
be less inclined to exert pressure over network asset management. 
This allows JP to divest away from deficit-incurring assets, and 
move cost centres from fixed to variable ones. 
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Table 8-12 continued 
Links to universal service 
From: MVL Comment 
Network asset 
management 
6 Autonomous network management decision-making allows JP to 
adjust size of network to suit, using outsourcing where needed and 
potentially reducing fixed costs. This could also reduce the 
number of locations at which JPI and JPB have to provide their 
products assuming post office numbers are revised. 
Links to operations and personnel management 
From: MVL Comment 
Amakudari 5 Presuming operations and personnel management is less exposed 
to bureaucratic influence as MVL5 suggests, JP should have 
greater selection for supporting companies other than the special 
corporations led by outgoing ministry officials. 
Government 5 MVL5 passing suggests that the government will be less inclined 
to exert influence over operations and personnel, meaning that 
incidents such as the temporary worker conversion scheme should 
not reoccur. 
Links to entry barriers 
From: MVL Comment 
Amakudari 5 The reduction in amakudari landings linked to JP should, if even 
only partially, reduce incentives to maintain high entry barriers to 
postal operations. 
Links to Japan Post Bank 
From: MVL Comment 
JPH 1 Separating the business units is an important step towards reform, 
but without individual listing of JPB via MVL4 the process is 
undermined. 
Cross-
subsidisation 
1 MVL1 shows the units being discrete entities, which makes cross-
subsidisation easier to locate and quantify. More reform would 
lessen the cross-subsidisation links but at least we are provided with 
an idea of how much subsidisation is occurring.  
 376
Table 8-12 continued 
Links to Japan Post Co. 
From: MVL Comment 
JPH 1 MVL1 shows the units being discrete entities, which adds a layer of 
executive management between the Ministry of Finance and JPC. 
This should help to reduce the amount of direct influence Ministry 
of Finance has over JPC. 
Links to Japan Post Insurance 
From: MVL Comment 
JPH 1 MVL1 shows the units being discrete entities, which adds a layer of 
executive management between the Ministry of Finance and JPC. 
This should help to reduce the amount of direct influence Ministry 
of Finance has over JPC. 
Cross-
subsidisation 
1 MVL1 shows the units being discrete entities, which makes cross-
subsidisation easier to locate and quantify. More reform would 
lessen the cross-subsidisation links but at least we are provided with 
an idea of how much subsidisation is occurring. 
Links to Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
From: MVL Comment 
Government 1 Separation of business units allows greater identification of sources 
of Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme funding through 
independent accounting records. Adding layers of management 
between government and JPI/JPB should reduce direct influence 
over fund diversion to Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme 
(assuming management is pro-reform). 
Government 5 Greater independence over operations and personnel management 
allows JP to pursue greater yields with less government pressure to 
invest in Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme.  
Links to Amakudari 
From: MVL Comment 
Ministry of 
Finance 
1 Breaking the ownership connection between JP and the Ministry of 
Finance is suggested to help reduce the number of amakudari 
landings in special corporations as influence over contract selection 
is diluted. 
 377 
Appendix E: Simulation Evolution  
Examples of player interactions 
The changes to the political landscape featured in Figure 8-12 are the net 
result of salience lobbying, weak ally challenges, and exchanges with rivals. Whilst 
these movements have been distilled into the initial and final values, it is possible 
to trace individual interactions by looking at the variables in the LOS and 
identifying the spikes in the player interaction elements. In other words, changes 
can be traced to which player acted over which issue in what round(s). The 
following provides two examples. 
 Figure 8-12 shows the ‘Kamei’ group shifting position on the separation 
issue (top left) from a very negative one to an almost neutral one. In addition, the 
minimum network issue (bottom left) shows the ‘LDP reform elements’ group 
shifting to the left129. These movements are an example of an exchange occurring 
at t=1; see Figure 8-48. 
 
Figure 8-48 Position changes of players a and g over MVL1 and MVL7 
 
 
 Pg1 refers to the position of player g (‘Kamei’ group) over separation 
(MVL1) and Pa7 refers to the position of player a (LDP reform elements) over 
minimum network (MVL7). We can see the ‘Kamei’ group’s position rising and the 
LDP reform group’s position falling. These changes were caused by an interaction 
                                                 
129 One also observes the LDP reform group moving upwards on the salience axis; this is a separate 
interaction and is explained shortly. 
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initiated by the LDP reform group over issue one. Taken from LOS1, Figure 8-49 
is the raw Vensim exchange element between a and g. The variable names contain 
inputs and calculations, arrows denote the flow of information. Whilst it is not vital 
that the reader understand the mechanics of Vensim130, for the purposes of tracing 
the simulation’s evolution, attention is drawn to three variables, emphasised by 
superimposed callouts in red: observe the spikes in the variables ΔPax a→g1, ΔPg1 
a→g1, and ExCond a→g1. 
 
Figure 8-49 Exchange element between players a and g from LOS1 
 
 
 The LDP reform group’s exchange issue algorithm returns issue seven as 
their least important issue at t=1 and they have been determined to be active over 
issue one. Action in the exchange element requires several criteria: the players must 
be adversaries over issue one, issue one must be more important to the appellant 
than issue seven, and issue seven must be more important to the candidate than issue 
one. In other words, separating the business units must be more important to the 
LDP reform group than the ‘Kamei’ group. Similarly, the minimum network issue 
must be more important to the ‘Kamei’ group than the LDP reform group. 
 The exchange algorithm calculates the best gains a can draw over issue one 
and necessary reciprocation to g over issue seven. The conditions are met at t=1 
where we observe a spike in the Ex Cond a→g1 variable. The exchange can be seen 
as there is a negative spike in ΔPaX a→g1 (change in position of a’s exchange issue 
                                                 
130 Exchange equations can be found in Chapter Seven, Section 7.2.7. 
Player A Offers exchange to Player G - Issue 1
<PaX>
<SaX>
<WCaX>
<Pa1>
<MVL1>
<MVLaX>
MaxΔMVL
a→g1
ΔPaX a→g1 ΔPg1 a→g1
ExCond a→g1<PaX>
<Exchange a>
Appellant
inputs
Candidate
inputs
<Ex offer a→g1>
<Pg1>
<Sg1>
<WCg1>
<Pg aX>
<a->g1>
<Sg1><Sg aX>
 
  
 Spikes @ t=1 
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when a exchanges with g over issue 1) and positive spike in ΔPg1 a→g1 (change 
in position of g over issue 1 when a exchanges with g over issue 1). 
 In summary, at t=1, the LDP reform group approaches the ‘Kamei’ group 
and initiates an exchange between the unit separation and minimum network issues. 
The ‘Kamei’ group accepts, leading to an increase in separation (MVL1). The LDP 
reform group reciprocates, decreasing minimum network (MVL7). This explains the 
leftward movement of the LDP reform group over the minimum network issue in 
Figure 8-12. Its upward movement, however, is the result of salience lobbying. 
Following the LDP reform group’s change in position they find themselves 
the recipient of salience lobbying from the LDP opposition group, the ‘Kamei’ 
group, and finally the business community (who make an exchange on issue seven 
at t=3). See Figure 8-50. 
 
Figure 8-50 Changes in LDP reform group salience over MVL7 
 
 
Salience decreases from t=0 to t=2, caused by concessions from salience 
lobbying. The LDP reform group lobbies the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications over asset management (MVL6) and in exchange for greater 
commitment has to offer a concession of lower salience over minimum network 
(MVL7): the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications’ position over 
minimum network (MVL7) is negative, which requires a positive player to reduce 
salience in order to achieve a more favourable result for the candidate. Table 8-11 
displays the concessions made by the LDP reform group to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications. 
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Table 8-11 Concessions from LDP reform group to Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications over MVL7 
Round 
Concessions from LDP reform group to 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications over primary issue 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and 
Communications 
primary 
0 -0.217 7 
1 -0.09946 7 
2 0.0114 7 
3 0.00522 7 
4 0 7 
5 0 7 
6 0 7 
7 0 7 
8 0 7 
9 0 7 
10 0 7 
 
Initially, interactions from salience lobbying result in the LDP reform group 
reducing their salience over the minimum network issue as they are at odds. Once 
the exchange with the ‘Kamei’ group is made and the LDP reform group takes a 
negative position, any further concessions to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications must now be positive. In simple terms, pressing the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications for gains elsewhere initially requires the LDP 
reform group to be less vocal about a minimum network presence for as long as 
they are opposed with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Once 
they find themselves on the same side of the position continuum, gains elsewhere 
must be met by increased commitment to maintaining a minimum network.  
Figure 8-51 is directly drawn from the Vensim build window where 
calculations are embedded in the variable names. It is the structural sketch of player 
a’s strong ally lobby action algorithm where player a gathers the offers for changes 
to salience together and decides which player’s offer to accept in a given round. 
The central ‘column’ of variables represents the influence other players have over 
player a’s salience and the effect as negotiations progress is captured by the blue 
lines within them. Observe that the influence lines of players b, d, e, and h are 
horizontal, indicating that these players have no effect on player a’s salience. 
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Players c, f, and g do, and attention is directed to the spikes present on the left hand 
side of the variables highlighted by red callouts.  
 
Figure 8-51 LDP reform group’s strong ally action algorithm from LOS7 
 
 Whilst the LDP reform group takes a positive position over the minimum 
network issue, the relationship between the LDP reform group and both the LDP 
opposition group (f) and ‘Kamei’ group (g) is adversarial, hence strong ally 
lobbying impossible. Recall however that at t=1 an exchange is conducted, meaning 
that from t=2 interests are aligned, allowing for salience lobbying. Recall also that 
the LDP reform group initially reduces salience over the minimum network issue, 
and given the power of the group, this presents a good opportunity for the LDP 
opposition and ‘Kamei’ group to extract gains through higher salience. Between 
these two players, they are able to convince the LDP reform group to raise salience. 
Later on, the business community (c) also makes an exchange over issue seven and 
pressures the LDP reform group to raise salience further although the changes are 
only marginal at this point (less than a tenth of a percent). Causal changes from the 
political landscape illustrated by Figure 8-13 can therefore be explained by tracking 
the spikes in the negotiation elements of the LOS. It is possible to explain a player’s 
movement, in overall terms, by strategy type and by individual interaction. Coaxial 
movements in position across two issues are the result of exchanges. Other 
movements in the position axis are caused by weak ally lobbying. Movements 
across the vertical axis depict salience lobbying and can be accompanied by 
concessions over primary issues, which may be positive or negative. 
 
 
Player a action
issue 7
<b->a7 influence Sa7>
<c->a7 influence Sa7>
Accepted offer
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Strong ally
effect -> a7
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